

IZA DP No. 7985

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February 2014

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Discussion Paper No. 7985  
February 2014

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## ABSTRACT

### The Slump and Immigration Policy in Europe<sup>\*</sup>

Historical experience suggests that when a period of rising immigration is followed by a sudden slump, this can trigger a policy backlash. This has not occurred in the current recession. This paper examines three links in the chain between the slump and immigration policy. First, although immigration flows have responded to the slump, and immigrants have borne more than their share of the burden, this has done little to protect the employment of non-immigrants. Second, despite the recession for Europe as a whole, attitudes to immigration have not changed very much, and they have been influenced more by fiscal concerns than by rising unemployment. Third, while far right parties have used the recession to renew the political pressure for tougher immigration policies, governments have been constrained by the composition of immigration and by EU regulation.

JEL Classification: F22, F52, J15

Keywords: European immigration, recession, immigration policy

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<sup>\*</sup> I am grateful for comments from delegates at the IMISCOE conference at Malmö, September 2013, to seminar participants at IMI Oxford, October 2013, and to delegates at the OECD/CEPR conference on Economic Recession and Migration, December 2013. This paper is supported by the CEPR-TEMPO project, which is part of the NORFACE research program on Migration in Europe--Social, Economic, Cultural and Policy Dynamics.

## Introduction

When the global financial crisis broke in 2008 it soon sparked a wide range of informed comment about how the economic and social landscape in Europe might be changed. Although much of the focus was on international banking and finance, some observers speculated on how the crisis, and the slump that followed, was likely to affect international migration, and especially whether there would be a widespread tightening of immigration policies. When labour markets are slack attitudes become more negative, the case for keeping the door ajar gets much weaker, and political imperatives for tougher immigration policy get stronger. Yet five years of recession has not seen the pervasive policy backlash that many expected and feared. This paper asks why.

Perhaps initial expectations were too pessimistic but some commentators invoked historical parallels (Green and Winters, 2010; OECD, 2009). History suggests that recessions have sometimes been the occasion for the introduction of restrictive immigration policy. A policy backlash is more likely, and more draconian, when it follows an extended period of high immigration. As the stock of immigrants increases, popular attitudes become more negative—the more so the greater are the cultural differences between immigrants and host populations. Thus a recession can be the trigger that converts growing anti-immigrant sentiment into a decisive tightening of immigration policy. This process can be illustrated with several historical examples.

In the United States anti-immigrant sentiment was on the rise from the 1880s onwards as the number of immigrants mounted and more of them came from the then poorer countries of Southern and Eastern Europe. After several unsuccessful attempts, starting in the deep recession of the 1890s Congress introduced a literacy test in 1917 (Goldin, 1994). No doubt the War fostered changing attitudes but the decisive shift came with the imposition of the first immigration quota in 1921. The Emergency Quota Act was rushed into law just as the unemployment rate rose from 5.2 percent in 1920 to 11.7 percent in 1921. A decade later the Great Depression triggered the retreat from open door immigration policies in a number of other countries including Australia, Canada, Brazil Argentina and Singapore.

Another example comes from Europe in the 1970s. From the late 1950s a number of countries (most prominently Germany) adopted guestworker programmes that admitted immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, Turkey and North Africa. As the number of immigrants grew, and economic growth slowed down, attitudes to immigration soured. In the early 1970s rapidly deteriorating conditions and the first oil shock brought these policies to an abrupt end. Similar reversals took place in Britain and France which had experienced in substantial postcolonial immigration during the 1960s. The last example is the 1997/8 Asian financial crisis which led to restrictions on recruitment and deportations from Malaysia and Thailand, but was short-lived (Skelton, 2004).

The global financial crisis that broke in 2008 has given way to a deep recession in many countries. Early commentators invoked parallels with the great depression which enveloped the western world in the 1930s. The great depression pushed globalization sharply into reverse as countries turned inwards to protect their labour markets. So how have the forces that influence immigration policies evolved in the current recession? Here I focus on three key topics. The first is how immigration has responded to the recession and how much of the jobless burden is borne by immigrants. The second is how public opinion towards immigration has changed since before the slump. And the third focuses on the incentives and constraints faced by governments in the formation of immigration policies.

### **Immigrants in the Recession**

Immigration has always been sensitive to the ebb and flow of the business cycle. This was so in the nineteenth century and it remains true today. A sharp fall in employment prospects is likely to deter prospective immigrants and induce at least some previous immigrants to head for home. If so then immigration may help to attenuate the ups and downs in labour market pressure. And if the immigrants that remain shoulder more than their share of the burden of joblessness then this too may help to insulate non-immigrants from the effects of recession. These responses may attenuate labour market competition and mute the clamour for more restrictive immigration policies. To what degree have these forces operated in recent years and how does this compare with the past?

#### *Slumps and immigration*

In the great European migrations of the late nineteenth century, when immigration policies were vastly less restrictive than today, migration flows were very volatile. The effects of variations in unemployment or other cyclical indicators can be clearly seen in the annual fluctuations of emigration from the UK and from other major emigration countries (Hatton and Williamson, 1998, p. 19-22). Although emigration (and return migration) was driven both by “pull” and “push factors, the former dominated, partly because of greater economic volatility in destination countries and partly because prospects abroad are inherently more uncertain than those at home. As a result global slumps are typically accompanied by a steep fall in net migration.

In the slump of the early 1890s gross immigration to the United States fell by half and net immigration to the US, Canada and Australia fell even more steeply as previous immigrants headed for home (Hatton and Williamson, 1998, pp. 156-161). In the Great Depression of the 1930s the effects were even more dramatic. In the United States net immigration turned negative as outflows exceeded inflows. So how large are these effects? Where there is substantial immigration in normal times (and immigration policies are not too restrictive), history tells us that, in a severe slump, every 100 jobs lost results in 10 fewer immigrants. This “10 percent rule” described countries like Canada and Australia during the Great Depression and it worked pretty well for other periods too. For countries of emigration, a

global slump worked in the opposite direction: their labour markets became even more glutted as fewer migrants left and more returned.

The 10 percent rule is a very crude rule of thumb that may not apply in other settings, particularly when immigration is tightly regulated by policy. Yet it seems to have operated in the United States between 1990 and 2004. For example, the unemployment rate rose by about one percentage point between 1997 and 2000 and net immigration fell by one per thousand of the population. Between 2000 and 2002 net immigration recovered as employment fell (Hatton and Williamson, 2009). One reason for this responsiveness to the business cycle is that the measure of net immigration used includes illegal immigration, mainly from Mexico (Passell and Suro, 2005). In the current recession the estimated net immigration of Mexicans has fallen close to zero (Passell, 2012).

In the EU the same pattern emerges in a slightly muted form. From 2008 to 2010 the EU-wide unemployment rate rose from 7.2 to 9.0 percent and net migration (not including illegal migration) fell from 2.6 to 1.4 per thousand. The EU-wide fluctuation in unemployment is relatively small, but what about the countries that have been hardest hit by the slump? Figure 1 shows trends over the last decade of the unemployment rate and the net immigration rate for Ireland and Spain. For Ireland the steep rise after 2004 was mainly due to immigration from the A8 accession countries but the classic relationship between unemployment and immigration is clearly visible in the recession. These are extreme cases but a similar pattern emerges even for countries such as the UK and Sweden, where the timing and severity of the recession is rather different (Figure 2).

Despite differences by period and country, the 10 percent rule seems to capture the relationship between immigration and unemployment in deep recessions. But it only applies to countries with non-negligible rates of immigration and in situations where there is some margin of flexibility, either through free mobility (as within the EU) or illegal immigration (as in the postwar US). But the most important finding is that it provides very little respite from job loss among non-immigrants. From the point of view of workers in the host country the 10 percent rule is a 90 percent rule.

#### *Who bears the burden of unemployment?*

Deep recessions may deter immigrants but those that remain typically bear more of the burden than the non-immigrant workforce. For the UK and Germany Dustmann et al. (2010) find that unemployment is more strongly cyclical for immigrants than for natives, and especially for immigrants from outside the OECD. Similar results are found for Sweden in the recession of the early 1990s (Arai and Vilhelmsson, 2004) and for the Netherlands in the current recession (Cervený and Van Ours, 2013). Partly this reflects differences in skill levels but, even within skill groups, immigrants are more vulnerable to changes in unemployment than non-immigrants. Thus immigrants are classic 'outsiders': they have low levels of tenure, are often on insecure contracts or self-employment, and are more concentrated in

cyclically sensitive sectors and age groups (OECD, 2009; Papademetriou et al 2010). It is not just that immigrants are more likely to lose employment but that, for non-western immigrants, job-finding rates are much lower than those of the native-born--little more than half in the Netherlands (Cervený and Van Ours, 2013).

The difference in unemployment responses is illustrated for Western European countries in Table 1. This shows that unemployment rates are substantially higher for immigrants than for nationals. These differences would be much greater for non-western immigrants alone. The unweighted 15 country average unemployment rate increased by 4.6 percentage points for natives and by 7.1 percentage points for immigrants, but with large variations between countries. Unemployment rates are almost always higher for immigrants than for non-immigrants and the difference increased between 2008 and 2012. Thus unemployment for immigrants increases by more in a recession and falls by more in a recovery, as in the case of Germany. But the *ratio* of immigrant to native unemployment rates is much more stable. This is the (constant) ratio rule, and it fits these countries fairly well except for Greece. In 2008 the average ratio of immigrant to native unemployment rates across these countries was 1.86; in 2012 it was 1.84.

The ratio rule suggests that, in a recession, the burden of unemployment falls disproportionately on immigrants. This can also be seen in the change in employment rates (Table 2). For men, the ratios of those in employment to population aged 15-64 declined in most countries, on average by 4.3 percentage points. For foreign-born men the employment rate declined by 6.8 percentage points but this masks a modest decline in Britain and a significant increase in Germany. For women the fall in employment ratios was smaller. Thus women were less affected by job loss and the difference between immigrants and natives was also smaller. One reason is that they were more often employed in the service sector and especially in the public sector where the recession was less severe. For those aged 15-25, the proportion in employment, education and training also fell in most countries. Although youth unemployment has been a major headline in the slump, the differences across countries between native-born and foreign born are more varied.

The evidence suggests that immigrants have borne a disproportionate burden of job loss in the great recession. But, as with immigrant flows, this probably had a modest effect on protecting the jobs of the non-immigrant population. So it would not be surprising if anti-immigrant sentiment increased and the clamour for tougher immigration policy amplified. Is this what happened?

### **Immigration and public opinion**

At times of severe recession and high unemployment history suggests that there would be rising disaffection and a growing demand for ever-tighter restrictions on immigration. As noted in the introduction, dramatic tightening in immigration policy occurred when a

sudden shock to the economy followed a period of rising immigration and growing public disquiet. So what happened in the current recession?

### *Public opinion in 2006 and 2010*

There is a large literature analyzing data on individual-level attitudes using a number of different surveys. Typical findings are that negative sentiment is strongest among males, older people and those further to the right on the political spectrum. Positive sentiment is especially strong among first and second generation immigrants and, most importantly, among respondents with higher education. One interpretation is that those with higher levels of education have greater tolerance towards immigrants and are more willing to embrace ethnic and cultural diversity (Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Another view is that they are less likely to be concerned about potential labour market competition from low skilled immigrants (Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006).

Several studies have also pointed to the importance of concerns about the fiscal costs of immigration, and in particular fears that immigration will lead to a higher tax burden (Fachini and Mayda, 2009; Boeri 2010). Boeri (2010) finds that opinion is more negative the greater is the fiscal cost. Although the net fiscal contribution of immigrants is positive for some EU countries, it is more likely to be negative the higher the proportion of low-skilled immigrants. Not surprisingly some studies suggest that the scale of immigration is also an important determinant of negative attitudes, either at the aggregate level (Lahav 2004) or as a result of concentration in the respondent's local community (Dustmann and Preston, 2001).

Public opinion on immigration can be tracked in a number of surveys. Here I examine the responses to questions on immigration in the European Social Survey (ESS) for 2006 and 2010--before and after the crisis. Respondents were asked the same six questions on both occasions. These are not the same respondents in both years but the data have been weighted to be representative of the adult populations of each country. The unweighted averages for the 18 countries that were surveyed in both years appear in Table 3.

The first three questions are on a scale 0 to 11, where a higher value represents a more pro-immigration attitude. Across all countries in the survey the averages are close to the central value of 5. Although there is considerable variation across individuals and to a lesser extent across countries, the averages are neither strongly pro-immigrant nor strongly anti-immigrant. But most striking is how little these averages changed between 2006 and 2010. Opinion on whether immigrants enrich the culture declined very slightly while opinion on whether immigrants make the country a better place to live became slightly more positive. Not surprisingly, responses to the question on whether immigration is good for the economy show a more marked decrease but even this is fairly modest.



The three questions in the lower half of Table 3 relate directly to immigration policy. They ask the respondent on what scale certain immigrant groups should be allowed in: many/some/a few/none. These have been coded 8,6,4,2 respectively so that the middle of the range would be 5 and the standard deviations are comparable with those in the upper half of the table. These too give averages of around 5, with slightly higher values for “same ethnicity” immigrants. And as before there is little evidence that attitudes towards immigration have turned sharply negative as compared with pre-crisis levels.

Overall the results seem surprising and they contrast with what many would have predicted on the basis of historical experience. How can this lack of change be explained?

#### *Cross country correlations.*

Most of the existing studies are cross-sectional and therefore have little to say about change over time. But it is worth considering what the cross sectional results imply. Most of the key explanatory variables change very slowly over time. The growth in education might make attitudes to immigration more positive over the long run; the growth in immigration could have the opposite effect. This may be one reason why there has been so little shift in average opinion between 2006 and 2010. But it is worth exploring a little further. Here I adopt the simple expedient of correlating average attitudes for the 18 countries with the change in key country-level variables.

Table 4 shows correlation coefficients between changes in country-level attitudes and three key variables: the unemployment rate, the budget deficit as a share of GDP and share of social expenditure in GDP. The results are instructive. The first column shows that the correlations with the change in the unemployment rate are generally low. For the questions about how many immigrants from different origins should be allowed, the correlations are weakly negative, the strongest being for the admission of immigrants from poor countries. The one exception is the question on whether immigrants are good for the economy, which as Table 3 showed, declined by more than the other attitudes. This negative relationship is displayed in Figure 3. It shows that the negative correlation is almost entirely driven by the countries that were most severely affected by the slump, especially Ireland and Spain. Interestingly, these are also countries where there was strong growth in immigration in the decade preceding the crisis.

The second and third columns of Table 4 show that correlations between the change in attitudes and the budget deficit or the share of social spending are much stronger. They suggest that concerns about public finances and social spending are far more important determinants of immigration attitudes than concerns about the labour market. Although the highest correlations are for the question on whether immigration is good for the economy they are relatively strong for all the questions. This suggests that the crisis has soured attitudes across the board and not just those relating to the economy. Nevertheless in each column the correlation is highest for whether immigration is good for the economy, and

especially so for the correlation with social spending in the last column. This relationship is depicted in Figure 4.

Clearly, one reason why opinion has not taken a large negative turn for Europe as a whole is that the experience has varied widely across countries. The economic gloom has not been pervasive and for most countries the increase in unemployment has been moderate—less than five percentage points. But unemployment is not the key variable driving attitudes to immigration. More important is rising social expenditures and ballooning budget deficits.

### **Politics and Policy**

The overall climate of public opinion has changed little since before the crisis, at least in most countries, and this would seem to be the reason why immigration policies have changed less than might have been predicted. However politics and policy often seems to evolve independently of public opinion. Here I examine the political currents, some of which favour tougher immigration policies.

#### *Salience and right wing politics*

The economic crisis itself has preoccupied much of Europe. It has largely diverted attention away from immigration as a political issue. Across Europe the slide in the salience of immigration can be seen in Eurobarometer polls (Figure 5). The percentage of Western Europeans thinking that immigration was an important problem fell from around 15 percent to less than 10 percent by 2009. An Ipsos-Mori poll for the UK shows that before the crisis around a third of voters thought that immigration was the most important or one of the most important issues facing Britain while only 10 percent put the economy as one of the most important. Since 2008 60 percent place the economy as the most, or one of the most, important issues while only 20 percent thought that immigration was one of the most important (*Economist* 11/5/2013, p. 57). Those trends are now gradually reversing.

Although the underlying salience of immigration and immigration policy has declined, governments can nevertheless create salience (Mulvey, 2010). But why should they do so? One reason is to divert attention away from an area (the economy) where they are perceived by many electors as failing. Another is to accommodate or forestall the rise of populist radical right parties that have gained increasing influence over the last three decades. For Europe as a whole the vote share of populist right parties grew from less than 5 percent in the late 1980s to more than 10 percent in the early 2000s to reach 15 percent in 2011. Although such parties vary widely in their histories, strength and political platforms they share one thing in common: a strong anti-immigration and anti-integration stance (Kessler and Freeman, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2008). And while they may appeal to those wishing to vote expressively there is evidence that their anti-immigration platforms register, not just with xenophobes or racists, but with broad range of immigration skeptics, even those who profess no prejudice (Rydgren, 2008; Blinder et al. 2013). Perhaps it is not surprising, then,

that even where such parties fail to gain office, or are excluded from it by a coalition of other parties, they exert influence by shifting the agendas of mainstream parties (van Spanje, 2010).

It is important to recognize that right wing anti-immigration parties were on the rise before 2008 and so their recent popularity cannot be attributed solely to the recession. Indeed, such parties generally do badly in recessions. Although there is some evidence that they do better when high unemployment is combined with high immigration (Golder, 2003), recent trends have been more heterogeneous (Dyrbekk, 2011). Those parties that have gained strength since the recession seem to have been able to combine or conflate economic woes with concerns about immigration. But the trends have differed between the north and the south. In northern Europe parties like True Finns, the Danish People's Party, the Netherlands Party for Freedom, and the UK Independence Party have managed to combine opposition to the EU, and particularly to bailing out southern European countries, with anti-immigration policies. In the countries hardest hit by the recession, like the Ireland, Portugal and Spain, the souring of opinion on immigration has not given birth to an explosion of radical right wing populism. One exception where anti-austerity is combined with anti-immigration is Golden Dawn in Greece which emerged in 2012, winning 7 percent of the popular vote and 18 seats in parliament.

So, despite the fall in salience of race/immigration/integration as a political issue there are reasons why governments in some parts of Europe might have shifted to more restrictive immigration policies. But there are also constraints. These are imposed by the very structure of immigration and by EU regulations.

#### *Constraints on policy*

One important constraint is reflected by the structure of immigration itself. Although much of the debate has been about immigration for employment, for most European countries the employment stream is a relatively modest share of the gross inflow. As Table 5 shows, the employment stream accounts for as much as a third of immigration for permanent settlement in only three countries: Italy Spain and the UK. For the rest it averages around ten percent. The so-called non-discretionary streams account for much more. Entry through the family reunification channel is substantial in all the countries and it amounts to nearly 30 percent on average. The number of asylum seekers has declined and these are now a much smaller proportion of the inflow than in the past. But the largest share of all is free migration from other European countries over which governments have no control at all (except to delay admission from accession countries).

Immigration for employment does not loom as large, either in the gross inflows or in public opinion, as is sometimes believed. But there has been a trend towards more skill-selective immigration policies. The European Blue Card predates the slump although the implementation in some countries has been more recent. Some, such as Germany, have

gone a step further by introducing job search visas. For the countries with skill-selective policies the scope for restriction by further raising skill requirements is limited. At the other end of the skill spectrum temporary work visas were drastically restricted in 2009-10 but there has been some easing since.

Family reunification is typically a larger share of the inflow and most countries, notably Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK have enacted reforms to limit the numbers. In these and other countries reforms have occurred in several dimensions. One is in the eligibility of qualifying relationships and age. Perhaps more important are the changes to conditions required for sponsorship, which include length of stay and type of visa as well as thresholds for income, accommodation and health cover. In addition there are integration conditions for migrants, notably language tests (for more details of all these conditions, see Pascouau and Labayle, 2011). In recent years almost every country has revised its rules and regulations for family reunification. One reason for the flurry of activity was the introduction in 2003 of the EU Directive on the Right to Family Reunification. Although many of its provisions were not binding member states often took the opportunity to introduce a package of reforms. Nevertheless policy still varies widely across countries. Thus although countries such as Belgium, Spain and Sweden (as well as accession countries) introduced reforms after 2008, for Europe and a whole, the trend cannot be attributed solely to the slump.

While some reforms were restrictive, many represented more liberal policy, especially in new member states. According to the family reunification component of the MIPEX index there was no decline in aggregate between 2007 and 2010. For the EU-15 the index increased from 60 to 62 and for the EU-25 from 53 to 54. The policies that hit the headlines were mainly restrictive, such as the pre-entry language tests and the raising or the application of income thresholds for sponsors. It is worth noting that these have been challenged, either in national courts, or in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Thus according to one study, EU regulations and especially the ECJ's interpretation of them "has framed and limited member states' room for manoeuvre" (Pascouau and Labayle, 2011, p. 3). The most notable instances are the *Chakroun* case of 2010 in which the ECJ ruled against the income requirements of the Dutch government and the *Bibi Mohammed Imran* case of 2010 on pre-entry integration, which induced the government to reverse its policy before a judgement was handed down. In the Netherlands and elsewhere such signals helped to forestall the introduction of further restrictions (Block and Bonjour, 2013, p. 220-1).

Similar developments took place somewhat earlier in the domain of asylum policy. As the 1951 Refugee Convention left considerable discretion over the precise rules and their application, there was a widespread toughening of policy in the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s after successive peaks in asylum applications. As a result there was a severe tightening in policy in three dimensions (Hatton, 2011, pp. 42-53). The first was enhanced border control and visa policies. The second was narrowing the qualification for refugee

status, designating some applications as ‘manifestly unfounded’ and speeding up processing. The third related to the living conditions of asylum applicants: limiting employment and benefits, dispersion and detention. In the mid-2000s the EU introduced a series of directives: on qualification for refugee status, on reception conditions and on procedures, to mention just three. There is some evidence that the first of these led to liberalization in some countries (Theilemann and El Enany 2009). These directives were further strengthened in subsequent legislation. As a result there is much less scope for a further tightening of policy in the event of a renewed surge of asylum applications.

What are sometimes described as non-discretionary streams of immigration clearly allow *some* scope for discretionary policy. But there are limits set by human rights legislation and EU directives. For countries that are part of the common immigration system, different strands of policy still vary widely and so EU directives do not put a binding floor on all aspects of policy. What it does do is to provide a coordinating mechanism that limits downward deviation and prevents a race to the bottom. As noted by Block and Bonjour (2013, p. 210) “The development of asylum and migration policies at the EU level since the 1990s has created new networks and dynamics of interaction among civil servants, politicians and non-state actors, as well as new channels for the circulation of information and policy perspectives. Such processes of exchange between Member States play an increasingly important role in domestic policy-making processes.”

Is there any evidence that this has made a difference? One piece of evidence comes from the policies of countries that have opted out of the common immigration system. In the UK radical immigration policy was introduced in 2010 to “reduce immigration from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands.” In Denmark family reunification was radically tightened with the introduction of a points system for education work experience and language skills, and an increase in the minimum income requirement. It also introduced a repatriation policy under continued pressure from the Danish People’s Party. Outside the EU, Norway and Switzerland also look set to introduce restrictions, in the latter case against immigrants from the EU. Although the full effects are yet to unfold it looks likely that the turn to restrictive policies may be greater in countries that are not constrained by the common immigration policy.

## **Conclusion**

This paper has analysed three interlinked issues relating to immigration and policy since the crisis of 2008 and the slump that followed. Historical experience suggests that when a period of rising immigration is followed by a sudden slump, this can trigger a policy backlash. But this has not happened. Immigration flows have been just as responsive to the business cycle as in the past and the immigrants that remain have shouldered more than their share of the jobless burden. But this has done little to protect the employment of non-immigrants. Yet public opinion has been more responsive to fiscal imperatives than to slack in the labour market. Indeed, opinion on immigration has shifted very little over the

recession, at least for Europe as a whole. That is one important reason why there has not been greater pressure for tougher immigration policy. Nevertheless governments, conscious of their fiscal failures, have been pushed hard for tougher policies by the populist radical right. For the most part, the policy response has been muted for a further reason. This is that there is less room left to manoeuvre in areas like asylum and family reunification, something that has been further constrained by EU regulations.

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**Table 1: Unemployment Rates in Western Europe, 2008-12**

	Non-immigrant men			Immigrant men		
	2008	2012	Increase	2008	2012	Increase
Austria	2.9	3.5	0.6	7.3	8.7	1.4
Belgium	5.3	5.8	0.6	14.3	17.6	3.2
Germany	6.6	5.2	-1.4	12.3	8.9	-3.3
Denmark	2.7	7.1	4.3	6.4	13.5	7.1
Spain	8.8	22.4	13.6	16.4	36.5	20.1
Finland	5.9	8.1	2.2	12.4	14.5	2.1
France	6.3	9.0	2.7	11.4	15.5	4.1
Great Britain	6.1	8.5	2.4	6.8	8.2	1.5
Greece	5.2	20.1	14.9	5.0	34.5	29.5
Ireland	7.0	17.8	10.8	8.2	19.4	11.2
Italy	5.6	9.7	4.1	5.9	12.4	6.5
Netherlands	2.1	4.6	2.5	5.3	10.5	5.2
Norway	2.4	3.1	0.7	6.0	7.2	1.2
Portugal	6.8	16.2	9.4	7.8	20.0	12.2
Sweden	5.1	6.7	1.6	11.5	16.9	5.4
Country average	5.3	9.9	4.6	9.1	16.3	7.2

Source: OECD, Labour market outcomes of immigrants, 2008-2012, (cf. Annex 2.A1).

**Table 2: Change in Employment to Population Ratios in Western Europe, 2008-12**

	Native-born Men	Foreign-born Men	Native-born Women	Foreign-born Women	Native-born Youth	Foreign-born Youth
Austria	-0.1	1.0	1.3	2.7	0.4	0.9
Belgium	-0.8	-4.4	0.9	0.1	-1.2	-1.6
Germany	1.4	3.9	3.2	5.2	2.3	4.5
Denmark	-6.3	-8.9	-3.5	-1.2	-4.6	-4.9
Spain	-11.7	-18.6	-2.8	-9.0	-10.8	-11.3
Finland	-1.2	-3.6	-0.3	0.6	-1.7	-1.0
France	-1.4	-3.3	0.0	-0.9	-2.2	-1.9
UK	-2.1	-0.9	-0.5	-1.8	-3.8	-0.8
Greece	-12.7	-25.6	-6.5	-7.7	-8.9	-18.4
Ireland	-12.4	-15.8	-4.8	-8.4	-10.2	-9.2
Italy	-3.4	-8.0	-0.1	-1.6	-4.7	-7.6
Netherlands	-2.7	-3.2	-0.1	-0.1	-3.3	-2.0
Norway	-2.0	-2.3	-0.9	-2.7	-1.4	-7.3
Portugal	-8.4	-11.2	-3.5	-2.3	-6.1	-8.6
Sweden	0.1	-1.8	1.2	-0.1	-1.1	-5.2
Average of changes	-4.3	-6.8	-1.1	-1.8	-3.8	-5.0

Source: OECD, *International Migration Outlook 2013*, data underlying Figures 2.11 and 2.5.

**Table 3: Attitudes to Immigration in the ESS**

ESS opinion (average of 18 countries)	2006	2010	change
Scale: 0 – 10			
Immigrants enrich the culture	5.75	5.71	-0.03
Immigration good for the economy	5.04	4.92	-0.12
Immigrants make country a better place to live	4.95	5.02	0.06
Scale: 2-4-6-8			
Allow many of same race/ethnicity as home country	5.60	5.65	0.05
Allow many of different race/ethnicity	5.02	5.11	0.09
Allow many from poor countries outside Europe	4.93	4.91	-0.01

**Table 4: Change in Attitudes: Cross-country Correlations**


Change in ESS Opinion (18 countries)	Correlation with change in:		
	Unempt rate (%)	Budget deficit (%)	Social spending (%)
Immigrants enrich the culture	0.18	-0.60	-0.27
Immigrants good for the economy	-0.57	-0.89	-0.83
Immigrants make country a better place to live	-0.14	-0.66	-0.54
Allow many of same race/ethnicity as home country	-0.04	-0.71	-0.49
Allow many of different race/ethnicity	-0.15	-0.63	-0.39
Allow many from poor countries outside Europe	-0.27	-0.62	-0.54

**Table 5: Composition of Entry Channels**

	Employment	Family	Humanitarian	Free	Other
Austria	1.7	21.3	11.0	65.5	0.4
Belgium	11.7	33.4	3.7	51.2	0.0
Denmark	15.6	13.9	5.4	56.9	8.1
Finland	5.6	38.4	11.0	41.3	3.7
France	11.4	39.9	5.1	33.7	10.0
Germany	9.0	18.6	3.8	67.9	0.7
Ireland	7.7	48.9	0.4	43.0	0.0
Italy	33.4	27.9	2.3	34.9	1.6
Netherlands	10.4	21.2	10.1	58.3	0.0
Norway	5.8	21.4	8.9	63.8	0.0
Portugal	19.7	38.8	0.2	32.7	8.6
Spain	38.9	16.4	0.3	42.6	1.9
Sweden	6.6	37.7	17.6	38.0	0.0
UK	35.5	26.2	4.0	22.6	11.6


Source: OECD, *International Migration Outlook 2013*, Country Notes.

**Figure 1 Immigration and Unemployment: Ireland and Spain**



Source: OECD, International Migration Policies and Data, Stocks and Flows of Immigrants 2001-2011 and OECD *StatExtracts*: Short-term Labour Market Statistics.

**Figure 2: Immigration and Unemployment: UK and Sweden**



Source: OECD, International Migration Policies and Data, Stocks and Flows of Immigrants 2001-2011 and OECD *StatExtracts*: Short-term Labour Market Statistics.

Figure 3: Unemployment and Opinion




Figure 4: Social Spending and Opinion





Figure 5: Salience of Immigration



Source: Dyrbekk (2011), kindly provided by Elizabeth Ivarsflaten.