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Get-What-You-Want: Gender Differences in Self-Set Salaries?

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Get-What-You-Want: Gender Differences in Self-Set Salaries?

Abstract

In Germany, the gross hourly income of men was 6% higher than that of women in 2025 when controlling for factors such as profession or qualifications. One possible explanation for the remaining gender pay gap may be gender differences in salary expectations and negotiations. Therefore, we examine whether gender differences exist in employees' self-set salaries and if so, we explore potential reasons behind them. Identifying gender differences in the comparatively simplified context of self-set salaries could provide valuable insights beyond the complexities of negotiation scenarios. In particular, we investigate whether providing subjects with information about the average salary of men – thereby offering pay transparency – impacts self-set salaries (individual vs. transparency treatment). Furthermore, we examine how salaries are set when there is a direct comparison to another worker, and when the self-set salary affects another worker's salary (individual vs. group treatment). Results clearly show that women set lower salaries than men in the individual treatment. However, no significant gender differences are observed in the transparency or group treatment.

JEL classification

C91, M5, J16, K38

Keywords

gender differences, self-set salaries, gender pay gap, pay transparency, laboratory experiment

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1 Introduction

In Germany, the gross hourly income of men was 16 % higher than that of women in 2025 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2025). Even when controlling for factors such as profession or qualifications, a gender pay gap of 6 % remains. One possible explanation for the remaining pay gap may be gender differences in salary negotiations (Säve-Söderbergh, 2019). Empirical evidence suggests that there are gender differences in salary negotiations such as women achieving less favorable economic outcomes than men (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). Additionally, women are less likely to initiate negotiations (Kugler et al., 2018; Small et al., 2007), tend to negotiate less competitively (Walters et al., 1998),¹ hold lower salary expectations (e.g., Filippin & Ichino, 2005; Kiessling et al., 2024; Reuben et al., 2017) and start negotiations with lower salary demands than men (Dreber et al., 2022; Rigdon, 2012; Roussille, 2024; Säve-Söderbergh, 2019).

Rather than focusing on gender differences in salary negotiations, we examine whether gender differences exist in employees' self-set salaries. Self-set salaries refer to "compensation contracts in which employees have the opportunity to determine (parts of) their own compensation" (Brück et al., 2021, p. 93). Unlike traditional salary negotiations, where employees' negotiation power may be limited, self-set salary scenarios grant employees substantial (or even full) power, with no immediate response by the employer. While some factors that may influence gender differences in self-set salaries – such as overconfidence, modesty or altruism – are also relevant in negotiation contexts, other factors – like women's fear of backlash when negotiating assertively (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013) – are unique to negotiations. By removing the strategic and interpersonal complexities of negotiation scenarios, self-set salaries enable a clearer identification of the mechanisms underlying gender differences. While initial salary requests in negotiations may be shaped by negotiation strategies and salary expectations may primarily reflect anticipated salaries in certain occupations, self-set salaries represent employees' desired earnings and provide a direct measure of what is perceived as adequate compensation by the respective employee. Therefore, finding gender differences in the comparatively simplified context of self-set salaries could provide valuable insights beyond the complexities of negotiation scenarios.

¹ Individuals who negotiate competitively focus on their own outcomes and give limited consideration to the outcomes of the negotiation partner because they are less willing to accommodate the preferences of others (Walters et al., 1998).

Self-set salaries are a common approach in organizations that value employees' self-management (Laloux, 2016). Instead of following classical hierarchical structures, self-managed companies apply systems of distributed authority. For example, the Californian tomato-processing company *Morning Star* (Laloux, 2016) and the Swiss consultancy *Great Place To Work* have implemented self-set salaries (Grund et al., 2025). The delegation of remuneration fosters greater employee codetermination and autonomy. Empirical evidence supports the effectiveness of self-set salaries, suggesting they enhance employee performance (Brück et al., 2021; Charness et al., 2012; Charness et al., 2016). Compared to fixed salaries, self-set salaries may increase performance by leading to a higher autonomy which in turn may enhance intrinsic motivation (Faillo & Piovanelli, 2017; Ryan & Deci, 2000).

To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have examined gender effects of self-set salaries. Brück et al. (2021) do not find significant gender differences in self-set salaries in their laboratory experiment. Conversely, Jeworrek and Mertins (2019) conduct a field study where they observe that women select significantly lower salaries compared to men. Neither study primarily focuses on gender differences in self-set salaries. Therefore, our research aims to further explore this topic by conducting a laboratory experiment to investigate whether such gender differences exist and identify factors that may explain them. In particular, we investigate whether providing subjects with information about the average salary of men - thereby offering pay transparency – impacts self-set salaries (individual treatment vs. transparency treatment). The transparency treatment is motivated by its growing importance in public policy, particularly following the EU Pay Transparency Directive. Furthermore, we examine how salaries are set when there is a direct comparison to another worker, and when the self-set salary affects another worker's salary (individual treatment vs. group treatment). The group treatment builds on the idea that organizations are composed of multiple employees, thereby increasing external validity as a self-set salary may also imply externalities for coworkers.

The results indicate that women set lower salaries than men in the individual treatment. However, when subjects are provided with information about the average salary of men, no gender difference in self-set salaries are observed. Comparing the individual and transparency treatment reveals a considerable significant treatment effect for women: Women set significantly higher salaries when salary information is provided than when it is not. In the group treatment, no significant gender differences emerge. Analyzing treatment differences reveals that women set higher salaries in the group treatment compared to the individual treatment, eliminating

gender differences as women's salaries align more closely with those of men in the group treatment.

After providing an overview of the related literature in Section 2, we describe the experimental design in Section 3. In Section 4, we derive the hypotheses. Then, the experiment's results are presented in Section 5, followed by the discussion and the conclusion of the paper in Sections 6 and 7.

2 Related Literature

This section provides an overview of the literature that directly relates to our research. Several studies indicate that self-set salaries enhance performance (Brück et al., 2021; Charness et al., 2012; Charness et al., 2016; Faillo & Piovanelli, 2017; Jeworrek & Mertins, 2019; Mellizo et al., 2014). Therefore, self-set salaries appear to be a promising strategy for improving employee performance. This motivates our investigation of a laboratory experiment with self-set salaries. To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have investigated gender differences in self-set salaries (Brück et al., 2021; Jeworrek & Mertins, 2019). While Brück et al. (2021) report no gender differences, Jeworrek and Mertins (2019) find that women set lower salaries than men, aligning with our expectations. However, Jeworrek and Mertins (2019) can only make assumptions about this result. Given the mixed evidence and the limited understanding of factors driving these gender differences, our research aims to address this gap.

Our research is also related to the broad literature on gender differences in negotiations as initial salary requests may affect the outcome of the negotiation. Multiple field studies show that women enter negotiations with lower salary requests than men (Dreber et al., 2022; Gomez-Herrera & Mueller-Langer, 2024; Hernandez-Arenaz & Iriberry, 2018; Roussille, 2024; Säv-Söderbergh, 2019; Teutloff et al., 2025). In addition to field data, experimental research also investigates gender differences in salary requests. Schwierén (2012) examines this in a gift-exchange setting, where workers make wage offers to firms, and finds no evidence that women request lower wages than men. However, a laboratory experiment by Rigdon (2012), using an ultimatum game² to simulate a negotiation scenario, reveals that women tend to demand lower shares of the available money compared to men. Dittrich et al. (2014) conduct a laboratory experiment on face-to-face salary negotiations and find that men achieve better outcomes than women. This result is largely attributed to higher initial salary demands made by men. Instead

² In the ultimatum game, two players interact: The proposer allocates a fixed sum of money, and the responder decides whether to accept or reject the proposer's allocation. If accepted, the money is split according to the proposal. If rejected, both players receive nothing (Rigdon, 2012).

of analyzing actual salary requests, Fröberg et al. (2023) show that women intend to ask for lower salaries than men.

Salary expectations can influence requested salaries (Fröberg et al., 2023). A body of literature uses student surveys to investigate gender differences in salary expectations. Filippin and Ichino (2005), Reuben et al. (2017) and Kiessling et al. (2024) show that women expect lower starting salaries than men.

Apart from Schwierén (2012), the existing literature consistently finds evidence of a “gender ask gap” in salaries, where women initially request lower salaries than men in negotiations. There is also evidence that lower requested salaries largely explain the gender gap in final negotiated salaries (Dreber et al., 2022; Gomez-Herrera & Mueller-Langer, 2024; Roussille, 2024; Sävè-Söderbergh, 2019; Teutloff et al., 2025). Thus, the initially requested salaries are of major importance for the negotiation outcome.

In our experiment, self-set salaries provide a clear measure of desired salaries within a setting that models negative effects on others, but without being influenced by negotiation tactics. Unlike surveys that capture salary requests or expectations, our experiment offers the advantage of measuring *actual* desired salaries. Self-set salaries can be considered a preliminary stage of negotiations because they exclude factors typically relevant in negotiations. Nevertheless, factors that are relevant in self-set salaries – such as overconfidence, modesty or altruism – may also contribute to gender differences in negotiations. Consequently, if gender differences emerge in self-set salaries, they are likely to appear in negotiations as well.

Furthermore, we review literature investigating the effectiveness of pay transparency laws in reducing the gender pay gap. In Germany, the Transparency in Wage Structures Act (*Entgelttransparenzgesetz*) was passed in 2017 and had the primary objective to promote wage equality. This act grants employees in companies with at least 200 employees the right to request information on the median gross salary of colleagues of the opposite gender performing equivalent work. Thus, employees who request this information gain a clearer understanding of their earnings relative to comparable colleagues (of the opposite gender) and can use this knowledge for salary negotiations.

Research assessing the German pay transparency act remains scarce. Seitz and Sinha (2022) and Brütt and Yuan (2022) utilize employee-employer data from the IAB (German Institute for Employment Research) and find no evidence that the act has contributed to narrowing the gender pay gap. By contrast, Vaccaro et al. (2025), also relying on IAB data, find that the law narrows the raw gender wage gap in medium-sized firms with a works council and collective

bargaining agreements. Nonetheless, they do not find an effect on the unexplained gender pay gap. Summed up, the German pay transparency act seems to fail its intention to narrow the gender pay gap.

In 2023, the EU adopted a directive in granting employees the right to be informed about the average salary differentiated by sex of colleagues performing equal work (Directive 2023/970). This directive has to be implemented at the national level by June 2026. Beyond this EU directive, several European countries already have transparency laws in place. The European evidence on pay transparency laws presents a mixed picture. For Austria, Gulyas et al. (2023) find no effect of the law on the gender pay gap, while Böheim and Gust (2021) report a narrowing gap for newly hired employees, but no impact on the overall gender pay gap. In the UK, Blundell (2021) identifies a decline in the gender pay gap which is driven by salary reductions among men. Evidence from Denmark also points to positive effects: Bennedsen et al. (2022) show a reduction of the gender pay gap following the implementation of pay transparency.

Only a limited number of experimental studies have examined the effects of pay transparency. With a laboratory experiment, Brütt and Yuan (2022) show that neither endogenous nor exogenous wage information reduces the gender wage gap.³ Rigdon (2012) demonstrates in a laboratory experiment that women request lower salaries than men in negotiations. Providing information about men's previous request effectively eliminates this gender request gap. Notably, participants are unaware that the disclosed information is of male participants. Similarly, Roussille (2024) shows that women request lower salaries than men on an online-recruitment platform, but introducing a treatment in which the median requested salary of comparable candidates is displayed in the salary input field, the gender gap in requests disappears.

While Rigdon (2012) and Roussille (2024) find positive effects of salary information, Brütt and Yuan (2022) find no such effect. Unlike Brütt and Yuan (2022) and Rigdon (2012), who examine pay transparency in negotiation settings, our study departs from this approach by examining self-set salaries. A further distinction is that the salary information is based on average male salaries in our experiment, a feature that directly resonates with the German Pay Transparency Act. Although field studies suggest that the German Pay Transparency Act has limited effectiveness, the underlying reasons remain unclear. One possible explanation is that employees

³ In their experiment, workers and firms negotiate over a monetary amount. It is varied whether workers are informed about the wage of a comparable worker. A worker is comparable if the worker was paired with the same firm in previous periods. Three treatments are implemented with varying the provision of wage information: i) No wage information ii) Endogenous wage information, where workers can decide to receive the wage information at a small cost iii) Exogenous wage information, where such information is exogenously provided for free.

seldom request the salary information (BMFSFJ, 2020). Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether merely providing salary information – without requiring employees to actively request it – can help to increase women’s salaries. Our transparency treatment is designed to address this question.

3 Experimental Design

At the beginning of the experiment, subjects answered test questions to assess comprehension of the instructions (see Figure 1 for an overview of the procedure). Next, subjects completed one sample task identical to the real-effort task they would later perform during the experiment. The real-effort task consisted of math tasks where five two-digit numbers had to be added. Subsequently, subjects accomplished the pre-round where they had to work on the real-effort task for 5 minutes, receiving 10 cents per correct answer. The pre-round was implemented to measure subjects’ innate ability in this real-effort task.⁴ The central part of the experiment is the self-set salary phase, and at the end of the experiment, subjects answered a questionnaire.




Figure 1: Procedure

We conducted three treatments: *Individual*, *Transparency* and *Group*. The treatment *Transparency* was exactly structured as *Individual*. The only difference was that workers in *Transparency* were informed about the average salary of men (15.90 €) before setting their salary. Before conducting the *Transparency* sessions, we completed all sessions of *Individual*, where the average salary set by men was 15.90 €.

In the following, the structure of the self-set salary phase of *Individual/Transparency* is explained in detail (see Table 1). In this phase, subjects were assigned roles as either worker or principal.⁵ Subjects were informed at the outset that workers would first work on the real-effort task for ten minutes and then set their own salary.⁶ The salary could be set in increments of 10

⁴ Adding two-digit numbers is a real-effort task that is commonly used to study gender differences and is supposed to exhibit no gender differences in subjects’ ability (e.g., Heinz et al., 2016; Ludwig et al., 2017; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). However, there are a few studies that show gender differences in this real-effort task which is why we control for subjects’ ability (e.g., Baldiga & Coffman, 2018; Dariel et al., 2017; Dreber et al., 2014).

⁵ Subjects are told that they form groups of two participants where one participant is the worker and the other is the principal. Since we are not interested in the principals’ behavior, we assigned several workers to the same principal, i.e., in each session there is one principal, and at the end one worker is randomly matched with the principal.

⁶ During this time, principals could answer quiz questions for entertainment.

cents between 0 € and 20 €. Additionally, subjects were informed about the principal's payoff function: $\pi_P = 20 \text{ €} - w_A + 0.1 \text{ €} * y_A$. The principal's endowment (20 €) was used to pay the worker's salary w_A and the principal received a performance-based component depending on the worker's output (y_A), measured by the number of correct answers.

The self-set salary phase continued by the implementation of overconfidence assessments.⁷ To measure *overestimation*, workers had to estimate their number of correctly solved tasks in the 10-minute working phase. Estimates within $\pm 20 \%$ of actual output were rewarded with 0.50 €. Following this, workers were asked to rate their confidence in the accuracy of their estimate, which served as a measure of *overprecision*.

Table 1: Procedure self-set salary phase

	<i>Individual/ Transparency</i>	<i>Group</i>
	Worker A + principal	Worker A + Worker B + principal
1	Real-effort task (10 minutes)	Real-effort task (10 minutes)
2	Worker A sets salary - $\pi_P = 20 - w_A + 0.1 * y_A$ - $w_A \in [0, 20]$ Only <i>Transparency</i> : Information about average salary of men (15.90)	Sequential salary decision: Worker A sets salary first, then Worker B - $\pi_P = 35 - w_A - w_B + 0.05 * (y_A + y_B)$ - $w_A \in [0, 20]$ - $w_B \in [0, 15 + x]$ - $x = 20 - w_A$
3	Assessment of confidence measures	Assessment of confidence measures

In contrast to *Individual*, there was an additional worker in *Group*. As our primary interest lies in the workers' behavior, the treatment *Group* is designed to compare workers in *Individual* with workers in the role of Worker A in *Group*. The self-set salary phase in *Group* started with a ten-minute working phase during which both workers individually worked on the real-effort task.⁸ There was a sequential salary decision where Worker A decided first within a range of 0 € to 20 € and Worker B second. Worker B could set the own salary between 0 € and $15 + x$ € where x represented any remaining amount from the 20 € that Worker A did not choose.

⁷ We distinguish three types of overconfidence i) *Overestimation*: Overconfidence regarding absolute performance ii) *Overplacement*: Overconfidence regarding relative performance iii) *Overprecision*: Subjects are asked whether they assume that they are correct in their assessment of their performance estimate (Moore & Healy, 2008).

⁸ Before commencing the working phase, subjects were informed of their roles as either Worker A, Worker B or principal, and they were familiarized with the payoff structure from the experiment's instructions.

The principal received an endowment of 35 € to pay the salaries of Worker A (w_A) and Worker B (w_B). Additionally, the principal received a variable reward depending on the workers' performance (y_A and y_B). The principal's endowment was determined based on the objective of ensuring that the principal could receive the same payment in *Group* as in *Individual* while allowing each worker to potentially earn the same amount as workers in *Individual*. Since the average self-set salary in *Individual* was 15 €, the endowment of 35 € consisted of 15 € for each of the two workers and 5 € for the principal.

In addition to the overconfidence measures used in *Individual*, we measured workers' *overplacement* relative to the coworker. Workers indicated whether they perceived their performance as better, equal or worse. Additionally, they had to estimate the absolute difference between the number of tasks they solved correctly and the number of correctly solved tasks by their coworker. Workers earned 0.50 € if they correctly estimated whether their performance was better, equal, or worse and if their estimate of the performance difference deviated by no more than ± 2 tasks from the actual difference.

At the end of the experiment, subjects answered a questionnaire that gathered information on their behavior during the experiment, general characteristics and socio-demographics. Subjects' gender was measured using the question "What is your sex?" with response options of male, female and diverse. Because we cannot disentangle the influence of biological versus social factors on behavior, we use the term gender throughout the paper. The character traits altruism, and modesty were measured using the HEXACO-PI-R1 (Iller et al., 2021). The big five personality traits were measured using the 10 Item Big Five Inventory (Rammstedt & John, 2007). Additionally, we included questions to capture subjects' motives for salary setting which were collected using a seven-point likert scale (1 = does not apply at all, 7 = fully applies) (see appendices A. 1 – A. 4).

The experiment was conducted in autumn 2024 (*Individual* and *Group*) and autumn 2025 (*Transparency*) at the laboratory in Aachen. Almost all of the 227 subjects⁹ are students from RWTH Aachen University. Table 2 provides an overview of the gender distribution across treatments. The experiment was conducted with "z-tree" (Fischbacher, 2007), with subjects recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), and was pre-registered prior to data collection.

⁹ Originally, the sample included 239 subjects. As one subject self-reported as diverse, the subject was excluded from the dataset. Additionally, we excluded 11 subjects from *Transparency* because they answered the manipulation check incorrectly.

Table 2: Subjects' gender

	<i>Individual</i> (n = 81)		<i>Transparency</i> (n = 64)		<i>Group</i> (n = 82)	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Worker A	39	39	31	29	38	36
Worker B	-	-	-	-	1	3
Principal	1	2	3	1	2	2

The table presents absolute numbers.

4 Hypotheses

As previously described, we distinguish between three treatments: An individual setting (*Individual*), an individual setting with additional salary information (*Transparency*) and a group setting (*Group*). Hence, hypotheses can be stated regarding gender differences within each treatment and for the comparison of the treatments. For the purpose of treatment comparisons, *Individual* serves as the baseline treatment. We begin by outlining our expectations concerning potential gender differences in *Individual*.

Gender roles can be described as “expectations for female and male behavior” (Eagly & Wood, 2012, p. 461). Women are generally expected to exhibit communal traits like being emotional, friendly and unselfish while men are expected to display agentic traits like being competitive, dominant and assertive (Eagly & Wood, 2012). People who have internalized their gender role may live up to role-specific characteristics (Eagly & Wood, 2012). Accordingly, women may set lower salaries compared to men because women are supposed to be unselfish and considerate of others. In our experimental setting, women may consider the negative impact of a high self-set salary on the principal (and Worker B), as a high salary represents selfishness and thus, role incongruent behavior.

Modesty may be another factor influencing self-set salaries. According to Wade (2001, p. 70) “A modest individual is often seen as soft-spoken and meek. More important, however, a modest person is selfless”. Modest individuals tend to understate their accomplishments which may lead them to set lower salaries. In principle, there are different gender specific norms such as women being more modest than men (Blakemore, 2003; Pearse & Connell, 2016; Smith & Huntoon, 2014). Throughout their lives, humans internalize norms and tend to act in line with them (Manusco et al., 2019; Pearse & Connell, 2016). It can be assumed that women are more modest than men, and thus, set lower salaries compared to them.

Another reason why women may set lower salaries than men could be that women tend to be more altruistic and generous (Bilén et al., 2021; Engel, 2011). Based on dictator games, several studies have shown that women send on average more money to the recipient than men (Bilén

et al., 2021; Doñate-Buendía et al., 2022; Engel, 2011). Our experiment shows parallels to the dictator game because subjects can freely decide about their salary which in turn reduces the payoff of the principal. Consequently, women may set lower salaries compared to men because they show generous and altruistic behavior towards the principal.

Assuming that subjects set their salary relative to their performance,¹⁰ overestimation may play a role in *Individual*. According to Moore and Healy's (2008) theory of confidence, an individual's evaluation of absolute performance depends on the task's difficulty level. Easy tasks will lead to an underestimation and difficult tasks to an overestimation of performance (Moore & Small, 2007). We assume that an underestimation of performance is more likely than an overestimation since subjects solve rather easy math problems. Thus, it is likely that subjects will underestimate their performance. There is empirical evidence that women and men differ in evaluations of their absolute performance (Beyer, 1990, 1998; Beyer & Bowden, 1997; Deaux & Farris, 1977; Lundeberg et al., 1994; Pulford & Colman, 1997). For example, Beyer could replicate in several laboratory experiments that females underestimate their performance and males accurately evaluate their performance in masculine tasks (Beyer, 1990, 1998; Beyer & Bowden, 1997). Though, she does not find significant gender differences for female or neutral tasks. Hence, it may be relevant whether subjects perceive the task as neutral, feminine or masculine. Assuming, subjects of our experiment perceive the math task as masculine, it is likely that women will underestimate their performance more strongly than men which may also lead to lower self-set salaries.

Hypothesis 1: Women set lower salaries than men in the individual setting (Individual).

In *Individual*, several factors described above – such as gender roles, modesty, altruism and overestimation – may contribute to women setting lower salaries than men. These factors could also influence behavior in *Transparency*. However, because subjects in *Transparency* are provided with information about the average salary of men, this additional salary information may shape their salary decisions. Women may start to reflect on whether their decision – and those of other women – differ from those of men. If they infer lower salaries of women in *Individual*, they may adjust their salary upward to align with the male average in response to fairness considerations.

¹⁰ According to classic economic theory, workers are expected to maximize their salary, taking the entire 20 €. However, equity theory posits that individuals who are in an exchange relationship – such as the worker and the principal – assess the fairness of the exchange by evaluating the proportionality between inputs (e.g., performance) and outputs (e.g., salary) (Adams, 1965). Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that workers consider their performance when setting their salary.

Furthermore, the provided salary information can act as an anchor that biases subjects' salary decisions towards it (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The existence of gender differences in self-set salaries depends on the extent to which women adjust their salaries towards the anchor. Without an anchor, women are likely to set salaries below the male average. With an anchor, they may increase their salaries towards it. For men, the anchor already reflects their average salary, meaning that it is less likely to alter their decisions compared to *Individual*.

Accordingly, we expect women to adjust their salaries upward towards men's average. The precise extent of this adjustment - whether partial convergence or complete alignment - remains uncertain.

Hypothesis 2: Women set salaries that do not exceed those set by men when provided with information about the average salary of men (Transparency).

Next, we derive the hypothesis for the treatment comparison of *Individual* and *Transparency*. In *Transparency* women are likely to adjust their salary upward towards the average salary of men due to fairness considerations or the anchoring effect. Therefore, we expect women to set higher salaries in *Transparency* compared to women in *Individual*.

Hypothesis 3: Women set higher salaries when receiving information about the average salary of men (Transparency) compared to women who do not receive this information (Individual).

For men, the salary information already reflects their average salary. Thus, we do not expect this information to impact their salary decision.

The factors contributing to potential gender differences in *Individual* are also relevant in *Group*. In addition, not only absolute overconfidence (overestimation), but also relative overconfidence (overplacement) may influence behavior in the group setting. According to Moore and Healy (2008), easy tasks tend to result in overplacement of one's performance compared to others. Thus, it is likely that subjects in *Group* will overplace their performance compared to Worker B. Research suggests that women are less overconfident than men regarding placement confidence (Baldiga & Coffman, 2018; Dreber et al., 2014; Ewers & Zimmermann, 2015; Ludwig et al., 2017; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). If men overplace their performance more strongly or more often than women, they are likely to set higher salaries than women.

Hypothesis 4: Women set lower salaries than men in the group setting (Group).

In the following, we outline our assumptions regarding the comparison of *Individual* with *Group*. The existence of the additional worker in *Group* may make it salient for Worker A to

consider the relative performance compared to Worker B when deciding on the salary. As previously explained, it is likely that individuals will overplace their performance in our experiment. Assuming that subjects (Worker A) want to reward the principal equivalently across *Individual* and *Group*, it is possible that subjects who overplace their performance may feel entitled to receive more money than Worker B. In this case, subjects will set higher salaries in *Group* compared to *Individual*.

Moreover, the decision of Worker A has different consequences in *Group* compared to *Individual*. In *Group*, Worker A can only indirectly influence the principal's payoff. While Worker B can determine the principal's exact payoff, Worker A experiences uncertainty. Worker A may hesitate to give a substantial amount to Worker B because Worker B can act opportunistically by keeping a major amount. This is another assumption for why self-set salaries could be higher in *Group* compared to *Individual*.

Additionally, not only the principal is affected by the salary decision of Worker A, but also Worker B. Since Worker A can decide on a larger share of the available money, Worker A can harm the principal and Worker B to a certain extent by setting a high salary. Social preferences such as altruism and generosity may play a role when deciding on the principal's and Worker B's payoff. As Worker A and Worker B have the same role, socio-psychological concepts like homophily and the similarity-attraction effect suggest Worker A may favor Worker B over the principal (Byrne, 1997; Lawrence & Shah, 2020). If the generosity towards Worker B is very strong, Worker A may grant Worker B earnings that exceed the own earnings. In this case, workers will set lower salaries in *Group* compared to *Individual*.

The relative performance comparison with Worker B and concerns about opportunistic behavior lead to the expectation that self-set salaries are higher in *Group* than in *Individual*. Nonetheless, considerations of generosity and altruism towards Worker B may weaken this effect or potentially reverse it. Therefore, the treatment effect cannot be clearly hypothesized and our assumptions are *a priori* ambiguous.

As previously mentioned, women are less likely to overplace their performance as often or as strongly as men do. Consequently, the overplacement towards Worker B may not be as pronounced as it is for men. Furthermore, women tend to be more altruistic and generous than men (Bilén et al., 2021; Engel, 2011), leading them to be more altruistic towards Worker B and to avoid actions that could negatively impact Worker B's payoff. This hesitation aligns with their gender role, where women are less inclined to harm others. Thus, it may be the case that women

set higher salaries in *Group* than in *Individual*, but this effect is expected to be less pronounced than the effect of men.

5 Results

In this section, we analyze the presence of gender differences in self-set salaries in *Individual*, *Transparency* and in *Group*. Additionally, we compare self-set salaries between *Individual* and *Transparency*, as well as between *Individual* and *Group*.

5.1 Individual

Subsequently, we analyze the treatment *Individual*. It is examined whether gender differences appear in self-set salaries.

Self-Set Salary Descriptive Statistics

Figure 2 pictures that the majority of women choose self-set salaries between 10 € and 15 € (77 %), with relatively few opting for the maximum amount of 20 € (13 %). Among men, it is notable that 41 % choose the maximum amount, but there is also a proportion of men (46 %) that rather decide for lower self-set salaries within the range of 10 € - 15 €.

The median salary for women is 13 € which is close to the average salary of 13.87 € (see appendix A. 5 for an overview of descriptive statistics). For men, the median salary is 16.10 €, slightly higher than the average salary of 15.91 €. Both the median and the average salary of women is lower than those of men. The two-sided Mann-Whitney U test (MWU test) shows a significant difference between self-set salaries of men and women, supporting *Hypothesis 1* ($z = 1.98$, $p\text{-value} = 0.05$).¹¹

Differences in self-set salaries between women and men may arise from variations in abilities or actual performance. Nevertheless, the pre-round output is 9.10 for women and 8.51 for men, with no significant difference in performance (MWU test: $z = -0.67$, $p\text{-value} = 0.50$). Similarly, no significant gender differences in performance are observed in the main round (MWU test: $z = -0.19$, $p\text{-value} = 0.85$). Therefore, variations in ability or performance do not appear to explain the differences in self-set salaries.

Confidence Measures

Moreover, differences in overconfidence may contribute to variations in self-set salaries between women and men. There are no gender differences in the estimated output (see Table 3).

¹¹ In all analyses in this paper, the two-sided MWU test is applied.

Comparing the estimated with the actual output reveals that underestimation (45 %) and overestimation (40 %) of performance occur at similar rates.

Table 3: Estimated output in *Individual*

	All (n = 78)		Female (n = 39)		Male (n = 39)		MWU	
	Mean	% of n	Mean	% of n	Mean	% of n	z	p-value
Self-set salary	14.89	100 %	13.87	100 %	15.91	100 %	1.98	0.05
Actual output	18.97	100 %	19.05	100 %	18.90	100 %	-0.19	0.85
Estimated output	23.35	100 %	21.54	100 %	25.15	100 %	0.52	0.60
Certainty estimated output ¹²	5.10	100 %	5.08	100 %	5.13	100 %	0.21	0.84
Δ Estimation: ¹³ Estimated output – actual output	4.37	100 %	2.49	100 %	6.26	100 %	0.91	0.37
Overestimation	14.42	40 %	7.94	44 %	22.29	36 %	1.69	0.09
Underestimation	-3.03	45 %	-2.71	36%	-3.24	54 %	-0.59	0.55
Accurate	0	15 %	0	20 %	0	10 %	-	-

However, a smaller proportion of women underestimate their output (36 %) than men (54 %), and the magnitude of underestimation is also lower among women, although this difference is not statistically significant. Men who overestimate their output seem to overestimate more strongly than women. Though, after excluding subjects with extremely high performance estimates,¹⁴ the MWU test indicates no significant gender difference anymore ($z = 0.70$, $p\text{-value} = 0.53$).

Among women, there is a moderate and positive correlation between the estimated output and self-set salaries ($r = 0.32$, $p\text{-value} = 0.05$), suggesting that a higher estimated output is associated with a higher salary (see Appendix A. 6). In contrast, there is no correlation found for male workers ($r = 0.01$, $p\text{-value} = 0.97$), indicating that their salary choice appears unrelated to their estimated output.¹⁵

¹² Workers are asked to rate their confidence in the accuracy of their estimate, which serves as a measure of over-precision.

¹³ The variable Δ Estimation is calculated by subtracting the actual output from the estimated output. If the value of Δ Estimation is positive, subjects overestimate their performance, i.e., the estimated output is larger than the actual output. If the value is negative, subjects underestimate their performance, i.e., the estimated output is smaller than the actual output.

¹⁴ There are five men and two women with extremely high performance estimates (within a range of 50 to 90), possibly due to misunderstanding the question or genuinely high self-estimations. Therefore, the higher average estimated output by men is driven by those with extreme behavior. When excluding these subjects, the average estimated output is 18.38 for women and 18.26 for men, with no significant difference (MWU test: $z = -0.06$, $p\text{-value} = 0.96$).

¹⁵ There is no correlation for the relationship between workers' actual output and their self-set salary for women ($r = -0.04$, $p\text{-value} = 0.81$) or men ($r = -0.01$, $p\text{-value} = 0.95$).

Preferences & Questionnaire

Character traits that we measured via the post-experimental questionnaire may also help understand the gender difference in self-set salaries in *Individual*. Results from the MWU test reveal that women exhibit higher levels of modesty and altruism¹⁶ than men.

Appendix A. 1 shows the results from the questions designed to capture a more nuanced understanding of subjects' decision-making process regarding their self-set salary. Women exhibit a stronger preference for achieving an equal monetary distribution between themselves and the principal (*Equal*; MWU test: $z = -2.58$, $p\text{-value} = 0.01$). Additionally, women appear to be more altruistic towards the principal because it was more important to them to give a sufficient amount of money to the principal (*Altruism (P)*; MWU test: $z = -2.02$, $p\text{-value} = 0.04$). Furthermore, women assign greater importance to the principal receiving a variable payoff based on their performance (*Variable Payoff*; MWU test: $z = -2.68$, $p\text{-value} = 0.01$), and women consider the principal's salary as fairer compared to men (*Fairness*; MWU test: $z = -2.04$, $p\text{-value} = 0.04$). Conversely, men are more motivated by the goal of maximizing their payoff (*Max*; MWU test: $z = 2.15$, $p\text{-value} = 0.03$), and exhibit a stronger intention towards harming the principal (*Harm*; MWU test: $z = 2.61$, $p\text{-value} = 0.01$). Hence, we observe significant gender differences in multiple salary-setting motives, which are controlled for in regression analyses.

Self-Set Salary Regression Analyses

The robustness of gender differences in self-set salaries is assessed using OLS regression analyses. The dependent variable in all regression models presented in Table 4 is the self-set salary. The primary independent variable is the dummy variable *Female* (1 = female, 0 = male). As shown in column (1), women set their salaries on average approximately 2 € lower than men, when controlling for subjects' innate ability (pre-round output), main-round output and subjects' estimated output.¹⁷ Consequently, *Hypothesis 1* can be confirmed which predicts lower self-set salaries for women than for men.

¹⁶ This result refers to the measurement of altruism using the HEXACO-PI-R1. In further analyses we name the corresponding variable *Altruism (G)* since this is a general measure for altruism. To capture altruistic behavior specifically directed at the principal, we incorporated an additional question in our questionnaire and labeled this variable *Altruism (P)*.

¹⁷ Using a Tobit regression to account for right-censoring at 20 €, the gender difference remains statistically significant.

Table 4: Regression analyses – Impact of gender on self-set salary in *Individual*

Dependent Variable:	Self-set Salary										
<i>Individual</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Female	-2.012** (0.855)	-1.489* (0.887)	-1.663* (0.921)	-0.557 (0.538)	-0.966 (0.689)	-0.978 (0.678)	-1.182 (0.769)	-1.186* (0.666)	-1.191 (0.846)	-0.205 (0.476)	-0.440 (0.520)
Pre-round Output	0.141 (0.353)	0.154 (0.353)	0.131 (0.354)	0.247 (0.185)	0.112 (0.246)	0.128 (0.257)	0.264 (0.344)	0.104 (0.233)	0.162 (0.331)	0.203 (0.181)	0.195 (0.187)
Output	-0.0979 (0.171)	-0.0825 (0.172)	-0.101 (0.167)	-0.151* (0.0885)	-0.0302 (0.132)	-0.141 (0.144)	-0.135 (0.177)	-0.0220 (0.119)	-0.0691 (0.158)	-0.101 (0.0987)	-0.0912 (0.104)
Estimated Output	0.0260 (0.0294)	0.0257 (0.0284)	0.0289 (0.0293)	0.0149 (0.0145)	0.0156 (0.0175)	0.0267 (0.0170)	-0.00180 (0.0237)	0.0221 (0.0195)	0.0198 (0.0268)	0.0109 (0.0139)	0.0164 (0.0160)
Altruism (G)		-0.286 (0.196)								0.0149 (0.0982)	0.0250 (0.124)
Modesty			-0.173 (0.147)							-0.0382 (0.0813)	0.00336 (0.0856)
Equal (P)				-1.286*** (0.0900)						-0.694*** (0.206)	-0.666*** (0.235)
Altruism (P)					-1.050*** (0.143)					-0.225 (0.141)	-0.239* (0.140)
Max						1.280*** (0.167)				0.244 (0.185)	0.226 (0.196)
Fairness							-1.112*** (0.192)			-0.213 (0.162)	-0.168 (0.176)
Image Concerns								-1.199*** (0.140)		-0.364** (0.168)	-0.468** (0.185)
Variable Payoff									-0.700*** (0.209)	-0.120 (0.120)	-0.129 (0.133)
Further Controls											Yes
Constant	15.90*** (1.826)	19.38*** (3.024)	18.23*** (2.329)	20.40*** (0.902)	18.63*** (1.342)	9.516*** (1.684)	20.87*** (1.559)	18.72*** (1.512)	18.24*** (1.857)	20.24*** (1.924)	19.69*** (2.941)
Observations	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78
R-squared	0.092	0.118	0.107	0.689	0.455	0.420	0.394	0.509	0.218	0.763	0.781

OLS Regression, reference category: Male. Further Controls are age, econ and big five personality traits. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Subsequently, additional control variables are included separately in the model. These control variables are included because they may impact the self-set salary or are likely to explain the gender difference due to gender differences that were found when applying the MWU test. Columns (4) and (5) show that subjects with increasing preferences for an equal monetary allocation (*Equal*) or for giving a sufficient amount of money to the principal referred to as *Altruism (P)* set significantly lower salaries. Including *Equal* or *Altruism (P)*, the gender difference vanishes. Furthermore, increasing preferences for being perceived by the principal as setting an appropriate salary (*Image Concerns*) leads to lower salaries, and the inclusion of this variable reduces the observed gender difference in salaries. In column (11) including all variables simultaneously, *Equal*, *Altruism (P)* and *Image Concerns* significantly impact the self-set salary.

5.2 Transparency

In this section, we examine whether gender differences appear in self-set salaries in the treatment *Transparency*. In the post-experimental questionnaire, a manipulation check is used to verify whether participants observe the information about the average salary of men. As *Individual* and *Transparency* differ only in displaying this salary information, we exclude three women and eight men from the sample who are unaware of this information. In this paper, we report all results excluding these subjects.¹⁸

Self-Set Salary Descriptive Statistics

The average salary of women (15.46 €) is similar to the median salary of women (15.90 €), which also applies to men (average: 15.10 €, median: 15.00 €). Women and men set salaries within a range of 10 € to 20 € (see Figure 2). 16 % of women select the maximum amount of 20 €, compared to 24 % of men. The MWU test shows no significant difference in self-set salaries between women and men ($z = -0.34$, $p\text{-value} = 0.74$). *Hypothesis 2* is confirmed as women's self-set salaries do not exceed those of men.

Confidence Measures

In the following, we analyze how workers perceive their performance. According to Table 5, the average estimated output of men (24.79) is weakly significantly higher than that of women

¹⁸ The following question functions as manipulation check: "During the experiment, you received information about the average salary of participants from previous experiments in this laboratory: What average salary was shown to you in the experiment?". Possible answers are: 1) salary of men, 2) salary of women, 3) salary of all (men and women) and 4) I did not observe the information regarding the average salary. One woman and four men select "salary of all", and two women and four men choose "I did not observe the information". These subjects are excluded from the sample.

(22.32).¹⁹ Overall, underestimation (30 %) is less common than overestimation (55 %) in *Transparency*. While similar proportions of women and men underestimate their output, women do so to a significantly greater extent.

Table 5: Estimated output in *Transparency*

	All (n = 60)		Female (n = 31)		Male (n = 29)		MWU	
	Mean	% of n	Mean	% of n	Mean	% of n	z	p-value
Self-set salary	15.28	100 %	15.46	100 %	15.09	100 %	-0.34	0.74
Actual output	18.17	100 %	16.87	100 %	19.55	100 %	1.56	0.12
Estimated output	23.52	100 %	22.32	100 %	24.79	100 %	1.64	0.10
Certainty estimated output	5.07	100 %	5.03	100 %	5.10	100 %	0.59	0.56
ΔEstimation: Estimated output – actual output	5.35	100 %	5.45	100 %	5.24	100 %	0.83	0.41
Overestimation ²⁰	11.85	55 %	14.67	48 %	9.50	62 %	-0.83	0.42
Underestimation	-3.89	30 %	-5.10	32 %	-2.38	28 %	2.32	0.02
Accurate	0	15 %	0	19 %	0	10 %	-	-

The scatter plot in appendix A. 7 displays that both women and men with a higher estimated output tend to set higher salaries. Also the correlation coefficients indicate a moderate and weakly significant correlation (women: $r = 0.31$, $p\text{-value} = 0.09$; men: $r = 0.31$, $p\text{-value} = 0.10$). Consequently, women and men seem to consider their estimated output when setting their salary.²¹

Preferences & Questionnaire

Appendix A. 5 indicates that women are significantly more altruistic than men. Almost no gender differences emerge in the responses to the items designed to capture subjects' motives when setting their salaries (see appendices A. 1 and A. 2). One exception is that women agree more strongly to the statement that they took possible salary differences between men and women from the past experiment into account when determining their salary (*Consideration Pay Gap*; MWU test: $z = -3.11$, $p\text{-value} = 0.00$). Additionally, subjects were asked whether they generally assume gender differences in the previous experiment (in *Individual*). The mean rating is 5.84

¹⁹ There are five subjects (two men and three women) with extremely high performance estimates. When excluding these subjects, the estimated output of women amounts to 16.14 and the output of men to 20.85 (MWU test: $z = 2.08$, $p\text{-value} = 0.04$).

²⁰ The stronger overestimation by women appears to be driven by the individuals reporting extremely high output estimates. When excluding these subjects, women's average overestimation (2.83) is smaller than men's (3.06), with no significant gender difference (MWU test: $z = -0.50$, $p\text{-value} = 0.63$).

²¹ For women, there is a moderate and weakly significant correlation between the actual output and salaries ($r = 0.31$, $p\text{-value} = 0.09$). For men, the actual output and salaries are uncorrelated ($r = -0.09$, $p\text{-value} = 0.65$).

for women and 5.28 for men (*Expected Pay Gap*; MWU test: $z = -1.26$, $p\text{-value} = 0.21$), suggesting that both genders generally assume gender-based salary differences. When asked about the direction of this difference, the vast majority (90 % of women, 83 % of men) believe that women's salaries are lower than men's.²²

Self-Set Salary Regression Analyses

The regression results in appendix A. 8 show the influence of workers' gender on self-set salaries. In column (1), *Female* does not significantly affect self-set salaries when controlling for performance measures and the estimated output. This result is in line with *Hypothesis 2*.

Columns (2) - (9) introduce additional control variables separately. The variables *Equal (P)* and *Altruism (P)* negatively affect self-set salaries, suggesting that workers who favor a more equal monetary allocation - or who assign greater importance to ensuring sufficient pay for the principal - tend to choose lower salaries for themselves. Moreover, stronger preferences for maximizing one's own payoff (*Max*) are linked to higher salaries. The variables *Fairness*, *Image Concerns* and *Variable Payoff* negatively impact self-set salaries. When all control variables are included simultaneously in the regression analysis in column (11), *Equal (P)*, *Altruism (P)* and *Max* emerge as significant predictors of self-set salaries.

5.3 Comparison Individual with Transparency

Women set significantly higher salaries in *Transparency* (15.46 €) compared to *Individual* (13.87 €) which is consistent with *Hypothesis 3* (MWU test: $z = -2.19$, $p\text{-value} = 0.03$). Conversely, men set lower salaries in *Transparency* (15.09 €) compared to men in *Individual* (15.90 €), but the difference is not statistically significant (MWU test: $z = 0.58$, $p\text{-value} = 0.56$).

Figure 2 illustrates that women in *Transparency* chose the maximum amount of 20 € slightly more often (16 %) than women in *Individual* (13 %). Additionally, 22.5 % of women in *Transparency* appear to anchor their choices to the male salary information, selecting either 15.90 € or 16.00 €.²³

²² The remaining subjects either believe that the average salaries are equal or indicate that they don't know.

²³ While the standard deviation of women's self-set salaries remains constant across treatments (3.24), the shape of the salary distribution changes noticeably. The skewness differs: in *Transparency*, it is negative (-0.15), indicating left skewness of the distribution, while in *Individual* it is positive (0.68), indicating right skewness. This shift in the distribution is confirmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, which reveals a statistically significant difference between the salary distributions in *Individual* and *Transparency* for women ($D = 0.34$, $p = 0.03$).

Among men, fewer choose the maximum amount in *Transparency* (24.1 %) compared to *Individual* (41 %). In *Individual*, salaries are slightly more evenly distributed, whereas in *Transparency* salaries around 12 €, 15 € and 20 € appear to be focal points. Interestingly, no man selects his salary in line with the salary information (15.90 €).²⁴

Column (3) of Table 6 indicates a positive and weakly significant interaction between treatments and gender, indicating that women set higher salaries in *Transparency* compared to *Individual*. Splitting the sample into women and men, confirms a significant positive treatment effect for women, showing that women in *Transparency* set salaries on average 1.598 € higher than women in *Individual* (see column (4)).




Figure 2: Histogram self-set salary *Individual* vs. *Transparency*

Next, we examine potential drivers underlying women's treatment effect. In *Transparency*, women perform significantly worse in the pre-round and in the main round compared to women in *Individual* (see appendix A. 9). From an economic perspective, a higher output should justify higher salary claims, suggesting that their lower performance should not account for their higher salaries. Moreover, women in *Transparency* score higher on general altruism (*Altruism (G)*), as measured by the HEXACO-PI-R1, than women in *Individual* (MWU test: $z = -1.67$, $p\text{-value} = 0.10$). A pattern that would typically be associated with lower salaries as higher salaries have

²⁴ The standard deviation of men's salaries is higher in *Individual* (4.08) than in *Transparency* (3.76). In both treatments, the skewness is negative, indicating left skewness (*Individual*: -0.26; *Transparency*: -0.37). The KS test does not indicate that salary distributions differ significantly among men ($D = 0.21$, $p\text{-value} = 0.45$).

a negative effect on the principal's payoff. In addition, women in *Transparency* over- and underestimate their performance more strongly (see appendix A. 9).²⁵ Thus, women in *Individual* estimate their performance more accurately. To account for this treatment difference, we control for the estimated and actual output in the regression analyses.

When conducting workers' decision-making motives, there are two statements in which women show weakly significant differences between *Individual* and *Transparency* (see appendix A. 1). Women in *Transparency* perceive the principal's salary as less fair compared to women in *Individual* (MWU test: $z = 1.76$, $p\text{-value} = 0.08$). Additionally, they perceive their own salary as less fair compared to the principal (MWU test: $z = 1.75$, $p\text{-value} = 0.08$).

Table 6: Regression analyses – *Transparency* vs. *Individual* on self-set salary

Dependent Variable:	Self-set Salary				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	All	All	All	Female	Male
<i>Transparency</i>	0.397	0.414	-0.815	1.598**	-0.815
	(0.622)	(0.622)	(0.956)	(0.780)	(0.956)
Female		-0.990	-2.038**		
		(0.622)	(0.836)		
<i>Transparency</i> × Female			2.413*		
			(1.234)		
Constant	14.89***	15.38***	15.91***	13.87***	15.91***
	(0.431)	(0.564)	(0.655)	(0.520)	(0.655)
Observations	138	138	138	70	68
R-squared	0.003	0.021	0.048	0.058	0.011

OLS Regression, reference categories: *Individual* & Male.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Regression analyses indicate that women's salaries are on average by 1.696 € higher in *Transparency* compared to women in *Individual* when controlling for the pre- and main round output as well as the estimated output (appendix A. 10, column (1)), supporting *Hypothesis 3*. After controlling for all variables in column (11), preferences for allocating a sufficient amount of money to the principal (*Altruism (P)*) and preferences for taking the maximum payoff (*Max*) remain significantly associated with self-set salaries.

²⁵ Approximately, the same amount of women over- or underestimate their output across treatments (48 % overestimate in *Transparency* and 44 % in *Individual*; 32 % underestimate in *Transparency* and 36 % in *Individual*).

5.4 Group

In this section, the treatment *Group* is analyzed in which worker A's salary decision implies – in addition to the principal – externalities also to a second worker.

Self-Set Salary Descriptive Statistics

For women, the median salary (17.25 €) is higher than the average salary (15.94 €), which applies similarly to men (median: 17.50 €, average: 16.21 €). 18 % of female workers choose the maximum salary of 20 €, compared to 25 % of male subjects (Figure 3). The similarity between average and median salaries across gender indicates no meaningful gender difference in salary choices, which is supported by the MWU test ($z = 0.19$, $p\text{-value} = 0.85$). Consequently, *Hypothesis 4*, which predicts lower salaries for women than for men, cannot be confirmed.

Confidence Measures

In this subsection, we first analyze workers' absolute performance estimates. Second, we examine their performance estimates relative to Worker B.

Table 7: Estimated output in *Group*

	All (n = 74)		Female (n = 38)		Male (n = 36)		MWU	
	Mean	% of n	Mean	% of n	Mean	% of n	z	p-value
Self-set salary	16.07	100 %	15.94	100 %	16.21	100 %	0.19	0.85
Actual output	18.34	100 %	17.26	100 %	19.47	100 %	1.52	0.13
Estimated output	20.09	100 %	19.21	100 %	21.03	100 %	1.18	0.24
Certainty estimated output	5.27	100 %	5.16	100 %	5.39	100 %	0.60	0.55
Δ Estimation: Estimated output – actual output	1.76	100 %	1.95	100 %	1.56	100 %	-0.24	0.81
Overestimation	6.61	45 %	6.59	45 %	6.63	44 %	-0.22	0.82
Underestimation	-2.93	40 %	-2.38	42 %	-3.57	39 %	-1.16	0.25
Accurate	0	15 %	0	13 %	0	17 %	-	-

As presented by Table 7, there are no significant gender differences in the estimated output.²⁶ Underestimation (40 %) and overestimation (45 %) occur at comparable rates. Similar proportions of women and men under- or overestimate their output with a comparable extent. For both

²⁶ Also in *Group* are two subjects with extremely high performance estimates (one woman and one man). When excluding these two subjects, the average estimated output is 17.30 for women and 19.34 for men (MWU test: $z = 1.23$, $p\text{-value} = 0.22$).

women and men, there is no meaningful relationship between workers' estimated output and their salary (women: $r = -0.06$, $p\text{-value} = 0.74$; men: $r = 0.12$, $p\text{-value} = 0.47$).²⁷

In *Group*, subjects additionally estimate their performance relative to Worker B (see Table 8). 58 % believe to have performed better than Worker B, 11 % believe to have performed worse and 31 % believe to have performed equally well. Slightly more men than women believe they had outperformed Worker B.

When comparing workers' estimated performance relative to Worker B with their actual performance, it can be assessed whether workers over- or underplace themselves. A substantial proportion of subjects (70 %) overplaces their performance relative to Worker B, defined as believing they performed better than Worker B while in fact performing equally well or worse.²⁸

²⁹ One explanation for this high level of overplacement is that subjects assigned to the role of Worker B performed almost in each session above average performance of workers in the role of Worker A, despite being randomly selected.

Table 8: Estimated difference towards Worker B in *Group*

	All (n = 74)		Female (n = 38)		Male (n = 36)		MWU	
	Mean	% of n	Mean	% of n	Mean	% of n	z	p-value
Actual Distance	-9.73	100 %	-11.9	100 %	-7.44	100 %	1.87	0.06
Better	6.36	19 %	6.25	11 %	6.4	28 %	0.29	0.79
Worse	-13.48	81 %	-14.0	89 %	-12.8	72 %	0.79	0.43
Equal	-	0 %	-	0 %	-	0 %	-	-
Estimated Distance ³⁰	1.62	100 %	0.84	100 %	2.44	100 %	1.24	0.21
Est_Better	3.67	58 %	2.95	55 %	4.36	61 %	1.24	0.22
Est_Worse	-4.75	11 %	-5	16 %	-4	6 %	-0.69	0.49
Est_Equal	0	31 %	0	29 %	0	33 %	-	-
Certainty B	3.62	100 %	3.63	100 %	3.61	100 %	-0.22	0.83

Preferences & Questionnaire

As shown in appendix A. 5, women demonstrate significantly higher levels of modesty and altruism than men in *Group*. There are no meaningful gender differences regarding subjects'

²⁷ There are also no significant correlations between the actual output and self-set salaries (women: $r = -0.03$, $p\text{-value} = 0.87$; men: $r = 0.16$, $p\text{-value} = 0.36$).

²⁸ Additionally, workers who believe they are equally good, but are actually worse are overconfident.

²⁹ Underplacement is observed among workers who believe they performed worse, while their actual performance is equal or better, which applies to 4.5 %. Correct self-assessments apply to 26 %. The prevalence of over-/underplacement is similar across genders.

³⁰ The estimated output difference between Worker A and Worker B is defined as Worker A's estimate of how much the own output deviates from Worker B's output. Estimated Distance is negative if Worker A assumes to perform worse than Worker B by x tasks. Estimated Distance is positive if Worker A assumes to perform better than Worker B by x tasks, and Estimated Distance is zero if Worker A assumes to perform equally good.

attitudes towards the principal (see appendix A. 3). Women and men differ in their attitudes towards Worker B on two questions (see appendix A. 4). It was more important for men that Worker B earns less than themselves (*Less (B)*; MWU test: $z = 1.74$, $p\text{-value} = 0.08$). Conversely, women thought more strongly about the payoff that Worker B will set (*Thoughts Salary*; MWU test: $z = 2.12$, $p\text{-value} = 0.03$). Furthermore, men more strongly agree to the statement that they liked having most decision-making power (*Power*; MWU test: $z = 2.23$, $p\text{-value} = 0.03$).

Self-Set Salary Regression Analyses

In line with the results of the MWU test ($z = 0.19$, $p\text{-value} = 0.85$), the regression analyses do not indicate a significant effect of workers' gender on self-set salaries. Accordingly, *Hypothesis 4* is rejected (see appendix A. 11).

Appendix A. 12 presents regression analyses to examine factors that may influence self-set salaries in *Group*. When including all control variables in one model in column (3), it can be observed that preferences for a maximum payoff (*Max*) positively impact workers' self-set salaries and the variable *Consideration of P* negatively impacts self-set salaries, indicating that subjects who assume Worker B will appropriately consider the principal set lower salaries.

5.5 Comparison Individual with Group

In this section, differences between *Individual* and *Group* are analyzed. For women, the average self-set salary is significantly higher in *Group* (15.94 €) compared to *Individual* (13.87 €) (MWU test: $z = -2.87$, $p\text{-value} = 0.00$).³¹ Although men set slightly higher salaries in *Group* (16.21 €) than in *Individual* (15.91 €), there is no significant treatment effect for men (MWU test: $z = -0.20$, $p\text{-value} = 0.85$).

When comparing the histogram of women's self-set salaries in *Individual* with the histogram of *Group* (see Figure 3), it is notable that women's behavior is different. In *Individual*, most women set salaries within the range of 10 € – 15 €, while in *Group*, a large proportion of women chooses salaries above 17 €. Additionally, 13 % of women choose the maximum salary of 20 € in *Individual*, increasing to 18 % in *Group*.³² When observing the histograms of men's self-set

³¹ See appendix A. 13 for a comparison of general descriptive statistics of *Individual* versus *Group*.

³² The standard deviation of women's salaries is higher in *Group* (3.89) compared to *Individual* (3.24). Additionally, skewness differs between treatments: In *Group*, it is negative (-1.61), indicating left skewness of the distribution, while in *Individual* it is positive (0.68), indicating right skewness. This shift in the distribution is confirmed by the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test, which reveals a statistically significant difference between the salary distributions in *Individual* and *Group* for women ($D = 0.36$, $p = 0.01$).

salaries, one notable difference emerges: In *Individual*, 41 % choose the maximum salary which decreases to 25 % in *Group*.³³




Figure 3: Histogram self-set salary *Individual* vs. *Group*

The regression analysis in column (1) of Table 9 shows that self-set salaries are on average 1.188 € higher in *Group* than in *Individual*. In column (2), controlling for subjects' gender does not change this treatment effect. However, when introducing an interaction term between treatment and gender in column (3), the treatment effect loses significance and decreases, though the interaction effect itself is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.15). However, the results suggest that the treatment effect is substantially driven by women.

In the next step, we investigate factors that may drive the interaction effect for women. According to the MWU test, women exhibit a higher average pre-round and main-round output in *Individual* compared to *Group* (pre-round, $z = 1.91$, p-value = 0.06; main round: $z = 1.75$, p-value = 0.08). Nevertheless, these differences in ability and performance are unlikely to explain women's treatment difference, as lower ability and performance in *Group* do not logically justify higher self-set salaries.

³³ The standard deviation of men's salaries is smaller in *Group* (3.77) compared to *Individual* (4.08). In both treatments, the skewness is negative, indicating left skewness of the distributions (*Individual*: -0.26; *Group*: -1.58). The KS test does not indicate that salary distributions differ significantly among men ($D = 0.23$, p-value = 0.25).

Table 9: Regression analyses – *Group* vs. *Individual* on self-set salary

Dependent Variable:	Self-set Salary				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	All	All	All	Female	Male
<i>Group</i>	1.188*	1.204*	0.306	2.078**	0.306
	(0.617)	(0.612)	(0.906)	(0.817)	(0.906)
Female		-1.176*	-2.038**		
		(0.612)	(0.835)		
<i>Group</i> × Female			1.772		
			(1.220)		
Constant	14.89***	15.47***	15.91***	13.87***	15.91***
	(0.431)	(0.556)	(0.654)	(0.519)	(0.654)
Observations	152	152	152	77	75
R-squared	0.024	0.048	0.061	0.080	0.002

OLS Regression, reference categories: *Individual* & Male.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The questionnaire reveals some questions where women significantly differ across treatments (see appendix A. 3). In *Individual*, women place more importance on the principal receiving an equal payoff (MWU test: $z = 2.16$, $p\text{-value} = 0.03$), and ensuring that the principal receives a sufficient amount of money (MWU test: $z = 2.25$, $p\text{-value} = 0.02$). Furthermore, it is more important for women in *Individual* that their salary is perceived as appropriate (MWU test: $z = 2.22$, $p\text{-value} = 0.03$), and that the principal's payoff is based on their performance (MWU test: $z = 2.46$, $p\text{-value} = 0.01$). Additionally, women perceive the principal's payoff as fairer in *Individual* (MWU test: $z = 4.40$, $p\text{-value} = 0.00$). To sum up, women in *Group* exhibit less pronounced prosocial preferences towards the principal than women in *Individual*.³⁴

The regression analyses in appendix A. 14 examine the effect of the treatment *Group* on self-set salaries, focusing solely on women and including control variables. Column (1) shows that women set their salaries 1.806 € higher in *Group* compared to women in *Individual* when controlling for pre-round and main-round output as well as estimated output. In column (11), where all control variables are included simultaneously, *Altruism* (P) and *Max* significantly influence women's self-set salaries. Preferences for a maximum payoff do not account for treatment differences (see column (6)). Nonetheless, the willingness to ensure a sufficient amount of money for the principal is still significant, and thus, seems to account for treatment differences (see

³⁴ We observe no differences in confidence assessments between women in *Individual* and *Group* (see appendix A. 13). Likewise, there are no significant differences in characteristics such as altruism and modesty between women in *Individual* and *Group*.

column (5)). Overall, the prosocial preferences towards the principal diminish for women in *Group* compared to *Individual*, partially explaining why women set higher salaries in *Group*.

6 Discussion

In the following discussion, we interpret the experimental results. First, we address the treatments *Individual* and *Transparency*, along with their comparison. Second, we compare the treatment *Group* with *Individual*.

Individual

In *Individual*, women set lower salaries than men which is in line with our expectation. Our results indicate that this difference is due to women being more prosocial towards the principal whose payoff is negatively affected by a higher self-set salary. In particular, preferences for an equal monetary distribution, concerns about how their salary is perceived by the principal and preferences for allocating a sufficient amount to the principal appear to drive the gender difference in self-set salaries in *Individual*. These factors align with studies indicating women to be more egalitarian and inequity averse than men (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Fehr et al., 2006; Kamas & Preston, 2015) and may stem from image concerns (Ariely et al., 2009; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006).

In addition to possible explanations for women's lower salaries drawn from the post-experimental questionnaire, non-measurable factors such as gender roles may also play a role. The female gender role is often associated with characteristics like being friendly and unselfish whereas the male gender role is typically described as competitive and assertive (Eagly & Wood, 2012). Assuming that women and men have internalized these roles, women may set lower salaries than men because high salaries could represent selfishness, which is incongruent with their gender role.

The gender difference in self-set salaries is particularly driven by a substantial number of men (41 %) who choose the maximum amount of 20 €. Interestingly, choosing the maximum amount does not correlate with their estimated (or actual) output, indicating that men opt for the maximum amount without considering their performance. Moreover, salary maximizing men differ from women in a greater number of post-experimental questionnaire items than non-maximizing men. By contrast, non-maximizing men are more similar to women, for example by showing stronger preferences for an equal monetary allocation.³⁵

³⁵ For non-maximizing men, it is significantly more important to implement an equal monetary allocation (*Equal*, MWU test: $z = 3.88$, $p\text{-value} = 0.00$) and to assign a sufficient amount of money to the principal compared to

Transparency

In *Transparency*, providing information about the average salary of men does not result in gender differences in self-set salaries. We observe that the salary information appears to serve as an anchor for some women: 22.5 % of women appear to anchor their choices to the male salary information, selecting either 15.90 € or 16.00 €. In contrast, no man selects his salary in line with the salary information. Men rather have three focal points around 12 €, 15 € and 20 €. Overall, the average salary of women and men is similar.

Results from the post-experimental questionnaire further indicate that women and men do not substantially differ in their motives for salary setting. However, significant gender differences emerge especially for women reporting significantly stronger agreement with the statement: “When determining my salary, I took into account possible salary differences between men and women from the past experiment”.

Individual versus Transparency

In *Individual*, where no salary transparency is provided, women set significantly lower salaries than men. In contrast, in *Transparency*, no gender differences emerge. The closing gender gap is primarily driven by women setting significantly higher salaries in *Transparency* compared to *Individual* although women in *Transparency* display higher levels of general altruism, as measured by the HEXACO-PI-R1. One possible interpretation is that salary transparency emphasizes fairness considerations with respect to gender-equal pay among workers to such extent that prosocial considerations towards the principal become less salient. When controlling for *Altruism (P)* in regression analyses, the treatment effect of women decreases and becomes insignificant, which indicates that preferences for allocating sufficient money to the principal partially explain the treatment effect.

Although no statistically significant difference in salaries is observed between men in *Transparency* and *Individual*, a few noteworthy patterns emerge. In *Transparency*, only 24 % of men take the maximum amount of 20 € compared to 41 % in *Individual*. Moreover, we find a moderate, weakly significant correlation between the estimated output and salaries in *Transparency*. Unlike *Individual*, men in *Transparency* seem to take their estimated output into account when setting their salaries. These findings suggest that salary transparency reduces extreme payoff-maximizing behavior. Maybe, because men observe that, on average, other men do not choose

maximizing men (*Altruism (P)*, MWU test: $z = 3.24$, $p\text{-value} = 0.00$). Additionally, non-maximizers place greater importance on the principal perceiving their salary as appropriate (*Image Concerns*, MWU test: $z = 3.29$, $p\text{-value} = 0.00$).

the maximum amount and therefore align their salary decisions more closely with their perceived performance.

Individual versus Group

In contrast to *Individual*, no gender differences in self-set salaries are observed in *Group*. It is questionable why gender differences in self-set salaries appear in a setting without a second worker (*Individual*), but not when one is present (*Group*). Analyzing treatment differences reveals that men's behavior does not significantly differ across treatments, whereas women set higher salaries in *Group* than in *Individual*, eliminating gender differences as women's salaries align more closely with those of men in *Group*.

Several factors may explain the treatment difference for women. Women in *Group* exhibit lower prosocial concerns towards the principal compared to women in *Individual*. This is reflected by women placing less importance on an equal monetary distribution towards the principal, and ensuring the principal receives a sufficient amount of money. Regression analyses further indicate that the preference for giving a sufficient amount to the principal partly explains the treatment effect. Hence, the lower prosocial concerns towards the principal in *Group* partially account for women's higher self-set salaries in *Group*.

For women, the presence of a second worker appears to influence their perception of the principal. In *Individual*, there is only the principal that can be focused on, and in *Group*, women seem to shift their attention to Worker B who is more similar to them. Indeed, post-experimental questionnaire results show that Worker B is more important to women than the principal (see appendix A. 15). For example, it is more important for women that Worker B receives a sufficient amount of money rather than the principal (WSR test: $z = 3.04$, $p\text{-value} = 0.00$).

Although Worker B is important to women, this does not deter them from setting higher salaries in *Group*.³⁶ One possible explanation is a shift in perceived responsibility across treatments. In contrast to *Individual*, responsibility for the principal's payoff is shared between Worker A and Worker B in *Group*. As a result, workers may perceive their individual impact on the principal as more diffuse and recognize that Worker B is only partly affected by their decisions but instead has own decision-making power.

Furthermore, strategic thinking may influence decision-making in *Group*. Worker A must form beliefs about the salary that Worker B will set. If Worker A anticipates opportunistic behavior

³⁶ According to the post-experimental questionnaire, the importance women attribute to Worker B in *Group* is comparable to the importance they attribute to the principal in *Individual* (see appendix A. 15).

by Worker B, Worker A may be more inclined to take a higher payoff. The post-experimental questionnaire reveals that women think about the salary Worker B will set, and a substantial number of women (45 %) believe that Worker B keeps a large proportion of the salary.³⁷ Consequently, allocating a large amount to Worker B may not be perceived as reasonable because they anticipate an unfair money allocation.

7 Conclusion

Next, we elaborate on limitations of our experimental design, derive practical implications from our findings and conclude.

In our experimental design, workers retain full decision-making authority without fearing consequences of their decision. This deliberate abstraction from risk allows us to better understand what individuals perceive as an adequate salary. Nevertheless, in real-world employment relationships, self-set salaries may involve risks, such as dismissal or social conflict. Since women tend to be more risk averse than men (Croson & Gneezy, 2009), this may lead to lower self-set salaries of women compared to men. Moreover, our experimental design does not capture potential long term effects which may arise when salaries are renegotiated or adjusted over time. Another limitation concerns the design of the treatment *Transparency*. While designed to reflect the current legal situation, it does not allow us to clearly disentangle whether women merely react to the disclosed average salary as an anchor or whether the salary information enhances expectations of gender differences, thereby triggering fairness considerations.

Previous studies indicate that the German Transparency in Wage Structures Act has failed to reduce the gender wage gap (Brütt & Yuan, 2022; Seitz & Sinha, 2022; Vaccaro et al., 2025). In contrast, our experiment – designed to mirror features of the German Act – shows that salary transparency contributes to closing the gender pay gap, primarily because women significantly increase their salaries. A key difference between the German Act and our experimental design lies in accessibility of salary information. While the German Act requires employees to actively request information, in our experiment the information is provided exogenously. One possible explanation for the limited effectiveness of the German Act is the low rate at which workers have requested salary information in the past (BMFSFJ, 2020). Furthermore, women do not have to negotiate their salaries in our experiment which is often required in real organizations. Even when salary transparency is provided, negotiations may be a hindrance for women. Our

³⁷ 45 % of women report moderate to strong agreement – values five to seven on a seven-point Likert scale - with the statement: “I assumed that Worker B would keep a large portion of the salary and give only a small amount to the manager”.

findings are consistent with Rigdon (2012) and Roussille (2024) who also demonstrate that access to salary information can help reduce the gender pay gap.³⁸ Transferring our experimental findings to transparency policies suggests that the German Transparency in Wage Structures Act could reduce the gender pay gap if salary information were provided exogenously. Therefore, policymakers should consider revising the law to ensure that salary information is automatically disclosed.

We implement the *Group* treatment to better understand how salary settings change when workers can directly compare themselves to another worker and when their self-set salary affects not only the principal but additionally another worker's salary. Our results show that women set significantly higher salaries in *Group* than in *Individual*. This increase is partly driven by women having lower prosocial concerns towards the principal in *Group*. Although women care about the second worker, they set higher salaries in *Group* than in *Individual*. While the underlying mechanisms cannot be directly identified, two explanations appear plausible. Responsibility may be perceived as more diffuse in *Group*, reducing the perceived impact of individual decisions on others. Alternatively, strategic considerations may limit generosity towards the other worker if opportunistic behavior is anticipated. Transferring these findings to real-world contexts shows that the effectiveness of self-set salary schemes may depend on how responsibility and decision-making power are structured. In particular, creating environments in which women do not bear sole responsibility for the distributional consequences of their decisions may contribute to reducing the gender pay gap.

The experiment's limitations motivate future research. For instance, extending our research could involve investigating the role of risk and repeated interactions in greater detail. Additionally, future research might focus on examining salary transparency by implementing various transparency treatments and to disentangle the underlying mechanisms. Furthermore, examining whether women dislike bearing responsibility for others when setting their salary could provide further insight into the observed differences between *Individual* and *Group*.

To conclude, our laboratory experiment offers the opportunity to investigate gender differences in self-set salaries within a simplified and controlled setting. We find that women set lower

³⁸ Seitz and Sinha (2022) conduct a laboratory experiment comparing the effectiveness of salary information when information is provided exogenously versus endogenously. They find that neither form of information provision reduces the gender pay gap. A key difference between their study and ours lies in the nature of the salary information provided. In our experiment, participants receive information on the average salary of all men from the *Individual* treatment. By contrast, Seitz and Sinha (2022) inform participants about the salary of a single comparable worker whose gender is not disclosed. This indicates that both the salience of gender and the aggregation level of salary information may be influential for transparency policies.

salaries than men in *Individual*, even under full anonymity. However, this gender pay gap dissolves when salary transparency is provided, as transparency leads to significantly higher salaries among women compared to *Individual*. Therefore, our results demonstrate that exogenously provided salary information can be an effective tool for reducing gender pay disparities in self-set salary environments. Moreover, when a second worker is present, no gender differences in self-set salaries emerge because women align their salaries more closely with those of men in *Group* compared to *Individual*.

8 Appendix

A. 1: Questionnaire salary setting motives – *Individual & Transparency*

		<i>Individual</i>						<i>Transparency</i>						<i>Individual vs. Transparency</i>			
Variable	Item	Mean		SD		MWU test		Mean		SD		MWU test		MWU test	MWU test		
		F	M	F	M			F	M	F	M			Female		Male	
						z	p					z	p	z	p	z	p
Equal	When setting my salary, it was important to me that the manager and I earned approximately the same amount.	4.41	3.21	2.19	2.42	-2.58	0.01	3.77	3.72	2.16	2.12	-0.05	0.97	1.24	0.22	-1.00	0.32
Altruism (P)	When setting my salary, it was important to me that there was a sufficient amount of money left over for the manager.	4.36	3.33	2.12	2.31	-2.02	0.04	3.52	3.86	2.23	2.18	0.61	0.55	1.56	0.12	-1.01	0.32
Image Concerns	When setting my salary, it was important to me that the manager perceived my salary as appropriate.	3.90	3.21	1.94	2.20	-1.57	0.12	3.77	3.31	2.24	2.21	-0.77	0.45	0.29	0.77	0.07	0.95
Variable Payoff	When setting my salary, it was important that the manager received a payoff based on my performance.	5.38	4.15	1.79	2.13	-2.68	0.01	4.68	4.59	2.12	2.29	0.01	1.00	1.40	0.16	-0.97	0.34
Max	My goal was to achieve the highest possible payoff.	4.90	5.69	1.83	1.61	2.15	0.03	4.97	5.14	1.83	1.88	0.42	0.68	-0.12	0.91	1.26	0.21
Fairness	I consider the manager's salary as fair.	5.05	4.15	1.97	1.90	-2.04	0.04	4.23	3.66	1.94	2.04	-1.13	0.26	1.76	0.08	1.02	0.31

Items are measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = does not apply at all, 7 = fully applies). As Worker A is the primary focus, the table only includes data from subjects in the role of Worker A.

A. 2: Questionnaire salary setting motives – Only *Transparency*

Variable	Item	<i>Transparency</i>					
		Mean		SD		MWU test	
		F	M	F	M		
						z	p
Expected Pay Gap	To what extent do you agree with the following statement: I think that in the past experiment, the average salaries of men and women differed.	5.84	5.28	1.16	1.73	-1.26	0.21
Consideration Pay Gap	To what extent do you agree with the following statement: When determining my salary, I took into account possible salary differences between men and women from the past experiment.	3.29	1.59	2.40	1.48	-3.11	0.00

Items are measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = does not apply at all, 7 = fully applies. As Worker A is the primary focus, the table only includes data from subjects in the role of Worker A.

A. 3: Questionnaire salary setting motives – *Individual & Group*

		<i>Individual</i>						<i>Group</i>						<i>Individual vs. Group</i>			
Variable	Item	Mean		SD		MWU test		Mean		SD		MWU test		MWU test	MWU test		
		F	M	F	M			F	M	F	M			Female		Male	
						z	p					z	p	z	p	z	p
Equal	When setting my salary, it was important to me that the manager and I earned approximately the same amount.	4.41	3.21	2.19	2.42	-2.58	0.01	3.34	3.25	2.13	2.23	-0.26	0.80	2.16	0.03	-0.46	0.65
Altruism (P)	When setting my salary, it was important to me that there was a sufficient amount of money left over for the manager.	4.36	3.33	2.12	2.31	-2.02	0.04	3.24	3.25	2.03	2.20	-0.13	0.89	2.25	0.02	0.05	0.96
Image Concerns	When setting my salary, it was important to me that the manager perceived my salary as appropriate.	3.90	3.21	1.94	2.20	-1.57	0.12	2.92	3.36	1.87	2.21	0.74	0.46	2.22	0.03	-0.40	0.69
Variable Payoff	When setting my salary, it was important that the manager received a payoff based on my performance.	5.38	4.15	1.79	2.13	-2.68	0.01	4.29	4.00	2.03	2.10	-0.62	0.53	2.46	0.01	0.32	0.75
Max	My goal was to achieve the highest possible payoff.	4.90	5.69	1.83	1.61	2.15	0.03	4.74	5.50	2.11	1.72	1.40	0.16	0.13	0.90	0.56	0.57
Fairness	I consider the manager's salary as fair.	5.05	4.15	1.97	1.90	-2.04	0.04	2.84	2.36	1.78	1.42	-1.06	0.29	4.40	0.00	4.15	0.00

Items are measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = does not apply at all, 7 = fully applies). As Worker A is the primary focus, the table only includes data from subjects in the role of Worker A.

A. 4: Questionnaire salary setting motives – Only Group

Variable	Item	Group					
		Mean		SD		MWU test	
		F	M	F	M	z	p
Equal (B)	When setting my salary, it was important to me that Worker B and I earned approximately the same amount.	4.82	4.31	1.94	2.41	-0.75	0.45
Altruism (B)	When setting my salary, it was important to me that there was a sufficient amount of money left over for Worker B.	4.55	4.19	1.84	2.29	-0.48	0.63
Relative Performance	When setting my salary, I thought about my performance in relation to the performance of Worker B.	4.21	4.39	2.27	2.09	0.33	0.74
Less (B)	When setting my salary, it was important to me that Worker B earned less than me.	2.05	2.81	1.43	1.89	1.74	0.08
Image Concerns (B)	When setting my salary, it was important to me that Worker B perceived my salary as appropriate.	3.66	3.67	1.88	2.06	0.02	0.99
Thoughts Salary	When setting my salary, I thought about what salary Worker B would set.	5.53	4.72	1.75	2.04	-1.89	0.06
Assumed Opportunism	I assumed that Worker B would keep a large portion of the salary and give only a small amount to the manager.	4.26	4.92	2.14	1.92	1.31	0.19
Consideration of P	I assumed that Worker B would consider the manager appropriately.	3.39	3.33	2.02	1.94	-0.09	0.93
Control	If it had been possible, I would have liked to directly determine the manager's salary.	4.11	4.50	2.14	2.24	0.90	0.37
Power	I liked having most decision-making power over the share of the amount that was available for payoffs.	3.89	4.97	2.00	1.98	2.23	0.03


Items are measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = does not apply at all, 7 = fully applies). As Worker A is the primary focus, the table only includes data from subjects in the role of Worker A.

A. 5: General descriptive statistics


	All				Female				Male				MWU	
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Min	Max	z	p-value
<i>Individual</i>														
Pre-round output	8.69	2.89	3	17	9	3.05	3	17	8.39	2.73	3	14	-0.67	0.50
Output	18.97	5.45	7	32	19.05	5.57	8	32	18.90	5.41	7	29	-0.19	0.85
Self-set salary	14.89	3.80	8	20	13.87	3.24	8	20	15.91	4.08	9.8	20	1.98	0.05
Modesty	13.96	2.90	8	20	14.92	2.41	10	19	13	3.06	8	20	-2.91	0.00
Altruism	14.5	2.36	9	19	15.44	1.92	11	19	13.56	2.40	9	19	-3.48	0.00
<i>Transparency</i>														
Pre-round output	8.12	3.33	1	16	7.45	3.33	1	16	8.82	3.25	3	15	1.50	0.14
Output	18.17	6.55	5	41	16.87	6.45	5	33	19.55	6.49	9	41	1.56	0.12
Self-set salary	15.28	3.48	5	20	15.46	3.24	10	20	15.09	3.76	5	20	-0.34	0.74
Modesty	14.00	2.93	6	19	14.52	2.79	9	19	13.56	3.03	6	19	-1.30	0.20
Altruism	15.15	2.74	5	20	16.06	2.76	5	20	14.17	2.39	10	19	-3.17	0.00
<i>Group</i>														
Pre-round output	8.45	3.54	1	18	7.74	3.36	1	15	9.19	3.62	2	18	1.89	0.06
Output	18.34	6.27	8	37	17.26	5.76	8	35	19.47	6.65	10	37	1.52	0.13
Self-set salary	16.07	3.81	0.9	20	15.94	3.89	0.9	20	16.21	3.77	2	20	0.19	0.85
Modesty	13.88	3.08	7	20	14.63	3.04	9	20	13.08	2.97	7	19	-2.02	0.04
Altruism	15.04	2.40	7	19	15.50	2.69	7	19	14.56	1.98	8	18	-2.32	0.02

As Worker A is the primary focus, the table only includes data from subjects in the role of Worker A.

A. 6: Scatter plot estimated output and self-set salary in *Individual*



A. 7: Scatter plot estimated output and self-set salary in *Transparency*



A. 8: Regression analyses – Impact of gender on self-set salary in *Transparency*

Dependent Variable:	Self-set Salary										
<i>Transparency</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Female	0.562 (0.893)	0.767 (0.946)	0.662 (0.905)	0.518 (0.625)	0.0812 (0.662)	0.758 (0.649)	1.088 (0.709)	0.878 (0.742)	0.658 (0.851)	0.335 (0.574)	0.828 (0.669)
Pre-round Output	0.152 (0.192)	0.143 (0.193)	0.144 (0.194)	0.00292 (0.154)	-0.0216 (0.157)	0.192 (0.160)	-0.108 (0.171)	0.0488 (0.182)	0.229 (0.188)	0.0438 (0.143)	0.00219 (0.151)
Output	-0.0604 (0.107)	-0.0654 (0.108)	-0.0839 (0.111)	-0.00239 (0.0762)	0.00927 (0.0963)	-0.0495 (0.0791)	0.0782 (0.103)	0.00157 (0.0951)	-0.0665 (0.0997)	-0.00781 (0.0715)	0.0214 (0.0614)
Estimated Output	0.0567*** (0.0194)	0.0574*** (0.0198)	0.0504** (0.0203)	0.0366** (0.0161)	0.0253 (0.0212)	0.0162 (0.0214)	0.0357 (0.0222)	0.0241 (0.0210)	0.0405** (0.0182)	0.00831 (0.0209)	0.0157 (0.0223)
Altruism (G)		-0.121 (0.180)								0.0945 (0.120)	0.138 (0.145)
Modesty			-0.178 (0.150)							-0.0531 (0.107)	-0.00292 (0.115)
Equal (P)				-1.099*** (0.115)						-0.686*** (0.189)	-0.752*** (0.207)
Altruism (P)					-1.015*** (0.142)					-0.318* (0.160)	-0.443*** (0.161)
Max						1.245*** (0.193)				0.680** (0.313)	0.527* (0.284)
Fairness							-0.988*** (0.180)			0.139 (0.264)	0.188 (0.341)
Image Concerns								-0.804*** (0.169)		-0.140 (0.159)	0.0214 (0.174)
Variable Payoff									-0.509** (0.194)	0.0380 (0.168)	-0.0799 (0.184)
Further Controls											Yes
Constant	13.53*** (1.403)	15.40*** (2.802)	16.61*** (3.015)	18.30*** (1.032)	18.39*** (1.224)	7.563*** (1.286)	17.23*** (1.378)	16.69*** (1.565)	15.70*** (1.722)	14.09*** (3.870)	15.17*** (4.532)
Observations	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
R-squared	0.101	0.109	0.118	0.532	0.473	0.494	0.387	0.331	0.195	0.693	0.731

OLS Regression, reference category: Male. Further Controls are age, econ and big five personality traits. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A. 9: General descriptive statistics – *Individual vs. Transparency*

	All				Female				Male			
	<i>Indivi- dual</i>	<i>Trans- parency</i>	MWU		<i>Indivi- dual</i>	<i>Trans- parency</i>	MWU		<i>Indivi- dual</i>	<i>Trans- parency</i>	MWU	
	Mean	Mean	z	p- value	Mean	Mean	z	p- value	Mean	Mean	z	p- value
Pre-round output	8.69	8.12	1.57	0.12	9.00	7.45	2.34	0.02	8.39	8.82	-0.16	0.87
Output	18.97	18.17	1.10	0.27	19.05	16.87	1.65	0.10	18.90	19.55	-0.17	0.87
Self-set salary	14.89	15.28	-0.93	0.36	13.87	15.46	-2.19	0.03	15.91	15.09	0.58	0.56
Modesty	13.96	14.00	-0.07	0.94	14.92	14.52	0.58	0.57	13.00	13.56	-0.64	0.52
Altruism	14.50	15.15	-1.68	0.09	15.44	16.06	-1.67	0.10	13.56	14.17	-0.93	0.39
Estimated output	23.35	23.52	0.16	0.87	21.54	22.32	0.84	0.41	21.03	24.79	-0.65	0.52
Certainty estimated output	5.10	5.07	0.89	0.38	5.08	5.03	0.86	0.40	5.39	5.10	0.34	0.75
ΔEstimation: Estimated output – ac- tual output	4.37	5.35	-1.63	0.10	2.49	5.45	-0.51	0.61	1.56	5.24	-1.79	0.07
Overestimation	14.42	11.85	-0.58	0.56	7.94	14.67	-2.04	0.04	6.63	9.50	1.14	0.26
Underestimation	-3.03	-3.89	1.35	0.18	-2.71	-5.10	2.42	0.01	-3.57	-1.60	-0.50	0.63
Accurate	0.00	0.00	-	-	0.00	0.00	-	-	0.00	0.00	-	-

As Worker A is the primary focus, the table only includes data from subjects in the role of Worker A.

A. 10: Regression analyses – Transparency vs. Individual on self-set salary only female

Dependent Variable:	Self-set Salary										
Female	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Transparency	1.696** (0.803)	1.879** (0.774)	1.653** (0.794)	0.783 (0.606)	0.912 (0.602)	1.661*** (0.611)	0.719 (0.580)	1.553** (0.692)	1.185 (0.721)	0.566 (0.468)	0.641 (0.534)
Pre-round Output	0.224 (0.269)	0.181 (0.273)	0.232 (0.277)	0.0345 (0.192)	0.198 (0.205)	0.280 (0.262)	0.186 (0.220)	0.0648 (0.245)	0.185 (0.254)	0.137 (0.195)	0.152 (0.194)
Output	-0.106 (0.139)	-0.0884 (0.143)	-0.119 (0.149)	-0.0786 (0.0925)	-0.0782 (0.104)	-0.143 (0.128)	-0.103 (0.125)	-0.0169 (0.119)	-0.0489 (0.116)	-0.0729 (0.0989)	-0.0876 (0.0995)
Estimated Output	0.0530** (0.0219)	0.0512** (0.0217)	0.0527** (0.0226)	0.0449** (0.0186)	0.0242 (0.0242)	0.0224 (0.0234)	0.0193 (0.0233)	0.0231 (0.0221)	0.0208 (0.0156)	0.0114 (0.0220)	0.0107 (0.0231)
Altruism (G)		-0.343*** (0.126)								0.0571 (0.0989)	0.0293 (0.110)
Modesty			-0.0671 (0.167)							0.0543 (0.0877)	0.0308 (0.0980)
Equal (P)				-1.046*** (0.120)						-0.424** (0.202)	-0.384 (0.261)
Altruism (P)					-0.977*** (0.140)					-0.452*** (0.129)	-0.460*** (0.156)
Max						0.984*** (0.169)				0.293* (0.158)	0.357** (0.178)
Fairness							-1.147*** (0.140)			-0.313 (0.217)	-0.332 (0.279)
Image Concerns								-0.790*** (0.175)		0.0239 (0.146)	0.0119 (0.175)
Variable Payoff									-0.843*** (0.200)	-0.212 (0.177)	-0.142 (0.203)
Further Controls											Yes
Constant	12.70*** (1.384)	18.10*** (2.146)	13.89*** (3.091)	18.70*** (1.220)	17.29*** (1.473)	8.747*** (1.222)	19.51*** (1.389)	16.18*** (1.664)	17.20*** (2.108)	17.10*** (2.363)	15.51*** (3.237)
Observations	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70
R-squared	0.156	0.212	0.158	0.592	0.539	0.419	0.571	0.367	0.371	0.738	0.748

OLS Regression, reference category: *Individual*. Further Controls are age, econ and big five personality traits. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A. 11: Regression analyses – Impact of gender on self-set salary in Group

Dependent Variable:	Self-set Salary										
Group	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Female	-0.305 (0.926)	-0.508 (0.970)	-0.211 (1.013)	-0.208 (0.864)	-0.277 (0.872)	0.378 (0.838)	-0.0235 (0.883)	-0.605 (0.825)	-0.326 (0.908)	-0.449 (0.760)	-0.731 (1.047)
Pre-round Output	-0.342 (0.263)	-0.301 (0.262)	-0.374 (0.251)	-0.226 (0.245)	-0.287 (0.238)	-0.194 (0.248)	-0.363 (0.264)	-0.255 (0.241)	-0.342 (0.265)	-0.00380 (0.219)	-0.122 (0.267)
Output	0.205 (0.159)	0.190 (0.155)	0.214 (0.155)	0.151 (0.156)	0.187 (0.148)	0.110 (0.139)	0.225 (0.159)	0.150 (0.152)	0.202 (0.160)	-0.00607 (0.137)	0.0479 (0.178)
Estimated Output	0.00471 (0.0119)	0.000462 (0.0109)	0.00681 (0.0119)	-0.000785 (0.0122)	0.00216 (0.0109)	0.00693 (0.00975)	0.000519 (0.0165)	0.0152 (0.0161)	0.00381 (0.0123)	0.00125 (0.0188)	0.00846 (0.0175)
Altruism (G)		0.236 (0.190)								0.263 (0.205)	0.291 (0.246)
Modesty			-0.0754 (0.136)							0.0154 (0.110)	0.0820 (0.124)
Equal (P)				-0.608*** (0.186)						-0.307 (0.270)	-0.299 (0.239)
Altruism (P)					-0.633*** (0.181)					-0.0430 (0.337)	0.0323 (0.349)
Max						0.882*** (0.180)				0.743*** (0.186)	0.711*** (0.206)
Fairness							-0.570** (0.250)			0.0694 (0.237)	0.00610 (0.239)
Image Concerns								-0.740*** (0.239)		-0.743* (0.396)	-0.868** (0.420)
Variable Payoff									0.0482 (0.207)	0.442** (0.191)	0.371* (0.214)
Further Controls											Yes
Constant	15.28*** (1.777)	11.83*** (3.849)	16.33*** (2.724)	17.34*** (2.114)	17.23*** (1.997)	10.87*** (1.869)	16.50*** (1.798)	17.80*** (1.696)	15.15*** (1.996)	9.924* (4.997)	8.304 (6.076)
Observations	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74
R-squared	0.029	0.050	0.032	0.146	0.150	0.221	0.086	0.181	0.030	0.432	0.488

OLS Regression, reference category: Male. Further Controls are age, econ and big five personality traits. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A. 12: Regression analyses – Influencing factors on self-set salary in Group

Dependent Variable:	Self-set Salary		
<i>Group</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	All	All
Female	-0.449 (0.760)	-0.149 (0.834)	-0.453 (1.152)
Pre-round Output	-0.00380 (0.219)	0.109 (0.224)	-0.00485 (0.298)
Output	-0.00607 (0.137)	-0.107 (0.152)	-0.0619 (0.214)
Estimated Output	0.00125 (0.0188)	0.0110 (0.0123)	0.0139 (0.0184)
Altruism (G)	0.263 (0.205)	0.0731 (0.170)	0.0370 (0.194)
Modesty	0.0154 (0.110)	0.0854 (0.127)	0.128 (0.121)
Equal (P)	-0.307 (0.270)	-0.103 (0.262)	0.00516 (0.276)
Altruism (P)	-0.0430 (0.337)	0.00357 (0.281)	-0.143 (0.284)
Max	0.743*** (0.186)	0.663*** (0.222)	0.595** (0.233)
Fairness	0.0694 (0.237)	0.159 (0.262)	0.129 (0.258)
Image Concerns	-0.743* (0.396)	-0.501* (0.255)	-0.424 (0.274)
Variable Payoff	0.442** (0.191)	0.340* (0.171)	0.275 (0.178)
Better		1.355 (0.985)	1.012 (1.183)
Est_Better		0.779 (0.859)	1.426 (0.948)
Equal (B)		-0.0338 (0.381)	-0.131 (0.375)
Altruism (B)		0.246 (0.367)	0.316 (0.368)
Image Concerns (B)		-0.169 (0.210)	-0.407 (0.256)
Consideration of P		-0.793*** (0.259)	-0.833** (0.311)
Further Controls			Yes
Constant	9.924* (4.997)	13.29** (5.497)	10.90* (6.196)
Observations	74	74	74
R-squared	0.432	0.524	0.587

OLS Regression. *Better* = 1 if Worker A's output exceeds Worker B's output, and 0 if Worker A's output is equal to or lower than Worker B's output. *Est_Better* = 1 if Worker A estimates that her output exceeds Worker B's output, and 0 if Worker A estimates that her output is equal to or lower than Worker B's output. Further Controls are age, econ and big five personality traits. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A. 13: General descriptive statistics – *Individual vs. Group*

	All				Female				Male			
	<i>Indivi- dual</i>	<i>Group</i>	MWU		<i>Indivi- dual</i>	<i>Group</i>	MWU		<i>Indivi- dual</i>	<i>Group</i>	MWU	
	Mean	Mean	z	p-value	Mean	Mean	z	p-value	Mean	Mean	z	p-value
Pre-round output	8.69	8.45	0.91	0.34	9.00	7.74	1.91	0.06	8.39	9.19	-0.71	0.48
Output	18.97	18.34	1.13	0.26	19.05	17.26	1.75	0.08	18.90	19.47	-0.22	0.82
Self-set salary	14.89	16.07	-2.19	0.03	13.87	15.94	-2.97	0.00	15.91	16.21	-0.20	0.85
Modesty	13.96	13.88	0.39	0.70	14.92	14.63	0.70	0.49	13.00	13.08	-0.20	0.84
Altruism	14.5	15.04	-1.66	0.10	15.44	15.50	-0.78	0.43	13.56	14.56	-2.07	0.04
Estimated output	23.35	20.09	0.98	0.33	21.54	19.21	1.00	0.32	21.03	25.15	0.35	0.73
Certainty estimated output	5.10	5.27	-0.90	0.34	5.08	5.16	-0.47	0.64	5.39	5.13	-0.81	0.42
Δ Estimation: Estimated output – ac- tual output	4.37	1.76	-0.37	0.71	2.49	1.95	0.04	0.97	1.56	6.26	-0.50	0.62
Overestimation	14.42	6.61	0.51	0.61	7.94	6.59	-0.63	0.53	6.63	22.29	1.40	0.16
Underestimation	-3.03	-2.93	0.24	0.81	-2.71	-2.38	0.04	0.97	-3.57	-3.24	0.52	0.60
Accurate	0.00	0.00	-	-	0.00	0.00	-	-	0.00	0.00	-	-

As Worker A is the primary focus, the table only includes data from subjects in the role of Worker A.

A. 14: Regression analyses – *Group* vs. *Individual* on self-set salary only female

Dependent Variable:	Self-set Salary										
Female	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
<i>Group</i>	1.806** (0.816)	1.802** (0.809)	1.861** (0.793)	1.076 (0.676)	1.036 (0.746)	1.960*** (0.692)	-0.128 (0.891)	1.216 (0.861)	1.455* (0.865)	0.755 (0.683)	0.331 (0.745)
Pre-round Output	-0.517 (0.338)	-0.480 (0.326)	-0.483 (0.325)	-0.225 (0.328)	-0.449 (0.305)	-0.319 (0.316)	-0.391 (0.326)	-0.478 (0.308)	-0.454 (0.341)	-0.142 (0.297)	-0.246 (0.333)
Output	0.148 (0.206)	0.123 (0.193)	0.145 (0.203)	0.0232 (0.208)	0.171 (0.192)	0.0169 (0.182)	0.136 (0.210)	0.185 (0.197)	0.149 (0.209)	0.0183 (0.195)	0.104 (0.230)
Estimated Output	0.0727 (0.0464)	0.0745 (0.0494)	0.0678 (0.0475)	0.0441 (0.0360)	0.0498 (0.0356)	0.0565* (0.0338)	0.0329 (0.0378)	0.0526 (0.0350)	0.0621 (0.0374)	0.0196 (0.0296)	0.0254 (0.0272)
Altruism (G)		0.236 (0.193)								0.200 (0.155)	0.173 (0.149)
Modesty			0.0830 (0.158)							0.133 (0.101)	0.0960 (0.0912)
Equal (P)				-0.786*** (0.201)						-0.230 (0.269)	-0.192 (0.287)
Altruism (P)					-0.758*** (0.150)					-0.371** (0.151)	-0.407*** (0.147)
Max						0.967*** (0.164)				0.678*** (0.153)	0.662*** (0.151)
Fairness							-0.901*** (0.190)			-0.234 (0.183)	-0.215 (0.171)
Image Concerns								-0.679*** (0.189)		-0.284 (0.188)	-0.447 (0.278)
Variable Payoff									-0.378* (0.218)	0.105 (0.179)	0.0565 (0.181)
Further Controls											Yes
Constant	14.19*** (1.799)	10.64*** (3.819)	12.79*** (3.612)	17.99*** (2.333)	16.93*** (1.914)	10.49*** (1.736)	18.69*** (1.856)	16.20*** (1.894)	15.86*** (2.308)	10.35** (5.116)	7.034 (6.609)
Observations	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77
R-squared	0.138	0.160	0.141	0.332	0.310	0.389	0.330	0.253	0.174	0.567	0.627

OLS Regression, reference category: *Individual*. Further Controls: age, econ and big five personality traits. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

A. 15: Comparison principal and Worker B

Variable	Principal Group	Principal Individual	Worker B	MWU Principal Group vs. principal Individual		WSR Principal Group vs. Worker B		MWU Principal Individual vs. Worker B	
	Mean	Mean	Mean	z	p-value	z	p-value	Z	p-value
Female									
Equal	3.34	4.41	4.82	2.16	0.03	3.28	0.00	-0.74	0.46
Altruism	3.24	4.36	4.55	2.25	0.02	3.04	0.00	-0.23	0.82
Image Concerns	2.92	3.90	3.66	2.22	0.03	2.30	0.02	0.57	0.57
Fairness	2.84	5.54	3.63	4.40	0.00	1.90	0.06	2.99	0.00
Male									
Equal	3.25	3.21	4.31	-0.46	0.65	2.45	0.01	-2.00	0.05
Altruism	3.25	3.33	4.19	0.05	0.96	3.07	0.00	-1.56	0.12
Image Concerns	3.36	3.21	3.67	-0.40	0.69	1.85	0.06	-1.14	0.26
Fairness	2.36	4.15	3.83	4.15	0.00	4.23	0.00	0.64	0.53

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Declaration of generative AI and AI-assisted technologies in the writing process

During the preparation of this work the authors used ChatGPT in order to improve readability and language of the manuscript. After using this tool, the authors reviewed and edited the content as needed and take full responsibility for the content of the published article.

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