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Payroll Tax, Employment and Labor Market Concentration

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Payroll Tax, Employment and Labor Market Concentration^{*}

Abstract

How much employment can be generated by decreasing payroll taxes? We examine this question by exploring the staggered rollout of a large payroll tax reform in Brazil. Using administrative matched employer-employee data, we find an increase of 5 percent on employment due to both firm growth and firm entry, no impact on wages and a significant increase in profits. Moreover, employment effects are driven by less concentrated labor markets, consistent with predictions from an oligopsony model.

JEL classification

H2, J3, J6, J42

Keywords

payroll tax, employment, wages, profits, oligopsony

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1 Introduction

Payroll taxation is an important policy instrument for governments. It is a large source of public revenue and a major component of labor costs, with tax rates paid by the firms averaging 18.4% across OECD countries (OECD, 2019). Despite its potentially distortionary nature, the effects of payroll taxes on employment are unclear as wages may fully adjust to changes in the tax firms face, as predicted by canonical models of tax incidence.¹

In this paper, we examine this question by studying the effects of a large reduction in payroll taxes for selected sectors in Brazil. Our empirical findings show a positive sizable effect on total employment due to both firm entry and firm growth in treated sectors, but no impact on wages. Moreover, the effects are driven by labor markets with relatively low levels of concentration which is consistent with predictions of an oligopsony model.

Our setup studies a change in firm taxation that was part of a government program called *Plano Brasil Maior* (PBM). This tax reform altered the tax base upon which payroll taxes are calculated for selected sectors in Brazil, *de facto* introducing an average reduction of 51% in the total payroll tax burden.² We exploit the gradual implementation of the PBM tax reform across 65 sectors (4-digit ISIC) from 2009 to 2014 in an event-study design.

Our baseline results show a sharp increase in sectoral employment in the first quarter after the tax cut that intensifies over the following quarters and stabilizes around 5 percent, an employment semi-elasticity of approximately 0.5% per percentage-point reduction in the effective payroll tax burden. We find that sectors with above-median (below-median) labor cost reduction experience an average increase in employment by 7.3% (2.2%). Furthermore, total increase in sectoral employment can be decomposed as 40% coming from firm entry (i.e. jobs created by new firms) and 60% from firm growth (i.e. increase in hiring by existing firms). On the other hand, we find small and insignificant effects on wages and show that PBM implementation was not designed as a response to sectoral trends in labor outcomes.

¹At least in the case when aggregate labor supply is much less elastic than aggregate labor demand.

²Instead of paying a flat 20% on wages, firms were required to contribute to social security with tax rates between 1% and 2% on gross revenue (net of export earnings). See Section 2.1 for a detailed explanation.

We also explore how our main estimates vary according to the degree of local labor market concentration. We follow Berger et al. (2022) and measure labor market concentration as a wage-bill Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for all 558 micro-regions in Brazil. In particular, we find that firms in less concentrated labor markets are responsible for almost all of the estimated effect on employment. Then we present an oligopsony model that rationalizes our findings. Firms are able to pay less than the worker’s marginal productivity due to imperfect labor mobility within and across markets but must trade off lower wages against higher firm size. The model characterizes the response to a labor-cost reduction that reaches only a subset of the employers competing for the same workers, a suitable assumption in the PBM environment, where only selected sectors were included in the reform and firms under the simplified tax regime *SIMPLES* are not included in the new taxation, leaving many competitors in each local labor market untreated. Unlike in a monopsony model, the existence of many firms makes labor market concentration a relevant measure in this context. In particular, there is less scope for firms in less concentrated labor markets to adjust wages in response to changes in labor costs. As concentration varies greatly across labor markets within a country, the employment and wage effects of a payroll tax reduction are thus likely highly market specific. The oligopsony model then predicts that (i) the impact of a labor subsidy is positive on both employment and wages, (ii) the employment effect dominates the wage effect for most levels of labor market concentration,³ and (iii) the employment (wage) effect decreases (increases) as markets become more concentrated. Taken together, our empirical estimates are qualitatively consistent with the theoretical prediction based on the oligopsony model.

Next, we take advantage of the micro-structure of our matched employer-employee administrative dataset to study heterogeneity with respect to firm size and workers’ education. We find that employment across different firm sizes and education levels reacts to the tax reform in a similar way. We also consider heterogeneity across sectors with respect to labor

³Based on a model calibration with plausible elasticities of substitution between firms within and across markets.

informality, as this is a significant source of jobs in developing countries. Importantly, another potential reason for the very small impact on wages in Brazil is the very highly elastic labor supply due to movement between the formal and informal sectors. However, we do not find any differential response to the payroll tax cut comparing sectors with high and low levels of informality.

Finally, we perform a cost-benefit analysis of the PBM tax reform and estimate firm profit gains. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals that this policy created a total of 322,054 jobs at a cost of a job of approximately US\$17,055 in 2018 prices, around 2.1 times more costly than estimates from a major federal program that transfers funds to municipalities to finance local public spending in Brazil (Corbi et al., 2019). Also, based on a structural approach we find that firms' profits increase by 106%.

The evidence on the labor market effects of changing labor costs is quite mixed. A few studies find that the incidence of such costs is fully on wages with no significant effects on employment for the US (e.g. Gruber, 1994; Gruber and Krueger, 1991) and Latin American countries (e.g. Gruber, 1997; MacIsaac and Rama, 1997; Mondino and Montoya, 2004).⁴ Other papers show that a share of the (but not the total) increase in the payroll tax burden was passed onto wages (e.g. Hamermesh, 1979; Holmlund, 1983; Kugler and Kugler, 2009).⁵ More recent work finds zero wage effect (relatively to the control group) but a sizeable impact on employment in Sweden (Saez et al., 2019), Colombia (Kugler et al., 2017), Finland (Benzarti and Harju, 2021a) and Argentina (Lauletta, 2023).⁶ Relatedly, payroll tax

⁴Gruber (1997) looks at the Chilean case, where the privatization of Social Security decreased the payroll tax by an average of 25% over 6 years. Using firm-level data from the manufacturing sector, he estimates that the incidence is fully on wages with no effects on employment. MacIsaac and Rama (1997) shows that the effect of mandated benefits in the Ecuadorian labor market is mitigated by a reduction of base earnings. And, similarly, Mondino and Montoya (2004) estimate that wages are 2.8-8% lower for workers with social security in Argentina.

⁵In particular, Hamermesh (1979) estimates that 0-36% of social security tax were shifted to wages, with a large negative effect on adults employment. Kugler and Kugler (2009) find that a 10 percent increase in payroll taxes reduces formal employment by five percent with wages decreasing by 1.4-2.3% in Colombia.

⁶Saez et al. (2019) find a zero effect on net-of-tax wages in Sweden for the directly treated young workers compared to the slightly older ineligible control group, and a 2–3 percentage point increase in youth employment. This replicates some of the findings in Skedinger (2014), Egebark and Kaunitz (2013, 2018) and Bennmarker et al. (2014) for the same country, also those in Saez et al. (2012) who study the effects of a cohort-based reform in Greece. Kugler et al. (2017) analyze the effects of a more recent tax reform

can help firms that are liquidity-constrained during recessions leading to higher employment and wages in Finland (Benzarti and Harju, 2021b) and in the case of a strong and salient relationship between contributions and expected benefits in France (Bozio et al., 2019).

To understand their findings, the empirical literature explicitly or implicitly assumes a standard competitive labor market model in which the impact of payroll taxes on employment is nonexistent and wages fully adjust when workers value one-to-one the benefits they get from payroll taxation or in the extreme cases of inelastic labor supply or perfectly elastic labor demand (Summers, 1989; Gruber, 1997). Then, evidence of employment effects associated with payroll tax changes is typically attributed to wage rigidities such as legal minimum wages and pay equity within firms (e.g., Kugler and Kugler, 2009; Saez et al., 2019)⁷ or differences in worker’s bargaining power as derived from firm heterogeneity in the pool of firms’ hirings (Bíró et al., 2022) or increased self-employment opportunities (Amodio et al., 2025). Our paper contributes to this literature by offering an alternative rationale to understand why employment effects can be sizable even in absence of wage or contract frictions. By allowing firms to operate in oligopsonistic labor markets, the model predicts and we empirically show that for all observed levels of concentration the tax burden is not borne by workers.

Our paper is also related to the empirical literature that explored the early stage of the payroll tax reduction introduced by the PBM (Dallava, 2014; Scherer, 2015).⁸ Regarding these works, our paper offers three main advantages. First, we complement them by present-

introduced in Colombia in 2012 that reduced payroll taxes by 13.5% for workers earning below 2 minimum wages and the self-employed with more than 2 employees. They find an increase of 15-32% in the probability of formal employment and 15% in the likelihood of transitioning into registered employment.

⁷For Colombia, downward wage rigidity is consistent with binding minimum wages (Maloney, 2004). In Sweden, one explanation is that employers cannot discriminate net pay by age due to fairness norms within the firm.

⁸Dallava (2014) conducts a difference-in-difference analysis by comparing sectors (within each 1-digit class) that are treated against those which are not over the period 2011-2012. She finds positive effects on employment and wages only for Information and Telecommunications. Scherer (2015) also analyzes the reform in 2011-2012 exploiting the fact that firms that belonged to the *SIMPLES* tax regime, as explained in Section 2.1, were not eligible for the tax reduction and used them as a control group. However, PBM implementation provided an incentive for firms to switch from *SIMPLES* to the standard tax regime, which we empirically show to be the case in subsection 4.2. This also accounts for the unreasonably large effects on employment that he reports, 15% on average.

ing a labor market model to understand the key findings while exploiting similar institutional changes. Second, we explore the timing of all tax changes implemented until the end of 2014 while these papers focused only at the first round of PBM implementation. By the end of 2012, only one quarter of eligible sectors had been affected by the policy (Figure 1). Third, when assigning sectors to treatment, they did not separate or exclude those for which treatment eligibility was defined by the problematic product-based NCM criterion (see Section 2.1). In more recent work, Lobel (2024) examines data on payment receipts to the PBM tax regime to evaluate the reform’s impact on workers’ and firms’ outcomes. His dataset spans from 2008 to 2017 at the firm-by-year level. His findings indicate a significant increase in employment (12%), likely attributable to the tax reduction and potentially concurrent industrial policies aimed at boosting manufacturing. Additionally, he observes small but notable average wage effects, primarily driven by an increase in top-level wages within firms. Our analysis differs from his in several ways. First, we focus solely on the sector-based tax reduction to separate it from other PBM reform components, such as import tax increases for products selected through NCM for payroll tax relief and loan subsidies for capital goods investments. This choice matters for identification. The PBM assigned sectors to the new regime through two distinct channels: economic sector and product (NCM) codes. His regressions keep NCM-allocated sectors while assigning treatment by sector eligibility alone, so firms relieved through the product channel while operating in ineligible sectors remain on the control side of his comparison (his instrumental-variables strategy classifies them as always-takers). Our assignment applies the complete statutory rule instead: sectors touched by the product criterion enter neither the treatment nor the control group (Table 1) and are analyzed separately in Appendix C, where we find no effects, so both arms of our comparison are clean of product-channel relief. Second, we construct a sector-by-month panel that aligns precisely with the policy implementation level. Third, we limit our analysis to the period ending in 2014 to avoid conflating different policy phases. Starting in February 2015, the federal government implemented measures that reversed several aspects of the policy, in-

cluding increased rates for revenue-based compensatory taxes, optional adoption of the new tax regime, and the exclusion of several sectors from the tax regime by 2017.⁹ Fourth, we take the reform to household-survey data and examine the informal labor market, a margin that firm tax records cannot observe and is important in the developing countries context. Our paper provides suggestive evidence that part of the formal-employment effect reflects formalization of previously informal jobs (point estimates imply roughly two-thirds, though the survey is too imprecise to pin this share down).

Finally, there is a recent and growing literature that provides several insights on how to measure labor market concentration and its association with market power and welfare. In particular, Azar et al. (2022) use a rich vacancies dataset to find that higher labor market concentration is associated with lower posted wages, which is evidence that concentration increases labor market power. Berger et al. (2022) map measures of concentration to labor market power through a structural model with oligopsony. They simulate a significant increase in the minimum wage and find that only very small firms exit and there are positive employment and welfare effects, consistent with the imperfect labor market theory they propose. Similar to them, we use the wage-bill Herfindahl as a measure of labor market concentration, and compute it for submarkets defined by each of the 558 microregions in Brazil. We add to this literature by quantifying how the labor market effects of a payroll tax reform vary with labor market concentration and by showing that an oligopsony framework provides a mechanism behind the observed employment and wage effects of payroll tax changes.¹⁰ Our analysis is closely related to Lobel (2024), who also finds that lower labor market power boosts employment effects, although our analysis differs in both the sample

⁹After four years of progressively expanding the payroll tax reform, 2015 saw the start of a pushback against these measures. The government sought to increase tax rates via provisional measure 669/2015 to address the tax collection deficit caused by the PBM. Due to political instability, the president of the Brazilian Federal Senate rejected the provisional measure, delaying the tax increases until Law 13.161/2015 was issued later that year. In March 2017, provisional measure 774/2017 further scaled back the reform, returning several sectors within the PBM to the previous wage bill-based contribution regime.

¹⁰Earlier theoretical work develops models of oligopsony or monopsonistic competition (e.g. Bhaskar et al., 2002; To, 2009). These studies do not estimate the effects of payroll taxes on employment and wages, or relate it to labor market concentration.

and the unit of treatment.

In Section 2 we provide background information on the Brazilian payroll tax reform and describe the data. Next, we present the empirical strategy in Section 3. In Section 4, we report our main estimates of the effects of the payroll tax reduction on wages and employment, examine potential mechanisms and threats to identification, including firms' self-selection into the PBM tax scheme, spillovers to non-treated sectors, and the reallocation of employment between the formal and informal sectors. Then, we study how they vary according to labor market concentration and explore further heterogeneity by firm, sector and individual characteristics. Finally, we conclude in Section 5

2 Background and Data

In this section, we first describe the Brazilian tax system and the introduction of the PBM tax reform. Then we present the main sources of data, discuss summary statistics of our sample and show the staggered roll-out of the reform across sectors.

2.1 The Payroll Tax Reform

Under the Brazilian Corporate Tax System, firms choose one of two main tax regimes in the beginning of each calendar year. Under the standard regime, firms pay a contribution to social security (COFINS) and to the employees' savings program (PIS/PASEP) of varying rates, based on gross income, and a flat payroll tax of 20%. They also pay additional corporate taxes (CSLL and IRPJ) on either gross or net income according to revenue size.¹¹ The *SIMPLES* tax regime was enacted in December 1996 and created a differentiated tax system for micro, small and medium enterprises in Brazil, which reduced red tape, consolidated several taxes and social security contributions into a single payment based on gross income, and lowered the overall tax burden (Assunção and Monteiro, 2012).

¹¹This regime is governed by Law 8,212, from July 24, 1991.

The year of 2011 marked the introduction of *Plano Brasil Maior* (PBM) - a set of industrial policies created by President Dilma Rousseff's government aimed at increasing formal job creation and fostering the competitiveness of Brazilian companies. Among other measures¹², this program implemented a tax reform that changed the base upon which the social security tax is calculated for some sectors. With the implementation of the PBM on selected sectors, all standard tax regime firms were exempted from paying the 20% payroll tax and were instead required to contribute to social security with tax rates between 1% and 2% on gross revenue (net of exports).¹³ Firms in the *SIMPLES* tax regime were not directly affected by PBM.

As described above, the PBM plan not only reduced payroll taxes but also replaced them with an increase in taxes on corporate revenue. While, theoretically, we might expect a reduction in the payroll tax to increase labor use and a tax on revenue would be expected to have the opposite effect (reducing output and thereby reducing labor), it should be noted that in practice the first dominates the second in terms of its impact on firms. The overall tax burden decreases for almost all firms allocated to the PBM reform in the analysis, ranging from close to zero to an 84 percent reduction across treated sectors (see Table 2 and section 2.2). Therefore, our estimates mostly capture the effect of the payroll tax change, while the increase in tax revenue is likely second order, and thus can be compared to other reforms that changed only payroll taxes.

2.2 Data Sources and Sample Description

The labor market outcomes data comes from *Relação Anual de Informações Sociais* (RAIS), spanning the period from 2009 to 2014. RAIS is a matched employer-employee administrative

¹²Other measures that were part of this program include the Programa de Sustentação do Investimento that expanded credit lines by the Brazilian Development Bank's (BNDES), the creation of REINTEGRA, a tax waiver of federal tax costs for exporting companies of manufactured goods, and the introduction of a minimum Brazilian-made content in investments in the local oil industry. For an overview of the PBM, see Brasil (2011). Virtually all of these other measures were directed at the manufacturing sector, so should not represent an important concern in our empirical analysis that focuses on services.

¹³Initially published as Provisional Measure (PM) 540, and later converted into Law 12,546.

dataset assembled yearly by the Brazilian Ministry of Labor (MTE), providing a high quality census of the Brazilian formal labor market. The Brazilian government uses RAIS to check the eligibility criteria of mandated benefits programs. Firms are required to report workforce data yearly (which can be reinforced by employees if they fail to receive benefits because of a report error). This creates a structure where workers and firms have an incentive to provide accurate information. Virtually all formal workers are included in RAIS, except interns and domestic workers.

The dataset includes information at the level of workers and firms. Firm-level data include detailed sector information and tax regime.¹⁴ Worker-level data includes age, gender, education, monthly wage in December, admission and dismissal date. Even though RAIS is produced on an yearly basis, we use the admission and dismissal dates to reconstruct a monthly workforce panel aggregated at the 4-digit sector level. This is an important aspect of the analysis, since the allocation of sectors (treatment) in the new tax regime is also made on a monthly basis.

Our Sample. A complicating feature of the PBM is that the criteria used in the legislative acts to include a sector under the gross revenue contribution scheme were not always drafted in a uniform fashion. While many firms eligible for PBM were included according to a list of standard 4-digit ISIC *sectors*, some were included instead according to a list of *product* codes from the Mercosur Common Nomenclature (NCM). The second criterion is problematic for our analysis as firms that were eligible to the new regime according to the second criterion were exempt from payroll taxation only in proportion to the share of their gross income coming from eligible products. As we do not have access to detailed firm-level information on gross income by product, we are unable to measure the extent of the tax exemption within a firm.¹⁵

¹⁴Firms may belong to the standard tax regime or a simplified system called SIMPLES, according to predetermined gross revenue thresholds and sector.

¹⁵For a richer discussion about the introduction of the PBM program and its eligibility criteria, see earlier research by Baumgartner (2017).

Table 1 tabulates Level 1 ISIC sectors included in the PBM reform according to ISIC and NCM criteria. NCM-based eligibility affected mainly specific agriculture and manufacturing products, while ISIC-based eligibility was mainly used in services.¹⁶ We focus our analysis on all Level 1 ISIC categories (in bold) that had at least one 4-digit sector included in PBM by the first criterion (ISIC or sector-based) and none by the second criterion (NCM or product-based). This strategy leaves us with a final sample of 219 sectors, among which 65 eventually are included in the PBM. While the other 154 never-treated sectors do not offer direct variation for identifying the treatment effect of interest, they are useful for estimating time fixed effects and seasonality patterns specific to different broadly defined economic sectors (ISIC section level).

This strategy leaves us with a final sample of 15,768 sector-month observations spread across 219 sectors and the 2009-2014 period.¹⁷ Within each sector, all firms in the standard tax regime are included in our main dataset.¹⁸ They correspond to around 20.4 million workers and 1.9 million firms, or 50% of total employment and total active firms in 2014.¹⁹ Table 2 reports summary characteristics of the main variable in our analysis. The average 4-digit sector employs nationally close to 95,000 workers, ranging from small sectors with a little less than 200 to sectors with more than 1,350,000. The workforce has 32% of individuals with elementary school or lower and a majority of 55% with a high school degree. The


¹⁶In Appendix Section C, we replicate our empirical analysis to sectors included in the PBM tax reform by the NCM criterion, based on products instead of sector ISIC codes. Tables C.1 and C.2 replicate baseline estimates reported in Tables 4 and 5 and show that the estimated effects are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero across all specifications.

¹⁷We exclude data from 2015 onwards for two reasons. First, in mid-2015 the federal government started a somewhat unsuccessful attempt to roll back the new tax scheme, significantly changing the new taxation structure, creating uncertainty for the new regime throughout the year and eventually making participation in the program optional. The associated political turmoil increased the animosity between the Executive and Legislative powers, culminating in the impeachment process of president Dilma Rousseff in 2016. Moreover, on the economic front Brazil faced the most severe economic downturn in its history in 2015-2016. Results are qualitatively similar and somewhat larger if we include data from 2015.

¹⁸In order to maintain a minimum empirical relevance, we exclude the only two 4-digit sector (spatial transportation and street vendors) that had less than 100 employees nationwide at any point across our period of analysis.

¹⁹Firms in the SIMPLES tax regime are excluded from our main analysis as they were not directly affected by the PBM. In Section 4.2 we discuss the possibility that SIMPLES firms self-select into the standard regime as a response to treatment and show that our results are robust to including all firms. See Appendix Section D for the estimates.

Figure 1: Staggered rollout of PBM tax reform



reduction in the burden of payroll taxation for treated sectors ranges from -2% to 84%.²⁰

Staggered PBM Implementation The tax reform was implemented in a staggered roll-out fashion across sectors from 2011 to 2014. Following the beginning of the program, several legislative acts were enacted, broadening the scope of the new regime. While only a small number of sectors were initially contemplated, the reform reached roughly 30% of all 4-digit ISIC sectors in our sample by the end of 2014.

Figure 1 depicts the number of sectors and their respective employment share affected by the introduction of the PBM tax reform in our sample period. PBM is introduced in December 2011 affecting initially software companies, call centers and hotels, then reaching 65 sectors that accounted for approximately 10 million jobs (43% of total) by the end of 2015. The list of all legislative acts and associated regulating laws with implementation dates are reported in Appendix Table A.2.

Another feature of the PBM tax reform is the heterogeneous magnitude of its tax reduction potential across different sectors. This is because shifting from a payroll tax to one based on gross income will impact firms differently according to their degree of labor intensiveness. Table A.1 reports estimates for the change in tax bill experienced by different

²⁰A negative number implies that some sectors are expected to suffer a small increase in taxes as a result of the PBM reform.

treated sectors. All sectors presented in these tables were allocated to PBM based on their economic activity (ISIC), and according to these calculations, had a considerable decrease in the contributions towards Social Security. Among all these sectors, only one (Retail trade of discs, CDs, DVDs and tapes) has increased their contributions to Social Security relative to the old regime, and even in this case, the observed difference observed is very small (2 percentage points).

3 Empirical Strategy

Now we explain how we explore the staggered timing of implementation of PBM by comparing changes in employment and wages for sectors that introduced it in different months between 2011 and 2015, i.e. earlier vs. later entrants, within an event-study framework. Therefore, we start by investigating the plausibility of our key identification assumption, namely that the timing of PBM implementation is uncorrelated with other determinants of changes in sectoral labor market outcomes. In particular, we study whether sector characteristics predict the timing implementation. Table 3 presents estimates for γ in the following equation:

$$Month_s = \gamma X_{s,t_0} + \psi_s \quad (1)$$

where $Month_s = 1, \dots, 60$ denotes the month of PBM implementation in sector s , X_{s,t_0} is a vector of sector-level average firm and labor force characteristics calculated in the 12-month period before the beginning of the program in 2011.

Column (1) of Table 3 reports estimates of the equation 1 for firms in the standard tax regime and shows that the month of implementation is correlated with the level of the workforce education. Column (2) adds ISIC section (broadly-defined sector) fixed effects and finds that the coefficient on the share of workers with college degree loses statistical significance, but earlier implementation of PBM took place in sectors with a greater share of younger, male workers and firms with slightly less employees. Column (3) and (4) recalculate

sectoral averages including firms from all tax regimes and finds virtually the same pattern. To account for these potential threats to internal validity, we add sectoral fixed effects to account for pre-existing differences in levels across sectors and control in some specifications for monthly fixed effects interacted with pre-determined baseline characteristics that significantly correlate with the timing of implementation, as discussed above.

The political process by which sectors are included in the tax reform is likely influenced by both the legislative power and executive structure. While the relative economic and political strength of different sectors does not represent an identification challenge *per se*, the effect of the tax reform would be confounded if the selection and implementation timing were determined as a response to sector-specific trends in employment. As a way to overcome these challenges, we estimate the effect of the PBM tax reform using an event study research design that is capable of testing for such trends and recovering any dynamics of the impact of the new tax regime. We specify a regression model for labor market outcomes that exploits the different implementation timing across sectors. Specifically, we assume that:

$$Y_{st} = \sum_{\tau=-T}^T \beta_{\tau} D_{st}^{\tau} + \rho_{ct} + \gamma_s + \alpha_t + u_{st} \quad (2)$$

where s and t index 4-digit sector and time in months, respectively. Y_{st} denotes labor market outcomes - sectoral employment and wage rate in logarithmic terms. ρ_{ct} represent ISIC section monthly dummies in order to control for seasonality patterns specific to different broadly defined economic sectors. γ_s accounts for time-invariant sector-specific factors (such as technology, geographical distribution, market structure) and α_t are monthly fixed effects. In some specifications, we also control for a set of pre-determined characteristics that significantly correlate with the timing of implementation (see Table 3) interacted with α_t as discussed above. These controls are sectoral averages calculated using data from the 12 months prior to the PBM implementation and include average age of employees and its square, share of males and the average number of employees per firm.

Treatment assignment is denoted by D_{st}^τ that is set to 1 if the PBM implementation date for sector s is τ periods away from the current month, with $\tau < 0$ referring to periods before implementation and $\tau > 0$ after implementation. Thus, for a sector entering the new regime in month e_s we have:

$$D_{st}^\tau = \mathbb{1}_{[t-e_s=\tau]}$$

The β_τ coefficients represent the time path of employment and wages relative to the date of implementation of the new tax regime for sectors subject to the new regime conditional on the three unobserved variance components α_t , γ_s and an error term u_{st} which may exhibit arbitrary dependence within sector but is uncorrelated with the other right hand side variables.²¹

An appealing feature of the event-study research design is that it provides an explicit way of testing our main identification assumption of whether sector-specific trends in outcomes determine PBM implementation. This is particularly relevant in our setup as tax changes are effectively implemented 3 months or more after enactment, potentially allowing anticipation effects to build up.²² In other words, we can directly test whether implementation is not systematically preceded by trends in sectoral employment. More formally, if implementation dates are randomly assigned the following restriction should hold:

$$\beta_\tau = 0 \quad \forall \tau < 0$$

Our main results in this paper are obtained by estimating equation 2 by ordinary least squares, including a set of event-time dummies along with time and sector dummies. For ease of exposition, in our main set of estimates we define τ as a period of 3 months, in practice forcing the treatment effect to be the same within a 3-month period. As usual,

²¹Recent econometric literature has raised concerns about the possibility of negative weights in the estimation of two-way fixed effects models when treatment timing is staggered (Goodman-Bacon, 2021). In Appendix J we address these concerns by estimating our main regressions following the Interaction Weighted (IW) procedure introduced by Sun and Abraham (2021), the DID_M estimator proposed by de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2020) and the imputation estimator as in Borusyak et al. (2024).

²²Brazilian law requires a minimum period of 3 months before new taxation rules are implemented.

not all β 's can be identified as D_{st}^τ are perfect collinear in the presence of sector 4-digit fixed effects. For this reason, we follow common practice and normalize $\beta_{-1} = 0$, so that all post-implementation coefficients can be thought of as treatment effects. We also impose the following endpoint restrictions:

$$\beta_\tau = \begin{cases} \bar{\beta} & \text{if } \tau \geq 5 \\ \underline{\beta} & \text{if } \tau \leq -5 \end{cases}$$


which simply state that any dynamics wear off after five quarters.²³ This restriction helps to reduce some of the collinearity between the year and event-time dummies. By limiting the analysis to a four-quarter window around treatment, we ensure that the event-time coefficients are identified off of a nearly balanced panel of sectors. We report robust standard errors clustered at the sector level.

4 Results

In this section, we first examine the responses of sectoral employment and wages to the changes in payroll taxation. Second, we investigate whether firms self select into the PBM tax scheme, whether the reform spills over onto non-treated sectors, and whether it moved employment between the formal and informal sectors. Third, we provide evidence regarding firm entry and average firm size. Fourth, based on a model of imperfect labor markets we explore how our estimated effects vary across markets with different levels of labor market concentration. Finally, we further discuss heterogeneity estimates according to firm and worker characteristics. Throughout, the *standard* (or regular) tax regime refers to firms outside the simplified *SIMPLES* regime. Only standard-regime firms in eligible sectors were directly affected by the PBM.

²³For another example of such endpoint restrictions, see Kline (2012). Nearly identical results ensue if we fully saturate the model in event time.

Figure 2: Impact of PBM tax reform on employment




4.1 Baseline Effects on Employment and Wages

We begin by examining the impact of the PBM tax scheme implementation on sectoral employment of all firms who are part of the standard tax regime.

Figure 2 plots the estimated β_τ coefficients from a regression of the form given in Equation 2 where the dependent variable is the log of employment. The bands around the point estimates are 95 percent cluster-robust confidence intervals. Prior to implementation, there is no differential trend in employment across treated and control sectors. This suggests that the PBM inclusion criterion, despite potentially having a political component, was not designed as a response to trends in employment. We find an increase in employment in the first quarter after implementation that intensifies over the following months and stabilizes around 5 percent. Given that the average effective reduction in the payroll tax burden across treated sectors is approximately 50% the original payroll tax burden²⁴, the estimated 5 percent increase in employment should be interpreted as resulting from a reduction in the effective payroll tax burden from 10 to 0 percentage points (50% of the original 20-percentage-point payroll tax). This implies an employment semi-elasticity of 0.5% per percentage-point reduction in the effective payroll tax burden.

²⁴weighted average of estimates of tax burden reduction by sector reported in Table A.1.

Figure 3: Impact of PBM tax reform on employment according to treatment intensity




In Table 4, we report specifications that associate employment and PBM implementation. Columns (1) gives estimates corresponding to Figure 2. Columns (2) and (3) add broad sector-specific seasonality dummies, ρ_{ct} , and a set of pre-determined characteristics, X_{s,t_0} , interacted with α_t as discussed in Section 3. The pattern observed in Figure 2 is virtually unchanged across all specifications.

We also explore whether these estimates vary with treatment intensity. More specifically, we use calculations by ANFIP (2015) of the expected change on firm taxation by sector due to the introduction of PBM and replicate our baseline specifications allowing treatment effects to vary according to whether a sector is above/below the median of the expected reduction. Table 2 reports the range. For sectors above the sample median (higher reduction), taxation change under the new tax scheme ranges from an economy of 52% up to 84% of the tax bill under the standard tax regime. For sectors below the median (lower reduction), it ranges between -2% to 52%.²⁵ Figure 3 shows that employment in sectors expected to gain more from the reform increases more sharply after implementation. As before, employment increases in the first quarter after the tax reform and intensifies over the following periods. It stabilizes around 7.3 percent with high statistical significance. Employment levels in sectors

²⁵A negative number implies that some sectors are expected to suffer a small increase in taxes as a result of the PBM reform. See Section 2.1 for a detailed discussion and the Appendix Table A.1 for the estimated tax changes in each sector.

Figure 4: Impact of PBM tax reform on average wages of new hires



below the median also seem to respond to the PBM implementation, albeit more slowly and with a smaller magnitude and precision, stabilizing around 2.2 percent. Table 5 reports the corresponding estimates for all specifications. Once again, the estimates with respect to intensity observed in Figure 3 are virtually unchanged across specifications.

The estimated effects on wages are reported in Table 6. Due to the nature of our dataset, we only have access to hourly contractual wages of new hires. Across all three specifications, point estimates are small and insignificant indicating that firms do not hire new workers at higher wages when labor costs go down due to the PBM implementation. Figure 4 illustrates the results. The lack of an effect is true for sectors both above and below the median treatment intensity level as shown in Table 7.

Summing up, our estimates indicate that the effect of a labor subsidy (or tax cut) is (i) positive on employment and (ii) null on wages.

Alternative Estimators. Recent econometric literature has raised concerns about the possibility of negative weights in the estimation of two-way fixed effects models when treatment timing is staggered (Goodman-Bacon, 2021). In Appendix J we address these concerns by estimating our main employment and wage regressions following the Interaction Weighted (IW) procedure introduced by Sun and Abraham (2021), the DID_M estimator proposed by

de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2020) and the imputation estimator as in Borusyak et al. (2024). All estimates are in line with our main analysis.


4.2 Tax Regime Selection, Sector Reallocation and Potential Spillovers

4.2.1 Tax Regime Selection

Our empirical analysis has so far focused on firms in the standard tax regime because they are the only ones directly affected by the PBM reform, as discussed in Section 2.1. In this section, we analyze the possibility that firms in the alternative *SIMPLES* tax regime may self-select into the standard regime as a response to the implementation of PBM in their respective sector. According to Brazilian law, firms are allowed to switch tax regimes once a year in January. In that case, the estimated effects reported in Section 4.1, especially longer term ones, could potentially be explained by firms simply switching tax regimes instead of actual job creation.

We explicitly test whether firms switch from *SIMPLES* into the standard tax regime due to lower labor costs by exploiting yearly variation of PBM implementation across sectors. Table B.1 reports the estimates. Columns (1) and (2) compare differences in means of the rate at which firms switch from *SIMPLES* to the standard regime between treated and control sectors in 2009-2010, before the introduction of PBM. The coefficients are insignificant and change signs once we control for firms and workers’ characteristics. In other words, sectors that were eventually included in the PBM (treated) had indistinguishable *SIMPLES* exit rates when compared to sectors that were not included (control) before the program started. Columns (3) and (4) instead associate *SIMPLES* exit rates to the actual timing of PBM implementation for our entire sample period 2009-2014. The estimates are now statistically significant and indicate that PBM is associated with an increase of 0.7 – 0.9 percentage points in the share of firms changing tax regimes (or equivalently 8-10% of the average exit rate in 2009-2010). Moreover, while the average size of firms in the *SIMPLES* regime is indistinguishable between treated and control sectors before PBM implementation, such

Figure 5: Impact of PBM tax reform on employment - all tax regimes



difference becomes 5.4 – 5.7 percent after implementation, as reported in columns (5)-(8). This is consistent with the idea that firms with more employees on average are likely to benefit more from the tax reform.

On the one hand, these results represent additional evidence that firms react to payroll tax incentives and take advantage of a reduction in labor costs. On the other hand, they suggest that our baseline estimates may be overestimating the true effect of the PBM program by capturing firms simply transitioning across tax regimes as opposed to real job creation. We account for this possibility by replicating our main results based on equation 2 on sectoral employment calculated over all firms, including both standard and *SIMPLES* tax regime. Figure 5 shows an increase in employment in the first quarter after implementation that intensifies over the following months and stabilizes around 3.6 percent. This exercise can be interpreted as an intent-to-treat estimate as *SIMPLES* firms are not eligible to the PBM tax reduction. Consistent with an ITT result, the magnitude is 2/3 of our baseline from Figure 2 and slightly more noisy. The corresponding estimates are reported in Appendix Table D.1. In addition, we also show in Appendix Tables D.2 and D.3 that firms in sectors that experience a greater reduction in payroll tax react more to treatment and tend to hire more educated workers.


In Appendix J we also replicate these results using the alternative estimators discussed at the end of Section 4.1 using data from all tax regimes. All estimates are virtually unchanged.

4.2.2 Sector Reallocation

The positive estimated effects on employment could in principle also be explained by sector reallocation by firms in non-treated sectors that respond to the PBM reform by changing their registered economic sector. In this subsection, we provide results that do not support this pattern as a relevant driver of our main estimates. Section 4.2.3 examines poaching and other spillovers onto non-treated firms.

Given the substantial tax relief provided by the PBM, non-eligible firms should systematically change sectors to take advantage of this benefit if feasible. Hence we should find that never-treated firms (those in economic sectors that were never allocated to the PBM) have a higher probability of changing across economic sectors when compared to firms in treated sectors. Figure 6 shows that there does not seem to be any difference in sectoral change between these two groups of firms throughout the years of the PBM implementation (table I.1).

Figure 6: Sectoral transition gap between PBM-allocated and non-allocated sectors



4.2.3 Potential Spillovers

Our estimates compare treated to never-treated sectors, and both groups hire in the same local labor markets. If the increased hiring of treated firms also affects control firms (treated firms poaching their workers, or local demand linkages transmitting the shock) we might be violating the stable unit treatment value assumption: poaching would depress the control group and bias our estimates upwards, while local demand spillovers would raise it and understate them. We provide two empirical exercises to show that there's not strong evidence of spillover effects in our setting.

First, we examine worker flows. If the employment expansion were built on poaching from non-treated formal employers, the share of new hires in treated sectors coming from outside the formal labor market should fall substantially after implementation. Figures 7 and 8 show the estimated change in the share of new hires who were outside formal employment in the previous 6 and 12 months, as reported in tables I.2 and I.4. Though some point estimates are statistically significant, they are unstable across specifications and small: about a 1 p.p. decline in the flow rate from outside the formal labor market, against a 5 p.p. baseline employment effect.

Figure 7: Share of new hires outside the formal labor market in the last 6 months





Figure 8: Share of new hires outside the formal labor market in the last 12 months



Second, we test directly for spillovers on the employment of control sectors. If the reform reaches control firms through the local labor market (treated firms poaching their workers, or local demand linkages transmitting the shock), control sectors surrounded by more treated employment should evolve differently after the reform than control sectors facing little treated presence. For each never-treated sector j (4-digit ISIC) in microregion r , we measure exposure to the reform as

$$Expo_{jr} = \frac{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{T}_{s(j)}} E_{kr}^{2010}}{\sum_{k \in s(j), k \neq j} E_{kr}^{2010}}, \quad (3)$$

where E_{kr}^{2010} is average monthly employment of sector k in microregion r during 2010 among firms in the standard tax regime, $s(j)$ is the ISIC section (1-digit) of sector j , and $\mathcal{T}_{s(j)}$ is the set of sectors in $s(j)$ eventually included in the PBM. Exposure is thus the share of employment held by later-treated sectors in j 's local pool of competing employers, ranging from zero to one.

Three features of this construction matter for identification. First, exposure is measured in 2010, before the announcement of the PBM, and held fixed thereafter, so post-reform reallocation of employment across sectors cannot contaminate the treatment intensity. Second, the pool of competing employers is defined as the sector's own ISIC section within the

microregion: the employers most likely to hire the same workers, which is where poaching and local reallocation should operate. This margin is also the most consequential one to test: in specifications that include section $\times$ month fixed effects, spillovers arriving from other sections are absorbed as long as they do not hit treated and control sectors of a section differentially. Within-section spillovers are what such fixed effects cannot absorb, and thus what could still bias the comparison between treated and control sectors. Third, the denominator excludes sector j 's own employment. This leave-one-out construction makes the regressor a function of other employers' baseline size only, so a transitory shock to a control sector's own 2010 employment cannot enter both the exposure measure and its subsequent employment path.

The sample covers the months of 2009, 2010 and 2014. The first two years predate the entry of any sector into the PBM; by 2014 all eventually treated sectors had entered. Using only fully untreated and fully treated years means that no partially treated month enters the estimation: the post-period treated share equals the fixed 2010 exposure for every cell, so the staggered entry of treated sectors during 2011–2013 cannot contaminate the comparison. The cross-sectional units are the never-treated sector $\times$ microregion cells with positive standard-regime employment in 2010; within these cells the panel is balanced, with months of no recorded employment entering as zeros. This baseline-activity condition selects on a predetermined variable: exploring regional variation requires going below the sectoral level of our main analysis, and at this finer granularity many sector $\times$ microregion combinations record no employment in 2010 and never enter the sample. The estimates should therefore be read as spillover effects on incumbent cells; they are silent on entry of control sectors into new locations.

We estimate

$$y_{jrt} = \beta (Expo_{jr} \times Post_t) + \alpha_{jr} + \delta_{jt} + \gamma_{rt} + \varepsilon_{jrt}, \quad (4)$$

where y_{jrt} is employment of control sector j in microregion r in month t and $Post_t$ indicates 2014. Poaching of control-sector workers by treated firms predicts $\beta < 0$; positive local

demand spillovers predict $\beta > 0$. The saturated specification includes sector $\times$ microregion fixed effects α_{jr} , sector $\times$ month fixed effects δ_{jt} absorbing national sector-specific shocks, and microregion $\times$ month fixed effects γ_{rt} absorbing local shocks common to all sectors. The coefficient β is thus identified from control cells that are more exposed than both their sector’s national average and their microregion’s average in that month. Because the numerator of exposure is common to all sectors in a section $\times$ microregion, exposure and residual shocks are correlated within these cells, so standard errors are two-way clustered by section $\times$ microregion and by sector.

Appendix Table I.6 reports OLS estimates on $\log(1 + \text{employment})$, building up from section $\times$ month controls to the saturated specification and including a column covering all tax regimes; Appendix Table I.7 repeats the fixed-effects progression with Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML), together with one $\log(1 + \text{employment})$ column and an all-tax-regimes column. The test detects spillovers that scale with local treated presence: spillovers common to all control sectors, or to all sectors within a microregion, are absorbed by the fixed effects. Across both tables, the exposure interactions are statistically insignificant and unstable in sign. These estimates are not precise enough to rule out modest spillovers in either direction, but they show no indication that control sectors in more exposed labor markets declined, as poaching would produce, or grew, as local demand spillovers would produce.

4.3 Informality

Our estimates so far are based on RAIS, which covers only formal employment. The 5 percent increase in sectoral employment is therefore consistent with two different channels: the creation of new jobs, or the formalization of jobs that already existed in the informal sector. The second margin is particularly important in Brazil, where over 40 percent of employment is informal (Meghir et al., 2015) and where payroll costs are a standard explanation for non-registration (Ulyssea, 2020). In this section we take the question to the annual PNAD

household survey, which records both formal and informal work.

We assign treatment at the survey’s five-digit activity code by matching each code in the household survey to the statutory ISIC allocation of the PBM: of the 210 activity codes observed in the survey, 34 contain treated classes under the reform’s sector criterion.²⁶ Treated codes are compared to untreated codes *within* the same CNAE section, with activity-code and section $\times$ year fixed effects, over survey years 2006–2015 relative to 2009. Standard errors are clustered at the activity code, and we also report Fisher permutation p -values that re-assign treated labels within sections. Two features of the survey attenuate these estimates relative to RAIS: activity codes are coarser than the 4-digit class at which eligibility is defined, so a treated code is only partially relieved. Additionally, the employer’s activity is reported by the household respondent, potentially misclassifying workers across the treatment boundary. Provided these errors are unrelated to the reform (and Section 4.2.3 finds no differential sector switching) both attenuate the estimates toward zero, allowing us to interpret them as lower bounds. Appendix L details the sample, the treatment based on code matching, the survey’s representativeness, and the regression tables.

Figure 9 shows the event study for the share of *sem-carteira* employees (without a signed labor card). Pre-treatment leads are flat; after implementation the point estimates are negative in every survey year, between -0.9 and -1.6 percentage points, with a difference-in-differences estimate of -1.2 points (cluster $p = 0.06$, permutation $p = 0.08$), identical when product-criterion (NCM) exposed control codes are dropped. The result is marginal: only the 2013 coefficient is individually significant. Formal and total employment results based on the household survey are also reported in Figure 10. Though point estimates are positive, we lack the power to assess the precise impact of the policy in this exercise. The design’s minimum detectable effect under the current specification would be considerably above the 5 p.p. estimate of the main analysis for formal employment.

Two channels lower the *sem-carteira* share: formalization of existing informal jobs (the

²⁶Specifically, we rely on the CONCLA correspondence tables between the *CNAE 2.0* codes and the *CNAE Domiciliar*, used in PNAD.

numerator), and purely formal hiring diluting the denominator. A pooled Diff-in-Diff coefficient for the informal share (parallel to the exercise in Figure 9) is estimated at -1.2 points. If the original 5 percent effect on formal employment entirely reflected formalization of previously informal workers, the share would fall by about 1.7 points. If the effect was purely based on formal hiring of new workers, the fall would reach only about 0.3 p.p. (Appendix L derives both benchmarks from the treated codes' employment-weighted baseline structure). The survey results are thus consistent with both formalization and job creation leading to our main 5 p.p. increase on employment. Taking the point estimate at face value, a back-of-the-envelope calculation detailed in Appendix L shows that the -1.2 -point decline attributes roughly two-thirds of the 5 percent formal-employment effect to the formalization of existing jobs and one-third to net job creation (though the confidence interval of the underlying estimate is consistent with any share between zero and one (Appendix L), a reading in line with the firm-entry evidence in Section 4.4 and with Ulyssea (2020) and Rocha et al. (2018) on formalization at the entry margin.

Figure 9: Impact of PBM tax reform on *sem-carteira* informality (PNAD)





Figure 10: Impact of PBM tax reform on survey employment (PNAD)




4.4 Firm Entry and Firm Growth

In this section, we further explore our baseline estimates by decomposing the observed increase in sectoral employment into firm entry (i.e. jobs created by new firms) or firm growth (i.e. increase in hiring by existing firms). Figure 11(a) illustrates that in response to a reduction in labor costs, net entry across firms in our main sample (firms in standard tax regime) increases by 2 percent. The effect is marginally significant at 5% confidence level. As these estimates may conflate actual net entry and firms switching from *SIMPLES* into the standard regime, Figure 11(b) replicates the analysis including all tax regimes and finds very similar results. Corresponding regression estimates are reported in Table B.2 and Appendix Table D.4.

These results contribute to the understanding of firm formalization and development. In a recent review of the literature on informality, Ulyssea (2020) argues that positive effects on formalization come from enforcement efforts, and policies that mainly reduce the ongoing costs of formality instead of entry/registration costs. In particular, Rocha et al. (2018) estimates that a formalization policy in Brazil targeted at microentrepreneurs with at most one employee led to an increase of around 11% in the number of formal firms, driven entirely

Figure 11: Impact of PBM tax reform on net firm entry




by the formalization of existing informal firms. While we are unable to distinguish whether our firm entry estimates are driven by the formalization of informal firms or the creation of new firms due to data limitations, our sample display average firm size of 26.7 employees, ranging between 2.5 and 426.8 across sectors (see Table 2).

The estimates of the effect of the PBM tax reform on firm growth are depicted in Figure 12. Two quarters after implementation, firms increase their average number of employees by approximately 3 percent in the main sample, and a little less for firms in all tax regimes. Corresponding regression estimates are reported in Table B.3 and Appendix Table D.5. Overall, these results indicate that the total increase in sectoral employment discussed in Section 4.1 can be attributed roughly 60% to increased firm size and 40% firm entry into the standard regime.

4.5 Labor Market Concentration

In Appendix section E we report the derivation of an oligopsonistic labor market model and calibrate it with values from the literature. The model characterizes the response to an *idiosyncratic* labor-cost shock: because eligibility is sectoral and excludes *SIMPLES* firms, the reform changed labor costs for only a subset of the employers competing for workers within a local labor market, so the relevant comparative statics hold competitors' taxes

Figure 12: Impact of PBM tax reform on firm growth



fixed — a reading consistent with Lobel (2024), who documents that treated firms were a small share of employers in their local labor markets. Under a tax change common to all employers in a market, by contrast, relative labor costs and wage-bill shares would not move, wages would absorb the tax one-for-one, and no concentration gradient would arise. In sum, the oligopsony model predicts that a reduction in labor costs is associated with:


- i) higher employment and wages;
- ii) larger employment than wage effects for most levels of labor market concentration; and
- iii) employment (wage) effects that decrease (increase) with labor market concentration.

While prediction (i) holds generally, predictions (ii) and (iii) arise for empirically plausible values of the elasticity-of-substitution parameters, as illustrated in Figure E.1.

In addition, when the elasticities of substitution across firms within sectors and across local labor markets are sufficiently large, positive demand shocks—for example, those induced by a payroll tax reduction—increase employment with little or no effect on wages.

Our baseline results discussed in section 4.1 are broadly consistent with predictions (i) and (ii), and we find no impacts on wages across several specifications, levels of aggregation, and estimation methods. Our interpretation of these results relies on the focus of our analysis

Figure 13: Geographical distribution of labor market concentration



Note: For each of the 558 geographic micro-regions of Brazil, we measure labor market concentration as a wage-bill Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). High (low) concentration is defined by a HHI index above (below) our sample median of 0.029.

on the retail, services, and construction sectors. Dix-Carneiro (2014) shows that these sectors have on average lower costs of mobility, relative to manufacturing, for workers originating from the formal sector, unemployment, and informality. In addition, these sectors are on average smaller than the sectors left out of our analysis, e.g. manufacturing. Amodio and de Roux (2024) provide evidence of larger labor market power among larger firms in the manufacturing sector, presenting no evidence of wage effects among smaller firms in their setting (where labor demand increases are driven by exchange-rate shocks).

We then test prediction (iii) from the oligopsonistic labor market model by repeating the employment and wage analysis for markets with different levels of labor market concentration. We follow Berger et al. (2022) and measure labor market concentration as a wage-bill Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).²⁷

HHI ranges from 0.003–0.433 across the 558 Brazilian micro-regions with mean (median)

²⁷We chose to employ a wage-bill HHI to measure labor market concentration, and employment Herfindahls may overstate competition (Berger et al., 2022). For completeness, we replicate the results from this section in the Appendix F using a more traditional employment-based HHI of labor market concentration. All results are qualitatively identical.

of 0.051 (0.029).²⁸ Figure 13 shows the geographical distribution of labor market concentration (above/below median). Regions with low levels of concentration (darker color) are scattered across most regions including southern, central and northeastern states of the country. Localities with above median HHI (lighter color) can be found across all 27 states in the country. Except for greater Manaus, high HHI localities are predominant in the Northwest/Amazon area, a region that is relatively underpopulated.²⁹

Based on the HHI, we recalculate our main dependent variables, sectoral employment and wages, separately for firms in low/high HHI micro-regions and replicate our main analysis. Figure 14 displays a sharp difference. Firms in less concentrated labor markets are responsible for virtually all of the estimated average effect. Sectoral employment in more concentrated markets does not seem to respond to the PBM tax reform. Tables B.4 and B.5 report the corresponding point estimates. Overall, these results are consistent with prediction (iii) since the effect of a labor subsidy (or tax cut) on employment is decreasing in labor market concentration. In contrast, the effect on average wages is small and insignificant across specifications for both low and high HHI micro-regions, as reported in Tables B.6 and B.7.

Further evidence. In Appendix section B we report on regressions checking for heterogeneity of our main results. Tables B.8 and B.9 show similar effects on employment in small and large firms, respectively.³⁰ Table B.10 shows that results are also similar across workers with or without a high school degree, while table B.11 shows similar results for microregions with low and high informality levels.³¹


²⁸The Brazilian Statistical Agency (IBGE) defines a micro-region as “groups of economically integrated municipalities sharing borders and structure of production”.

²⁹It should be noted that 15% of the population lived in rural areas in 2010. Moreover, our sample excludes agriculture and mining sectors, among others (see Table 1 and our sample description in section 2.2). This eases concerns about comparing, for instance, a high-tech firm in São Paulo to a mining camp in the Amazon.

³⁰A firm is considered small (large) if it is below (above) the median size in its sector. As before, the timing of PBM implementation is associated with a sharp increase in sectoral employment, stabilizing around 5 percent.

³¹This analysis is particularly important as developing countries’ labor markets are known to have a large informal sector. In fact, over 40 percent of employment is in the informal sector (e.g. Meghir et al., 2015). In

Figure 14: PBM tax reform and employment according to labor market concentration



Granular analysis. In Appendix section M we re-examine the concentration heterogeneity on a sector $\times$ microregion $\times$ month panel with a *continuous* HHI–treatment interaction, rather than the high/low split used above. Moving to this granularity raises the number of zero-employment cells considerably, so we estimate by OLS on $\log(1+\text{employment})$ and report Poisson estimates alongside. The OLS results are in line with our main estimates: post-implementation employment growth is monotonically smaller in more concentrated microregions, with flat pre-treatment interactions. Poisson estimates are qualitatively similar but noisier. Given the weight of empty cells at this level of disaggregation, we present these results as a robustness exercise.

Cost-benefit analysis and Effect on profits. Appendix K presents a back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit analysis and a structural estimate of profit effects. We estimate that the PBM created approximately 322,000 formal jobs at a fiscal cost of around R\$47,600 per job (2014 prices), roughly twice the cost per job of another large federal employment program in Brazil. The structural model further implies an average 106% increase in firms’ profits,

this situation, labor supply is likely to be more elastic than in developed countries as workers can find jobs in the unregulated sector, limiting the extent to which costs are shifted to workers (Heckman and Pagés, 2004). This argument depends on workers having access to similar jobs in both the formal and informal sectors. In fact, Meghir et al. (2015) show a significant overlap of the productivity distributions in the formal and informal sectors.

consistent with our finding of negligible wage effects and suggesting that firms retained most of the payroll tax reduction rather than passing it through to workers.

Taking stock. We estimate an average employment effect of 5% (3.6% in the intent-to-treat specification), corresponding to an employment semi-elasticity of approximately 0.5% (0.4%) per percentage-point reduction in the effective payroll tax burden. This holds in low-concentration labor markets, consistent with an oligopsonistic labor market framework, as described in our Appendix in section E. With sufficiently high substitution within and across markets, the prediction is that the wage pass-through tend to zero and our results show this to be the case, at least in our setting focusing on trade, construction, and services. Our findings are robust to a wide range of sensitivity analyses, including alternative measures of labor market concentration, regression specifications, estimation methods, sample definitions accounting for firms under different tax regimes, and potential sectoral reallocation and spillovers, as well as heterogeneity by firm size, worker skill, and the degree of informality. In Appendix section H we also provide additional evidence with regressions at the firm and individual level that corroborates our results. Both firm level regressions and individual level regressions also show no significant effects of the PBM reform on wages.

5 Conclusion

This paper provides an empirical analysis of a large payroll tax cut for selected sectors in Brazil. Our findings show a positive sizable effect on total employment due to both firm entry and firm growth, but no impact on wages.

The effect on employment is found mainly in markets with relatively low levels of labor market concentration, consistent with predictions of an oligopsony framework. We additionally explore other sources of heterogeneity at the firm, worker and sector level. We find that treated sectors expand employment regardless of firm size, worker's education and degree of labor informality.

These findings shed light on how payroll taxation can be an important policy instrument in the government tool kit. However, job creation through tax policy is likely least effective in regions where labor markets are more concentrated, as in such environments subsidies are mostly absorbed by firms as profit. Indeed, based on a structural approach we find that the tax cut generates a significant profit windfall.

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Tables

Table 1: Sectors in the PBM tax regime according to ISIC and NCM criteria

Level 1 ISIC sections	Share of sectors in PBM regime	Total number of 4-digit sectors	Included by ISIC criterion (sector)	Included by NCM criterion (product)
A - Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing	41.18%	34	0	14
B - Mining and Quarrying	12.50%	16	0	2
C - Manufacturing	74.03%	259	4	187
D - Electricity, and Gas Industries	0.00%	6	0	0
E - Water, Sanitation and Waste	9.09%	11	0	1
F - Construction	95.24%	21	20	0
G - Repair and Sale of motor vehicles	15.96%	95	15	0
H - Transportation, Storage and Mail Services	41.18%	34	14	0
I - Accomodation and Food Industries	20.00%	5	1	0
J - Information and Communication Industries	43.75%	32	14	0
K - Financial Activities, Insurance and Related	0.00%	37	0	0
L - Real Estate	0.00%	3	0	0
M - Professional, Scientific and Technical	0.00%	19	0	0
N - Administrative Activities and Services	2.94%	34	1	0
O - Public Admin, Defense and Social Security	0.00%	10	0	0
P - Education	0.00%	14	0	0
Q - Human Health and Social Services	0.00%	13	0	0
R - Arts, Culture, Sport and Recreation	0.00%	13	0	0
S - Other Service Activities	0.00%	16	0	0
T - Domestic Services	0.00%	1	0	0
U - International Organizations	0.00%	1	0	0

Note: List of ISIC sectors allocated to the PBM tax regime. Firms were included in PBM by either their standard 4-digit ISIC sector codes (criterion 1) or their product codes based on the Mercosur Common Nomenclature (NCM). Highlighted ISIC sections (F, G, H, I, J, and N) have at least one 4-digit sector eligible by the ISIC criterion and none by the NCM criterion and are included in our main empirical analysis. The sectors allocated to the PBM based on their products' NCM codes were identified using the product classification provided by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, matching products to their respective economic sectors. Our main sample includes 219 sectors (out of 221), as two sectors did not have active firms in all years.

Table 2: Summary statistics

	Mean	σ	Min	Max	Median
Total employment	94,465	182,337	187	1,358,143	32,009
Total number of firms	8,976	21,488	11	178,232	2,062
Average employment per firm	26.77	46.37	2.52	426.84	11.55
Elementary school or less	0.32	0.18	0.00	0.79	0.30
High school	0.55	0.13	0.18	0.91	0.56
College degree	0.13	0.13	0.01	0.64	0.07
Average age	34.32	2.70	26.15	47.68	34.15
Male	0.66	0.18	0.13	0.96	0.68
Average real hourly wage	13.44	8.37	4.99	69.49	10.47
Share of employment in SIMPLES	0.31	0.26	0.00	0.90	0.24
% Expected variation in tax burden due to PBM (treated sectors)	0.51	0.17	-0.02	0.84	0.52
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768	15,768	15,768

Note: Summary statistics of the 219 sectors in the sample used in the analysis in the period 2009-2014. Wages per hour are in Brazilian Reais of December 2014.

Source: RAIS (MTE) and ANFIP (2015).

Table 3: Determinants of timing in the PBM allocation

	Regular regime		All regimes	
	Month of PBM Allocation	Month of PBM Allocation	Month of PBM Allocation	Month of PBM
Total Number of Firms	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Average Employees per Firm	-0.002 (0.010)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.012 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.009)
High school	-5.900 (7.369)	-0.095 (7.476)	-7.033 (7.245)	2.259 (8.150)
College degree or more	-27.275*** (9.251)	-16.923 (14.350)	-24.592** (9.358)	-16.636 (15.390)
Average Age	0.358 (0.360)	1.027** (0.425)	0.406 (0.389)	1.057** (0.452)
Share of Employees in a SIMPLES Firm	1.406 (4.752)	4.075 (4.505)	4.565 (4.432)	4.547 (4.390)
Male	-4.180 (7.709)	-16.340* (8.575)	-2.086 (7.016)	-12.955* (7.358)
Average Real Hourly Wage	0.179 (0.177)	0.062 (0.154)	0.159 (0.184)	0.010 (0.173)
Observations	65	65	65	65
R-squared	0.370	0.569	0.365	0.561
ISIC section fixed-effect	-	✓	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the timing of PBM implementation to sector characteristics at their average level prior to PBM (from December 2010 to November 2011). The dependent variable is the month in which each of the sectors was allocated to PBM. The sample consists of all 65 sectors that entered the PBM tax regime at some point. The first 2 columns report estimates for firms in the standard tax regime, while the last 2 columns show the results for all regimes. For both specifications, we present estimates without and with the ISIC section fixed-effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table 4: PBM implementation and sectoral employment

	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)	(3) log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.017)
-3 quarters	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.012)
-2 quarters	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.009)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.016* (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)
+1 quarter	0.019 (0.012)	0.012 (0.012)	0.017 (0.013)
+2 quarters	0.042*** (0.014)	0.036** (0.015)	0.034** (0.017)
+3 quarters	0.049*** (0.015)	0.045** (0.019)	0.042** (0.020)
+4 quarters	0.049*** (0.019)	0.057** (0.024)	0.057** (0.025)
Constant	9.755*** (0.005)	9.754*** (0.006)	9.915*** (1.295)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.991	0.991	0.991
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table 5: PBM implementation and sectoral employment according to treatment intensity

	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)	(3) log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters (High int.)	0.010 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.024)	-0.006 (0.026)
-3 quarters (High int.)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.018)
-2 quarters (High int.)	0.000 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.010)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief (High int.))	0.024* (0.014)	0.017 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)
+1 quarter (High int.)	0.031* (0.017)	0.024 (0.019)	0.028 (0.019)
+2 quarters (High int.)	0.053*** (0.020)	0.052** (0.023)	0.052** (0.025)
+3 quarters (High int.)	0.064*** (0.022)	0.067** (0.027)	0.062** (0.029)
+4 quarters (High int.)	0.073*** (0.026)	0.087*** (0.031)	0.086*** (0.033)
-4 quarters (Low int.)	-0.018 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.020)	-0.015 (0.021)
-3 quarters (Low int.)	-0.029* (0.015)	-0.019 (0.016)	-0.021 (0.017)
-2 quarters (Low int.)	-0.023* (0.013)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.019 (0.014)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief (Low int.))	0.008 (0.007)	0.000 (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)
+1 quarter (Low int.)	0.009 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.010)	0.008 (0.012)
+2 quarters (Low int.)	0.032* (0.018)	0.018 (0.015)	0.020 (0.017)
+3 quarters (Low int.)	0.034** (0.016)	0.021 (0.018)	0.023 (0.020)
+4 quarters (Low int.)	0.022 (0.019)	0.019 (0.021)	0.026 (0.023)
Constant	9.755*** (0.005)	9.755*** (0.006)	9.882*** (1.338)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.991	0.991	0.992
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2), allowing effects to differ according to high/low intensity (above/below median) in the reduction of the payroll tax burden due to PBM (see Table A.1 for the average reduction by sector). Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table 6: PBM implementation and average wage (new hires)

	(1) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)	(2) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)	(3) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)
-4 quarters	0.011 (0.021)	0.018 (0.023)	0.019 (0.025)
-3 quarters	0.001 (0.020)	0.010 (0.023)	0.009 (0.025)
-2 quarters	0.002 (0.019)	0.009 (0.020)	0.007 (0.021)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.005 (0.020)	0.004 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.023)
+1 quarter	0.017 (0.023)	0.019 (0.027)	0.009 (0.028)
+2 quarters	-0.022 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
+3 quarters	-0.009 (0.026)	-0.009 (0.027)	-0.009 (0.028)
+4 quarters	-0.010 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.026)	-0.011 (0.027)
Constant	1.982*** (0.005)	1.980*** (0.006)	4.847*** (1.200)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.845	0.849	0.853
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the hourly wage of new hires to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table 7: PBM implementation and average wage according to treatment intensity

	(1) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)	(2) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)	(3) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)
-4 quarters (High int.)	0.004 (0.035)	0.019 (0.037)	0.020 (0.038)
-3 quarters (High int.)	0.002 (0.036)	0.018 (0.040)	0.013 (0.042)
-2 quarters (High int.)	-0.001 (0.034)	0.009 (0.036)	0.005 (0.037)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief (High int.))	-0.002 (0.038)	-0.006 (0.041)	-0.012 (0.041)
+1 quarter (High int.)	0.050 (0.043)	0.054 (0.048)	0.040 (0.050)
+2 quarters (High int.)	-0.002 (0.035)	0.011 (0.037)	0.010 (0.037)
+3 quarters (High int.)	-0.011 (0.048)	-0.009 (0.048)	-0.010 (0.047)
+4 quarters (High int.)	-0.014 (0.039)	-0.016 (0.042)	-0.008 (0.043)
-4 quarters (Low int.)	0.019 (0.021)	0.017 (0.022)	0.017 (0.025)
-3 quarters (Low int.)	0.000 (0.017)	0.002 (0.019)	0.004 (0.019)
-2 quarters (Low int.)	0.005 (0.014)	0.009 (0.015)	0.008 (0.016)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief (Low int.))	0.010 (0.017)	0.013 (0.018)	0.007 (0.016)
+1 quarter (Low int.)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.016 (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)
+2 quarters (Low int.)	-0.041** (0.017)	-0.035* (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)
+3 quarters (Low int.)	-0.007 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.020)	-0.012 (0.021)
+4 quarters (Low int.)	-0.005 (0.022)	-0.018 (0.024)	-0.015 (0.023)
Constant	1.982*** (0.005)	1.980*** (0.006)	4.898*** (1.186)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.845	0.849	0.853
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the hourly wage of new hires to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2), allowing effects to differ according to high/low intensity (above/below median) in the reduction of the payroll tax burden due to PBM (see Table A.1 for the average reduction by sector). Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Payroll Tax, Employment and Labor Market Concentration

Erick Baumgartner, Raphael Corbi and Renata Narita

ONLINE APPENDIX

A Supplementary Tables

Table A.1: Tax burden before and after PBM implementation

Description	ISIC	PBM Tax Rate	Tax Burden*		
			Before	After	$\frac{\text{After}}{\text{Before}}$
Construction of buildings	4120	2%	3583,9	1886,3	52,6%
Construction of roads, railways, urban works and special works of art	421	2%	1358,7	2228,1	61,0%
Infrastructure works for electricity, telecommunications, water, sewage and pipeline transportation	422	2%	364,1	874,0	41,7%
Construction of other infrastructure works	429	2%	914,4	1537,8	59,5%
Demolition and site preparation art	431	2%	195,2	350,5	55,7%
Electrical Installations	4321	2%	469,4	176,3	37,5%
Installation of hydraulic, ventilation and cooling systems	4322	2%	170,7	88,2	51,7%
Installation work in constructions not cited previously	4329	2%	284,0	136,0	47,9%
Finish work	4330	2%	215,2	95,6	44,4%
Foundation work in construction	4391	2%	118,8	57,9	48,7%
Specialized services in construction not cited previously	4399	2%	377,5	169,9	45,0%
Retail trade of general merchandise without predominance of food products	4713	1%	504,9	352,3	69,8%
Retail trade of hardware, wood and construction materials	4744	1%	1173,3	815,2	69,5%
Specialized retail trade of computer equipment and supplies	4751	1%	208,9	109,8	52,6%
Specialized retail trade of telephony and communication equipment	4752	1%	83,8	38,7	46,2%
Specialized retail trade of household appliances and audio and video equipment	4753	1%	839,2	602,0	71,7%
Specialized retail trade of furniture, bedding and lighting articles	4754	1%	340,4	182,9	53,7%
Specialized retail trade of textiles and bedding, bath and table	4755	1%	73,5	42,4	57,6%
Retail trade of household articles not previously specified	4759	1%	61,5	43,5	70,6%
Retail sale of books, newspapers, magazines and stationery	4761	1%	130,2	74,4	57,2%
Retail trade of discs, CDs, DVDs and tapes	4762	1%	5,1	5,3	102,0%
Retail trade of recreational and sporting goods	4763	1%	244,3	179,2	73,3%
Retail trade of pharmaceutical products for human and veterinary use	4771	1%	642,3	361,1	56,2%
Retail trade of cosmetics, perfumery and personal hygiene products	4772	1%	140,7	93,9	66,7%
Retail trade of clothes and accessories	4781	1%	719,4	376,6	52,4%
Footwear and travel goods retail trade	4782	1%	250,2	116,5	46,6%
Retail trade of other new products not previously specified	4789	1%	43,9	40,4	92,0%
Freight rail transport	4911	1%	168,6	117,4	69,6%
Railway passenger transport	4912	2%	418,8	96,8	23,1%
Collective transportation of road passengers with a fixed route in municipal and metropolitan regions	4921	2%	1857,7	640,2	34,5%

Note: This table compares the contribution schemes of the treated sectors in our sample before and after the implementation of PBM. "ISIC" denotes the 4-digit sector code according the Brazilian classification system (CNAE). Some sectors are identified with higher granularity than others. This reflects the structure presented by ANFIP (2015) that provided the calculations. "PBM Tax Rate" shows whether the initial tax rate of the sector after its entry in the tax regime was either 1% or 2%. Columns "Before" and "After" show the tax burden that would be paid in the standard regime (before) and in PBM (after). Finally, $\frac{\text{After}}{\text{Before}}$ compares the contribution in PBM to the one that would be paid before. *Millions of BRL.

(Continued) Tax burden before and after PBM implementation

Description	ISIC	PBM Tax Rate	Tax Burden*		$\frac{\text{After}}{\text{Before}}$
			Before	After	
Collective transportation of road passengers with a fixed route across different municipalities, states and countries	4922	2%	553,9	263,1	47,5%
Road freight transport	4930	1%	2971,0	1390,2	46,8%
Cabotage shipping	5011	1%	149,1	103,1	69,2%
Long sea shipping	5012	1%	43,0	16,0	37,2%
Inland freight transportation	5021	1%	64,1	23,6	36,9%
Inland waterway passenger transportation on scheduled lines	5022	1%	3,5	0,5	16,1%
Support Navigation	5030	1%	580,1	118,1	20,4%
Regular passenger air transportation	5111	1%	703,4	286,5	40,7%
Air cargo transportation	5120	1%	28,8	18,3	63,6%
Loading and unloading	5212	1%	110,8	35,6	32,2%
Port and terminal management	5231	1%	307,7	127,3	41,4%
Book publishing	5811	1%	141,4	54,0	38,2%
Newspaper publishing	5812	1%	84,5	19,6	23,2%
Magazine edition	5813	1%	28,5	12,1	42,7%
Integrated edition and printing of newspapers	5822	1%	224,2	44,6	19,9%
Radio activities	6010	1%	96,6	22,5	23,3%
Open television activities	6021	1%	719,2	215,1	29,9%
Development of custom computer programs	6201	2%	1000,8	377,7	37,7%
Development and licensing of customizable computer programs	6202	2%	244,1	101,1	41,4%
Development and licensing of non-customizable computer programs	6203	2%	382,0	154,6	40,5%
Consulting in information technology	6204	2%	864,0	364,8	42,2%
Technical support, maintenance and other information technology services	6209	2%	511,4	279,8	54,7%
Data processing, application service providers and web hosting services	6311	2%	414,7	174,5	42,1%
Portals, content providers and other internet information services	6319	1%	130,6	61,5	47,1%
Call center activities	8220	2%	1104,5	290,9	26,3%

Note: This table compares the contribution schemes of the treated sectors in our sample before and after the implementation of PBM. “ISIC” denotes the 4-digit sector code according the Brazilian classification system (CNAE). Some sectors are identified with higher granularity than others. This reflects the structure presented by ANFIP (2015) that provided the calculations. “PBM Tax Rate” shows whether the initial tax rate of the sector after its entry in the tax regime was either 1% or 2%. Columns “Before” and “After” show the tax burden that would be paid in the standard regime (before) and in PBM (after). Finally, $\frac{\text{After}}{\text{Before}}$ compares the contribution in PBM to the one that would be paid before. *Millions of BRL.

Table A.2: Legislative acts and the implementation of the PBM tax reform

Act	Law	Date	Sectors
MP №540	12.546	Dec 2011	Service sector (<i>call centers</i> and IT companies) Manufacturing (clothing and leather artifacts)
MP №563	12.715	Sept 2012	Service sector (<i>design houses</i> and hotels) Manufacturing (furniture, plastic, textiles, electric material, among others)
PLV №18	12.715	Sept 2012	Manufacturing (toys, medications and pharmaceutical drugs, ornamental stones, among others) Transportation (air, road and sea)
MP №582	12.794	April 2013	Industry (glass, metallic construction, railway equipment, paper and cellulose, among others)
MP №610	12.844	July 2013	Service sector (technical support in IT) Construction (construction industry) Manufacturing (rubber, copper, maintenance and repair of vessels, among others) and Retail Transportation (road cargo, subway, among others)

Note: List of all legislative acts and associated regulating laws with the date of implementation of the PBM tax reform.

B Further results on main sample

Table B.1: PBM implementation and firm transition from SIMPLES into the standard tax regime

	(1) Before PBM 2009-2010 SIMPLES Exit Rate	(2) Before PBM 2009-2010 SIMPLES Exit Rate	(3) All years 2009-2014 SIMPLES Exit Rate	(4) All years 2009-2014 SIMPLES Exit Rate	(5) Before PBM 2009-2010 log(avg firm size)	(6) Before PBM 2009-2010 log(avg firm size)	(7) All years 2009-2014 log(avg firm size)	(8) All years 2009-2014 log(avg firm size)
Treated sector = 1	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.011 (0.008)			0.002 (0.029)	-0.006 (0.032)		
Payroll Tax Change			0.007* (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)			-0.057** (0.025)	-0.054** (0.027)
Constant	0.084*** (0.001)	-0.090 (0.211)	0.073*** (0.000)	0.224 (0.337)	1.727*** (0.004)	1.801* (0.958)	1.712*** (0.003)	2.715 (2.187)
Observations	436	436	1,308	1,308	436	436	1,308	1,308
R-squared	0.869	0.874	0.777	0.786	0.961	0.968	0.906	0.920
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Yearly FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Yearly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	✓	-	✓	-	✓	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the probability of leaving the SIMPLES tax regime (columns 1-4) and the log of the sectoral average number of employees in SIMPLES firms (columns 5-8) to the timing of PBM implementation in a given sector. Treated sector=1 is an indicator that equals 1 if a sector was eventually included in the PBM in any year. PBM implementation is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a sector is included in the PBM tax regime at a given year. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) present results of a simple mean difference test between treated and control groups before the implementation of PBM. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) explore the timing of PBM implementation (yearly variation) across sectors. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) add the interaction of year fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. All columns report estimates that control for sector and year fixed effects. Our sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime from 218 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. We lose 1 sector out of 219 of the main sample - “Microwave-based operators of TV channels” - as it did not have active SIMPLES firms in all years. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table B.2: PBM implementation and the number of firms

	(1) log(number of firms)	(2) log(number of firms)	(3) log(number of firms)
-4 quarters	0.001 (0.010)	0.007 (0.013)	0.011 (0.013)
-3 quarters	0.003 (0.007)	0.009 (0.009)	0.011 (0.009)
-2 quarters	0.003 (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.008* (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)
+1 quarter	0.009 (0.007)	0.007 (0.008)	0.009 (0.009)
+2 quarters	0.012 (0.010)	0.011 (0.011)	0.013 (0.012)
+3 quarters	0.019* (0.011)	0.021 (0.014)	0.018 (0.015)
+4 quarters	0.020 (0.013)	0.026 (0.017)	0.020 (0.017)
Constant	6.711*** (0.004)	6.710*** (0.005)	6.429*** (0.316)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.995	0.995	0.995
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the number of active firms in each sector to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table B.3: PBM implementation and firm size

	(1) log(avg employees per firm)	(2) log(avg employees per firm)	(3) log(avg employees per firm)
-4 quarters	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)
-3 quarters	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.020* (0.011)	-0.019 (0.012)
-2 quarters	-0.014 (0.008)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.016* (0.009)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.008 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)
+1 quarter	0.010 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)	0.008 (0.012)
+2 quarters	0.031** (0.013)	0.024* (0.014)	0.024 (0.016)
+3 quarters	0.030** (0.013)	0.025 (0.016)	0.026 (0.019)
+4 quarters	0.029** (0.014)	0.031* (0.018)	0.036* (0.021)
Constant	3.044*** (0.005)	3.044*** (0.005)	3.658* (1.894)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.984	0.984	0.985
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the sectoral average number of employees to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table B.4: PBM implementation, employment and low market concentration

	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)	(3) log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.017)
-3 quarters	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.013)
-2 quarters	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.010)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.012 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)
+1 quarter	0.016 (0.012)	0.008 (0.013)	0.012 (0.014)
+2 quarters	0.043*** (0.015)	0.035** (0.016)	0.032* (0.018)
+3 quarters	0.052*** (0.016)	0.046** (0.020)	0.040* (0.022)
+4 quarters	0.052*** (0.019)	0.057** (0.024)	0.054** (0.024)
Constant	9.664*** (0.005)	9.663*** (0.006)	9.216*** (1.289)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.990	0.991	0.991
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). The dependent variable is sectoral employment in micro-regions associated with low levels (below median) of labor market concentration which is measured by a wage-bill HHI index, as discussed in section 4.5. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime and in low-concentration micro-regions from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table B.5: PBM implementation, employment and high market concentration

	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)	(3) log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters	0.046 (0.056)	-0.019 (0.056)	-0.018 (0.049)
-3 quarters	0.050 (0.041)	0.009 (0.040)	0.016 (0.038)
-2 quarters	0.009 (0.034)	-0.013 (0.040)	-0.016 (0.044)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.004 (0.035)	-0.006 (0.034)	-0.024 (0.035)
+1 quarter	-0.001 (0.042)	-0.012 (0.044)	-0.019 (0.043)
+2 quarters	-0.012 (0.052)	-0.020 (0.057)	-0.029 (0.052)
+3 quarters	-0.020 (0.060)	-0.030 (0.068)	-0.020 (0.058)
+4 quarters	-0.047 (0.064)	-0.049 (0.079)	-0.010 (0.072)
Constant	7.007*** (0.014)	7.017*** (0.015)	12.712*** (3.134)
Observations	15,336	15,336	15,336
R-squared	0.970	0.971	0.973
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). The dependent variable is sectoral employment in micro-regions associated with high levels (above median) of labor market concentration which is measured by a wage-bill HHI index, as discussed in section 4.5. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime and in high-concentration micro-regions from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table B.6: PBM implementation, average wage and low market concentration

	(1) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)	(2) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)	(3) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)
-4 quarters	0.026 (0.018)	0.032 (0.021)	0.030 (0.022)
-3 quarters	0.017 (0.015)	0.025 (0.019)	0.026 (0.020)
-2 quarters	0.016 (0.013)	0.024 (0.016)	0.025 (0.016)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.017 (0.018)	0.015 (0.021)	0.007 (0.021)
+1 quarter	0.032* (0.019)	0.026 (0.025)	0.017 (0.026)
+2 quarters	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.020)	0.002 (0.020)
+3 quarters	0.004 (0.023)	0.001 (0.025)	-0.000 (0.026)
+4 quarters	0.005 (0.020)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.002 (0.025)
Constant	1.989*** (0.004)	1.987*** (0.005)	4.772*** (1.125)
Observations	15,767	15,767	15,767
R-squared	0.854	0.858	0.863
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the hourly wage of new hires to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). The dependent variable is sectoral hourly wage in micro-regions associated with low levels (below median) of labor market concentration which is measured by a wage-bill HHI index, as discussed in section 4.5. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime and in low-concentration micro-regions from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table B.7: PBM implementation, average wage and high market concentration

	(1) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)	(2) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)	(3) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)
-4 quarters	-0.058* (0.033)	-0.034 (0.035)	-0.013 (0.035)
-3 quarters	-0.040 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.034)	-0.004 (0.037)
-2 quarters	-0.041 (0.032)	-0.019 (0.033)	-0.003 (0.035)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	-0.007 (0.032)	0.010 (0.034)	0.028 (0.035)
+1 quarter	-0.024 (0.036)	0.002 (0.037)	0.023 (0.039)
+2 quarters	-0.072* (0.038)	-0.048 (0.040)	-0.035 (0.041)
+3 quarters	-0.009 (0.041)	0.021 (0.044)	0.024 (0.045)
+4 quarters	-0.029 (0.039)	0.003 (0.042)	0.014 (0.043)
Constant	1.721*** (0.010)	1.714*** (0.010)	0.892 (0.861)
Observations	14,867	14,867	14,783
R-squared	0.596	0.605	0.614
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the hourly wage of new hires to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). The dependent variable is sectoral average hourly wage in micro-regions associated with high levels (above median) of labor market concentration which is measured by a wage-bill HHI index, as discussed in section 4.5. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime and in high-concentration micro-regions from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table B.8: PBM implementation and sectoral employment in small firms

	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)	(3) log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters	-0.007 (0.012)	0.001 (0.015)	0.020 (0.014)
-3 quarters	0.004 (0.010)	0.009 (0.012)	0.021* (0.011)
-2 quarters	-0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.009)	0.008 (0.009)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.010* (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)
+1 quarter	0.025*** (0.009)	0.023** (0.011)	0.018 (0.011)
+2 quarters	0.028** (0.012)	0.025* (0.015)	0.018 (0.015)
+3 quarters	0.044*** (0.013)	0.046** (0.018)	0.034* (0.018)
+4 quarters	0.043** (0.017)	0.053** (0.023)	0.034 (0.021)
Constant	8.365*** (0.004)	8.362*** (0.005)	6.774*** (1.559)
Observations	15,264	15,264	15,264
R-squared	0.994	0.994	0.994
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment in small firms to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). A small firm is defined as a firm with less employees than the average in its sector before the beginning of PBM. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all small firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table B.9: PBM implementation and sectoral employment in large firms

	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)	(3) log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.018)	-0.022 (0.020)
-3 quarters	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.023 (0.014)
-2 quarters	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.017 (0.011)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.017* (0.009)	0.008 (0.009)	0.015 (0.010)
+1 quarter	0.017 (0.014)	0.013 (0.013)	0.024* (0.014)
+2 quarters	0.046*** (0.017)	0.044*** (0.017)	0.045** (0.018)
+3 quarters	0.050*** (0.018)	0.049** (0.020)	0.049** (0.022)
+4 quarters	0.050** (0.021)	0.061** (0.025)	0.066** (0.026)
Constant	9.526*** (0.006)	9.527*** (0.007)	9.256*** (1.150)
Observations	15,624	15,624	15,624
R-squared	0.988	0.989	0.989
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment of large firms to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). A large firm is defined as a firm with at least as many employees as the average in its sector before the beginning of PBM. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all large firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table B.10: PBM implementation and sectoral employment according to education level

	(1) Incomplete HS log(sectoral employment)	(2) Incomplete HS log(sectoral employment)	(3) Incomplete HS log(sectoral employment)	(4) Complete HS log(sectoral employment)	(5) Complete HS log(sectoral employment)	(6) Complete HS log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters	-0.026 (0.023)	-0.029 (0.025)	-0.022 (0.025)	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.018)
-3 quarters	-0.031* (0.018)	-0.025 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.013)
-2 quarters	-0.023** (0.011)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.009)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.006 (0.023)	0.013 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.027)	0.014* (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.012 (0.008)
+1 quarter	0.015 (0.026)	0.022 (0.031)	0.000 (0.031)	0.017 (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)	0.018 (0.013)
+2 quarters	0.039 (0.029)	0.044 (0.035)	0.011 (0.035)	0.041*** (0.014)	0.033** (0.015)	0.037** (0.017)
+3 quarters	0.043 (0.031)	0.047 (0.038)	0.015 (0.037)	0.050*** (0.016)	0.043** (0.019)	0.050** (0.021)
+4 quarters	0.044 (0.028)	0.061 (0.040)	0.043 (0.035)	0.047** (0.019)	0.052** (0.024)	0.061** (0.026)
Constant	8.349*** (0.007)	8.348*** (0.008)	8.814*** (0.827)	9.348*** (0.005)	9.341*** (0.006)	10.741*** (1.592)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.987	0.988	0.989	0.990	0.991	0.991
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment according to educational level to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). Different estimates are presented for employees without a high school diploma (columns (1)-(3)), and employees with at least a high school (columns (4)-(6)). Columns (1) and (4) report estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Columns (2) and (5) interact monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Columns (3) and (6) add the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table B.11: PBM implementation and sectoral employment according to sector formality levels

	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)	(3) log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters (High Form.)	0.015 (0.024)	0.008 (0.023)	0.011 (0.026)
-3 quarters (High Form.)	-0.004 (0.018)	0.001 (0.017)	0.006 (0.019)
-2 quarters (High Form.)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.010)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief) (High Form.)	0.013 (0.009)	0.011 (0.008)	0.010 (0.009)
+1 quarter (High Form.)	0.020 (0.016)	0.023 (0.015)	0.027* (0.016)
+2 quarters (High Form.)	0.048** (0.022)	0.054** (0.022)	0.055** (0.023)
+3 quarters (High Form.)	0.054*** (0.020)	0.069*** (0.024)	0.067** (0.026)
+4 quarters (High Form.)	0.048** (0.022)	0.082*** (0.028)	0.079*** (0.030)
-4 quarters (Low Form.)	-0.019 (0.016)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.027 (0.021)
-3 quarters (Low Form.)	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.022 (0.016)
-2 quarters (Low Form.)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.014)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief) (Low Form.)	0.018 (0.012)	0.005 (0.012)	0.010 (0.011)
+1 quarter (Low Form.)	0.018 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.017)	0.004 (0.017)
+2 quarters (Low Form.)	0.037** (0.017)	0.018 (0.020)	0.013 (0.022)
+3 quarters (Low Form.)	0.045** (0.020)	0.024 (0.023)	0.018 (0.025)
+4 quarters (Low Form.)	0.049* (0.025)	0.036 (0.030)	0.037 (0.031)
Constant	9.755*** (0.005)	9.754*** (0.006)	9.840*** (1.313)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.991	0.991	0.991
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). Different estimates are presented for sectors below and above the median level of formality (defined as the percentage of total employees working in a formal firm in that sector according to the 2010 Census). Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all large firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

C Sectors included by product-based (NCM) criterion

In this section, we replicate our event-study analysis to sectors included in the PBM tax reform by the NCM criterion, based on products instead of sector ISIC codes. This criterion affected mainly firms in Agriculture, Mining and Manufacturing, as reported in Table 1.

Figure C.1 depicts the number of 4-digit sectors (included by the NCM criterion) and their respective employment share affected by the introduction of the PBM tax reform between 2009 and 2015.

Tables C.1 and C.2 replicate estimates reported in Tables 4 and 5 for the NCM criterion. The estimated effects are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero across all specifications.

Figure C.1: Staggered Rollout of PBM Tax Reform (NCM criterion)




Table C.1: PBM implementation and employment for product-based (NCM) eligible sectors

	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)	(3) log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters	0.011 (0.010)	0.001 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)
-3 quarters	0.012* (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.008)
-2 quarters	0.008** (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)
+1 quarter	-0.009 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)
+2 quarters	-0.010 (0.011)	0.006 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.011)
+3 quarters	-0.009 (0.013)	0.013 (0.012)	0.007 (0.013)
+4 quarters	-0.011 (0.015)	0.016 (0.014)	0.010 (0.014)
Constant	9.345*** (0.005)	9.346*** (0.005)	11.890*** (2.380)
Observations	22,392	22,392	22,392
R-squared	0.989	0.990	0.991
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our NCM sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime from 523 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table C.2: PBM implementation and employment for product-based (NCM) eligible sectors according to treatment intensity

	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)	(3) log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters (High int.)	0.005 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.001 (0.012)
-3 quarters (High int.)	0.008 (0.008)	0.000 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.010)
-2 quarters (High int.)	0.010*** (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief (High int.))	-0.006 (0.006)	0.002 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)
+1 quarter (High int.)	-0.007 (0.009)	0.002 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.011)
+2 quarters (High int.)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.016)
+3 quarters (High int.)	-0.013 (0.017)	0.008 (0.016)	0.003 (0.017)
+4 quarters (High int.)	-0.017 (0.019)	0.013 (0.018)	0.009 (0.019)
-4 quarters (Low int.)	0.017 (0.011)	0.004 (0.011)	0.004 (0.011)
-3 quarters (Low int.)	0.016** (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)
-2 quarters (Low int.)	0.006* (0.003)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief (Low int.))	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)
+1 quarter (Low int.)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.000 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.010)
+2 quarters (Low int.)	-0.008 (0.012)	0.010 (0.011)	0.002 (0.012)
+3 quarters (Low int.)	-0.006 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.009 (0.013)
+4 quarters (Low int.)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.020 (0.015)	0.009 (0.015)
Constant	9.345*** (0.005)	9.346*** (0.005)	11.891*** (2.389)
Observations	22,392	22,392	22,392
R-squared	0.989	0.990	0.991
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2), allowing effects to differ according to high/low intensity (above/below median) in the reduction of the payroll tax burden due to PBM (see Table A.1 for the average reduction by sector). Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our NCM sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime from 523 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***) , 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

D Evidence for all tax regimes

Table D.1: PBM implementation and sectoral employment - all tax regimes

	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)	(3) log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters	0.005 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.015)
-3 quarters	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.010)
-2 quarters	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.016** (0.008)	0.008 (0.007)	0.011 (0.007)
+1 quarter	0.022* (0.011)	0.013 (0.010)	0.019* (0.011)
+2 quarters	0.041*** (0.014)	0.031** (0.013)	0.035** (0.015)
+3 quarters	0.040*** (0.015)	0.029* (0.017)	0.031* (0.019)
+4 quarters	0.036** (0.018)	0.034 (0.021)	0.042* (0.023)
Constant	10.234*** (0.004)	10.232*** (0.005)	11.089*** (1.545)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.993	0.993	0.993
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in both standard and SIMPLES tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table D.2: PBM implementation and sectoral employment according to treatment intensity - all tax regimes

	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)	(3) log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters (High int.)	0.018 (0.021)	0.002 (0.022)	0.005 (0.022)
-3 quarters (High int.)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000 (0.016)	0.004 (0.016)
-2 quarters (High int.)	0.006 (0.005)	0.000 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief (High int.))	0.024* (0.013)	0.016 (0.013)	0.018 (0.013)
+1 quarter (High int.)	0.032* (0.017)	0.025 (0.017)	0.031* (0.017)
+2 quarters (High int.)	0.051*** (0.020)	0.048** (0.021)	0.053** (0.023)
+3 quarters (High int.)	0.057** (0.022)	0.056** (0.025)	0.059** (0.027)
+4 quarters (High int.)	0.058** (0.025)	0.065** (0.028)	0.074** (0.030)
-4 quarters (Low int.)	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.018)
-3 quarters (Low int.)	-0.021* (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.021 (0.014)
-2 quarters (Low int.)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.018* (0.009)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief (Low int.))	0.009 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)
+1 quarter (Low int.)	0.013 (0.013)	-0.000 (0.008)	0.010 (0.010)
+2 quarters (Low int.)	0.032* (0.017)	0.012 (0.012)	0.020 (0.014)
+3 quarters (Low int.)	0.022 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.014)	0.006 (0.017)
+4 quarters (Low int.)	0.011 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.018)	0.009 (0.020)
Constant	10.234*** (0.004)	10.232*** (0.005)	11.094*** (1.550)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.993	0.993	0.993
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2), allowing effects to differ according to high/low intensity (above/below median) in the reduction of the payroll tax burden due to PBM (see Table A.1 for the average reduction by sector). Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in both standard and SIMPLES tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table D.3: PBM implementation and sectoral employment according to education level - all tax regimes

	(1) Incomplete HS log(sectoral employment)	(2) Incomplete HS log(sectoral employment)	(3) Incomplete HS log(sectoral employment)	(4) Complete HS log(sectoral employment)	(5) Complete HS log(sectoral employment)	(6) Complete HS log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.015)
-3 quarters	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.010)
-2 quarters	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.006)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.004 (0.022)	0.010 (0.026)	-0.007 (0.025)	0.014* (0.008)	0.005 (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)
+1 quarter	0.011 (0.025)	0.016 (0.029)	-0.003 (0.029)	0.020* (0.011)	0.009 (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)
+2 quarters	0.030 (0.027)	0.031 (0.033)	0.006 (0.033)	0.041*** (0.014)	0.029** (0.013)	0.038** (0.015)
+3 quarters	0.030 (0.029)	0.026 (0.035)	0.004 (0.035)	0.041*** (0.015)	0.027 (0.017)	0.037** (0.018)
+4 quarters	0.024 (0.025)	0.028 (0.036)	0.023 (0.032)	0.036** (0.018)	0.031 (0.021)	0.046** (0.023)
Constant	8.911*** (0.006)	8.907*** (0.007)	9.569*** (1.044)	9.808*** (0.005)	9.801*** (0.005)	11.454*** (1.756)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.990	0.991	0.991	0.991	0.992	0.993
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment according to educational level to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). Different estimates are presented for employees without a high school diploma (columns (1)-(3)), and employees with at least a high school (columns (4)-(6)). Columns (1) and (4) report estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Columns (2) and (5) interact monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Columns (3) and (6) add the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in both standard and SIMPLES tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table D.4: PBM implementation and the number of firms - all tax regimes

	(1) log(number of firms)	(2) log(number of firms)	(3) log(number of firms)
-4 quarters	-0.002 (0.009)	0.002 (0.011)	0.003 (0.011)
-3 quarters	0.000 (0.006)	0.002 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)
-2 quarters	-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.006 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)
+1 quarter	0.013* (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	0.013* (0.008)
+2 quarters	0.020** (0.009)	0.012 (0.009)	0.021** (0.010)
+3 quarters	0.021* (0.011)	0.011 (0.012)	0.020 (0.013)
+4 quarters	0.022* (0.013)	0.013 (0.015)	0.020 (0.016)
Constant	7.606*** (0.004)	7.602*** (0.004)	7.436*** (0.339)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.996	0.996	0.527
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the number of active firms in each sector to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in both standard and SIMPLES tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table D.5: PBM implementation and firm size - all tax regimes

	(1) log(avg employees per firm)	(2) log(avg employees per firm)	(3) log(avg employees per firm)
-4 quarters	0.007 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.013)
-3 quarters	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.009)
-2 quarters	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.010* (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)
+1 quarter	0.009 (0.009)	0.007 (0.008)	0.007 (0.009)
+2 quarters	0.021* (0.012)	0.019* (0.011)	0.016 (0.012)
+3 quarters	0.019* (0.012)	0.018 (0.013)	0.012 (0.015)
+4 quarters	0.014 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	0.018 (0.016)
Constant	2.628*** (0.004)	2.630*** (0.004)	2.368** (1.059)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.990	0.990	0.991
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the sectoral average number of employees per firm to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in both standard and SIMPLES tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

E An Oligopsonistic Labor Market Model

In this section, we first present a theoretical framework to study the effects of payroll taxes on employment and wages in imperfect labor markets characterized by (oligo)monopsony power. We then use the model to derive predictions that guide our empirical analysis of how labor market concentration shapes the effects of a payroll tax reduction on our main outcomes, as examined in Section 4.5. We also make explicit the level at which the tax shock operates. This distinction is important because the equilibrium response to a tax change affecting all employers is different from the response to a tax change affecting only a subset of firms within a labor market.

In a simple monopsony model with a tax on labor, firms are assumed to face an upward-sloping labor supply curve, with its inverse denoted by $w(\ell)$. The equilibrium values of wages and employment are obtained by profit maximization and can be solved by choosing the quantity of labor:

$$\max_{\ell} [y - (1 + T)w(\ell)]\ell, \quad (\text{E.1})$$

where y is the marginal productivity of labor and T is a tax (or subsidy, when negative) on wages. This leads to the first-order condition

$$\frac{y - w}{w} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon} + \left(1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon}\right) T,$$

where ε is the labor supply elasticity faced by the firm.

According to this result, both wages and employment are lower than under perfect competition, and a labor subsidy can be used to raise wages and increase employment. In fact, the employer chooses the competitive allocation with $w = y$ if the government sets $T = -1/(\varepsilon + 1)$, so that the corrective subsidy depends on the labor supply elasticity. To put this into perspective, consider two monopsonistic labor markets, A and B , in which workers are equally productive but labor supply is less elastic in market A than in market B . The subsidy required to attain the competitive level of employment is larger in market A .

We now consider an oligopsony model because we are interested in understanding how the impact of a labor tax reduction varies with labor market concentration. Instead of one firm, there is a finite number of employers, J_m , which compete à la Cournot by choosing how many workers to hire in market m .

In models of oligopsony, upward-sloping labor supply curves for particular firms can arise even when many firms compete in the market (Bhaskar et al., 2002; Manning, 2003). We follow Berger et al. (2022) and specify the inverse labor supply function for each firm j in

market m as

$$w_{jm}(\ell_{jm}) = \zeta \ell_{jm}^{\frac{1}{\eta}} L_m^{\frac{1}{\theta} - \frac{1}{\eta}}, \quad (\text{E.2})$$

where L_m is total employment in market m (i.e. $L_m = \sum_j \ell_{jm}$), and ζ depends on preference parameters and aggregate labor supply, which are taken as given by the firm. The parameter η denotes the elasticity of substitution across firms within a market, with a high value corresponding to low within-market mobility costs. The parameter θ is the elasticity of substitution across markets. Following Berger et al. (2022), we assume imperfect substitution across firms and greater mobility costs across markets than within markets, so that $\theta < \eta < \infty$.

Analogous to problem E.1, firm j chooses employment taking the labor supply function in equation E.2 as given. To make the nature of the policy experiment explicit, we index the labor tax by firm and market:

$$\max_{\ell_{jm}} [y_{jm} - (1 + T_{jm})w_{jm}(\ell_{jm})]\ell_{jm}, \quad (\text{E.3})$$

where y_{jm} is the exogenous marginal product of labor. In the expressions below, T_{jm} changes for the treated firm while the tax rates faced by competing firms remain fixed. Thus, the comparative statics correspond to an idiosyncratic labor-cost shock from the perspective of the relevant labor market.

This is the appropriate interpretation of the PBM variation even though legal eligibility was assigned at the sector level. A sector is not a labor market: workers can move across sectors within a micro-region, and firms in the SIMPLES regime were not directly affected even when operating in an eligible sector. Hence, the reform did not uniformly change labor costs for all employers competing for the same workers. Our sector-level event studies aggregate the responses of treated firms, but the underlying economic shock remains concentrated among a subset of firms within local labor markets. This interpretation is also consistent with Lobel (2024), who uses firm-level tax records for the same reform and documents that treated firms represented a small share of employers within relevant local labor markets and that spillovers to untreated firms were limited.

The first-order condition for problem E.3 is

$$y_{jm} - (1 + T_{jm})w_{jm}(\ell_{jm}) - (1 + T_{jm})w'_{jm}(\ell_{jm})\ell_{jm} = 0,$$

and can be written as

$$\frac{y_{jm} - w_{jm}}{w_{jm}} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{jm}} + \left(1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{jm}}\right) T_{jm}.$$

As in the monopsony case, a subsidy $T_{jm} = -1/(\varepsilon_{jm} + 1)$ corrects the markdown and restores

the competitive allocation for that firm, conditional on the behavior of the other employers.

As shown by Atkeson and Burstein (2008) for product markets and Berger et al. (2022) for labor markets, the labor supply elasticity faced by a firm is related to its labor-market share. Define the wage-bill share of firm j in market m as

$$s_{jm} = \frac{w_{jm}\ell_{jm}}{\sum_{k=1}^{J_m} w_{km}\ell_{km}}.$$

Because the inverse labor supply of a firm depends on its own employment and on total market employment, taking logs of equation E.2 and differentiating $\log(w_{jm})$ with respect to $\log(\ell_{jm})$ gives

$$s_{jm} = \frac{\frac{1}{\varepsilon_{jm}} - \frac{1}{\eta}}{\frac{1}{\theta} - \frac{1}{\eta}}, \quad (\text{E.4})$$

with $1/\theta > 1/\varepsilon_{jm} \geq 1/\eta$ because $s_{jm} \in [0, 1)$. Equivalently,

$$\frac{1}{\varepsilon_{jm}} = \frac{1}{\eta} + \left(\frac{1}{\theta} - \frac{1}{\eta} \right) s_{jm}. \quad (\text{E.5})$$

It is clear from this equation that firms with smaller shares face more elastic labor supply.

The level of the tax shock

Before deriving the comparative statics, it is useful to distinguish the idiosyncratic experiment from two alternative policy experiments. If the payroll tax changes by the same proportion for every firm in the economy, all wages can scale proportionately with $1/(1+T)$ while relative wages, employment allocations, and wage-bill shares remain unchanged. With fixed aggregate labor supply, the equilibrium response is then

$$\frac{d \log w_{jm}}{d \log(1+T)} = -1, \quad \frac{d \log \ell_{jm}}{d \log(1+T)} = 0.$$

Similarly, if all firms in a labor market receive the same tax change, the within-market shares remain unchanged; the policy does not create a relative labor-cost advantage among firms competing for the same workers.

The comparative statics below instead hold the tax rates of other firms fixed and perturb T_{jm} . This is not a claim that legal eligibility was assigned firm by firm. It is a claim about the incidence of the reform within economically relevant labor markets. Since the set of treated standard-regime firms is only a subset of all employers available to workers in a micro-region, the PBM is substantially closer to an idiosyncratic shock than to a tax change covering the full labor market. The distinction reconciles the sectoral level of policy assignment and estimation with the firm-level comparative static in the model.

Employment and wage responses

Recall that the maximization problem E.3 implies

$$y_{jm} - (1 + T_{jm})w_{jm}(\ell_{jm}) - (1 + T_{jm})w'_{jm}(\ell_{jm})\ell_{jm} = 0, \quad (\text{E.6})$$

which is an implicit function of ℓ_{jm} , given y_{jm} and the inverse labor supply function in equation E.2.

Totally differentiating equation E.6 with respect to $(1 + T_{jm})$ gives

$$- [w_{jm} + w'_{jm}\ell_{jm}] - (1 + T_{jm}) (2w'_{jm} + w''_{jm}\ell_{jm}) \frac{d\ell_{jm}}{d(1 + T_{jm})} = 0,$$

which can be rearranged as

$$\frac{d\ell_{jm}}{d(1 + T_{jm})} = - \frac{w_{jm} + w'_{jm}\ell_{jm}}{(1 + T_{jm}) (2w'_{jm} + w''_{jm}\ell_{jm})}.$$

Multiplying both sides by $(1 + T_{jm})/\ell_{jm}$ yields

$$\frac{d \log \ell_{jm}}{d \log(1 + T_{jm})} = - \frac{w_{jm} + w'_{jm}\ell_{jm}}{\ell_{jm} (2w'_{jm} + w''_{jm}\ell_{jm})}.$$

Using the inverse labor supply function in equation E.2,

$$w_{jm}(\ell_{jm}) = \zeta \ell_{jm}^{1/\eta} L_m^{1/\theta - 1/\eta},$$

together with

$$\frac{w'_{jm}\ell_{jm}}{w_{jm}} = \alpha - \beta s_{jm},$$

and

$$\frac{w''_{jm}\ell_{jm}}{w'_{jm}} = \alpha - \beta s_{jm} - 1 - \frac{\beta s_{jm}(1 - s_{jm})}{\alpha - \beta s_{jm}},$$

which follows from equation E.4, we obtain

$$\frac{d \log \ell_{jm}}{d \log(1 + T_{jm})} = - \frac{1}{\alpha - \beta s_{jm} - \frac{\beta s_{jm}(1 - s_{jm})}{1 + \alpha - \beta s_{jm}}} < 0. \quad (\text{E.7})$$

where $\alpha = \frac{1}{\eta}$ and $\beta = \frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\theta} < 0$.

Thus, a reduction in labor cost is expected to increase employment. A similar analysis

can be conducted for wages. Since

$$\frac{dw_{jm}}{d(1+T_{jm})} = \frac{dw_{jm}}{d\ell_{jm}} \frac{d\ell_{jm}}{d(1+T_{jm})},$$

it follows that

$$\frac{d\log(w_{jm})}{d\log(1+T_{jm})} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{jm}} \frac{d\log(\ell_{jm})}{d\log(1+T_{jm})}.$$

or

$$\frac{d\log(w_{jm})}{d\log(1+T_{jm})} = -\frac{\alpha - \beta s_{jm}}{\alpha - \beta s_{jm} - \frac{\beta s_{jm}(1-s_{jm})}{1+\alpha-\beta s_{jm}}} < 0. \quad (\text{E.8})$$


Equation E.8 shows that a tax reduction raises wages, but the wage response is smaller than the employment response when the labor supply is elastic. In particular, the wage effect tends to zero as the labor supply elasticity becomes very large, in other words, when the elasticity of substitution across firms within sector and across sectors, η and θ , respectively, are sufficiently high.

Figure E.1 illustrates how the employment and wage effects in equations E.7 and E.8 vary with firm share, calibrating η and θ using the values estimated by Berger et al. (2022), $\eta = 6.96$ and $\theta = 0.45$. For most firm-share levels, the wage effect is smaller than the employment effect. This indicates that the wage pass-through of an idiosyncratic labor subsidy is generally lower in imperfect labor markets characterized by oligopsony power. Because workers are imperfectly mobile within and across markets, firms trade off wages against size. When a firm's market share is small, there is less scope for it to affect wages, making adjustment through employment relatively more profitable. Furthermore, given these estimates, a decrease in labor costs increases employment relatively less for firms with a higher share of the market. Conversely, the wage response becomes stronger as the firm's market share increases over most of the share range.

We now make the case for the need for an oligopsony model to understand how labor market concentration influences the impact of a labor tax. In a standard competitive labor market, wage and employment effects of labor subsidies depend on the elasticities of labor supply and labor demand. In the extreme case of inelastic labor supply, a labor-cost reduction is transferred to workers through higher wages; with perfectly elastic labor supply, the adjustment occurs through employment. For intermediate cases, the oligopsony model adds a market-structure mechanism linking the relevant labor supply elasticity to firm size and concentration.

The oligopsony framework provides a structural explanation for why labor supply is more or less elastic. In equilibrium, both firm wage-bill shares and the labor supply elasticity

Figure E.1: Effects of a labor subsidy on employment and wages



Note: The figure shows the effects of reducing the payroll tax.

faced by each firm are jointly determined by the within- and across-market elasticities of substitution, as shown in equation E.5. At the market level, recent literature documents a close relationship between labor market concentration and labor market power. Standard concentration measures such as the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index also permit comparisons with antitrust thresholds (Azar et al., 2022; Berger et al., 2022).

The correlation between the wage-bill HHI and the average firm share across markets is 0.72 in our data. Under the special case in which all firms have the same share within market m , $s_{jm} = 1/J_m$, the wage-bill Herfindahl measure becomes

$$\text{HHI}_m = \sum_{j=1}^{J_m} s_{jm}^2 = J_m \frac{1}{J_m^2} = s_{jm}.$$

Since market concentration is positively related to the average firm share, the labor-market effects in equations E.7 and E.8 can be interpreted with respect to HHI_m at the market level.

This mapping does not require the reform to affect every firm entering the HHI. On the contrary, the empirical exercise compares the response of treated standard-regime firms across local markets with different pre-existing concentration. Small firms in the SIMPLES regime remain part of workers’ outside options and of the market structure even though they are not directly treated. This feature makes the shock less, not more, like a full-market tax change. It may attenuate the reduced-form concentration gradient if low-concentration markets contain a larger untreated SIMPLES share, but it does not overturn the model’s

qualitative prediction that treated firms expand employment more where their labor supply is more elastic.


The model should therefore be read as characterizing the direct response to a sparse labor-cost shock within a local labor market. It is not a model of the aggregate effects of removing payroll taxes for every employer in a sector or in the economy. Under the latter experiment, relative firm costs and wage-bill shares would not move in the way required for equations E.7–E.8 . The empirical setting is closer to the idiosyncratic case because sector-based eligibility intersects with tax-regime eligibility and geographically defined labor markets, leaving many competing employers untreated. This is the sense in which the model rationalizes the positive employment response, its concentration in less concentrated labor markets, and the limited average wage response observed in the data.

F Labor Market Concentration (employment HHI) and the effects of Payroll Taxation

Now we replicate our analysis introduced in Section 4.5 that explored how the effects of a reduction in labor costs vary across markets with different levels of labor market concentration, but using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on employment (instead of wage-bill) as a measure of labor market concentration.

Figure F.1 shows the geographical distribution of the 558 micro-regions according to above/below median (employment-based) labor market concentration. Similarly, Figure F.2 replicates Figure 14 and Tables F.1-F.4 replicate results from Tables B.4-B.7.

Figure F.1: Geographical distribution of labor market concentration - employment HHI



Note: For each of the 558 geographic micro-regions of Brazil, we measure labor market concentration as the employment Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). High (low) concentration is defined by a HHI index above (below) our sample median of 0.008.

Figure F.2: PBM tax reform and employment according to employment HHI




Table F.1: PBM implementation, employment and low employment HHI

	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)	(3) log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.017)
-3 quarters	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.012)
-2 quarters	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.009)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.015* (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.013 (0.008)
+1 quarter	0.020 (0.012)	0.013 (0.012)	0.018 (0.013)
+2 quarters	0.045*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	0.038** (0.017)
+3 quarters	0.053*** (0.016)	0.048** (0.019)	0.044** (0.021)
+4 quarters	0.052*** (0.019)	0.058** (0.024)	0.057** (0.025)
Constant	9.686*** (0.005)	9.684*** (0.006)	9.855*** (1.277)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.990	0.991	0.991
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). The dependent variable is sectoral employment in micro-regions associated with low levels (below median) of labor market concentration which is measured by an employment-based HHI index, as discussed in section 4.5. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime and in low-concentration micro-regions from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table F.2: PBM implementation, employment and high employment HHI

	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)	(3) log(sectoral employment)
-4 quarters	0.010 (0.055)	-0.071 (0.062)	-0.021 (0.049)
-3 quarters	0.021 (0.038)	-0.028 (0.045)	0.015 (0.041)
-2 quarters	-0.012 (0.031)	-0.033 (0.041)	-0.008 (0.049)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.049 (0.057)	0.049 (0.065)	0.027 (0.062)
+1 quarter	0.050 (0.071)	0.056 (0.085)	0.039 (0.082)
+2 quarters	0.048 (0.083)	0.060 (0.104)	0.039 (0.099)
+3 quarters	0.060 (0.090)	0.069 (0.113)	0.050 (0.101)
+4 quarters	0.025 (0.097)	0.032 (0.127)	0.027 (0.112)
Constant	6.613*** (0.017)	6.630*** (0.018)	6.900 (4.902)
Observations	15,192	15,192	15,192
R-squared	0.963	0.965	0.966
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). The dependent variable is sectoral employment in micro-regions associated with high levels (above median) of labor market concentration which is measured by an employment-based HHI index, as discussed in section 4.5. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime and in high-concentration micro-regions from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table F.3: PBM implementation, average wage and low employment HHI

	(1) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)	(2) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)	(3) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)
-4 quarters	0.025 (0.018)	0.032 (0.021)	0.031 (0.022)
-3 quarters	0.016 (0.014)	0.023 (0.019)	0.023 (0.019)
-2 quarters	0.018 (0.012)	0.027* (0.015)	0.029* (0.017)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.018 (0.018)	0.016 (0.022)	0.008 (0.021)
+1 quarter	0.034* (0.019)	0.033 (0.025)	0.023 (0.026)
+2 quarters	-0.005 (0.017)	0.003 (0.021)	0.006 (0.021)
+3 quarters	0.004 (0.024)	0.001 (0.026)	-0.002 (0.026)
+4 quarters	0.003 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.025)	-0.003 (0.025)
Constant	1.985*** (0.004)	1.984*** (0.005)	4.168*** (1.295)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.852	0.856	0.861
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the hourly wage of new hires to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). The dependent variable is sectoral hourly wage in micro-regions associated with low levels (below median) of labor market concentration which is measured by an employment-based HHI index, as discussed in section 4.5. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime and in low-concentration micro-regions from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table F.4: PBM implementation, average wage and high employment HHI

	(1) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)	(2) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)	(3) log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)
-4 quarters	-0.046 (0.040)	-0.048 (0.040)	-0.046 (0.042)
-3 quarters	-0.026 (0.038)	-0.024 (0.038)	-0.021 (0.041)
-2 quarters	-0.024 (0.043)	-0.000 (0.043)	0.004 (0.045)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	-0.011 (0.040)	-0.005 (0.038)	-0.019 (0.041)
+1 quarter	-0.064* (0.036)	-0.049 (0.037)	-0.061 (0.041)
+2 quarters	-0.085** (0.038)	-0.069* (0.037)	-0.066 (0.041)
+3 quarters	-0.022 (0.041)	-0.011 (0.041)	-0.019 (0.045)
+4 quarters	-0.066* (0.040)	-0.064 (0.044)	-0.073 (0.047)
Constant	1.711*** (0.009)	1.708*** (0.009)	1.864** (0.757)
Observations	14,486	14,486	14,357
R-squared	0.503	0.513	0.525
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the hourly wage of new hires to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). The dependent variable is sectoral hourly wage in micro-regions associated with high levels (above median) of labor market concentration which is measured by an employment-based HHI index, as discussed in section 4.5. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime and in high-concentration micro-regions from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

G Computing the Effect of the PBM Reform on Profits

To estimate the effect of the PBM tax reform on firm profits we use a structural approach that takes advantage of the oligopsony model described in Section 4.5. First, recall that this is a large scale reform involving a change of tax base upon which payroll taxes are calculated for selected sectors and firms in the standard taxation regime. The reduction of 20 p.p. in the tax rate paid on wages and the increase of 1-2 p.p. in the tax rate paid on revenue implied an average reduction of 51% in the total firm payroll tax burden.

Let $\Pi_{jm,t}$ denote the solution to the profit maximization problem (5). Below we expand it to explicit the main time-varying wage and revenue tax parameters, T_t and f_t , with $t = 0, 1$ indicating pre- and post-reform respectively, as well as time-invariant parameters, $\bar{T}$ and $\bar{f}$.

$$\Pi_{jm,t} = [(1 - f_t - \bar{f})y_{jm} - (1 + T_t + \bar{T})w_{jm,t}^*]\ell_{jm,t}^* \quad (12)$$

From the first order condition of problem (5) in $t = 0$ we also obtain the mark-down ratio, i.e. (fixed) labor productivity, y_{jm} , in terms of $w_{jm,0}^*$:

$$\frac{y_{jm}}{w_{jm,0}^*} = \left(1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{jm,0}}\right) \frac{(1 + T_0 + \bar{T})}{(1 - f_0 - \bar{f})}$$

We further use relation (6) between labor supply elasticity and firm share to write the mark-down function in terms of the firm share:

$$\frac{y_{jm}}{w_{jm,0}^*} = \left[1 + \frac{1}{\eta} + s_{jm,0} \left(\frac{1}{\theta} - \frac{1}{\eta}\right)\right] \frac{(1 + T_0 + \bar{T})}{(1 - f_0 - \bar{f})} \quad (13)$$

where θ and η are calibrated with values from the literature (see Section 4.5 and $s_{jm,0}$ is estimated from our data in 2010 (pre-program) using the wage-bill definition of firm share.

From (12), we can calculate the profit gain in percentage terms by using the formula

$$100 \times \left(\frac{\Pi_{jm,1} - \Pi_{jm,0}}{\Pi_{jm,0}} \right) = 100 \times \frac{\left[(1 - f_1 - \bar{f}) \frac{\ell_{jm,1}^*}{\ell_{jm,0}^*} - (1 - f_0 - \bar{f}) \right] \frac{y_{jm}}{w_{jm,0}^*} - (1 + T_1 + \bar{T}) \frac{w_{jm,1}^*}{w_{jm,0}^*} \frac{\ell_{jm,1}^*}{\ell_{jm,0}^*} + (1 + T_0 + \bar{T})}{(1 - f_0 - \bar{f}) \frac{y_{jm}}{w_{jm,0}^*} - (1 + T_0 + \bar{T})} \quad (G.1)$$

where $y_{jm}/w_{jm,0}^*$ is derived in (13). The tax parameters are calibrated from laws allowing

for the changes in the tax rates due to the PBM reform with $f_0 = 0$, $f_1 = 0.015$, $T_0 = 0.20$, $T_1 = 0$, $\bar{f} = 0.0365$, and $\bar{T} = 0.057$.³² $\ell_{jm,1}^*/\ell_{jm,0}^*$ and $w_{jm,1}^*/w_{jm,0}^*$ are set equal to the reduced-form estimates for the employment and wage average treatment effect, respectively, 1.05 and 1. After plugging all these calibrated parameters and estimated average treatment effects into (G.1), we obtain an effect on profits of 106% for firms with the average firm share (0.0015).

³²The time-invariant tax parameters, $\bar{f}$ and $\bar{T}$, represent other social security contributions charged as a percentage of revenue (Cofins (3%) and PIS/PASEP (0.65%) based on the most typical taxation criterion “lucro presumido”) and other taxes on wages including expected severance costs (3.2%) and sectoral contributions (“Sistema S” at the maximum rate of 2.5% based on the trade sector), respectively. Before the PBM reform, in addition to $\bar{T}$, firms also paid $T_0 = 0.20$ and $f_0 = 0$. After the reform, the change in the tax base from wages to revenue implied $T_1 = 0$ and $f_1 = 0.015$, which is an average between the new adopted rates in the range 1-2%.

H Firm and individual level results

This section presents results for the regressions performed at the firm- and individual-level. Each of these exercises will have some deviations with respect to the main specification at the sectoral level, which are presented below.

Employment at the firm level: The firm-level employment regression follows the same specification presented for our sectoral analysis (2), following each specific firm’s employment level at a monthly basis. However, firm attrition is not likely to be random, as our firm entry results imply. We thus restrict our sample to firms that were both active and outside the SIMPLES regime throughout our whole analysis period. This should lead to a decrease in the employment level effects, since firm entry and potential effects of sectoral reallocation will no longer be observed in our sample. Given the large number of firms present in the formal employment census (RAIS), we currently present results on a random subsample of 25% of all firms that were always open and always in the normal tax regime. To maintain the same level of analysis as the one in our main specification, all regressions results we use regression weights to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Results for the employment at the firm level are presented in tables H.1, H.2, H.3, H.4, H.5, and H.6.

Entry wages at the firm level: For the firm-level entry wage specification, because we observe univocally the month in which new hires were employed, we can identify whether their wages were set prior or after the allocation of their firms to the PBM tax regime. Thus, we keep the observation at the monthly level as in the main specification (2). Once again, we restrict our analysis to firms that were both always open throughout our analysis period (2009-2014) and always in the regular tax regime. We use regression weights to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Results are provided in tables H.7, H.8, H.9, H.10, H.11, H.12, H.13, and H.14. An alternative specification using firms that not only were open and in the regular tax regime throughout the whole period, but also hired in all months across this period, is given in table H.15.

Wages at the firm level: Given that we observe average wages yearly, including all employees of a given firm in our analysis will lead incumbents to have both wages prior and after PBM in their calculation. To allow for a specification where incumbents are also observed, we present an alternative wage specification where observations are given at an yearly level and treated firms are excluded from our sample in the year of their allocation to the PBM tax regime (“donut” regression). Once again, we restrict our sample to firms that were both always open throughout our analysis period (2009-2014) and always in the regular tax regime, and use regression weights to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Results are provided in tables H.16, H.17, H.18, H.19, H.20 and H.21.

Wages at the individual level: Regressions at the individual level present results for the effect of the PBM on the log of the wage level of new hires. Each new hire is kept as an observation only for the month in which they entered their firm. We use regression weights to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Given the large number of new hires in the formal employment census (RAIS), we currently present results for a random subsample of 5% of all new hires in the 219 sectors of our analysis between 2009 and 2014. For the main results presented in tables H.22 and H.23, regressions using the full sample of new hires led to similar results. Results are presented in tables H.22, H.23, H.24 and H.25.

HHI indexes: For the more granular regressions presented in this section we have calculated variations of our main wage-bill HHI index presented in section 4.5. While our main index focused on regional variation, our granular HHI indexes will also account for occupational variation within microregions. For the individual level regression, we follow standard practice in the literature and calculate our HHI index based on wage bill information at the Microregion $\times$ 2-digit occupation level. An alternative analysis based on a Microregion $\times$ 6-digit occupation level index leads to similar results. For the firm level outcomes, we calculate firm-specific HHIs based on a weighted average of Microregion $\times$ 2-digit occupation HHI indexes, where weights are based on the share of workers of that occupation with respect to its total employment in 2010, the year prior to the PBM implementation. More specifically, given share $s_{occ,f,m}$ of workers in occupation occ in firm f in microregion m in 2010 (prior to PBM introduction), and wage-bill HHI index $HHI_{m,occ}$ in microregion m and occupation occ , the firm-specific HHI index will be given by:

$$HHI_{f,m} = \sum_{occ} s_{occ,f,m} HHI_{m,occ}$$

The remainder of this section presents the results of the specifications described above.

Table H.1: PBM implementation and employment at the firm level

VARIABLES	(1) firm log employment	(2) firm log employment	(3) firm log employment	(4) firm log employment
4 quarters before PBM	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.015)
3 quarters before PBM	-0.012* (0.007)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.017* (0.009)
2 quarters before PBM	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.008)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	0.013 (0.017)	0.014 (0.016)	0.014 (0.017)	0.014 (0.016)
1 quarter after PBM	0.008 (0.015)	0.016 (0.014)	0.010 (0.015)	0.016 (0.014)
2 quarters after PBM	0.004 (0.018)	0.015 (0.020)	0.006 (0.017)	0.014 (0.019)
3 quarters after PBM	0.011 (0.020)	0.028 (0.021)	0.013 (0.019)	0.027 (0.021)
4 quarters after PBM	0.002 (0.024)	0.031 (0.024)	0.005 (0.023)	0.030 (0.024)
Constant	2.501*** (0.004)	2.503*** (0.003)	2.097*** (0.163)	2.234*** (0.155)
Observations	4,203,648	4,203,648	4,203,648	4,203,648
R-squared	0.926	0.926	0.927	0.927
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes a random sample of 25% of all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.2: PBM implementation and employment at the firm level with HHI index interaction

VARIABLES	(1) firm log employment	(2) firm log employment	(3) firm log employment	(4) firm log employment
4 quarters before PBM	0.002 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.014)
3 quarters before PBM	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.015* (0.008)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.014 (0.008)
2 quarters before PBM	0.002 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.001 (0.005)	0.000 (0.008)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	0.008 (0.019)	0.009 (0.018)	0.009 (0.019)	0.009 (0.017)
1 quarter after PBM	0.003 (0.016)	0.010 (0.014)	0.004 (0.015)	0.011 (0.014)
2 quarters after PBM	0.013 (0.014)	0.024* (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.023* (0.012)
3 quarters after PBM	0.022 (0.016)	0.039*** (0.015)	0.023 (0.016)	0.037*** (0.014)
4 quarters after PBM	0.021 (0.019)	0.049*** (0.019)	0.023 (0.019)	0.048** (0.018)
4 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.152 (0.183)	-0.184 (0.191)	-0.175 (0.175)	-0.207 (0.185)
3 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.077 (0.144)	-0.089 (0.147)	-0.089 (0.144)	-0.103 (0.147)
2 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.131 (0.130)	-0.130 (0.127)	-0.137 (0.131)	-0.139 (0.130)
Quarter of implementation of PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.173 (0.229)	0.175 (0.225)	0.178 (0.224)	0.178 (0.221)
1 quarter after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.190 (0.270)	0.206 (0.268)	0.203 (0.263)	0.216 (0.264)
2 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.339 (0.549)	-0.324 (0.544)	-0.318 (0.546)	-0.305 (0.543)
3 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.398 (0.561)	-0.387 (0.553)	-0.375 (0.556)	-0.365 (0.551)
4 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.685 (0.723)	-0.677 (0.715)	-0.651 (0.718)	-0.645 (0.714)
Constant	2.501*** (0.004)	2.503*** (0.003)	2.099*** (0.162)	2.235*** (0.155)
Observations	4,203,648	4,203,648	4,203,648	4,203,648
R-squared	0.926	0.926	0.927	0.927
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes a random sample of 25% of all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. The HHI index in the interaction is a weighted average of each of the occupations composing the firm in its microregion, as explained in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***) , 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.3: PBM implementation and employment at the firm level (above median PBM intensity)

VARIABLES	(1) firm log employment	(2) firm log employment	(3) firm log employment	(4) firm log employment
4 quarters before PBM	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.020)
3 quarters before PBM	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.013)
2 quarters before PBM	0.005 (0.006)	0.009 (0.014)	0.005 (0.007)	0.010 (0.014)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	0.025 (0.025)	0.026 (0.026)	0.025 (0.025)	0.026 (0.025)
1 quarter after PBM	0.022 (0.019)	0.033* (0.020)	0.022 (0.019)	0.033* (0.019)
2 quarters after PBM	0.025* (0.014)	0.041** (0.017)	0.024* (0.014)	0.039** (0.016)
3 quarters after PBM	0.037*** (0.014)	0.061*** (0.019)	0.037*** (0.014)	0.059*** (0.019)
4 quarters after PBM	0.037** (0.017)	0.067*** (0.023)	0.036** (0.016)	0.066*** (0.022)
Constant	2.439*** (0.003)	2.441*** (0.003)	2.191*** (0.156)	2.247*** (0.158)
Observations	3,801,816	3,801,816	3,801,816	3,801,816
R-squared	0.926	0.927	0.927	0.927
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes a random sample of 25% of all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.4: PBM implementation and employment at the firm level (below median PBM intensity)

VARIABLES	(1) firm log employment	(2) firm log employment	(3) firm log employment	(4) firm log employment
4 quarters before PBM	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.017)
3 quarters before PBM	-0.023** (0.011)	-0.018* (0.009)	-0.021** (0.011)	-0.017* (0.009)
2 quarters before PBM	-0.013* (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.009)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.014)
1 quarter after PBM	-0.015 (0.020)	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.006 (0.019)
2 quarters after PBM	-0.032 (0.039)	-0.028 (0.049)	-0.027 (0.037)	-0.024 (0.048)
3 quarters after PBM	-0.036 (0.045)	-0.026 (0.051)	-0.031 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.051)
4 quarters after PBM	-0.062 (0.056)	-0.039 (0.061)	-0.057 (0.054)	-0.034 (0.061)
Constant	2.439*** (0.003)	2.439*** (0.002)	2.098*** (0.186)	2.209*** (0.183)
Observations	3,554,280	3,554,280	3,554,280	3,554,280
R-squared	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.929
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes a random sample of 25% of all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.5: PBM implementation and employment at the firm level with HHI index interaction (above median PBM intensity)

VARIABLES	(1) firm log employment	(2) firm log employment	(3) firm log employment	(4) firm log employment
4 quarters before PBM	0.003 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.018)	0.002 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.018)
3 quarters before PBM	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.012)
2 quarters before PBM	0.010 (0.006)	0.013 (0.014)	0.009 (0.006)	0.015 (0.014)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	0.017 (0.029)	0.018 (0.029)	0.016 (0.028)	0.018 (0.029)
1 quarter after PBM	0.010 (0.021)	0.021 (0.021)	0.010 (0.020)	0.021 (0.020)
2 quarters after PBM	0.016 (0.014)	0.032** (0.015)	0.015 (0.014)	0.030** (0.014)
3 quarters after PBM	0.030** (0.014)	0.055*** (0.019)	0.029** (0.014)	0.052*** (0.018)
4 quarters after PBM	0.031* (0.017)	0.063*** (0.023)	0.030* (0.016)	0.061*** (0.022)
4 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.200 (0.222)	-0.221 (0.235)	-0.215 (0.214)	-0.240 (0.227)
3 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.090 (0.176)	-0.096 (0.179)	-0.093 (0.174)	-0.104 (0.179)
2 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.147 (0.164)	-0.148 (0.160)	-0.145 (0.164)	-0.153 (0.163)
Quarter of implementation of PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.272 (0.294)	0.267 (0.293)	0.274 (0.289)	0.270 (0.289)
1 quarter after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.396 (0.328)	0.405 (0.327)	0.405 (0.320)	0.413 (0.322)
2 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.297 (0.258)	0.297 (0.248)	0.318 (0.252)	0.318 (0.246)
3 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.235 (0.209)	0.220 (0.197)	0.253 (0.204)	0.239 (0.197)
4 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.187 (0.190)	0.161 (0.180)	0.214 (0.189)	0.190 (0.183)
Constant	2.439*** (0.003)	2.441*** (0.003)	2.191*** (0.156)	2.247*** (0.158)
Observations	3,801,816	3,801,816	3,801,816	3,801,816
R-squared	0.926	0.927	0.927	0.927
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes a random sample of 25% of all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. The HHI index in the interaction is a weighted average of each of the occupations composing the firm in its microregion, as explained in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.6: PBM implementation and employment at the firm level with HHI index interaction (below median PBM intensity)

VARIABLES	(1) firm log employment	(2) firm log employment	(3) firm log employment	(4) firm log employment
4 quarters before PBM	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.017)
3 quarters before PBM	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.020 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.010)
2 quarters before PBM	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.000 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.016)
1 quarter after PBM	-0.002 (0.018)	0.001 (0.020)	0.002 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
2 quarters after PBM	0.026 (0.027)	0.024 (0.023)	0.030 (0.028)	0.028 (0.023)
3 quarters after PBM	0.024 (0.035)	0.026 (0.023)	0.028 (0.035)	0.029 (0.023)
4 quarters after PBM	0.025 (0.044)	0.039 (0.035)	0.028 (0.045)	0.043 (0.035)
4 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.010 (0.269)	-0.077 (0.276)	-0.031 (0.270)	-0.104 (0.276)
3 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.059 (0.232)	-0.108 (0.237)	-0.080 (0.232)	-0.127 (0.236)
2 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.112 (0.171)	-0.121 (0.176)	-0.118 (0.171)	-0.131 (0.176)
Quarter of implementation of PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.204 (0.180)	-0.205 (0.170)	-0.202 (0.176)	-0.203 (0.167)
1 quarter after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.537 (0.333)	-0.530 (0.322)	-0.517 (0.328)	-0.514 (0.319)
2 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-2.495 (1.989)	-2.476 (1.993)	-2.468 (1.984)	-2.455 (1.990)
3 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-2.589 (2.093)	-2.540 (2.100)	-2.559 (2.090)	-2.512 (2.099)
4 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-3.772 (2.790)	-3.700 (2.815)	-3.731 (2.792)	-3.659 (2.820)
Constant	2.439*** (0.003)	2.439*** (0.002)	2.117*** (0.179)	2.219*** (0.179)
Observations	3,554,280	3,554,280	3,554,280	3,554,280
R-squared	0.928	0.928	0.929	0.929
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes a random sample of 25% of all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. The HHI index in the interaction is a weighted average of each of the occupations composing the firm in its microregion, as explained in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.7: PBM implementation and entry wages at the firm level

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
4 quarters before PBM	0.011 (0.009)	0.001 (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)	0.000 (0.011)
3 quarters before PBM	0.004 (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)	0.000 (0.011)	0.003 (0.012)
2 quarters before PBM	0.012 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	0.001 (0.009)	0.001 (0.011)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.011)
1 quarter after PBM	0.010 (0.010)	0.013 (0.011)	0.008 (0.010)	0.009 (0.011)
2 quarters after PBM	0.015 (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)	0.012 (0.009)	0.007 (0.010)
3 quarters after PBM	0.002 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)
4 quarters after PBM	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.013)
Constant	7.141*** (0.003)	7.141*** (0.003)	7.249*** (0.264)	7.259*** (0.264)
Observations	4,866,790	4,866,790	4,866,790	4,866,790
R-squared	0.704	0.704	0.704	0.705
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of average entry wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.8: PBM implementation and entry wages at the firm level with HHI index interaction

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
4 quarters before PBM	0.005 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)
3 quarters before PBM	-0.002 (0.013)	0.002 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.013)
2 quarters before PBM	0.013 (0.011)	0.009 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	0.000 (0.010)	-0.000 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)
1 quarter after PBM	0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	0.002 (0.011)	0.003 (0.012)
2 quarters after PBM	0.011 (0.010)	0.008 (0.010)	0.008 (0.009)	0.003 (0.010)
3 quarters after PBM	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.011)
4 quarters after PBM	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.015)
4 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.226** (0.107)	0.236** (0.109)	0.234** (0.108)	0.239** (0.109)
3 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.196 (0.135)	0.203 (0.138)	0.201 (0.135)	0.206 (0.138)
2 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.013 (0.142)	0.000 (0.145)	-0.008 (0.141)	0.005 (0.144)
Quarter of implementation of PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.038 (0.118)	0.033 (0.120)	0.041 (0.119)	0.031 (0.121)
1 quarter after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.211 (0.138)	0.220 (0.139)	0.220 (0.139)	0.226 (0.140)
2 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.119 (0.119)	0.118 (0.121)	0.134 (0.121)	0.130 (0.122)
3 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.157 (0.134)	0.170 (0.135)	0.168 (0.135)	0.177 (0.135)
4 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.217 (0.166)	0.214 (0.169)	0.226 (0.167)	0.218 (0.169)
Constant	7.141*** (0.003)	7.141*** (0.003)	7.249*** (0.264)	7.259*** (0.264)
Observations	4,866,790	4,866,790	4,866,790	4,866,790
R-squared	0.704	0.704	0.704	0.705
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of average entry wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. The HHI index in the interaction is a weighted average of each of the occupations composing the firm in its microregion, as explained in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.9: PBM implementation and entry wages at the firm level (above median PBM intensity)

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
4 quarters before PBM	0.006 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)
3 quarters before PBM	0.002 (0.016)	0.003 (0.019)	-0.000 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.018)
2 quarters before PBM	0.016 (0.013)	0.007 (0.015)	0.013 (0.013)	0.002 (0.014)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	0.002 (0.014)	0.002 (0.017)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.018)
1 quarter after PBM	0.016 (0.015)	0.023 (0.018)	0.014 (0.015)	0.019 (0.018)
2 quarters after PBM	0.024* (0.012)	0.014 (0.014)	0.022* (0.013)	0.010 (0.015)
3 quarters after PBM	0.006 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.009 (0.014)	0.009 (0.013)
4 quarters after PBM	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.015)
Constant	7.133*** (0.003)	7.134*** (0.003)	7.052*** (0.260)	7.066*** (0.265)
Observations	4,255,580	4,255,580	4,255,580	4,255,580
R-squared	0.702	0.703	0.703	0.703
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of average entry wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.10: PBM implementation and entry wages at the firm level (below median PBM intensity)

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
4 quarters before PBM	0.022*** (0.008)	0.019** (0.009)	0.019* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)
3 quarters before PBM	0.009 (0.013)	0.016 (0.015)	0.001 (0.013)	0.009 (0.015)
2 quarters before PBM	0.006 (0.016)	0.001 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.017)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.012)
1 quarter after PBM	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.013)
2 quarters after PBM	-0.000 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.017)
3 quarters after PBM	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.021)	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.021)
4 quarters after PBM	-0.009 (0.027)	-0.016 (0.034)	-0.010 (0.026)	-0.018 (0.034)
Constant	7.106*** (0.002)	7.105*** (0.002)	7.274*** (0.332)	7.304*** (0.339)
Observations	3,718,786	3,718,786	3,718,786	3,718,786
R-squared	0.707	0.708	0.707	0.708
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of average entry wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***) , 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.11: PBM implementation and entry wages at the firm level with HHI index interaction (above median PBM intensity)

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
4 quarters before PBM	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.015)	0.000 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.016)
3 quarters before PBM	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.020)
2 quarters before PBM	0.017 (0.014)	0.008 (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.002 (0.015)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	0.003 (0.014)	0.002 (0.018)	0.003 (0.015)	0.001 (0.018)
1 quarter after PBM	0.011 (0.016)	0.017 (0.019)	0.008 (0.016)	0.013 (0.019)
2 quarters after PBM	0.021* (0.012)	0.012 (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.007 (0.015)
3 quarters after PBM	-0.000 (0.012)	0.001 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)
4 quarters after PBM	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.015 (0.016)
4 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.216** (0.103)	0.226** (0.102)	0.218** (0.102)	0.225** (0.099)
3 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.202 (0.163)	0.207 (0.167)	0.210 (0.162)	0.217 (0.166)
2 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.030 (0.116)	-0.023 (0.120)	-0.017 (0.115)	-0.008 (0.119)
Quarter of implementation of PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.011 (0.092)	-0.020 (0.091)	-0.011 (0.093)	-0.023 (0.093)
1 quarter after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.192 (0.147)	0.192 (0.144)	0.207 (0.146)	0.205 (0.144)
2 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.087 (0.125)	0.075 (0.123)	0.103 (0.128)	0.091 (0.126)
3 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.203* (0.120)	0.212* (0.116)	0.213* (0.121)	0.222* (0.116)
4 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.207 (0.179)	0.198 (0.178)	0.210 (0.180)	0.199 (0.179)
Constant	7.133*** (0.003)	7.134*** (0.003)	7.052*** (0.260)	7.066*** (0.265)
Observations	4,255,580	4,255,580	4,255,580	4,255,580
R-squared	0.702	0.703	0.703	0.703
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of of average entry wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. The HHI index in the interaction is a weighted average of each of the occupations composing the firm in its microregion, as explained in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.12: PBM implementation and entry wages at the firm level with HHI index interaction (below median PBM intensity)

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
4 quarters before PBM	0.015 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)	0.011 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)
3 quarters before PBM	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.003 (0.018)
2 quarters before PBM	0.005 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.016)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.013)
1 quarter after PBM	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.012)
2 quarters after PBM	-0.005 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.017 (0.017)
3 quarters after PBM	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.023)	-0.008 (0.020)	-0.017 (0.023)
4 quarters after PBM	-0.016 (0.031)	-0.022 (0.037)	-0.017 (0.030)	-0.024 (0.037)
4 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.246 (0.219)	0.280 (0.223)	0.264 (0.219)	0.288 (0.222)
3 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.195 (0.235)	0.226 (0.234)	0.188 (0.237)	0.213 (0.236)
2 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.009 (0.307)	0.033 (0.313)	-0.002 (0.306)	0.021 (0.312)
Quarter of implementation of PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.116 (0.256)	0.119 (0.263)	0.136 (0.259)	0.131 (0.265)
1 quarter after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.239 (0.269)	0.270 (0.280)	0.254 (0.274)	0.276 (0.282)
2 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.167 (0.227)	0.175 (0.233)	0.187 (0.233)	0.188 (0.235)
3 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.105 (0.269)	0.125 (0.271)	0.116 (0.275)	0.130 (0.273)
4 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.240 (0.313)	0.230 (0.305)	0.257 (0.316)	0.238 (0.306)
Constant	7.106*** (0.002)	7.105*** (0.002)	7.274*** (0.331)	7.304*** (0.339)
Observations	3,718,786	3,718,786	3,718,786	3,718,786
R-squared	0.707	0.708	0.707	0.708
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of of average entry wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. The HHI index in the interaction is a weighted average of each of the occupations composing the firm in its microregion, as explained in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***) , 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.13: PBM implementation and entry wages at the firm level with HHI index interaction (large firms)

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
4 quarters before PBM	0.006 (0.014)	0.002 (0.014)	0.009 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)
3 quarters before PBM	0.002 (0.017)	0.007 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.015)
2 quarters before PBM	0.011 (0.013)	0.010 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.002 (0.014)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	0.004 (0.014)	0.007 (0.016)	0.003 (0.014)	0.002 (0.016)
1 quarter after PBM	0.017 (0.017)	0.025 (0.019)	0.011 (0.016)	0.017 (0.017)
2 quarters after PBM	0.020* (0.012)	0.017 (0.013)	0.018 (0.012)	0.011 (0.013)
3 quarters after PBM	0.005 (0.013)	0.006 (0.013)	0.011 (0.014)	0.008 (0.014)
4 quarters after PBM	-0.017 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.018)	-0.020 (0.021)
4 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.229* (0.128)	0.225* (0.130)	0.210 (0.129)	0.210 (0.129)
3 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.210 (0.153)	0.200 (0.156)	0.210 (0.151)	0.204 (0.154)
2 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.014 (0.171)	-0.014 (0.174)	-0.029 (0.170)	-0.024 (0.172)
Quarter of implementation of PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.026 (0.146)	-0.043 (0.148)	-0.040 (0.149)	-0.056 (0.151)
1 quarter after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.167 (0.170)	0.160 (0.171)	0.167 (0.173)	0.152 (0.172)
2 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.089 (0.153)	0.078 (0.155)	0.087 (0.156)	0.075 (0.156)
3 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.145 (0.160)	0.141 (0.160)	0.137 (0.158)	0.132 (0.158)
4 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.260 (0.207)	0.251 (0.210)	0.244 (0.205)	0.238 (0.208)
Constant	7.241*** (0.005)	7.240*** (0.004)	7.786*** (0.607)	7.773*** (0.608)
Observations	2,459,374	2,459,374	2,459,374	2,459,374
R-squared	0.715	0.716	0.715	0.716
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of of average entry wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. The HHI index in the interaction is a weighted average of each of the occupations composing the firm in its microregion, as explained in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.14: PBM implementation and entry wages at the firm level with HHI index interaction (small firms)

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
4 quarters before PBM	0.002 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.013)
3 quarters before PBM	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.018)
2 quarters before PBM	0.010 (0.014)	0.004 (0.014)	0.009 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.013)
1 quarter after PBM	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.021 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.013)	-0.027* (0.014)
2 quarters after PBM	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.011 (0.014)
3 quarters after PBM	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.017 (0.015)
4 quarters after PBM	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.016)
4 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.242 (0.184)	0.208 (0.182)	0.249 (0.183)	0.214 (0.183)
3 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.153 (0.191)	0.159 (0.191)	0.173 (0.193)	0.175 (0.193)
2 quarters before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.031 (0.127)	0.038 (0.129)	0.048 (0.122)	0.050 (0.125)
Quarter of implementation of PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.210 (0.130)	0.207 (0.135)	0.242* (0.129)	0.229* (0.134)
1 quarter after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.321 (0.217)	0.330 (0.219)	0.343 (0.214)	0.350 (0.217)
2 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.208 (0.131)	0.175 (0.133)	0.227* (0.131)	0.191 (0.133)
3 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.232 (0.150)	0.230 (0.162)	0.231 (0.146)	0.230 (0.157)
4 quarters after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.146 (0.206)	0.118 (0.213)	0.146 (0.203)	0.106 (0.209)
Constant	7.020*** (0.002)	7.020*** (0.002)	6.929*** (0.164)	6.957*** (0.162)
Observations	2,407,416	2,407,416	2,407,416	2,407,416
R-squared	0.663	0.664	0.664	0.665
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of of average entry wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. The HHI index in the interaction is a weighted average of each of the occupations composing the firm in its microregion, as explained in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.15: PBM implementation and entry wages at the firm level (balanced sample of firms hiring in every month)

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
4 quarters before PBM	0.024 (0.019)	0.013 (0.026)	0.022 (0.019)	0.010 (0.025)
3 quarters before PBM	0.039** (0.017)	0.049** (0.022)	0.034** (0.016)	0.041** (0.021)
2 quarters before PBM	0.028 (0.020)	0.026 (0.021)	0.018 (0.019)	0.018 (0.020)
Quarter of implementation of PBM	0.022 (0.017)	0.013 (0.020)	0.018 (0.016)	0.009 (0.019)
1 quarter after PBM	0.023 (0.016)	0.022 (0.017)	0.019 (0.016)	0.018 (0.017)
2 quarters after PBM	0.030 (0.022)	0.027 (0.025)	0.023 (0.022)	0.019 (0.024)
3 quarters after PBM	0.029* (0.016)	0.041* (0.022)	0.029* (0.016)	0.042** (0.021)
4 quarters after PBM	0.024 (0.019)	0.029 (0.026)	0.020 (0.020)	0.026 (0.024)
Constant	7.243*** (0.005)	7.243*** (0.006)	8.062*** (0.612)	7.842*** (0.555)
Observations	262,512	262,512	262,512	262,512
R-squared	0.843	0.846	0.844	0.847
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Month Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of average entry wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the month $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-month pairs and includes all firms that were always open, hired at least one person in every month and were always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.16: PBM implementation and wages at the firm level (yearly observations - "donut" regression)

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
1 year after PBM	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.010)
2 years before PBM	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Constant	7.291*** (0.001)	7.289*** (0.001)	7.171*** (0.048)	7.161*** (0.049)
Observations	1,405,833	1,405,833	1,405,833	1,405,833
R-squared	0.947	0.947	0.947	0.947
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Year x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Year Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of of average wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and year fixed effects. Column (2) interacts yearly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of yearly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of yearly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the year $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-year pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Among treated firms, the year in which they were allocated to the PBM is excluded from the sample ("donut" regression). Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.17: PBM implementation and wages at the firm level with HHI index interaction (yearly observations - "donut" regression)

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
1 year after PBM	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.010)
2 years before PBM	-0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
1 year after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.067 (0.077)	0.081 (0.080)	0.078 (0.077)	0.084 (0.079)
2 years before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.042 (0.042)	0.047 (0.043)	0.036 (0.042)	0.043 (0.044)
Constant	7.291*** (0.001)	7.289*** (0.001)	7.170*** (0.048)	7.161*** (0.048)
Observations	1,405,833	1,405,833	1,405,833	1,405,833
R-squared	0.947	0.947	0.947	0.947
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Year x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Year Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of average wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and year fixed effects. Column (2) interacts yearly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of yearly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of yearly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the year $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-year pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Among treated firms, the year in which they were allocated to the PBM is excluded from the sample ("donut" regression). The HHI index in the interaction is a weighted average of each of the occupations composing the firm in its microregion, as explained in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.18: PBM implementation and wages at the firm level with HHI index interaction (yearly observations of large firms - "donut" regression)

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
1 year after PBM	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.009)
2 years before PBM	-0.003 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)
1 year after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.073 (0.082)	0.092 (0.084)	0.062 (0.077)	0.073 (0.077)
2 years before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.017 (0.026)	0.021 (0.028)	0.014 (0.026)	0.020 (0.028)
Constant	7.391*** (0.001)	7.389*** (0.001)	7.595*** (0.233)	7.585*** (0.222)
Observations	731,511	731,511	731,511	731,511
R-squared	0.954	0.955	0.955	0.955
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Year x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Year Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of of average wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and year fixed effects. Column (2) interacts yearly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of yearly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of yearly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the year $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-year pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Among treated firms, the year in which they were allocated to the PBM is excluded from the sample ("donut" regression). The HHI index in the interaction is a weighted average of each of the occupations composing the firm in its microregion, as explained in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.19: PBM implementation and wages at the firm level with HHI index interaction (yearly observations of small firms - "donut" regression)

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
1 year after PBM	0.000 (0.013)	0.007 (0.016)	0.000 (0.013)	0.002 (0.015)
2 years before PBM	-0.001 (0.012)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.002 (0.010)
1 year after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.064 (0.124)	0.073 (0.126)	0.096 (0.125)	0.097 (0.126)
2 years before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.148 (0.184)	0.152 (0.185)	0.138 (0.183)	0.142 (0.184)
Constant	7.118*** (0.001)	7.116*** (0.001)	6.926*** (0.057)	6.919*** (0.057)
Observations	674,322	674,322	674,322	674,322
R-squared	0.927	0.927	0.927	0.928
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Year x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Year Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of average wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and year fixed effects. Column (2) interacts yearly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of yearly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of yearly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the year $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-year pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Among treated firms, the year in which they were allocated to the PBM is excluded from the sample ("donut" regression). The HHI index in the interaction is a weighted average of each of the occupations composing the firm in its microregion, as explained in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.20: PBM implementation and wages at the firm level with HHI index interaction (above median PBM intensity, yearly observations - "donut" regression)

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
1 year after PBM	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.015)
2 years before PBM	0.000 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
1 year after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.065 (0.098)	0.073 (0.102)	0.077 (0.097)	0.081 (0.100)
2 years before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.073 (0.056)	0.076 (0.057)	0.067 (0.056)	0.071 (0.058)
Constant	7.288*** (0.001)	7.287*** (0.001)	7.145*** (0.052)	7.141*** (0.053)
Observations	1,290,478	1,290,478	1,290,478	1,290,478
R-squared	0.947	0.947	0.947	0.948
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Year x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Year Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of average wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and year fixed effects. Column (2) interacts yearly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of yearly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of yearly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the year $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-year pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Among treated firms, the year in which they were allocated to the PBM is excluded from the sample ("donut" regression). The HHI index in the interaction is a weighted average of each of the occupations composing the firm in its microregion, as explained in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.21: PBM implementation and wages at the firm level with HHI index interaction (below median PBM intensity, yearly observations - "donut" regression)

VARIABLES	(1) log firm avg wage	(2) log firm avg wage	(3) log firm avg wage	(4) log firm avg wage
1 year after PBM	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.009)
2 years before PBM	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.004)
1 year after PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	0.073 (0.126)	0.082 (0.134)	0.086 (0.129)	0.085 (0.137)
2 years before PBM x HHI 2010 (2 dig)	-0.014 (0.060)	-0.006 (0.065)	-0.020 (0.062)	-0.008 (0.066)
Constant	7.263*** (0.001)	7.262*** (0.000)	7.146*** (0.037)	7.137*** (0.039)
Observations	1,213,883	1,213,883	1,213,883	1,213,883
R-squared	0.949	0.950	0.950	0.950
Firm fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed-effects	✓	-	✓	-
Year x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	-	✓
2010 Controls x Year Dummies	-	-	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of average wages at the firm level to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Column (1) reports estimates that control for firm and year fixed effects. Column (2) interacts yearly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of yearly fixed-effects with firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. Finally, column (4) includes both the interaction of yearly fixed-effects with pre-PBM firm characteristics and the year $\times$ ISIC-1 fixed-effects. The controls are the average age of employees in each firm and its square, share of male employees and the number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of firm-year pairs and includes all firms that were always open and always in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Among treated firms, the year in which they were allocated to the PBM is excluded from the sample ("donut" regression). The HHI index in the interaction is a weighted average of each of the occupations composing the firm in its microregion, as explained in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.22: PBM implementation and entry wages at the individual level

VARIABLES	(1) log avg wage	(2) log avg wage	(3) log avg wage	(4) log avg wage	(5) log avg wage	(6) log avg wage	(7) log avg wage	(8) log avg wage
-4 quarters	0.006 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.026)	0.009 (0.021)	0.026 (0.019)	0.010 (0.013)	0.018 (0.016)	0.012 (0.012)	0.019 (0.018)
-3 quarters	-0.010 (0.016)	0.004 (0.018)	0.005 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.016)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.004 (0.014)	0.007 (0.012)
-2 quarters	-0.004 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.020)	0.008 (0.016)	0.006 (0.015)	0.012 (0.012)	0.008 (0.013)	0.017 (0.014)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	-0.010 (0.023)	-0.035 (0.028)	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.018)	0.008 (0.020)	0.013 (0.016)	0.009 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.017)
+ 1 quarter	-0.030 (0.027)	-0.036 (0.032)	-0.035 (0.028)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.003 (0.019)	0.012 (0.014)	0.004 (0.017)	-0.006 (0.010)
+2 quarters	-0.009 (0.024)	-0.021 (0.031)	-0.006 (0.025)	0.007 (0.017)	0.004 (0.019)	0.013 (0.014)	0.005 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)
+3 quarters	-0.019 (0.028)	-0.027 (0.035)	-0.021 (0.026)	0.006 (0.020)	-0.010 (0.019)	0.008 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.017)	0.011 (0.013)
+4 quarters	-0.014 (0.027)	-0.027 (0.034)	-0.023 (0.025)	0.005 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.026)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.002 (0.017)
Constant	7.122*** (0.005)	7.125*** (0.006)	5.969*** (0.050)	6.351*** (0.041)	6.246*** (0.045)	6.585*** (0.034)	6.245*** (0.045)	6.173*** (0.079)
Observations	2,883,820	2,883,820	2,883,820	2,883,407	2,683,551	2,683,116	2,683,551	2,072,236
R-squared	0.298	0.301	0.480	0.625	0.716	0.804	0.716	0.923
Sector fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Occupation fixed-effects	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-
Firm fixed-effects	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	-
Worker fixed-effects	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the wage level of individual new hires to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Several combinations of fixed-effects at the sector, month, occupation, firm, worker and month $\times$ ISISC-1 sector level are presented, as described in the last 7 rows of the table. The characteristics of new hires used as controls are age, age squared, dummies for race and for disability and education level. Our main sample consists of a random subsample of 5% of all new hires in the firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. This analysis was also performed on the full sample of new hires in the sampled sectors with similar results. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.23: PBM implementation and entry wages at the individual level with HHI index interaction

VARIABLES	(1) log avg wage	(2) log avg wage	(3) log avg wage	(4) log avg wage	(5) log avg wage	(6) log avg wage	(7) log avg wage	(8) log avg wage
-4 quarters	0.011 (0.021)	-0.000 (0.027)	0.012 (0.021)	0.028 (0.019)	0.011 (0.013)	0.019 (0.016)	0.013 (0.012)	0.020 (0.018)
-3 quarters	-0.004 (0.016)	0.011 (0.019)	0.009 (0.018)	0.001 (0.016)	0.004 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.013)	0.006 (0.014)	0.007 (0.012)
-2 quarters	-0.001 (0.022)	-0.002 (0.025)	-0.000 (0.020)	0.009 (0.016)	0.004 (0.015)	0.010 (0.012)	0.007 (0.013)	0.018 (0.014)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	-0.005 (0.024)	-0.030 (0.028)	-0.013 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.019)	0.009 (0.020)	0.014 (0.016)	0.010 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.017)
+ 1 quarter	-0.019 (0.029)	-0.025 (0.034)	-0.027 (0.029)	-0.008 (0.020)	0.005 (0.020)	0.013 (0.015)	0.006 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.010)
+2 quarters	-0.002 (0.025)	-0.014 (0.032)	-0.002 (0.026)	0.011 (0.017)	0.005 (0.020)	0.015 (0.014)	0.007 (0.018)	0.004 (0.014)
+3 quarters	-0.016 (0.029)	-0.025 (0.036)	-0.020 (0.027)	0.007 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.019)	0.006 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.017)	0.009 (0.013)
+4 quarters	-0.004 (0.028)	-0.017 (0.035)	-0.018 (0.026)	0.010 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.026)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.024)	0.004 (0.017)
-4 quarters x HHI 2010	-1.327 (0.959)	-1.141 (0.875)	-0.635 (0.680)	-0.658 (0.533)	-0.105 (0.375)	-0.291 (0.326)	-0.272 (0.366)	-0.118 (0.372)
-3 quarters x HHI 2010	-1.697** (0.737)	-1.813** (0.733)	-1.256*** (0.463)	-1.170*** (0.439)	-0.329 (0.245)	-0.439 (0.275)	-0.500** (0.239)	-0.012 (0.198)
-2 quarters x HHI 2010	-0.792 (0.504)	-0.867* (0.502)	-0.307 (0.414)	-0.307 (0.383)	0.516 (0.434)	0.496 (0.487)	0.361 (0.458)	-0.099 (0.182)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief) x HHI 2010	-1.485** (0.642)	-1.532** (0.668)	-0.707 (0.569)	-0.560 (0.643)	-0.315 (0.534)	-0.186 (0.399)	-0.453 (0.540)	-0.402 (0.292)
+ 1 quarter x HHI 2010	-3.020*** (1.042)	-3.010*** (1.040)	-2.139** (0.985)	-1.311 (0.818)	-0.591 (0.613)	-0.406 (0.476)	-0.735 (0.606)	0.507 (0.493)
+2 quarters x HHI 2010	-2.042*** (0.729)	-2.214*** (0.747)	-1.284** (0.625)	-1.263** (0.541)	-0.536 (0.865)	-0.479 (0.656)	-0.673 (0.849)	0.021 (0.585)
+3 quarters x HHI 2010	-0.678 (1.146)	-0.725 (1.136)	-0.281 (0.857)	-0.413 (0.648)	1.307 (0.916)	0.620 (0.753)	1.166 (0.912)	0.656 (0.457)
+4 quarters x HHI 2010	-2.996** (1.182)	-3.015*** (1.145)	-1.688** (0.841)	-1.752*** (0.549)	-0.304 (0.675)	-0.233 (0.460)	-0.440 (0.650)	-0.606 (0.769)
Constant	7.122*** (0.005)	7.125*** (0.006)	5.971*** (0.050)	6.353*** (0.041)	6.246*** (0.045)	6.585*** (0.034)	6.246*** (0.045)	6.173*** (0.079)
Observations	2,883,820	2,883,820	2,883,820	2,883,407	2,683,551	2,683,116	2,683,551	2,072,236
R-squared	0.298	0.301	0.480	0.625	0.716	0.804	0.716	0.923
Sector fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Occupation fixed-effects	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-
Firm fixed-effects	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	-
Worker fixed-effects	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the wage level of individual new hires to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Several combinations of fixed-effects at the sector, month, occupation, firm, worker and month $\times$ ISISC-1 sector level are presented, as described in the last 7 rows of the table. The characteristics of new hires used as controls are age, age squared, dummies for race and for disability and education level. Our main sample consists of a random subsample of 5% of all new hires in the firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. The HHI index is the wage-bill HHI index of the microregion $\times$ occupation for the job of the new hire in that specific month and the microregion of their firm, as presented in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***) , 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.24: PBM implementation and entry wages at the individual level with HHI index interaction (above median PBM intensity)

VARIABLES	(1) log avg wage	(2) log avg wage	(3) log avg wage	(4) log avg wage	(5) log avg wage	(6) log avg wage	(7) log avg wage	(8) log avg wage
-4 quarters	-0.004 (0.032)	-0.028 (0.041)	0.001 (0.032)	0.033 (0.029)	-0.004 (0.020)	0.020 (0.024)	-0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.025)
-3 quarters	0.027 (0.019)	0.042* (0.024)	0.043* (0.025)	0.031 (0.021)	0.004 (0.023)	0.000 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.022)	0.004 (0.021)
-2 quarters	0.012 (0.026)	0.008 (0.034)	0.011 (0.030)	0.025 (0.023)	0.008 (0.024)	0.020 (0.018)	0.001 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.024)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.004 (0.028)	-0.032 (0.036)	-0.007 (0.033)	0.008 (0.026)	0.022 (0.031)	0.032 (0.026)	0.014 (0.028)	-0.028 (0.029)
+ 1 quarter	-0.008 (0.041)	-0.031 (0.050)	-0.026 (0.041)	0.008 (0.027)	0.005 (0.029)	0.027 (0.021)	-0.003 (0.026)	0.008 (0.019)
+2 quarters	0.020 (0.037)	0.002 (0.048)	0.012 (0.041)	0.026 (0.026)	0.014 (0.032)	0.022 (0.023)	0.005 (0.029)	-0.012 (0.021)
+3 quarters	-0.015 (0.039)	-0.041 (0.050)	-0.025 (0.037)	0.020 (0.029)	-0.024 (0.031)	0.016 (0.022)	-0.033 (0.027)	0.011 (0.020)
+4 quarters	0.006 (0.036)	-0.018 (0.046)	-0.013 (0.035)	0.030 (0.026)	-0.012 (0.035)	0.017 (0.027)	-0.021 (0.031)	-0.005 (0.023)
-4 quarters x HHI 2010	0.009 (0.304)	0.056 (0.292)	-0.016 (0.278)	-0.354 (0.230)	0.465*** (0.130)	-0.068 (0.101)	0.453*** (0.130)	0.048 (0.164)
-3 quarters x HHI 2010	-0.384* (0.226)	-0.413** (0.205)	-0.455* (0.237)	-0.650** (0.270)	0.250 (0.201)	-0.153 (0.177)	0.242 (0.201)	0.154 (0.094)
-2 quarters x HHI 2010	0.342 (0.340)	0.312 (0.341)	0.245 (0.316)	-0.122 (0.215)	0.530 (0.330)	0.037 (0.196)	0.522 (0.327)	0.289* (0.166)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief) x HHI 2010	0.134 (0.297)	0.102 (0.298)	-0.041 (0.229)	-0.111 (0.226)	0.149 (0.220)	-0.028 (0.180)	0.146 (0.219)	0.091 (0.102)
+ 1 quarter x HHI 2010	0.142 (0.211)	0.141 (0.202)	0.044 (0.207)	-0.323 (0.201)	0.487* (0.278)	0.013 (0.156)	0.487* (0.278)	0.157 (0.113)
+2 quarters x HHI 2010	0.124 (0.364)	0.069 (0.364)	0.177 (0.363)	-0.127 (0.265)	0.441* (0.239)	0.074 (0.133)	0.438* (0.239)	0.122 (0.175)
+3 quarters x HHI 2010	0.443 (0.268)	0.444 (0.270)	0.386* (0.219)	-0.098 (0.199)	0.635*** (0.208)	0.052 (0.131)	0.631*** (0.208)	-0.027 (0.224)
+4 quarters x HHI 2010	-0.072 (0.332)	-0.063 (0.314)	0.002 (0.298)	-0.433* (0.255)	0.465 (0.390)	0.062 (0.174)	0.455 (0.391)	0.143 (0.118)
Constant	7.104*** (0.004)	7.109*** (0.006)	5.937*** (0.055)	6.310*** (0.044)	6.213*** (0.049)	6.538*** (0.037)	6.213*** (0.049)	6.135*** (0.099)
Observations	2,459,886	2,459,886	2,459,886	2,459,709	2,287,529	2,287,335	2,287,529	1,681,899
R-squared	0.294	0.297	0.482	0.623	0.724	0.807	0.724	0.928
Sector fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Occupation fixed-effects	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-
Firm fixed-effects	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	-
Worker fixed-effects	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the wage level of individual new hires to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Several combinations of fixed-effects at the sector, month, occupation, firm, worker and month $\times$ ISISC-1 sector level are presented, as described in the last 7 rows of the table. The characteristics of new hires used as controls are age, age squared, dummies for race and for disability and education level. Our main sample consists of a random subsample of 5% of all new hires in the firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. The HHI index is the wage-bill HHI index of the microregion $\times$ occupation for the job of the new hire in that specific month and the microregion of their firm, as presented in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***) , 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table H.25: PBM implementation and entry wages at the individual level with HHI index interaction (below median PBM intensity)

VARIABLES	(1) log avg wage	(2) log avg wage	(3) log avg wage	(4) log avg wage	(5) log avg wage	(6) log avg wage	(7) log avg wage	(8) log avg wage
-4 quarters	0.016 (0.019)	0.031 (0.020)	0.025 (0.019)	0.046** (0.023)	0.008 (0.016)	0.032* (0.018)	0.026* (0.014)	0.046 (0.030)
-3 quarters	-0.044 (0.028)	-0.024 (0.035)	-0.015 (0.029)	-0.002 (0.028)	-0.005 (0.020)	0.001 (0.019)	0.012 (0.020)	0.017 (0.025)
-2 quarters	-0.049 (0.043)	-0.067 (0.050)	-0.055 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.023)	-0.045* (0.023)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.030 (0.019)	0.005 (0.020)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	-0.044 (0.040)	-0.060 (0.051)	-0.037 (0.034)	-0.014 (0.026)	-0.044 (0.031)	-0.022 (0.020)	-0.027 (0.027)	-0.017 (0.026)
+ 1 quarter	-0.071** (0.029)	-0.058* (0.035)	-0.054 (0.039)	-0.024 (0.032)	-0.030 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.023)	-0.033 (0.021)
+ 2 quarters	-0.058** (0.027)	-0.071** (0.036)	-0.045 (0.028)	-0.010 (0.018)	-0.046* (0.026)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.030 (0.022)	0.011 (0.024)
+ 3 quarters	-0.061 (0.041)	-0.058 (0.052)	-0.054 (0.041)	-0.010 (0.024)	-0.036 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.020)	0.017 (0.024)
+ 4 quarters	-0.038 (0.044)	-0.053 (0.058)	-0.046 (0.043)	-0.014 (0.032)	-0.051 (0.044)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.032 (0.041)	-0.019 (0.025)
-4 quarters x HHI 2010	0.184 (0.236)	0.197 (0.242)	0.251 (0.237)	-0.002 (0.202)	0.348** (0.162)	0.088 (0.088)	0.346** (0.162)	0.139 (0.209)
-3 quarters x HHI 2010	-0.084 (0.169)	-0.098 (0.143)	-0.169 (0.194)	-0.237 (0.215)	0.236 (0.158)	0.103 (0.174)	0.235 (0.159)	0.041 (0.110)
-2 quarters x HHI 2010	0.176 (0.190)	0.122 (0.189)	0.144 (0.149)	-0.095 (0.116)	0.399*** (0.113)	0.085 (0.099)	0.392*** (0.112)	0.098 (0.073)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief) x HHI 2010	0.331* (0.177)	0.291* (0.167)	0.357** (0.163)	0.044 (0.129)	0.466*** (0.117)	0.188* (0.112)	0.461*** (0.118)	0.101 (0.112)
+ 1 quarter x HHI 2010	0.151 (0.165)	0.138 (0.173)	0.153 (0.173)	-0.038 (0.108)	0.318*** (0.115)	0.153 (0.117)	0.318*** (0.115)	0.305** (0.148)
+ 2 quarters x HHI 2010	0.147 (0.144)	0.104 (0.137)	0.127 (0.168)	-0.087 (0.120)	0.375*** (0.115)	0.131 (0.098)	0.375*** (0.115)	-0.072 (0.111)
+ 3 quarters x HHI 2010	0.479* (0.290)	0.466 (0.284)	0.399 (0.267)	0.140 (0.167)	0.450** (0.190)	0.220 (0.149)	0.452** (0.190)	0.037 (0.113)
+ 4 quarters x HHI 2010	0.019 (0.188)	-0.017 (0.182)	-0.120 (0.143)	-0.289** (0.145)	0.228* (0.126)	0.102 (0.085)	0.228* (0.125)	-0.028 (0.110)
Constant	7.079*** (0.004)	7.079*** (0.005)	5.973*** (0.052)	6.360*** (0.042)	6.234*** (0.044)	6.569*** (0.033)	6.230*** (0.044)	6.233*** (0.089)
Observations	2,025,099	2,025,099	2,025,099	2,024,929	1,880,917	1,880,714	1,880,917	1,306,113
R-squared	0.289	0.292	0.476	0.621	0.721	0.805	0.721	0.925
Sector fixed-effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	-
Month fixed-effects	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Occupation fixed-effects	-	-	-	✓	-	✓	-	-
Firm fixed-effects	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓	-
Worker fixed-effects	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Month x ISIC-1 fixed-effects	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the wage level of individual new hires to the timing of PBM implementation. It implements a variation of the regression defined by specification (2), as described in appendix H. Several combinations of fixed-effects at the sector, month, occupation, firm, worker and month $\times$ ISISC-1 sector level are presented, as described in the last 7 rows of the table. The characteristics of new hires used as controls are age, age squared, dummies for race and for disability and education level. Our main sample consists of a random subsample of 5% of all new hires in the firms in the standard tax regime from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. The HHI index is the wage-bill HHI index of the microregion $\times$ occupation for the job of the new hire in that specific month and the microregion of their firm, as presented in H. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***) , 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

I Results on other potential drivers of employment effects

Table I.1: Sectoral transition among sectors not allocated to PBM

VARIABLES	(1) Changed ISIC	(2) Changed ISIC
Sector was never allocated to PBM x (Year = 2008)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.009)
Sector was never allocated to PBM x (Year = 2009)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.009)
Sector was never allocated to PBM x (Year = 2011)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.007)
Sector was never allocated to PBM x (Year = 2012)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.008)
Sector was never allocated to PBM x (Year = 2013)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.006)
Sector was never allocated to PBM x (Year = 2014)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)
Constant	0.134*** (0.005)	0.098*** (0.003)
Observations	11,038,230	11,038,230
R-squared	0.037	0.037
Sector FE	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates of the probability of changing your registered economic sector. For each year, the sample consists of all firms registered in the 219 sectors of our analysis. Regression weights are used to keep the interpretation of coefficients at the sectoral level. Coefficients report the difference between firms in sectors never allocated to PBM to the ones that were added to the new tax regime at some point. All coefficients compare sectoral change probabilities to a base-year (2007). Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.




Figure I.1: Sector and Month FEs




Figure I.2: Sector and Month x Section FEs

Table I.2: Share of new hires outside formal labor market in the last 6 months

	(1) Out of LM (6m)	(2) Out of LM (6m)	(3) Out of LM (6m)
-4 quarters	0.005 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)	0.005 (0.009)
-3 quarters	0.004 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.000 (0.007)
-2 quarters	0.008 (0.007)	0.013* (0.007)	0.008 (0.006)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.003 (0.008)
+1 quarter	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)
+2 quarters	-0.009 (0.007)	0.004 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)
+3 quarters	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)
+4 quarters	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)
Constant	0.344*** (0.002)	0.343*** (0.002)	-1.187*** (0.417)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.790	0.803	0.813
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the share of new hires outside the formal labor market in firms in the regular tax regime to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). The dependent variable is the share of new hires outside the formal labor market in the last 6 months, as observed in RAIS, the matched employer-employee formal employment census. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime and in low-concentration micro-regions from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Figure I.3: Event-study graphs




Figure I.4: Sector and Month FEs




Figure I.5: Sector and Month x Section FEs




Figure I.6: Sector and Month x Section FEs and Ctrl

Table I.3: Share of new hires outside formal labor market in the last 6 months

	(1) Out of LM (6m)	(2) Out of LM (6m)	(3) Out of LM (6m)
-4 quarters	0.005 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.002 (0.007)
-3 quarters	0.003 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)
-2 quarters	0.002 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)
+1 quarter	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)
+2 quarters	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)
+3 quarters	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)
+4 quarters	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.007)
Constant	0.380*** (0.002)	0.380*** (0.002)	-1.115*** (0.358)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.860	0.872	0.880
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the share of new hires outside the formal labor market in firms in all tax regimes to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). The dependent variable is the share of new hires outside the formal labor market in the last 6 months, as observed in RAIS, the matched employer-employee formal employment census. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime and in low-concentration micro-regions from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Figure I.7: Event-study graphs




Figure I.8: Sector and Month FEs




Figure I.9: Sector and Month x Section FEs




Figure I.10: Sector and Month x Section FEs and Ctrl

Table I.4: Share of new hires outside formal labor market in the last 12 months

	(1) Out of LM (12m)	(2) Out of LM (12m)	(3) Out of LM (12m)
-4 quarters	0.003 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)
-3 quarters	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.005)
-2 quarters	0.002 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)
+1 quarter	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)
+2 quarters	-0.011** (0.005)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)
+3 quarters	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)
+4 quarters	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.000 (0.006)
Constant	0.215*** (0.001)	0.214*** (0.001)	-0.920*** (0.347)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.738	0.750	0.764
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the share of new hires outside the formal labor market in firms in the regular tax regime to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). The dependent variable is the share of new hires outside the formal labor market in the last 12 months, as observed in RAIS, the matched employer-employee formal employment census. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime and in low-concentration micro-regions from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Figure I.11: Event-study graphs




Figure I.12: Sector and Month FEs




Figure I.13: Sector and Month x Section FEs




Figure I.14: Sector and Month x Section FEs and Ctrl

Table I.5: Share of new hires outside formal labor market in the last 12 months

	(1) Out of LM (12m)	(2) Out of LM (12m)	(3) Out of LM (12m)
-4 quarters	0.006 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)
-3 quarters	0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.003)
-2 quarters	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
+1 quarter	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)
+2 quarters	-0.006 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)
+3 quarters	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
+4 quarters	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
Constant	0.239*** (0.001)	0.238*** (0.001)	-0.753** (0.324)
Observations	15,768	15,768	15,768
R-squared	0.833	0.843	0.855
Sector FE	✓	✓	✓
Monthly FE	✓	-	-
Monthly FE x ISIC level 1 category	-	✓	✓
Monthly FE x Worker/firm char. before PBM	-	-	✓

Note: The table reports regression estimates associating the share of new hires outside the formal labor market in firms in all tax regimes to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2). The dependent variable is the share of new hires outside the formal labor market in the last 12 months, as observed in RAIS, the matched employer-employee formal employment census. Column (1) reports estimates that control for sector and month fixed effects. Column (2) interacts monthly fixed effects with category-specific (level 1 ISIC) dummies. Column (3) adds the interaction of monthly fixed-effects with worker and firm characteristics at their averages in the one year period before the PBM implementation. The controls are the average age of employees in each sector and its square, share of male employees and the average number of employees per firm. These variables were selected based on the regression on table 3. Our main sample consists of a balanced panel of sector-month pairs and includes all firms in the standard tax regime and in low-concentration micro-regions from 219 sectors during the period 2009 – 2014, as described in section 2.1. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***) , 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Figure I.15: Event-study graphs




Figure I.16: Sector and Month FEs




Figure I.17: Sector and Month x Section FEs




Figure I.18: Sector and Month x Section FEs and Ctrl

Table I.6: Spillover effects on control sectors: $\log(1+\text{Employment})$

VARIABLES	(1) $\log(1+\text{Employment})$ (regular tax regime)	(2) $\log(1+\text{Employment})$ (regular tax regime)	(3) $\log(1+\text{Employment})$ (regular tax regime)	(4) $\log(1+\text{Employment})$ (all tax regimes)
Exposure $\times$ Post 2014	0.120 (0.083)	0.108 (0.114)	-0.089 (0.087)	-0.023 (0.062)
Constant	2.894*** (0.008)	2.895*** (0.012)	2.915*** (0.009)	3.737*** (0.006)
Observations	1,059,192	1,059,156	1,059,156	1,059,156
R-squared	0.894	0.898	0.904	0.936
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Tax regimes	Standard	Standard	Standard	All
ISIC $\times$ Microregion FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Section $\times$ Month FEs	Yes	Yes	No	No
ISIC $\times$ Month FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes
Microregion $\times$ Month FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: OLS estimates of the effect of local exposure to the PBM reform on the employment of control (never-treated) sectors, at the 4-digit ISIC sector $\times$ microregion $\times$ month level. Exposure of a never-treated sector j in microregion r is the share of employment held by eventually treated sectors in j 's local pool of competing employers: average monthly employment in 2010 of eventually treated sectors within j 's ISIC section in microregion r , divided by the 2010 employment of all other sectors of that section in r , excluding j 's own employment (leave-one-out). Employment is measured among firms in the standard tax regime, and exposure is fixed at its 2010 (pre-announcement) value; see Section 4.2.3. The dependent variable is $\log(1+\text{employment})$ of sector j in microregion r in month t , computed over firms in the standard tax regime in columns (1)-(3) and over firms in all tax regimes in column (4). Exposure is interacted with an indicator for 2014, when all eventually treated sectors had entered the reform. The sample covers the months of 2009, 2010 and 2014 and the never-treated sector $\times$ microregion cells with positive standard-regime employment in 2010; cell-months with no recorded employment enter as zeros. Poaching of control-sector workers by treated firms predicts a negative coefficient; positive local demand spillovers predict a positive one. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered by ISIC section $\times$ microregion and by 4-digit sector. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table I.7: Spillover effects on control sectors: PPML

VARIABLES	(1) Employment (regular tax regime)	(2) Employment (regular tax regime)	(3) Employment (regular tax regime)	(4) log(1+Employment) (regular tax regime)	(5) Employment (all tax regimes)
Exposure $\times$ Post 2014	0.132 (0.086)	0.079 (0.090)	0.010 (0.119)	-0.089 (0.087)	0.037 (0.057)
Constant	8.106*** (0.009)	8.113*** (0.010)	8.125*** (0.013)	2.915*** (0.009)	8.136*** (0.006)
Observations	1,059,192	1,059,156	1,059,156	1,059,156	1,059,156
Estimator	PPML	PPML	PPML	OLS	PPML
Tax regimes	Standard	Standard	Standard	Standard	All
ISIC $\times$ Microregion FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Section $\times$ Month FEs	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
ISIC $\times$ Month FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Microregion $\times$ Month FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared				0.904	

Note: Estimates of the effect of local exposure to the PBM reform on the employment of control (never-treated) sectors, at the 4-digit ISIC sector $\times$ microregion $\times$ month level. Exposure of a never-treated sector j in microregion r is the share of employment held by eventually treated sectors in j 's local pool of competing employers: average monthly employment in 2010 of eventually treated sectors within j 's ISIC section in microregion r , divided by the 2010 employment of all other sectors of that section in r , excluding j 's own employment (leave-one-out). Employment is measured among firms in the standard tax regime, and exposure is fixed at its 2010 (pre-announcement) value; see Section 4.2.3. Exposure is interacted with an indicator for 2014, when all eventually treated sectors had entered the reform. Columns (1)-(3) and (5) are estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood with employment in levels as the dependent variable, so coefficients are semi-elasticities; column (4) is estimated by OLS on log(1+employment). Employment is computed over firms in the standard tax regime in columns (1)-(4) and over firms in all tax regimes in column (5). The sample covers the months of 2009, 2010 and 2014 and the never-treated sector $\times$ microregion cells with positive standard-regime employment in 2010; cell-months with no recorded employment enter as zeros. Poaching of control-sector workers by treated firms predicts a negative coefficient; positive local demand spillovers predict a positive one. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered by ISIC section $\times$ microregion and by 4-digit sector. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

J Robustness checks

To assess the reliability of our identification strategy, here we estimate our employment and wage regressions following the Interaction Weighted (IW) procedure proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021), the DID_M estimator as in de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2020) and the imputation estimator proposed by Borusyak et al. (2024). Tables J.1 and J.2 show results for the Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator in the regular tax regime and for all tax regimes (binning the coefficients in quarters as in our main specification). All estimates are in line with our main analysis. We also explore richer dynamics by allowing coefficients to vary monthly in Tables J.3 and J.4. Additionally, Tables J.5 and J.6 show this analysis following the imputation procedure proposed by Borusyak et al. (2024), while Tables J.7 and J.8 follow de de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2020). All results are in line with our main analysis.

Table J.1: Employment results following Sun and Abraham (2021)

	Regular tax regime	All tax regimes
-4 quarters	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.009)
-3 quarters	-0.002 (0.015)	0.006 (0.013)
-2 quarters	0.012 (0.031)	0.012 (0.027)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.015* (0.009)	0.015* (0.008)
+1 quarter	0.019 (0.012)	0.021* (0.012)
+2 quarter	0.042*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.015)
+3 quarter	0.049*** (0.016)	0.039** (0.015)
+4 quarter	0.046** (0.019)	0.033* (0.017)

Note: Implements the Interaction Weighted estimator as proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021) to the employment outcomes. The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2) for both the regular tax regime and all tax regimes combined. The specification matches the one presented in the first column of the main tables, controlling for sector and month fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Figure J.1: Impact of PBM tax reform on employment following Sun and Abraham (2021)




Table J.2: Average wage results following Sun and Abraham (2021)

	Regular tax regime	All tax regimes
-4 quarters	0.001 (0.021)	-0.013 (0.030)
-3 quarters	0.012 (0.021)	-0.026 (0.025)
-2 quarters	-0.003 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.019)
0 (1st quarter of the tax relief)	0.006 (0.020)	-0.013 (0.026)
+1 quarter	0.018 (0.023)	0.041* (0.022)
+2 quarter	-0.023 (0.020)	0.001 (0.025)
+3 quarter	-0.010 (0.026)	-0.020 (0.031)
+4 quarter	-0.007 (0.021)	-0.003 (0.025)

Note: Implements the Interaction Weighted estimator as proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021) to the average wage results among new hires. The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the hourly wage of new hires to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2) for both the regular tax regime and all tax regimes combined. The specification matches the one presented in the first column of the main tables, controlling for sector and month fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Figure J.2: Impact of PBM tax reform on average wage (among new hires) following Sun and Abraham (2021)




Table J.3: Employment results with monthly coefficients following Sun and Abraham (2021)

	Regular tax regime	All tax regimes
0 (1st month of the tax relief)	0.010 (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)
+1 month	0.014* (0.009)	0.014* (0.008)
+2 months	0.015 (0.010)	0.015 (0.009)
+3 months	0.015 (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)
+4 months	0.010 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)
+5 months	0.027* (0.014)	0.028** (0.013)
+6 months	0.036** (0.014)	0.035** (0.014)
+7 months	0.041*** (0.015)	0.039*** (0.014)
+8 months	0.044*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)
+9 months	0.050*** (0.016)	0.039** (0.015)
+10 months	0.049*** (0.016)	0.038** (0.015)
+11 months	0.044*** (0.016)	0.034** (0.015)
+12 months	0.045** (0.017)	0.033** (0.016)
+13 months	0.043** (0.019)	0.030* (0.018)
-2 months	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004* (0.002)
-3 months	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)
-4 months	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.006)
-5 months	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.007)
-6 months	-0.016* (0.010)	-0.011 (0.008)
-7 months	-0.020* (0.010)	-0.014 (0.009)
-8 months	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.010)
-9 months	-0.006 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)
-10 months	0.002 (0.016)	0.009 (0.014)
-11 months	-0.005 (0.015)	0.004 (0.012)
-12 months	-0.011 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.015)
-13 months	0.009 (0.023)	0.012 (0.019)
-14 months	0.007 (0.023)	0.010 (0.019)
-15 months	0.008 (0.024)	0.011 (0.020)
-16 months	0.004 (0.024)	0.011 (0.020)
-17 months	-0.000 (0.025)	0.008 (0.021)
-18 months	-0.007 (0.026)	0.003 (0.022)
-19 months	-0.010 (0.026)	0.000 (0.022)
-20 months	-0.005 (0.025)	-0.003 (0.021)
-21 months	0.000 (0.026)	0.002 (0.022)
-22 months	0.000 (0.026)	0.001 (0.022)
-23 months	-0.001 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.023)
-24 months	0.001 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.024)


Note: Implements the Interaction Weighted estimator as proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021) to the employment outcomes. The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2) for both the regular tax regime and all tax regimes combined. The specification matches the one presented in the first column of the main tables, controlling for sector and month fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Event-study coefficients more than 25 months before the PBM allocation or more than 13 months after it are binned in one single coefficient and excluded from the tables. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***) , 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table J.4: Average wage results with monthly coefficients following Sun and Abraham (2021)


	Regular tax regime	All tax regimes
0 (1st month of the tax relief)	0.014 (0.023)	-0.046 (0.047)
+1 month	0.037 (0.025)	-0.051 (0.048)
+2 months	0.000 (0.025)	-0.090** (0.045)
+3 months	0.038 (0.030)	-0.006 (0.041)
+4 months	0.054** (0.024)	0.015 (0.046)
+5 months	-0.005 (0.023)	-0.029 (0.043)
+6 months	0.010 (0.020)	-0.047 (0.046)
+7 months	-0.007 (0.021)	-0.060 (0.049)
+8 months	-0.036 (0.025)	-0.034 (0.046)
+9 months	0.007 (0.035)	-0.048 (0.054)
+10 months	0.010 (0.029)	-0.092* (0.047)
+11 months	-0.011 (0.024)	-0.065 (0.052)
+12 months	0.002 (0.025)	-0.041 (0.046)
+13 months	0.004 (0.026)	-0.033 (0.050)
-2 months	0.050 (0.046)	-0.112** (0.054)
-3 months	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.036 (0.045)
-4 months	0.002 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.045)
-5 months	0.014 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.039)
-6 months	0.028 (0.018)	-0.087* (0.051)
-7 months	0.014 (0.018)	-0.084 (0.057)
-8 months	0.029 (0.020)	-0.036 (0.049)
-9 months	-0.008 (0.020)	-0.063 (0.050)
-10 months	0.041 (0.028)	-0.053 (0.056)
-11 months	0.008 (0.023)	-0.065 (0.049)
-12 months	0.019 (0.024)	-0.107** (0.047)
-13 months	0.026 (0.024)	-0.019 (0.043)
-14 months	0.022 (0.023)	-0.085 (0.055)
-15 months	-0.017 (0.019)	-0.055 (0.035)
-16 months	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.039 (0.051)
-17 months	0.021 (0.022)	-0.020 (0.047)
-18 months	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.113*** (0.040)
-19 months	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.082 (0.056)
-20 months	0.007 (0.024)	-0.050 (0.047)
-21 months	0.001 (0.020)	-0.106** (0.050)
-22 months	-0.003 (0.021)	-0.103** (0.051)
-23 months	0.050 (0.032)	-0.047 (0.046)
-24 months	0.033 (0.024)	0.004 (0.053)

Note: Implements the Interaction Weighted estimator as proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021) to the average wage results among new hires. The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the hourly wage of new hires to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2) for both the regular tax regime and all tax regimes combined. The specification matches the one presented in the first column of the main tables, controlling for sector and month fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Event-study coefficients more than 25 months before the PBM allocation or more than 13 months after it are binned in one single coefficient and excluded from the tables. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Figure J.3: Impact of PBM tax reform on employment following Sun and Abraham (2021)




(a) regular tax regime




(b) all tax regimes

Figure J.4: Impact of PBM tax reform on average wage (among new hires) following Sun and Abraham (2021)



(a) regular tax regime



(b) all tax regimes

Table J.5: Employment results following Borusyak et al. (2024)

VARIABLES	(1) log(sectoral employment)	(2) log(sectoral employment)
0 (1st month of the tax relief)	0.009 (0.024)	0.007 (0.022)
+1 months	0.012 (0.025)	0.011 (0.023)
+2 months	0.013 (0.026)	0.012 (0.024)
+3 months	0.012 (0.027)	0.013 (0.025)
+4 months	0.007 (0.028)	0.008 (0.026)
+5 months	0.024 (0.030)	0.024 (0.028)
+6 months	0.033 (0.030)	0.031 (0.028)
+7 months	0.038 (0.031)	0.035 (0.029)
+8 months	0.041 (0.031)	0.036 (0.029)
+9 months	0.047 (0.031)	0.035 (0.028)
+10 months	0.045 (0.031)	0.034 (0.029)
+11 months	0.041 (0.031)	0.030 (0.029)
+12 months	0.042 (0.032)	0.029 (0.030)
+13 months	0.040 (0.033)	0.026 (0.031)
-1 months	-0.008 (0.038)	-0.006 (0.035)
-2 months	-0.012 (0.038)	-0.010 (0.035)
-3 months	-0.010 (0.038)	-0.009 (0.034)
-4 months	-0.016 (0.037)	-0.011 (0.033)
-5 months	-0.019 (0.037)	-0.014 (0.033)
-6 months	-0.024 (0.036)	-0.016 (0.033)
-7 months	-0.028 (0.036)	-0.019 (0.032)
-8 months	-0.020 (0.033)	-0.008 (0.030)
-9 months	-0.013 (0.032)	-0.003 (0.029)
-10 months	-0.005 (0.031)	0.004 (0.028)
-11 months	-0.012 (0.032)	-0.001 (0.028)
-12 months	-0.018 (0.031)	-0.006 (0.027)
-13 months	0.002 (0.028)	0.007 (0.025)
-14 months	-0.001 (0.027)	0.005 (0.024)
-15 months	0.000 (0.027)	0.006 (0.024)
-16 months	-0.004 (0.025)	0.006 (0.023)
-17 months	-0.009 (0.025)	0.002 (0.023)
-18 months	-0.017 (0.024)	-0.003 (0.022)
-19 months	-0.019 (0.024)	-0.006 (0.022)
-20 months	-0.015 (0.024)	-0.009 (0.022)
-21 months	-0.010 (0.023)	-0.005 (0.022)
-22 months	-0.010 (0.023)	-0.007 (0.022)
-23 months	-0.011 (0.024)	-0.009 (0.022)
-24 months	-0.010 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.022)
Observations	15,260	15,260


Note: Implements the imputation approach as proposed by Borusyak et al. (2024) to the employment outcomes. The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2) for both the regular tax regime and all tax regimes combined. The specification matches the one presented in the first column of the main tables, controlling for sector and month fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***), 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Table J.6: Average wage results following Borusyak et al. (2024)


VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
	log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)	log(hourly wage in contract) (among new hires)
0 (1st month of the tax relief)	0.004 (0.020)	0.008 (0.034)
+1 months	0.027 (0.021)	0.006 (0.038)
+2 months	-0.012 (0.023)	-0.032 (0.038)
+3 months	0.028 (0.026)	0.046 (0.039)
+4 months	0.045*** (0.017)	0.071** (0.034)
+5 months	-0.016 (0.022)	0.028 (0.033)
+6 months	-0.001 (0.016)	0.008 (0.030)
+7 months	-0.018 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.033)
+8 months	-0.047** (0.021)	0.023 (0.033)
+9 months	-0.003 (0.030)	0.008 (0.041)
+10 months	-0.001 (0.025)	-0.036 (0.032)
+11 months	-0.021 (0.020)	-0.009 (0.032)
+12 months	-0.009 (0.022)	0.014 (0.031)
+13 months	-0.006 (0.020)	0.023 (0.031)
-1 months	-0.009 (0.020)	0.054* (0.030)
-2 months	0.041 (0.046)	-0.058 (0.041)
-3 months	-0.024 (0.021)	0.017 (0.036)
-4 months	-0.007 (0.022)	0.032 (0.039)
-5 months	0.005 (0.021)	0.035 (0.037)
-6 months	0.019 (0.018)	-0.033 (0.042)
-7 months	0.005 (0.020)	-0.030 (0.043)
-8 months	0.020 (0.020)	0.018 (0.042)
-9 months	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.036)
-10 months	0.032 (0.028)	0.001 (0.040)
-11 months	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.038)
-12 months	0.011 (0.022)	-0.053 (0.039)
-13 months	0.018 (0.019)	0.035 (0.039)
-14 months	0.014 (0.018)	-0.031 (0.042)
-15 months	-0.025 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.038)
-16 months	-0.011 (0.015)	0.015 (0.037)
-17 months	0.012 (0.018)	0.034 (0.037)
-18 months	-0.030* (0.017)	-0.059* (0.032)
-19 months	-0.028* (0.016)	-0.028 (0.040)
-20 months	-0.002 (0.018)	0.004 (0.035)
-21 months	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.052 (0.036)
-22 months	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.048 (0.035)
-23 months	0.041 (0.026)	0.007 (0.033)
-24 months	0.024 (0.017)	0.058 (0.042)
Observations	15,260	15,260

Note: Implements the imputation approach as proposed by Borusyak et al. (2024) to the average wage results among new hires. The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the hourly wage of new hires to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2) for both the regular tax regime and all tax regimes combined. The specification matches the one presented in the first column of the main tables, controlling for sector and month fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significantly different from zero at 99% (***) , 95% (**) and 90% (*) confidence level.

Figure J.5: Impact of PBM tax reform on employment following Borusyak et al. (2024)




(a) regular tax regime




(b) all tax regimes

Figure J.6: Impact of PBM tax reform on average wage (among new hires) following Borusyak et al. (2024)



(a) regular tax regime



(b) all tax regimes

Table J.7: Employment results following de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfœuille (2020)

Months to/from PBM	Regular tax regime					All tax regimes				
	Treatment estimate	SE	N	Upper bound CI	Lower bound CI	Treatment estimate	SE	N	Upper bound CI	Lower bound CI
-25 months	0.00733	0.00966	1388	0.0263	-0.0116	0.00651	0.00830	1388	0.0228	-0.00977
-24 months	-0.00119	0.00599	1388	0.0105	-0.0129	0.00168	0.00532	1388	0.0121	-0.00875
-23 months	0.000707	0.00313	1388	0.00685	-0.00544	0.00188	0.00254	1388	0.00686	-0.00311
-22 months	0.000701	0.00239	1388	0.00539	-0.00399	0.00156	0.00215	1388	0.00576	-0.00265
-21 months	-0.00565	0.00201	1388	-0.00171	-0.00959	-0.00465	0.00197	1388	-0.000798	-0.00851
-20 months	-0.00731	0.00712	1388	0.00666	-0.0213	0.00101	0.00717	1388	0.0151	-0.0130
-19 months	0.00217	0.00214	1388	0.00637	-0.00203	0.00223	0.00197	1388	0.00610	-0.00164
-18 months	0.00742	0.00281	1388	0.0129	0.00192	0.00584	0.00191	1388	0.00959	0.00208
-17 months	0.00497	0.00260	1388	0.0101	-0.000132	0.00339	0.00198	1388	0.00727	-0.000484
-16 months	0.00264	0.00660	1388	0.0156	-0.0103	-0.00179	0.00584	1388	0.00966	-0.0132
-15 months	-0.00165	0.00297	1388	0.00417	-0.00747	-0.00155	0.00258	1388	0.00351	-0.00661
-14 months	0.00177	0.00185	1388	0.00539	-0.00185	0.00173	0.00164	1388	0.00494	-0.00148
-13 months	-0.0191	0.0124	1388	0.00524	-0.0435	-0.0130	0.00793	1388	0.00251	-0.0286
-12 months	0.00599	0.00503	1388	0.0158	-0.00386	0.00553	0.00500	1388	0.0153	-0.00427
-11 months	0.00689	0.00694	1388	0.0205	-0.00671	0.00569	0.00654	1388	0.0185	-0.00712
-10 months	-0.00784	0.00704	1388	0.00596	-0.0216	-0.00708	0.00634	1388	0.00535	-0.0195
-9 months	-0.00639	0.00257	1388	-0.00135	-0.0114	-0.00566	0.00219	1388	-0.00138	-0.00995
-8 months	-0.00630	0.00864	1388	0.0106	-0.0232	-0.0100	0.00708	1388	0.00387	-0.0239
-7 months	0.00293	0.00201	1388	0.00686	-0.00100	0.00240	0.00170	1388	0.00573	-0.000941
-6 months	0.00532	0.00321	1388	0.0116	-0.000961	0.00324	0.00239	1388	0.00792	-0.00144
-5 months	0.00376	0.00330	1388	0.0102	-0.00270	0.00342	0.00239	1388	0.00811	-0.00128
-4 months	0.00754	0.00538	1388	0.0181	-0.00300	0.00310	0.00381	1388	0.0106	-0.00436
-3 months	-0.00165	0.00323	1388	0.00469	-0.00799	-0.000647	0.00243	1388	0.00412	-0.00541
-2 months	0.00324	0.00284	1388	0.00881	-0.00234	0.00412	0.00241	1388	0.00885	-0.000611
0 (1st month of the tax relief)	0.00991	0.00574	1388	0.0212	-0.00134	0.00941	0.00529	1388	0.0198	-0.000968
1+ month	0.0138	0.00650	1388	0.0265	0.00105	0.0136	0.00652	1388	0.0264	0.000862
2+ months	0.0140	0.00756	1388	0.0288	-0.000808	0.0142	0.00738	1388	0.0287	-0.000257
3+ months	0.0134	0.00826	1364	0.0296	-0.00275	0.0152	0.00800	1364	0.0309	-0.000475
4+ months	0.0102	0.00919	1339	0.0282	-0.00784	0.0119	0.00861	1339	0.0287	-0.00501
5+ months	0.0272	0.0114	1330	0.0495	0.00484	0.0279	0.0102	1330	0.0478	0.00799
6+ months	0.0361	0.0116	1330	0.0588	0.0134	0.0349	0.0106	1330	0.0556	0.0142
7+ months	0.0412	0.0119	1305	0.0646	0.0178	0.0389	0.0107	1305	0.0599	0.0180
8+ months	0.0445	0.0116	1282	0.0672	0.0218	0.0400	0.0109	1282	0.0613	0.0187
9+ months	0.0501	0.0123	1273	0.0742	0.0260	0.0388	0.0117	1273	0.0618	0.0159
10+ months	0.0486	0.0132	1271	0.0744	0.0228	0.0381	0.0121	1271	0.0617	0.0144
11+ months	0.0442	0.0132	1271	0.0701	0.0183	0.0340	0.0122	1271	0.0578	0.0101
12+ months	0.0455	0.0145	1226	0.0740	0.0171	0.0333	0.0134	1226	0.0596	0.00698
13+ months	0.0434	0.0157	1217	0.0742	0.0126	0.0301	0.0149	1217	0.0593	0.000887

Note: Implements the DID_M estimator as proposed by de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfœuille (2020) to the employment outcomes. The table reports regression estimates associating the log of sectoral employment to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2) for both the regular tax regime and all tax regimes combined. The specification matches the one presented in the first column of the main tables, controlling for sector and month fixed effects. Upper and lower bounds of the estimated effects are reported at the 95% confidence level.

Table J.8: Average wage results following de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfœuille (2020)

Months to/from PBM	Regular tax regime					All tax regimes				
	Treatment estimate	SE	N	Upper bound CI	Lower bound CI	Treatment estimate	SE	N	Upper bound CI	Lower bound CI
-25 months	0.00367	0.0208	1388	0.0444	-0.0371	0.0519	0.0490	1388	0.148	-0.0440
-24 months	0.0175	0.0236	1388	0.0637	-0.0288	-0.0510	0.0441	1388	0.0354	-0.137
-23 months	-0.0514	0.0200	1388	-0.0122	-0.0905	-0.0528	0.0534	1388	0.0519	-0.157
-22 months	-0.000586	0.0163	1388	0.0313	-0.0325	-0.00792	0.0443	1388	0.0790	-0.0948
-21 months	0.00626	0.0220	1388	0.0494	-0.0369	0.0566	0.0445	1388	0.144	-0.0307
-20 months	-0.0237	0.0175	1388	0.0107	-0.0580	-0.0265	0.0530	1388	0.0773	-0.130
-19 months	-0.00157	0.0139	1388	0.0256	-0.0288	-0.0300	0.0513	1388	0.0706	-0.131
-18 months	0.0422	0.0162	1388	0.0740	0.0105	0.0839	0.0354	1388	0.153	0.0145
-17 months	-0.0221	0.0140	1388	0.00535	-0.0495	-0.0121	0.0423	1388	0.0708	-0.0949
-16 months	-0.0129	0.0158	1388	0.0181	-0.0439	-0.0158	0.0545	1388	0.0910	-0.123
-15 months	0.0374	0.0196	1388	0.0759	-0.00110	-0.0328	0.0500	1388	0.0652	-0.131
-14 months	0.00464	0.0160	1388	0.0360	-0.0267	0.0614	0.0432	1388	0.146	-0.0232
-13 months	-0.00933	0.0245	1388	0.0388	-0.0574	-0.0833	0.0469	1388	0.00857	-0.175
-12 months	-0.0102	0.0184	1388	0.0259	-0.0463	0.0478	0.0474	1388	0.141	-0.0451
-11 months	0.0305	0.0341	1388	0.0974	-0.0364	0.00436	0.0462	1388	0.0949	-0.0862
-10 months	-0.0412	0.0289	1388	0.0154	-0.0978	-0.0133	0.0388	1388	0.0628	-0.0894
-9 months	0.0308	0.0190	1388	0.0680	-0.00638	0.0383	0.0375	1388	0.112	-0.0351
-8 months	-0.0143	0.0196	1388	0.0241	-0.0526	-0.0519	0.0587	1388	0.0631	-0.167
-7 months	0.0104	0.0195	1388	0.0486	-0.0278	-0.000463	0.0509	1388	0.0993	-0.100
-6 months	-0.00533	0.0159	1388	0.0258	-0.0364	0.0616	0.0458	1388	0.151	-0.0281
-5 months	-0.0205	0.0185	1388	0.0157	-0.0567	0.000876	0.0528	1388	0.104	-0.103
-4 months	-0.0167	0.0197	1388	0.0220	-0.0553	-0.0149	0.0478	1388	0.0787	-0.109
-3 months	0.0644	0.0470	1388	0.157	-0.0277	-0.0737	0.0572	1388	0.0384	-0.186
-2 months	-0.0473	0.0473	1388	0.0454	-0.140	0.104	0.0465	1388	0.195	0.0128
0 (1st month of the tax relief)	0.0147	0.0236	1388	0.0610	-0.0316	-0.0430	0.0468	1388	0.0488	-0.135
1+ month	0.0374	0.0232	1388	0.0830	-0.00811	-0.0455	0.0492	1388	0.0510	-0.142
2+ months	-0.00114	0.0259	1388	0.0496	-0.0519	-0.0836	0.0472	1388	0.00891	-0.176
3+ months	0.0378	0.0309	1364	0.0984	-0.0227	-0.00660	0.0391	1364	0.0700	-0.0832
4+ months	0.0539	0.0247	1339	0.102	0.00539	0.0176	0.0415	1339	0.0989	-0.0637
5+ months	-0.00652	0.0232	1330	0.0390	-0.0520	-0.0256	0.0429	1330	0.0585	-0.110
6+ months	0.00824	0.0208	1330	0.0490	-0.0326	-0.0456	0.0467	1330	0.0458	-0.137
7+ months	-0.00955	0.0204	1305	0.0305	-0.0496	-0.0598	0.0481	1305	0.0346	-0.154
8+ months	-0.0387	0.0238	1282	0.00797	-0.0854	-0.0323	0.0452	1282	0.0562	-0.121
9+ months	0.00493	0.0303	1273	0.0643	-0.0544	-0.0470	0.0586	1273	0.0677	-0.162
10+ months	0.00734	0.0274	1271	0.0610	-0.0464	-0.0905	0.0534	1271	0.0141	-0.195
11+ months	-0.0133	0.0244	1271	0.0344	-0.0610	-0.0639	0.0571	1271	0.0480	-0.176
12+ months	-0.000807	0.0247	1226	0.0477	-0.0493	-0.0412	0.0487	1226	0.0543	-0.137
13+ months	0.00219	0.0240	1217	0.0492	-0.0448	-0.0313	0.0492	1217	0.0651	-0.128

Note: Implements the DID_M estimator as proposed by de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfœuille (2020) to the average wage results among new hires. The table reports regression estimates associating the log of the hourly wage of new hires to the timing of PBM implementation as defined by specification (2) for both the regular tax regime and all tax regimes combined. The specification matches the one presented in the first column of the main tables, controlling for sector and month fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the sector level are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Upper and lower bounds of the estimated effects are reported at the 95% confidence level.

Figure J.7: Impact of PBM tax reform on employment following de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2020)





Figure J.8: Impact of PBM tax reform on average wage (among new hires) following de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2020)



K Cost-benefit Analysis and Effect on Profits

Here we perform a cost-benefit analysis of the PBM reform and compare its effectiveness in terms of job creation to another federal program. In addition, based on a structural approach we provide an estimate for the firms' profit gain.

The PBM was officially introduced as a means to incentivize job creation by the productive sector. Despite having achieved a significant impact on employment in treated sectors as discussed in Section 4.1, its costs in terms of forgone tax income were substantial. Across the rollout of the program across the 65 different sectors in our sample, the accumulated loss of tax revenue triggered by the PBM amounted to R\$15.3 billion in 2014 according to ANFIP (2015).³³

A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals that the average sector included in the program experiences an increase in 4,954 employees, leading to a total of 322,054 jobs created in 65 treated sectors.³⁴ Dividing the total tax relief by the estimated number of jobs created, we find an estimated cost of a job of approximately R\$47,585 in 2014 prices (or US\$17,055 in 2018 prices).

It is useful to compare that with other estimates for programs funded by the federal government. For example, Corbi et al. (2019) explore a series of discontinuities in the allocation mechanism of federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil (Fundo de Participação dos Municípios or FPM). They find that federal transfers increase local public spending and generate an increase in local labor markets at the rate of one new job per extra spending of US\$8,000 in 2018 prices (R\$22,320 in 2014 prices), mainly in services. This indicates that the cost of a job associated with the PBM estimated in this paper is roughly 2.1 times more costly than the estimates of the FPM federal transfer program.

This kind of simple cost-benefit analysis comes with the important caveat that it does not take into account other consequences of this kind of reform. For instance, workers are likely to face welfare consequences related to lower social security tax revenues. Second, the fiscal position of the government is likely to deteriorate. A more complete and quantitative general equilibrium would be needed to assess such tradeoffs.

Profits. As firm-level data on profits are not available, we use the oligopsony model in section 4.5 to back out an estimate for the effect of the PBM reform on profits. Using a

³³These estimates are available at <http://bit.ly/38tOy7B>. In this section, we convert BRL 1998 to BRL 2014 at a 2,79 rate using the IBGE IPC-A index. Also, 1 BRL in 1998 prices is roughly equivalent to 1 USD in 2018 prices.

³⁴The full calculation is $322,054 \approx 137,630 \times 0.036 \times 65$, where 137,630 is the employment level of the average treated sector before PBM implementation, 0.036 is the long-run (+4 quarters) treatment estimate for all tax regimes from column (1) in Table D.1 times 65 treated sectors.

structural approach, explained in detail in Appendix Section G, we estimate that the average profit gain for firms in the sectors included in the PBM reform is 106%. Therefore, our results on firm profits along with those on employment and a null effect on wages show that firms did not pass on some of the tax windfall to workers in terms of wages. Instead, while firms have expanded due to the PBM reform, they pocketed most of the tax cut.

L Informality Evidence from the PNAD Household Survey

L.1 Sample and representativeness

We use the PNAD person files for 2006–2009 and 2011–2015 (2010 is a census year and the survey was not fielded). The analysis sample is the employed population aged 14–65 with a valid position-in-occupation code: 1,502,754 person-year observations covering all 27 states, weighted by the person expansion factor. Formality follows the position-in-occupation classification: registered employees, military, statutory public servants, registered domestic workers and employers are formal; *sem-carteira* informality comprises unregistered employees (including domestics); broad informality adds the self-employed, own-use production and unpaid workers. Person records are collapsed to survey-weighted activity-code $\times$ year cells — 210 codes over nine years — and regressions weight cells by mean pre-2012 code employment.

The PNAD sample is representative at the national and state level, not by economic activity, so a code-year cell mean estimates its population counterpart with sampling error. This error enters the estimating equation as part of the residual: it inflates standard errors — code-clustered inference prices in its within-code correlation, and the employment weights concentrate estimation on precisely measured cells — but it biases the coefficients only if survey coverage of an activity code drifts differentially with treatment. Coverage drift of that kind would appear as differential pre-treatment trends, so we report the joint pre-lead test with every event study and treat it as the central reliability check for each outcome, in the same spirit as other work estimating PNAD-based effects below the survey’s design strata (Derenoncourt et al., 2025).

L.2 Treatment assignment

PBM eligibility is statutory at the CNAE 2.0 class level. We take the monthly class-level allocation panel used in the administrative analysis — including its in-force convention — and map it into the PNAD activity code through the official CONCLA correspondences, V9907 $\rightarrow$ CNAE 1.0 $\rightarrow$ CNAE 2.0. An activity code is treated if it contains sector-criterion treated classes, and treated in survey year t if that relief is in force by the late-September reference week. This yields 34 treated codes — construction, most retail segments, transport, hotels, and the software, publishing, broadcasting and call-center block — of which 3 are treated from survey year 2012 and 31 from 2013. Aggregated to sections, the resulting matching of treated sectors to activity codes reproduces the treated-class counts of Table 1 exactly. Because the product (NCM) criterion touches some manufacturing and agriculture

control codes with intensity a household survey cannot measure, all results are reported both keeping all 210 codes and excluding the 66 NCM-exposed control codes.

L.3 Specification and estimates

Tables L.1 and L.2 report the event-study regressions plotted in Figures 9 and 10:

$$Y_{ct} = \sum_{\tau \neq 2009} \beta_{\tau} D_c \times \mathbf{1}[t = \tau] + \alpha_c + \lambda_{s(c),t} + \varepsilon_{ct},$$

where D_c indicates a treated activity code, α_c are activity-code fixed effects and $\lambda_{s(c),t}$ are section $\times$ year fixed effects. The corresponding difference-in-differences estimates (Post = 2013+) appear in the table notes with Fisher permutation p -values (999 within-section re-assignments of treated labels) and the minimum detectable effect implied by the permutation distribution. Beyond parallel trends, identification requires no interference within sections: untreated codes in a treated code’s own section are its closest competitors, so poaching or business-stealing would overstate treatment effects. The assumption is not directly testable in the survey; Section 4.2.3 finds no evidence of such spillovers in the administrative data.

Our headline informality outcome is the *sem-carteira* margin because it is the margin the CPRB prices, it is the standard outcome in recent causal work on payroll costs, enforcement and minimum wages (Derenoncourt et al., 2025; Imbert and Ulyssea, 2026), and it is immune to the MEI program, under which own-account workers could formalize through a simplified registration from 2009 — a secular drift that moves any measure including the self-employed. Our broad measure (adding all self-employed, own-use and unpaid workers) is the legacy position-in-occupation measure of the structural literature (Dix-Carneiro et al., 2026; Engbom et al., 2022), not the current IBGE proxy, which requires CNPJ information the annual PNAD does not collect. Contributory (no social-security contribution) and firm-size (≤ 5 employees) definitions were also estimated; neither moves (+1.1 and -0.8 percentage points, permutation $p = 0.49$ and 0.42).

Benchmarks for the registration margin. The two polar benchmarks quoted in Section 4.3 are computed from three employment-weighted quantities over treated codes, with the same pre-2012 employment weights as the regressions: the treated-class employment share of treated codes, $d = 0.647$ (from the matching of treated sectors to activity codes); the baseline formal share, $s^F = 0.52$; and the baseline *sem-carteira* share, $s^N = 0.19$. Let $\gamma = 0.05$ be the administrative formal-employment effect on treated classes. In a treated code with total employment T , formal employment in treated-class content is $d s^F T$, so the administrative effect corresponds to $\Delta F = \gamma d s^F T$ newly formal jobs; this assumes the effect is proportional

across treated classes and that the formal share of a code's treated-class content equals the code's overall formal share. Under *pure formalization*, each newly formal job is a *sem-carteira* job converted in place and total employment is fixed, so

$$\Delta s^N = -\frac{\Delta F}{T} = -\gamma d s^F \approx -0.017.$$

Under *pure formal hiring*, the *sem-carteira* stock is unchanged and total employment rises by ΔF , so

$$\Delta s^N = -s^N \frac{\gamma d s^F}{1 + \gamma d s^F} \approx -s^N \gamma d s^F \approx -0.003.$$

Neither benchmark assumes codes are equal-sized: d , s^F and s^N are employment-weighted aggregates, so each code contributes in proportion to its baseline employment. The substantive assumptions are the homogeneous proportional effect γ across treated classes and, under formalization, one-for-one conversion drawn from *sem-carteira* employees rather than the self-employed.

More generally, if a fraction φ of the administrative effect operates through formalization and $1 - \varphi$ through formal hiring, the implied share change is linear between the two poles,

$$\Delta s^N(\varphi) = -\gamma d s^F [\varphi + (1 - \varphi) s^N],$$

which inverts to $\varphi = (|\Delta s^N|/(\gamma d s^F) - s^N)/(1 - s^N)$. Evaluated at the estimated -0.012 , this gives $\varphi \approx 0.64$: taken at face value, about two-thirds of the 5 percent formal-employment effect would reflect the formalization of existing *sem-carteira* jobs and one-third net job creation. This is a point-estimate reading, not a bounded one: the 95 percent confidence interval of the *sem-carteira* estimate ($[-0.024, 0.000]$) maps into the full range $\varphi \in [0, 1]$. Two directions of error work against each other in interpreting φ : the sector-allocation error discussed in Section 4.3 attenuates the estimated decline and hence understates φ , while any within-section spillovers (discussed above) would overstate it.

Table L.1: PBM implementation and informality (PNAD)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	sem-carteira share		broad informality share	
	all controls	excl. NCM	all controls	excl. NCM
2006	-0.000	-0.002	-0.008	-0.010
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.012)
2007	0.002	0.003	0.002	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.011)
2008	0.001	0.003	0.000	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.010)
2011	0.001	0.006	0.005	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.015)
2012	-0.011	-0.009	-0.000	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.017)
2013	-0.016**	-0.014*	0.000	0.000
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.021)
2014	-0.010	-0.009	0.013	0.011
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.023)
2015	-0.013	-0.012	0.017	0.017
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Observations	1,862	1,207	1,862	1,207
R-squared	0.901	0.894	0.985	0.986
Activity-code FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Section × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Event-study estimates at the PNAD activity-code level (survey years 2006–2015; 2009 omitted; 2010 not fielded; 2011 pre-treatment). Relief is in force by the survey reference week for 3 of 34 treated codes in 2012 and all 34 from 2013. Columns (1), (3) use all 210 codes; (2), (4) exclude the 66 NCM-exposed control codes. Cells weighted by mean pre-2012 code employment. Joint pre-lead Wald p : 1.00, 0.84, 0.71, 0.79 in columns (1)–(4). DiD estimates (Post = 2013+): sem-carteira -0.012 (s.e. 0.006, permutation $p = 0.08$, MDE 0.019) and -0.012 (0.007, $p = 0.14$, MDE 0.022); broad 0.010 ($p = 0.58$, MDE 0.047) and 0.010 ($p = 0.68$, MDE 0.055). Continuous-dose DiD: -0.018 (0.011) and -0.018 (0.011); Callaway–Sant’Anna: -0.007 (0.016) and -0.006 (0.016). Standard errors clustered at the activity code in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table L.2: PBM implementation and survey employment (PNAD)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	log(formal employment)		log(total employment)	
	all controls	excl. NCM	all controls	excl. NCM
2006	-0.052 (0.044)	-0.056 (0.049)	-0.083** (0.041)	-0.092** (0.045)
2007	-0.047 (0.042)	-0.041 (0.047)	-0.059 (0.037)	-0.060 (0.042)
2008	0.003 (0.024)	0.002 (0.027)	0.016 (0.025)	0.017 (0.027)
2011	0.078 (0.087)	0.098 (0.096)	0.117 (0.080)	0.139 (0.087)
2012	0.047 (0.090)	0.063 (0.099)	0.084 (0.083)	0.107 (0.090)
2013	0.051 (0.100)	0.075 (0.110)	0.087 (0.092)	0.115 (0.101)
2014	0.031 (0.111)	0.063 (0.120)	0.078 (0.093)	0.105 (0.101)
2015	-0.002 (0.102)	0.006 (0.114)	0.062 (0.093)	0.075 (0.104)
Observations	1,862	1,207	1,862	1,207
R-squared	0.978	0.985	0.978	0.988
Activity-code FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Section $\times$ Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Samples, weights and fixed effects as in Table L.1. Joint pre-lead Wald p : 0.76, 0.81, 0.34, 0.30 in columns (1)–(4). DiD estimates (Post = 2013+): log formal 0.022 (permutation p = 0.82, MDE 0.26) and 0.037 (p = 0.74, MDE 0.30); log total 0.063 (p = 0.42, MDE 0.22) and 0.080 (p = 0.39, MDE 0.25); log *informal* 0.088 (s.e. 0.080) and 0.123 (0.087), i.e. no decline. Minimum detectable effects are roughly five times the RAIS baseline estimate, so these regressions cannot detect an effect of that size; they show that nothing in the survey contradicts it. Standard errors clustered at the activity code in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

M Labor Market Concentration: Microregion-level Robustness

Our main concentration analysis splits microregions at the median wage-bill HHI and compares event studies across the two groups. This Appendix re-examines the heterogeneity at a finer level, a sector $\times$ microregion $\times$ month panel, with a *continuous* HHI–treatment interaction, so the gradient is identified from the full distribution of local concentration rather than a binary split. The granularity has a cost: most sector–microregion cells are small, and the number of cells with zero employment rises considerably (the estimation sample grows from about 3.2 million observations under Poisson, which drops separated cells, to 8.8 million under OLS on $\log(1+\text{employment})$, which retains them). We therefore treat these estimates as a robustness exercise rather than as the primary design.

Table M.1 reports OLS estimates of event-time effects and their interactions with the microregion’s 2010 wage-bill HHI, on $\log(1+\text{employment})$. The average post-implementation effect rises to about 2.4 log points by the fifth quarter, and the HHI interactions are near zero before implementation and turn negative and monotonically larger after it, reaching -0.17 to -0.18 per unit of HHI with sector $\times$ month and microregion $\times$ month fixed effects. To gauge the magnitude, at the median HHI of 0.029 the implied offset is about half a log point. The results deliver the same qualitative message as the median-split analysis in Section 4.5: employment growth after the payroll tax cut is concentrated in less concentrated local labor markets.

Table M.2 reports the same design under Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood on employment counts alongside the OLS column. The two estimators weight different margins: Poisson estimates proportional effects and drops the roughly 5.6 million cells separated by the fixed effects, while OLS on $\log(1+\text{employment})$ retains the extensive margin at the cost of a transformation that is not scale-invariant at zero. At this granularity the Poisson estimates remain qualitatively consistent with the model: the post-period interaction point estimates are negative at nearly every horizon in every specification, but they reach statistical significance less often than their OLS counterparts, and the pre-period interactions display significant positive terms that are absent under OLS, so the continuous Poisson gradient does not pass the pre-period check. Each exercise also carries its own interpretation caveats, since treatment effects on $\log(1+\text{employment})$ are not invariant to the units of the outcome when zeros are present (Chen and Roth, 2024), while Poisson identifies proportional effects only on the non-separated sample. With these caveats in mind, we report these tables as further evidence corroborating the direction of the HHI heterogeneity documented in the main median-split analysis of Section 4.5.

Table M.1: HHI heterogeneity (microregion - OLS)

VARIABLES	(1) Employment (regular tax regime)	(2) Employment (regular tax regime)	(3) log(1+Employment) (regular tax regime)	(4) Employment (all tax regimes)
-4 quarters	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.009)		
-3 quarters	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.007)		
-2 quarters	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)		
+1 quarter	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)		
+2 quarters	0.008** (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)		
+3 quarters	0.017*** (0.005)	0.016*** (0.006)		
+4 quarters	0.022*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.007)		
+5 quarters	0.024*** (0.008)	0.024*** (0.008)		
-4 quarters × HHI (2010)	-0.019 (0.051)	-0.012 (0.053)	-0.012 (0.052)	-0.030 (0.037)
-3 quarters × HHI (2010)	-0.015 (0.040)	-0.012 (0.040)	-0.012 (0.040)	-0.011 (0.030)
-2 quarters × HHI (2010)	-0.041 (0.028)	-0.038 (0.026)	-0.038 (0.026)	-0.008 (0.018)
+1 quarter × HHI (2010)	-0.063* (0.034)	-0.054 (0.035)	-0.054 (0.035)	-0.064** (0.032)
+2 quarters × HHI (2010)	-0.095** (0.039)	-0.074* (0.042)	-0.074* (0.042)	-0.084** (0.037)
+3 quarters × HHI (2010)	-0.141*** (0.046)	-0.112** (0.050)	-0.112** (0.050)	-0.106** (0.042)
+4 quarters × HHI (2010)	-0.200*** (0.056)	-0.171*** (0.058)	-0.171*** (0.058)	-0.119*** (0.042)
+5 quarters × HHI (2010)	-0.211*** (0.057)	-0.182*** (0.061)	-0.182*** (0.061)	-0.102** (0.048)
Constant	1.109*** (0.003)	1.109*** (0.003)	1.112*** (0.000)	1.444*** (0.000)
Observations	8,798,544	8,798,544	8,798,544	8,798,544
R-squared	0.953	0.953	0.954	0.980
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Tax regimes	Standard	Standard	Standard	All
ISIC x Microregion FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Section x Month FEs	Yes	Yes	No	No
ISIC x Month FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes
Microregion x Month FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table M.2: HHI heterogeneity (microregion - Continuous)

VARIABLES	(1) Employment (regular tax regime)	(2) Employment (regular tax regime)	(3) Employment (regular tax regime)	(4) log(1+Employment) (regular tax regime)	(5) Employment (all tax regimes)
-4 quarters	0.016 (0.016)	0.016 (0.016)			
-3 quarters	0.004 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)			
-2 quarters	0.007 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)			
+1 quarter	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)			
+2 quarters	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)			
+3 quarters	0.011 (0.009)	0.011 (0.009)			
+4 quarters	0.019 (0.016)	0.017 (0.016)			
+5 quarters	0.018 (0.020)	0.016 (0.020)			
-4 quarters $\times$ HHI (2010)	1.360*** (0.413)	1.078*** (0.389)	1.048*** (0.379)	-0.012 (0.052)	0.617** (0.254)
-3 quarters $\times$ HHI (2010)	1.098*** (0.360)	0.796** (0.321)	0.733** (0.303)	-0.012 (0.040)	0.416* (0.218)
-2 quarters $\times$ HHI (2010)	0.601* (0.309)	0.366 (0.249)	0.376 (0.244)	-0.038 (0.026)	0.175 (0.182)
+1 quarter $\times$ HHI (2010)	-0.638* (0.348)	-0.526** (0.252)	-0.451* (0.238)	-0.054 (0.035)	-0.235 (0.151)
+2 quarters $\times$ HHI (2010)	-0.765 (0.540)	-0.600 (0.403)	-0.526 (0.390)	-0.074* (0.042)	-0.313 (0.216)
+3 quarters $\times$ HHI (2010)	-0.815 (0.729)	-0.357 (0.547)	-0.214 (0.531)	-0.112** (0.050)	-0.140 (0.266)
+4 quarters $\times$ HHI (2010)	-1.018 (0.843)	-0.378 (0.644)	-0.130 (0.639)	-0.171*** (0.058)	-0.048 (0.323)
+5 quarters $\times$ HHI (2010)	-0.844 (0.789)	-0.215 (0.698)	0.101 (0.706)	-0.182*** (0.061)	0.221 (0.382)
Constant	8.171*** (0.008)	8.173*** (0.008)	8.189*** (0.001)	1.112*** (0.000)	8.194*** (0.001)
Observations	3,202,272	3,202,024	3,202,024	8,798,544	3,202,128
Estimator	PPML	PPML	PPML	OLS	PPML
Tax regimes	Standard	Standard	Standard	Standard	All
ISIC x Microregion FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Section x Month FEs	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
ISIC x Month FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Microregion x Month FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared				0.954	

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1