NET WORK LISER

Discussion Paper Series

IZA DP No. 18663 May 2026

The Word Is Not Enough: Testing the Effects of Information Treatments on Perceived Corruption in Ukraine

Yuriy Gorodnichenko
University of California, Berkeley
and IZA@LISER

Ilona Sologoub
VoxUkraine

Yuriy Fedyk
AI for Good Foundation

ISSN: 2365-9793

IZA DP No. 18663 May 2026

The Word Is Not Enough: Testing the Effects of Information Treatments on Perceived Corruption in Ukraine*

Abstract

Using a representative sample of more than 7,000 Ukrainians, we study how information treatments affect corruption perceptions and prosocial behavior. We document a large gap between perceived and experienced corruption: while most respondents view corruption as widespread and a major national problem, far fewer report direct exposure. Through a randomized controlled trial, we find that informing citizens about successful prosecutions raises perceived government willingness to fight corruption but does not reduce overall corruption perceptions. Communicating the scale of corruption alone generates no significant effects. Information treatments have little effect on hypothetical or actual donations and volunteering, suggesting a limited pass-through from changed beliefs to prosocial action. Thus, while information interventions can strengthen institutional credibility, they alone are not enough to tangibly improve civic engagement or reduce perceptions of corruption.

JEL classification

D73, O17, O52, P2

Keywords

corruption, beliefs, RCT

Corresponding author

Yuriy Gorodnichenko
ygorodni@econ.berkeley.edu

* We thank Nicolas Sarullo for excellent research assistance.

1. Introduction

Reducing corruption is a difficult task but convincing the public that corruption is falling may be even harder. After years of fighting corruption, Ukraine continues to have a large share of the populace who believe that the country is very corrupt. This view is not unfounded. Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Ukraine 104th in the world. At the same time, perceptions of corruption can deviate from actual corruption. For example, while ~80% of Ukrainians identify corruption as the #1 problem, only a small share of the population (10-15%) actually experienced corruption.[1]

This discrepancy between beliefs and facts on the ground can turn corruption into a self-fulfilling prophecy: people with higher corruption perceptions are more likely to be involved in corruption (Corbacho et al. 2016, Čábelková and Hanousek 2004) because they believe this is the "usual way to do things." Higher corruption, in turn, is associated with lower growth, worse business environment, lower prosperity (Hlatshwayo et al. 2018), lower trust in government (Pittaluga et al. 2024), weaker social fabric (Villoria et al. 2012), and lower will to act against corruption (Peiffer and Alvarez 2016). These factors create more favorable conditions for corruption and therefore can result in more corruption. More urgently, a bad reputation of Ukraine can act as a justification for cutting military and financial aid that is critical for the survival of the country.[2] By inhibiting foreign direct investment, perception of high corruption can be equally detrimental for Ukraine's post-war reconstruction (Gorodnichenko and Obstfeld 2026).

How can one defeat the corruption narrative? A natural first step is to communicate anticorruption progress and therefore rehabilitate the country's reputation. While intuitive, this approach can face the "integrity paradox" (Nieuwenburg 2007): by fighting corruption, a "clean" government may reveal instances of corruption, which can increase perceived corruption within government and thereby undermine public confidence in it. Therefore, the net effect of communication can be attenuated or even turn negative. To resolve this potential ambiguity regarding the effects of such communication, we run a randomized controlled trial on a representative sample of Ukrainians.

---

[1] Other evidence also suggests that the level of corruption is not abnormally high in Ukraine relative to other countries. For example, Sarullo et al. (2026) and Deryugina et al. (2025) develop objective measures of corruption such as high discrepancy between income and expenditures of public servants and the degree of competition for government procurement. They find that these objective measures are uncorrelated with corruption perceptions and that Ukraine is an "average" country. Becker et al. (2022) also document that various objective measures of corruption declined significantly.

[2] In 2019, Donald J. Trump declared: "And one of the reasons I held up money [for Ukraine], very important, corruption." In 2024, JD Vance rejected calls to help Ukraine: "We simply have no idea where a lot of our money to Ukraine has gone. The corruption is out of control".

Surveying a large sample (~7,000) of Ukrainians in early 2024, we elicit their beliefs about the state of corruption in the country and in specific government bodies and agencies. Consistent with other evidence, we find that the public believes corruption deeply permeates the government and presents a critical problem. Although no government body or agency is viewed as clean, the central government and law enforcement are believed to be especially problematic. The cross-sectional variation in these views is largely driven by demographic factors, the frequency of interactions with the state, and the frequency of encountering corruption while dealing with the state. Media consumption is an important predictor of views about the central government too. At the same time, employment, geography, and knowledge about anticorruption agencies play relatively minor roles. We also document that perceptions of corruption are negatively correlated with the perceived effectiveness of anticorruption agencies and the government's will to fight corruption. Corruption is corrosive in other dimensions too: perceptions of more widespread corruption are negatively associated with the desire to remain in the country rather than emigrate, as well as with willingness to contribute to public-good initiatives (donate or volunteer) that are organized by the government. Importantly, the spillover to public-good initiatives that are organized by grassroots movements (friends, volunteers) or more credible government institutions (armed forces) is limited.

While informative, these correlations do not imply causal effects of news about anticorruption efforts on beliefs about the extent of corruption or behavioral responses (e.g., donating to or volunteering for a public-good initiative). To establish these effects, we randomly split the sample into a control group and several treatment groups where respondents are presented with various combinations of information about *i*) extent of corruption and *ii*) successful prosecution of corrupt officials. We find that, immediately after treatments, informing people about successful prosecutions does not lower perceptions of corruption but it does raise the perceived effectiveness of anticorruption agencies (even when we also tell respondents about the degree of corruption). The immediate effect is higher with general statistics compared to information about a specific high-level case. On the other hand, informing people about the degree of corruption in the country does not generate statistically significant effects on perceived corruption or perceived effectiveness of the anticorruption agencies.

When we measure perceptions two months after information treatments, we find similar results in the follow-up survey wave. These findings suggest that at least some information interventions have persistent effects on perceptions (i.e., raise the perceived effectiveness of anticorruption institutions). Through the lens of a basic model linking beliefs to fundamentals

(i.e., the actual state of corruption and the actual anticorruption effort), our empirical estimates suggest that beliefs load mostly on the state of corruption rather than anticorruption efforts. Finally, we do not find a significant pass-through from information treatments to actions: two months after treatments, there is no materially important difference in donations and volunteer activities between treatment and control groups.

These results suggest that *the word is not enough*: merely informing citizens about the imprisonment of corrupt officials is unlikely to overturn the "Ukraine is very corrupt" account. If anything, it can reinforce rather than weaken this narrative. At the same time, the government should not shy away from admitting the problem. According to our estimates, doing so does not undermine the perceived will of the government to fight corruption as long as information about the extent of corruption is accompanied by hard facts about successful prosecutions. We interpret our results as calling for patience and persistence in the difficult process of reducing corruption.

To put these results into a perspective, we note that the foundational theoretical framework for understanding corruption as an economic phenomenon treats it as a tax on transactions between firms and public officials (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). The implications of that framework for growth and investment were documented empirically by Mauro (1995) and others: higher perceived corruption is associated with significantly lower investment ratios and slower GDP growth. Strikingly, this foundational literature heavily relies on perception-based measures. The Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International, the World Bank's Control of Corruption indicator (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009), and the International Country Risk Guide indices all aggregate expert assessments and surveys of business executives rather than direct measures of bribery incidence or judicial outcomes. However, perceptions of corruption can differ substantially from actual experiences of corruption (e.g., Pittaluga et al. 2024). Abramo (2008) even showed that, if anything, perceptions of both petty and grand corruption are correlated with other perceptions (e.g., of government effectiveness) but not with actual experience of corruption.

This places the media—an influential information intermediary—at the center of the analysis: can the media affect corruption and perceptions, and reduce the gap between actual and perceived corruption documented by prior literature? Camaj (2013) documents a strong association between media freedom and corruption that runs from high levels of media freedom to low levels of corruption. A meta-study by Chen and Ganapati (2018) demonstrates that freedom of the press reduces corruption, but its effect is lower than the effect of fiscal and budget transparency. Gutmann et al. (2020) find a positive effect of media freedom on perceived corruption (i.e. more reports on corruption increase the level of perceived

corruption), and Costa (2013) adds that this effect is persistent. However, findings related to closing the gap between actual and (over)perceived corruption are rather mixed.

In their seminal paper, Besley and Prat (2006) present a model that establishes a link between observable features of the media industry (concentration and ownership) and observable political outcomes (capture, corruption, and turnover). They show that the degree of media pluralism therefore conditions the relationship between actual corruption and measured perceptions. Corrado et al. (2023) show that when media provide more factual information on corruption, such as the number of investigations and convictions, the gap between experienced and perceived corruption decreases. This result is supported by the findings of Rizzica and Tonello (2020) documenting that corruption perceptions increase mostly in response to "general" news rather than to reports on specific corruption events (investigations or convictions). Ajzenman et al. (2024) show that telling people that other people believe that corruption in a government agency is low improves perceptions of anti-corruption struggle. On the other hand, Monnery and Chirat (2024) find a "backfire" effect: people who receive more information about France's High Authority for the Transparency in Public Life (HATVP) are more likely to perceive the news of another HATVP case as evidence of more corruption rather than cleaning the system. Similarly, two experimental studies in China (Sun et al. 2022 and Pan et al. 2023) suggest that people perceive a high number of exposed corrupt officials as evidence of corruption rather than a sign of successful anti-corruption effort.

Studying the formation of corruption perceptions is important because these perceptions have implications for the real economy (e.g., Mauro 1995, Svensson 2005). For example, Hlatshwayo et al. (2018) show that an increase in "outside" perceptions (i.e., mentions of corruption in a certain country in international news outlets) increase borrowing cost and stock market volatility, decrease foreign direct investment and economic growth. Gillanders and Parviainen (2018) arrive at a similar conclusion: perceived corruption negatively affects the M&A market (purchase of domestic firms by foreign ones). Another important consequence of higher perceived corruption is that firms believing that government officials are corrupt are less likely to participate in public procurement (Colonnelli et al. 2024). The last finding is especially relevant to our study of how perceived corruption affects people's motivation to volunteer and donate in Ukraine.

The issue of actual and perceived corruption in Ukraine has been a focus of multiple recent papers, especially given extra attention to this topic domestically and internationally. Belyaev et al. (2025) present a review paper on how corruption in Ukraine has been understood and discussed over the past two decades across academic research and organizational reports.

Deryugina et al. (2025) develop a novel method for assessing the quality of public procurement systems and offer a practical tool for cross-sector and cross-country assessment of procurement systems. Using procurement data from Ukraine and EU member states in 2018–2021 to assess the performance of five large sectors, the paper finds that Ukraine's procurement performance in four of the five sectors is comparable to many other European countries. However, Ukraine's construction sector displays the largest excess concentration among all countries considered in the study. Sarullo et al. (2026) use household data on expenditures and incomes to construct an objective measure of corruption in the public sector by comparing consumption-income gap for public- and private-sector workers. They find that common perception-based corruption measures are only weakly correlated with objective measures.

Our contribution to the existing literature is that we present a parsimonious model that links individual beliefs to fundamentals—the actual state of corruption and the actual anticorruption efforts. We further test our model and find that beliefs load mostly on the state of corruption rather than anticorruption efforts. Specifically, we show that: 1) the media exposure (information treatments) does not affect perceived corruption; 2) information treatments do affect perceived effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies; 3) two months after treatments, there is no materially important difference in donations and volunteer activities between treatment and control groups and provide empirical evidence consistent with the model's predictions.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Ukrainian context and institutional setting. Section 3 presents a simple model to organize ideas and guide our empirical work. Section 4 introduces the data and the design of our experiment. Section 5 provides descriptive and correlational analysis of the survey data. Section 6 reports results of our randomized controlled trial. Section 7 concludes.

2. Institutional details

While the situation with corruption is far from perfect, Ukraine has made significant progress since 2014.[3] Specifically, Ukraine established an independent anticorruption infrastructure (a specialized investigative agency, prosecutor's office, and court) tasked with handling high-level corruption (Table 1). In addition to these agencies, National Corruption Prevention Agency monitors electronic declarations of public servants and promotes integrity, Asset Recovery and Management Agency confiscates assets from corrupt officials and tries to return the money to the state budget, and the Economic Security Bureau investigates tax evasion and

[3] See Chapters 2 and 3 of the White Book of Reforms (Ahapova et al. 2025).

other financial crimes (it replaced deeply corrupt tax police). It took several years for these institutions to become fully operational. Today, however, their achievements are visible: many cases against high-level officials and judges resulted in meaningful prison sentences (Figure 1). This does not imply that the fight is over and the active part of the Ukrainian society is aware that a long road still lies ahead. Furthermore, public pressure protects the anticorruption institutions when the government tries to undermine them.

Anticorruption reforms have been supported by international institutions. For example, various IMF programs and the EU's Ukraine Facility Plan make funding contingent on specific reforms and milestones in this arena. These incentives are reinforced by pressure from many Ukrainian civil society organizations ranging from Ukraine's Transparency International to small local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that monitor actions of their local governments. These NGOs rely on a number of instruments that were introduced since 2015 and that actually allow them to uncover (and prevent) corruption. These are (1) the electronic procurement system Prozorro and its analytical module Dozorro; (2) the electronic portal spending.gov.ua that allows transaction-based monitoring of public expenditures; (3) e-declarations that allow anyone to see incomes and assets of public officials and top management of state-owned enterprises; (4) many registers that were open after 2015 (since the start of the full-scale invasion, some of them (e.g. property registry, land cadastre) were fully or partially closed to prevent Russians from learning sensitive information). The results of these reforms are reflected in the steady improvement in corruption perception indices since 2014 (Table 2).

One consequence of the activities of anticorruption agencies and NGOs has been a steady stream of news about discovered and investigated corruption cases. Figure 1 shows a dramatic increase in the media coverage of corruption in the country after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. The publication of news about prosecutions and convictions is an important component of law enforcement because it is a prerequisite for deterrence. News about corruption cases may also affect corruption perceptions. As we discussed earlier, some people may interpret this news as evidence that "Ukraine is extremely corrupt," corruption perceptions of these people will probably worsen. Others may focus on the fact that a corrupt official has been detected and is being prosecuted, causing their perceptions to improve. The framing of the case, the main narrative of the news story and the emphasis it places may all affect perceptions of a specific case and thus perceptions of people who learn about this case.

3. Model

To model how information about law enforcement can affect perceptions of corruption, we develop a stylized model to build intuition. Suppose that c is the true level of corruption, which is unobservable. Let e be the true level of enforcement, which is also unobservable. For information, we introduce two variables: m is the media coverage of corruption cases (more generally, some information about prevalence of corruption) and s is the number of sentences/convictions on corruption cases.

Suppose that the relationship between corruption and observable signals is given by

$$m = a_c \times c + a_e \times e \tag{1}$$

$$s = b_c \times c + b_e \times e \tag{2}$$

where a_e, a_c, b_e, b_c are some constants. We assume $a_c > 0$ and $b_e > 0$, that is, media coverage of corruption increases with corruption levels, and sentences become more frequent with stronger enforcement.

We can express these relationships in a matrix form

$$y \equiv \begin{bmatrix} m \\ s \end{bmatrix} = \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} a_c & a_e \\ b_c & b_e \end{bmatrix}}_{\equiv H} \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} c \\ e \end{bmatrix}}_{\equiv z} = Hz \tag{3}$$

Suppose that $z \sim N(0, \Sigma_z)$. Without loss of generality, we normalize $\Sigma_z(1,1) = \Sigma_z(2,2) = 1$ so that $\Sigma_0 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \rho \\ \rho & 1 \end{bmatrix}$. In the empirically relevant case, $\rho < 0$, i.e., people associate poor law enforcement with more corruption. It follows that $y \sim N(0, \Sigma_y)$ where $\Sigma_y = H\Sigma_z H'$. The covariance of beliefs y and fundamentals z is given by $\Sigma_{zy} = \Sigma_z H'$.

We can interpret perceptions as expectations of z conditional on y. Again without loss of generality, we can assume that the prior for z is equal to the unconditional mean. Using properties of normally distributed random variables, we have $E(z|y) = \Sigma_{zy}\Sigma_y^{-1} y$, which intuitively corresponds to running a regression of z on y. Specifically, conditional expectations for z after observing signals m and s are:

$$E(c|m) = \frac{a_c + a_e\rho}{a_c^2 + 2a_c a_e \rho + a_e^2} m \tag{4a}$$

$$E(c|s) = \frac{b_c + b_e\rho}{b_c^2 + 2b_c b_e \rho + b_e^2} s \tag{4b}$$

$$E(e|m) = \frac{a_c\rho + a_e}{a_c^2 + 2a_c a_e \rho + a_e^2} m \tag{4c}$$

$$E(e|s) = \frac{b_c\rho + b_e}{b_c^2 + 2b_c b_e \rho + b_e^2} s \tag{4d}$$

We are interested in how posteriors co-move in response to the signals.

Consider first signal m. Posteriors $E(c|m)$ and $E(e|m)$ move in the same directions if $(a_c + a_e\rho)(a_c\rho + a_e) > 0$. This is the case when $\rho a_c^2\left(\frac{1}{\rho} + \frac{a_e}{a_c}\right)\left(\rho + \frac{a_e}{a_c}\right) > 0$. After some algebra, this condition amounts to $\frac{a_e}{a_c} \in \left(-\rho, -\frac{1}{\rho}\right)$. In this case, a surprisingly strong media report about corruption raises both perceptions of corruption and perceptions of anticorruption efforts (i.e., $m \uparrow \Longrightarrow E(c|m) > 0, E(e|m) > 0$). If $a_e \leq 0$ (i.e., enforcement weakly decreases the number of corruption cases reported by the media), a surprisingly strong media coverage raises the perception of corruption and lowers perceptions of law enforcement (i.e., $m \uparrow \Longrightarrow E(c|m) > 0, E(e|m) < 0$). Now consider $\frac{a_e}{a_c} \in (0, -\rho)$. In this case, stronger enforcement increases the media coverage of activities of law enforcement agencies, but the magnitude is small relative to how media covers corruption cases (i.e., $\frac{a_e}{a_c}$ is small). In this case, we can still replicate results for the case of $a_e \leq 0$. Now consider $\frac{a_e}{a_c} > -\frac{1}{\rho}$ where media covers anticorruption efforts strongly relative to corruption itself. For this case, a surprisingly strong media coverage of corruption lowers the perception of corruption and raises perceptions of law enforcement ($m \uparrow \Longrightarrow E(c|m) < 0, E(e|m) > 0$).

Using the same logic, one can show that $\frac{b_c}{b_e} \in \left(-\rho, -\frac{1}{\rho}\right)$ is needed to ensure that a publicized prison sentence of a corrupt official (signal $s \uparrow$) results in a higher perception of corruption and a higher perception of law enforcement ($E(c|s) > 0, E(e|s) > 0$). To obtain a lower perception of corruption and a stronger perception of anticorruption effort, we need $\frac{b_c}{b_e} < -\rho$, that is, convictions load more heavily on law enforcement e than on the extent of corruption c (i.e., $s \uparrow \Longrightarrow E(c|s) < 0, E(e|s) > 0$). On the other hand, if convictions largely reflect the extent of corruption (a relatively large b_c) rather than law enforcement (a relatively small b_e) so that $\frac{b_c}{b_e} > -\frac{1}{\rho}$, more convictions of corrupt officials should increase perception of corruption and reduce perceptions of anticorruption efforts (i.e., $s \uparrow \Longrightarrow E(c|s) > 0, E(e|s) < 0$).

This analysis suggests that media coverage of corruption and information about the successful prosecution of corrupt officials can lead to different inferences about the degree of corruption c and law enforcement e depending on how these signals load on the true state of e and c. For instance, one may be in a situation where publicizing convictions can "backfire": instead of convincing the public that the government is serious about fighting corruption, the public may conclude that corruption is a larger problem than they thought and anticorruption

agencies are less effective than they thought. In this case, perceived corruption and experienced corruption diverge in the sense that one may have objectively low corruption, but people believe that corruption is widespread.

4. Data description

Our analysis is based on two survey waves implemented by Info Sapiens, a Ukrainian marketing/survey company. Both waves were based on the company's online panel that is representative of the Ukrainian population as of January 2022 in terms of gender, age, and regional characteristics. Since February 2022, Ukrainian statistical authority stopped publishing population data. Therefore, all surveys implemented after that date are based on January 2022 data, with some adjustments for internal and external migration of people. The population of people who are 70+ years old is somewhat underrepresented as this group uses smartphones, laptops, and similar electronics less frequently.

The first wave was fielded from February 6 to February 22, 2024. We have 7,324 responses. This wave had two main components. The first component is focused on eliciting perceptions of corruption at the aggregate level as well as for specific government bodies and agencies. Using a 1-10 Likert scale, we ask respondents to report how widespread corruption is, how effective anticorruption agencies are, and how corrupt specific government agencies (President, courts, Parliament, tax inspection, conscription office, etc.) are. In this wave, we also measure media exposure and experienced corruption, that is, how often respondents interact with various government agencies and how often they had to make informal payments (bribes) to resolve their issues.

The second component implements a randomized controlled trial where some respondents are presented with factual information about anticorruption efforts in Ukraine. Specifically, respondents were randomly assigned into one of five groups that received (1) a neutral message (control), (2) information on the number of convictions for corruption; (3) information on corruption incidence at the judiciary and the customs office; (4) information on both convictions and incidence; (5) a message about a specific corruption case where officials were sentenced to long terms in jail for misusing public funds. Table 3 describes the information provided for each group. Appendix Table 1 and Appendix Table 2 establish that group assignment is uncorrelated with observable characteristics of respondents and the sample is balanced across the groups. Through the lens of the model, we interpret treatments T1 and T4 as signal s, treatment T2 as signal m, and treatment T3 as a mixture of the signals.

After the information intervention is completed, we elicit perceptions of corruption again. We will treat these beliefs as posteriors and pre-treatment beliefs as priors. To avoid survey fatigue, the post-treatment elicitation uses different wording for the questions and a different Likert scale (from 1 to 100 rather than 1 to 10).

In the post-treatment block of questions, we ask respondents to report their personal experience of corruption, tolerance to corruption, knowledge of anticorruption institutions, willingness to emigrate from Ukraine, and trust in different entities (measured by willingness to donate or volunteer if asked by an official, a volunteer, an army member or a friend). The latter questions are meant to measure effects of beliefs on hypothetical actions. The median duration of the first survey wave was less than 10 minutes.

The second wave was implemented approximately two months after the original survey. A total of 4,888 respondents (~70% of the original sample) answered the second questionnaire that contained only four questions: two on corruption perceptions, one on perceived corruption enforcement (respondents estimated on a scale from 1 to 10 willingness of Ukrainian government to fight corruption) and one on actual actions (whether a person donated or volunteered during the last month for different initiatives). This wave aimed to measure the persistence of treatment effects on beliefs and the effects of treatments on actual behavior. Appendix Table 3 documents that information treatments do not predict participation in the follow-up survey wave. The median duration of the survey was less than 5 minutes.

5. Perceptions about corruption

A. Basic facts

In the first pass at the data, we report basic descriptive statistics and correlations for beliefs about the incidence and frequency of corruption (Table 4). Figure 2 indicates that corruption is broadly seen as a pervasive, major issue in Ukraine. Almost 50% of respondents assign the highest score (10) to the prevalence of corruption in the country. Few respondents assign a score of less than 5. In addition, more than 80% of respondents believe that corruption is the most important problem (score of 10) for the country. Thus, Ukrainians view corruption as widespread and highly problematic. These statistics suggest that information treatments emphasizing anticorruption efforts likely surprise respondents by giving objective facts on prosecution of corruption.

Interestingly, the vast majority of respondents believe that corruption is not justified in addressing minor or even important issues but can be tolerated in matters of life and death (Figure 3). This result is consistent with the gradual shift in tolerance after Russia illegally annexed Crimea and partially occupied the Donbas in 2014 when Ukrainians realized that

corruption is an existential risk for the country (Table 2). For example, while in 2007 37% of Ukrainians believed that corruption is never justified, the share increased to 42% in 2018, and 47% in 2025.[4] Lower shares of people reporting that corruption is never justified in these surveys compared to our survey can be explained by the fact that "regular" questions are not detailed enough, as Figure 3 shows (e.g. giving a bribe to a doctor to save the life of a relative would be acceptable for many people). Indirect measures of intolerance to corruption such as refusing to give a bribe or reporting that they were asked to provide a bribe or gift (Table 2), also show that tolerance to corruption declined in recent years, although the change has been gradual.

Figure 4 demonstrates that corruption is perceived to be present in all government agencies but the intensity is believed to vary considerably. For example, among central government bodies, the Parliament is perceived to be rather corrupt while the National Bank of Ukraine is viewed as one of the least corrupt institutions. Educational establishments, social security offices, and the newly established administrative service centers receive low corruption scores. To be clear, this is not driven by the fact that these institutions are not a part of the central government, since, for example, healthcare (a public sector where informal payments used to be widespread before the major reforms started in 2017) is perceived as fairly corrupt.

We observe that government bodies and agencies tasked with law enforcement (courts, customs, tax inspection, prosecution and conscription offices) are perceived as corrupt, but notably patrol police, which was deeply reformed in 2015, is viewed relatively favorably. The difference between police and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with limited spillovers from reforming one government body and not reforming others (Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2024). Interestingly, while the Cabinet of Ministers and President's office score poorly relative to local authorities (mayors), the President himself is perceived as relatively clean. Thus, our tentative conclusion is that people view corruption as being particularly problematic in the law enforcement sector and in the top echelons of the government, which can provide another justification for decentralization of the government.

Despite these differences, principal component analysis suggests strong comovement across different government agencies (Figure 5): the first principal component accounts for

[4] For comparison, the share of Europeans who believe that corruption is never justified ranges from 55% in Hungary and Latvia to over 90% in Finland or Portugal (Alvarez-Garcia et al. 2026).

almost 60% of the variation. In other words, there is a perception of broad-based corruption in the government.

Perhaps not surprisingly, respondents give the government and law enforcement agencies low scores for both effectiveness and willingness to fight corruption (Figure 6). Most respondents believe that corruption has worsened over the past three years—63% indicated it had increased considerably or to some degree, while only 13.5% felt that it had declined at all or substantially when comparing early 2024 to 2021. The correlation between perceived degree of corruption and perceived effectiveness of anticorruption agencies is $\rho = -0.35$.

In part, these perceptions could be driven by uneven knowledge that respondents have about anticorruption institutions established after the Revolution of Dignity (Figure 7). For example, although ~50% of respondents know what National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) is and another 37% have heard about it, fewer people are familiar with the Specialized Anticorruption Prosecutor Office (SAPO), which is an integral part of the anticorruption infrastructure in Ukraine. The High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine (HACC) and National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) fall in between. Eleven percent of respondents believe these bodies are capable of eradicating corruption entirely, 23% think they could cut it roughly in half, and 55% expect them to achieve no more than a quarter reduction or less. To put these figures into perspective, Monnery and Chirat (2024) document that only 9% of people in France are aware of the High Authority for the Transparency in Public Life (HATVP), the French analogue of Ukraine's NACP.

Figure 8 captures the correlation between respondents' direct exposure to the state and the frequency of reported informal payments: participants were asked to indicate how frequently they or members of their household had dealings with various government bodies over the preceding twelve months (horizontal axis) and to estimate in what proportion of those interactions a bribe had been solicited (every time, more than half the time, less than half the time, or rarely/never). As one might expect, healthcare institutions were the most visited, and 27% of respondents who had visited them more than once in the past year reported being asked for a bribe at least half the time. This figure aligns closely with data from the NACP survey, in which 32% of 2023 respondents—or their relatives—reported encountering corruption in healthcare settings.

The proportion of respondents who faced corruption at educational institutions (~18%) falls between the rates recorded for higher education and kindergartens (27%) and secondary schools (16%, as measured in 2022) in NACP surveys. The corruption incidence at administrative service offices in our data (~11%) is slightly higher than the 2023 NACP figure

(~9%). Since the NACP survey restricts its questions about corruption in courts, customs, and tax authorities to business respondents only, those figures are not directly comparable to our findings. If healthcare is excluded, there is generally a negative relationship between the intensity of interactions with the state and the frequency of bribe payments. One possible interpretation is that lower-level corruption has become less prevalent due to digitalization or decentralization, though this remains speculative.

Figure 9 shows that the vast majority of respondents rely on internet-based sources for their news (television ceded its status as the primary news medium in Ukraine around 2018–2019). Over 60% of respondents named Telegram as a key news source, followed by Facebook at 46% and YouTube at 35%.

Finally, most respondents see their future in Ukraine (Figure 10). However, corruption is an important factor for many respondents: ~17% indicate that they will stay in Ukraine if corruption problems are addressed. This consideration is more important than the war. This commitment to the country can rationalize why respondents are willing to contribute to public good. Figure 11 shows that 70-80% of Ukrainians are ready to donate to high-trust (low perception of corruption) organizations and institutions such as volunteers, friends and the army. For comparison, ~30% of Ukrainians are willing to support initiatives originating from institutions with relatively high corruption perception scores (mayors, president or ministers).

B. Predictors of corruption perceptions

We conducted a series of regression analyses in which the outcome variable is either overall corruption perception or perception of corruption at a specific institution, while the explanatory variables include demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, number of children, employment status and sector, place and region of residence), personal experience of corruption, familiarity with anticorruption bodies, and primary news sources. For brevity, we provide an overview of the results and report estimates in Appendix Table 6.

We observe an inverted-U relationship with age. Young and old respondents tend to perceive corruption as somewhat less prevalent, while middle-aged respondents report higher corruption perceptions. Men tend to report lower perceptions of corruption. Marital status, the number of children in the household and employment status do not predict views on corruption. We also find that, relative to the private sector, public sector employees report somewhat lower corruption perceptions. Relative to Kyiv, West, South, and Center have slightly higher general corruption scores while their perception of effectiveness of anticorruption efforts are not very different from Kyiv. Respondents from smaller cities (50-100k residents) tend to report higher

perceptions of corruption. Respondents reporting TV as the main source of information (which has been tightly controlled by the government since the full-scale invasion in 2022) report lower perceived corruption, while those who mainly get the news from online media and social networks have higher perceived corruption. Respondents with higher "consumption" of media tend to have somewhat higher corruption scores. Being aware of anticorruption agencies has diverse effects on perceptions of corruption of different agencies: for example, knowing about NABU reduces perceptions of corruption for the president and increases for other government agencies, while knowing about SAPO increases corruption perceptions of the president and reduces – of courts, prosecution and conscription offices. At the same time, knowledge of anticorruption agencies is not significantly associated with perceptions of the effectiveness of these agencies. One possible reading of this pattern is that awareness of prevention and prosecution mechanisms attenuates perceived corruption, while awareness of active investigations amplifies it—since a high volume of cases may be read as a signal of how deeply corruption is embedded. Having frequent interactions with the state does not seem to have a robust correlation with views on corruption but personal experience with informal payments to government officials does. For example, encountering bribery in education, healthcare, conscription offices, or the police tends to raise one's perception of corruption in those sectors.

Given the large number of correlated controls in these regressions, assessing the quantitative importance of individual coefficients is difficult. However, we can use the Shapley (1953) decomposition of R^2 for blocks of variables to understand which variables are strong predictors of corruption perceptions. Table 5 reports the decomposition for seven blocks: i) demographic variables (age, gender, etc.); ii) employment (status, sector); iii) geography (type and size of settlement); iv) media exposure and consumption; v) knowledge about anticorruption agencies; vi) frequency of interaction with various government agencies; vii) the frequency of informal payments while dealing with various government agencies.

We generally find the variables related to employment, geographic location and knowledge of anticorruption agencies are relatively unimportant. This pattern may be consistent with several explanations such as a block of variables does not matter or corruption is roughly uniform across variables within the block (e.g., corruption is similar across different regions of Ukraine). With the available data, we cannot establish which of these hypotheses accounts for the observed results.

Blocks 1 (demographics), 2 (interactions with the state), and 3 (frequency of bribes) are roughly equally important with each block accounting for 20% of the estimated R^2s, which are reported in column (8) of the table. However, there is variation in the importance across

government agencies within each block. For instance, demographic variables account for 36% of R^2 for perceptions of corruption in courts but for only 5% of R^2 for administrative services. At the same time, frequency of bribes accounts for 13% of R^2 for courts and 48% for administrative services.

In a similar spirit, we find large variation in the importance of media exposure/consumption across government agencies. Media variables are important for central government bodies and law enforcement but less so for local/decentralized government agencies (mayors, education, etc.). This can be rationalized by the fact that media tend to cover national issues more than local issues. Alternatively, respondents obviously do not interact with the President or the Cabinet and therefore they have to rely on the media to form their views on the central government.

C. Trust and perceptions of corruption

One of the most corrosive effects of corruption is the lack of trust in institutions. As a result, widespread perceptions of corruption should reduce the willingness to contribute to public goods (e.g., stimulate more tax evasion or reduce donations to charities). This consideration is especially important in wartime when national unity and a sense of common cause are vital for defense. However, an acute concern about survival can overcome distrust that stems from corruption concerns. Indeed, a common narrative suggests that Ukrainians donated significantly to strangers who asked for help to repel Russia's assault (e.g. Klymak et al. 2025).

To better understand the link between corruption and trust, we relate respondents' stated willingness to donate or volunteer when approached by various groups to corruption perceptions, controlling for the same set of variables as above. Respondents who view corruption as more widespread and who regard the government's anticorruption efforts as less effective are less inclined to donate or volunteer in response to a hypothetical request from the president or a cabinet minister (Figure 12). At the same time, perceptions of corruption do not correlate with lower willingness to donate to more trustworthy organizations (friends, volunteers, army). In other words, the spillover from perceived corruption in the government to grassroots movements (friends, volunteers) or credible/vital institutions (army) seems to be limited. The gap between the share willing to donate to friends vs. the president is close to zero for those who assign the minimum corruption score, but this gap grows to ~65% for those who assign the maximum corruption score.

In additional unreported checks, we also explore which characteristics predict willingness to donate. Those who believe corruption has fallen over the past three years, those

familiar with the High Anti-Corruption Court (established in 2019), and the youngest cohort (18–25) all show a greater willingness to respond to such appeals. Similar patterns emerge when examining willingness to respond to requests from a mayor or community leader. Respondents living in cities—as opposed to villages—and those who have personally encountered corruption in dealings with local authorities are, however, less inclined to engage. Corruption perceptions do not significantly predict the likelihood of donating or volunteering in response to non-governmental calls to action (perhaps because citizens mentally associate corruption primarily with the public sector). Nonetheless, those who believe corruption has grown over the past three years are actually more likely to take part in such initiatives. Men and residents of cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants are somewhat less inclined to respond than women and rural residents. Geographic variables are statistically significant only for volunteer activities: respondents from every region except the East are more willing to volunteer than those from Kyiv. Members of the armed forces are more likely to engage with initiatives organized by their fellow service members, while no other occupational categories show statistically significant effects. Notably, those who are aware of the High Anticorruption Court are also more inclined to participate in non-governmental volunteer activities—possibly reflecting a broader pattern of civic engagement and political awareness.

Finally, we examine how corruption perceptions relate to the intention to remain in Ukraine. As we reported earlier, 72% of respondents unconditionally envision their future in the country. However, this share is lower for those who perceive corruption as being widespread (Figure 13). Furthermore, respondents with high perceptions of corruption are more likely to leave the country unconditionally or relate their choice to addressing corruption. In further analyses of correlations, we find that direct personal experience of corruption, by contrast, does not appear to be a strong driver of this outcome. Several demographic factors are linked to a lower stated likelihood of remaining in Ukraine unconditionally: men, respondents under 55, urban residents, those from the South and East, and those who have already relocated abroad all express less certainty about staying. Notably, respondents employed by non-governmental organizations are more likely to say they intend to remain.

6. Experiment

While correlations are informative, they do not entail causal relationships. To address this concern, we now utilize our randomized controlled trial (RCT) to establish causal effects of news about law enforcement on perceptions of corruption. Specifically, we follow the recommendations in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2026) and estimate regression:

$$Outcome_i = a_0 + a_1 \times Prevalence_i^{prior} + a_2 \times Enforcement_i^{prior} + \sum_j b_j \times \mathbb{I}\{i \in Treatment\ j\} + Controls + error \quad (5)$$

where $Prevalence_i^{prior}$ is the pre-treatment belief about the prevalence of corruption in the country, $Enforcement_i^{prior}$ is the pre-treatment belief about the effectiveness of the anticorruption agencies, $\mathbb{I}\{i \in Treatment\ j\}$ is an indicator variable equal to one if respondent i is in treatment group j, $Controls$ is a vector of demographic, employment and geographic variables. Note that because the coefficients of interest b_j are on the variables generated through randomization, including controls should only affect the precision of $\hat{b}_j$ but not the estimates themselves.

When we measure beliefs about the importance of corruption measured immediately after treatment, we find (Table 6) that information treatments have no statistically significant effect on the beliefs about how important the corruption problem is for Ukraine. We also do not find any effect two months after the treatment. The interpretation of this result can be somewhat nuanced because information treatments may be unable to overturn the overwhelming sense that corruption is a major problem in Ukraine. Indeed, many people give maximum scores to this problem and to the extent that many respondents are at the upper bound of the scale (in the "corner"), the effects of treatments can be inframarginal. This finding is also consistent with the theoretical case where communication about successful prosecution of corrupt officials can (weakly) raise perceptions of corruption.

At the same time, treatments emphasizing successful efforts to reduce corruption do change the perception of the government's will to fight corruption. Specifically, treatment T2, which describes the extent of bribery in the country, lowers the perceived will (but the point estimate is not statistically significant) while informing people about cases of sending corrupt officials to jail (treatment T1) raises the perceived will. Importantly, when we inform people about the extent of bribery and successful prosecution of corrupt officials (treatment T3), we find that the latter (successful prosecution) dominates the former (extent of bribery). This suggests that information campaigns aimed at reducing social acceptance of graft, bribery and corruption are not likely to lose their potency when the scale of the problem is truthfully reported to the public. Although a popular narrative emphasizes the importance of having a handful of high-profile cases for anticorruption efforts, our evidence suggests for responses immediately after information treatments that providing specific names (treatment T4) can be less powerful than providing anonymized but more complete statistics (treatment T1).

Importantly, we find that these effects persist two months after the treatment. If anything, treatments T3 and T4 become stronger. The effects of treatment T1 are weaker after two months but the estimate is less precise and so we cannot reject the null of no effect or the null of the effect being equal to the effect immediately after the treatment. The change in the relative magnitude of point estimate is not statistically significant but it may suggest that concrete cases can be more relatable and hence memorable to the public in the longer run (e.g., Bholat et al. 2019).

Consistent with these results, we find (Table 7) that information treatments T3 and T4 cause respondents to become more optimistic about the ability of anticorruption institutions to reduce or even eradicate corruption. The point estimate for the effect of treatment T1 is also negative (i.e., people become more optimistic) but is not statistically significant.

These results suggest that in the context of our simple model we have $E(c|m) > 0$, $E(c|s) \approx 0$, $E(e|m) < 0$, and $E(e|s) > 0$. Thus, we have a case of $\frac{a_e}{a_c} < -\rho$ and $b_c/b_e \approx -\rho$. Given $\rho = -0.35$ in the data, this means that, for our respondents, signal s (prison sentences for corrupt officials) loads relatively less on the state of corruption than on the degree of law enforcement, but the loadings are both positive. This pattern is likely reversed for how our respondents interpret news, statistics, etc. about corruption, i.e., signal m loads more on the state of corruption than on the degree of law enforcement. As a result, an energetic, widely publicized anticorruption campaign with many convicted corrupt officials can raise rather than lower perceptions of corruption even though the public may be more convinced that the government is serious about corruption.

At the same time, we observe little evidence that information treatments change hypothetical willingness to donate or volunteer (Table 8). We also find no robust evidence that information treatments affect actual behavior in terms of donations or volunteering activities (Table 9). Thus, the pass-through from a more positive outlook about anticorruption efforts to behavioral outcomes is weak. Although our statistical power is smaller for subsamples, we find broadly similar results when we estimate treatment effects for specific scores in prior beliefs (Figure 14). Thus, our results are not driven by respondents providing extreme scores for their perceived corruption or perceived effectiveness of anticorruption agencies.

Finally, we examine the effects on perceptions of corruption for specific government bodies and agencies immediately after the treatment (Table 10) and two months after the treatment (Table 11). Because we have prior and posterior beliefs about corruption for specific government bodies and agencies, we can estimate a modified version of specification (5):

$$Corruption_{i,s}^{posterior} = a_0^{(s)} + a_1^{(s)} \times Corruption_{i,s}^{prior} + \sum_j b_j^{(s)} \times \mathbb{I}\{i \in Treatment\ j\} + Controls + error \quad (6)$$

where s indexes government agencies.

In short, we do not find systematic causal effects immediately after the treatment or two months later. This result can be consistent with several explanations. First, as we discussed earlier, treatments may be too weak to move people from extreme views. Second, the pass-through from prosecution of corruption "somewhere" may be unable to change beliefs about the prevalence of corruption in a specific government body or agency. Third, people may infer a higher degree of corruption from learning about jail terms for high-level corrupt officials that offsets potentially positive news about stronger law enforcement.

7. Conclusions

Our survey paints a clear picture: Ukrainians believe that corruption is widespread and it is a central problem. These beliefs are similar across various socioeconomic groups, which points to a consensus view in the country. We also observe that, although there is some variation in perceptions across government agencies, no part of the public sector is viewed as clean, with particularly pessimistic perceptions regarding the central government and law enforcement agencies. Media exposure and consumption, the frequency of interaction with the state, the incidence of bribery, and respondents' demographic characteristics are among the strongest predictors. Our correlational analysis indicates that perceptions of corruption are associated with a range of respondents' decisions, including such important decisions as whether to stay in the country or emigrate. We also document that more negative perceptions are correlated with lower willingness to donate and volunteer for initiatives coming from the government (but this correlation is relatively muted for initiatives coming from the armed forces or high-trust non-governmental institutions).

We use a randomized controlled trial (RCT) to establish the causal effects of communicating successful anticorruption efforts to the public. Although one could have expected such communication to lower perceptions of corruption, we find muted (if any) effects not only on corruption perceptions but also on willingness to contribute to the public good. At the same time, this communication causes people to believe that the government is more serious about fighting corruption. We argue that these patterns can be consistent with Bayesian learning where reports of anticorruption efforts not only make respondents believe that the government

is serious about corruption but also make respondents believe that corruption is even more important or widespread than they thought before.

These findings point to the importance of communicating the success of anticorruption efforts as well as understanding that such communication can have a limited short-term effect on perceptions of corruption. This calls for persistent anticorruption efforts to eventually overcome the entrenched perceptions. This also underscores the importance of putting the success of anticorruption efforts in a broader context so that the public can appreciate the progress.

We see a number of potential avenues for future research. For example, we have examined a limited set of behavioral outcomes. One can explore further how information about anticorruption efforts affects the incidence and frequency of bribe-paying among members of the public. One can also investigate additional inferences (e.g., state of crime in the country) that respondents draw from the provided information. Finally, it would be instructive to implement similar experiments in other countries and times to not only assess external validity of our findings but also provide benchmarks for evaluating results for high-corruption countries.

References

Abramo, Claudio Weber. 2008. "How Much Do Perceptions of Corruption Really Tell Us?" *Economics* 2(1): 20080003.

Ahapova, Viktoria, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Oleh Ivanov, Ilona Sologoub, and Viktoria Vyhovska. 2025. *White Book of Reforms 2025*. VoxUkraine. https://voxukraine.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/White-Book-of-Reforms-2025-eng.pdf

Ajzenman, Nicolás, Martin Ardanaz, Guillermo Cruces, German Feierherd, and Ignacio Lunghi. 2024. "Unraveling the Paradox of Anticorruption Messaging: Experimental Evidence from a Tax Administration Reform," *IDB Working Paper 13555*, Inter-American Development Bank.

Alvarez-García, Begoña, Dolores Lagoa-Varela, Susana Iglesias-Antelo, and Jorge Gallud Cano. 2026. "Exploring Tolerance Towards Corruption in the European Union Through Experienced Corruption, Perceived Corruption and Institutional Trust," *Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility* 35(2): 1279-1304.

Becker, Torbjörn, Jonathan Lehne, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Nataliia Shapoval, and Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2022. "Anti-corruption policies in the reconstruction of Ukraine." In

Rebuilding Ukraine: Principles and policies, edited by Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Ilona Sologoub, and Beatrice Weder di Mauro. CEPR Press.

Belyaev, Demyan, Jean-Patrick Villeneuve, and Giulia Mugellini. 2025. "Framing Corruption in Ukraine: A Two-Decade Scoping Review of Academic and Organizational Perspectives." *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe* 33(1): 109–128.

Besley, Timothy, and Andrea Prat. 2006. "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability." *American Economic Review* 96(3): 720–736.

Bholat, David, Nida Broughton, Janna Ter Meer, and Eryk Walczak. 2019. "Enhancing Central Bank Communications Using Simple and Relatable Information." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 108: 1–15.

Čábelková, Inna, and Jan Hanousek. 2004. "The power of negative thinking: corruption, perception and willingness to bribe in Ukraine." *Applied Economics* 36: 383–397.

Camaj, Lindita. 2013. "The Media's Role in Fighting Corruption: Media Effects on Governmental Accountability." *International Journal of Press/Politics* 18(1): 21–42.

Chen, Can, and Sukumar Ganapati. 2018. "Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant? A Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Transparency on Government Corruption." Open government partnership.

Coibion, Olivier, and Yuriy Gorodnichenko. 2026. *Expectations Matter: The New Causal Macroeconomics of Surveys and Experiments*. Princeton University Press.

Colonnelli, Emanuele, Francesco Loiacono, Edwin Muhumuza, and Edoardo Teso. 2024. "Do Information Frictions and Corruption Perceptions Kill Competition? A Field Experiment On Public Procurement in Uganda," NBER Working Paper 32170.

Corbacho, Ana, Daniel W. Gingerich, Virginia Oliveros, and Mauricio Ruiz-Vega. 2016. "Corruption as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Costa Rica." *American Journal of Political Science* 60(4): 1077–1092.

Corrado, Germana, Luisa Corrado, Giuseppe De Michele, and Francesco Salustri. 2023. "Are Perceptions of Corruption Matching Experience? Evidence from Microdata." *British Journal of Criminology, Centre for Crime and Justice Studies* 63(3): 687-708.

Costa, Samia. 2013. "Do Freedom of Information Laws Decrease Corruption?" *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 29(6): 1317-1343.

Deryugina, Tatyana, Alminas Žaldokas, Anastassia Fedyk, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, James Hodson, and Ilona Sologoub. 2025. "Rating Government Procurement Markets," NBER Working Paper 34479.

Gillanders, Robert and Sinikka Parviainen. 2018. "Experts' Perceptions Versus Firms' Experiences of Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment," *Manchester School* 86(2): 195-218.

Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, and Maurice Obstfeld. 2026. "You Only Live Twice: Financial Inflows and Growth in a Westward-Facing Ukraine," forthcoming in *Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues*.

Gutmann, Jerg, Fabio Padovano, and Stefan Voigt. 2020. "Perception vs. Experience: Explaining Differences in Corruption Measures Using Microdata," *European Journal of Political Economy* 65: 101925.

Hlatshwayo, Sandile, Anne Oeking, Manuk Ghazanchyan, David Corvino, Ananya Shukla, and Lamin Leigh. 2018. "The Measurement and Macro-Relevance of Corruption: A Big Data Approach," IMF Working Papers 2018/195, International Monetary Fund.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2009. "Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996–2008." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4978. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Klymak, Margaryta, Andrew Kosenko, Oleg Korenok, Dariia Mykhailyshyna, and Kathryn Vasilaky. 2025. "Charitable Giving in Wartime: Evidence from Ukraine's War Fundraising," CSAE Working Paper Series 2025-04, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.

Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). 2011. *Corruption in Ukraine: Comparative Analysis of National Surveys 2007–2009, 2011*. Kyiv: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. Available at https://kiis.com.ua/img/pr_img/20110920_korup/Corruption%20in%20Ukraine_2007-2009_2011_Ukr.pdf

Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). 2016. *Corruption in Ukraine: Comparative Analysis of National Surveys: 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2015*. Kyiv: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2016. Available at https://kiis.com.ua/materials/pr/20161602_corruption/Corruption%20in%20Ukraine%202015%20UKR.pdf

Mauro, Paolo. 1995. "Corruption and Growth." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110(3): 681–712.

Monnery, Benjamin, and Alexandre Chirat. 2024. "Trust in the Fight Against Political Corruption: A Survey Experiment among Citizens and Experts," Working Papers AFED 24-02, Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED).

National Agency on Corruption Prevention of Ukraine (NACP). 2022. *Corruption in Ukraine 2021: Status, Dynamics, and Key Trends*. Kyiv: National Agency on Corruption Prevention, 2022. Available at https://nazk.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Corr2021-Presentation-Ukr-Mar24-.pdf

National Agency on Corruption Prevention of Ukraine (NACP). 2025a. *Corruption in Ukraine 2024: Understanding, Perception, and Prevalence*. Kyiv: National Agency on Corruption Prevention, 2024. Available at https://nazk.gov.ua/pdfjs/?file=/wp-content/uploads/Pages/07/17/0717bf197d9dbfd35baa6d2e939ca43a2e4746078555232 8ee7bd5e2fdebb05e11548549.pdf

National Agency on Corruption Prevention of Ukraine (NACP). 2025b. *Corruption in Ukraine: Key Trends and Indicators* (presentation). Kyiv: National Agency on Corruption Prevention. Available at https://nazk.gov.ua/pdfjs/?file=/wp-content/uploads/Pages/15/e5/15e591a59553a107242702360724a50657184e00538377 415c76276ecb88c0538683479.pdf

Nieuwenburg, Paul. 2007. "The Integrity Paradox." *Public Integrity* 9(3): 213-224.

Pan, Fengne, Tianguang Meng, and Mingan Zhan. 2023. "The Integrity Paradox: How Corruption Investigation Exposure Affects Political Trust in China." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 28: 433–456.

Peiffer, Caryn, and Linda Alvarez. 2016. "Who Will Be the Principled Principals? Examining Willingness to Actively Oppose Corruption." *Governance* 29(3): 351-369.

Pittaluga, Giovanni, Elena Seghezza, and Pierluigi Morelli. 2024. "Media Fabrication of Corruption and the Quality of the Political Class: The Case of Italy." *European Journal of Political Economy* 84: 102461.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Graeme Robertson. 2024. "Do reforms reduce corruption perceptions? Evidence from police reform in Ukraine." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 40(5): 345-361.

Rizzica, Lucia, and Marco Tonello. 2020. "Persuadable Perceptions: The Effect of Media Content on Beliefs about Corruption." *Economic Policy* 35(104): 679-737.

Sarullo, Nicolas, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Tatyana Deryugina, James Hodson, Ilona Sologoub, and Anastassia Fedyk. 2026. "Measuring Corruption from Household Income and Consumption Micro-Data: An International Perspective." *Economic Modelling* 160: 107578.

Shapley, Lloyd. 1953. "A Value for n-Person Games," reprinted in *The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley*, ed. A. Roth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1993. “Corruption.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108 (3): 599–617.

Sun, Zongfeng, Lin Zhu, and Xing Ni. 2022. “How Does Anti-Corruption Information Affect Public Perceptions of Corruption in China?” *China Review* 22(2): 113–143.

Svensson, Jakob. 2005. “Eight Questions about Corruption.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19(3): 19–42.

Villoria, Manuel, Gregg Van Ryzin, and Cecilia Lavena. 2012. “Social and Political Consequences of Administrative Corruption: A Study of Public Perceptions in Spain.” *Public Administration Review* 73(1): 85–94.

Figure 1. Media coverage of corruption and corruption cases with court sentences.



Source: Information about corruption cases is from NACP (https://dap.nazk.gov.ua/kpi/3/). Additional statistics are in Appendix Table 7. The media mentions are estimated using the IMI "white list" which includes: УНІАН, Суспільне, Еспресо, Бабель, Українська правда, Радіо Свобода, hromadske, ZN.UA, Тексти, LB.ua, Укрінформ, Грати, Громадське радіо, Український тиждень, Рубрика, Слово і Діло, Новинарня, Frontliner, tsn.ua, Укрінформ, nv.ua, 24 канал, главком, сегодня, цензор.нет, корреспондент, обозреватель, ліга, ICTV, СТБ, ukr.net.

Figure 2. Corruption perception (% of respondents)



Figure 3. Tolerance to corruption: answers to question "is corruption justified…" in order to solve a certain issue (% of respondents)



Notes: because these survey questions are asked after information treatments, this figure uses only responses of respondents in the control group.

Figure 4. Corruption perception, by government bodies and agencies (% of respondents who provided a defined answer)



Figure 5. Scree plot for perceived corruption across government agencies.



Notes: the figure plots eigenvalues for principal components for corruption perception for specific government agencies and bodies shown in Figure 4.

Figure 6. Perception of government efforts in fighting corruption (% of respondents)



Notes: because these survey questions are asked after information treatments, this figure uses only responses of respondents in the control group.

Figure 7. Do you know or have you heard about the new anticorruption institutions before this survey? (% of respondents)



Notes: because these survey questions are asked after information treatments, this figure uses only responses of respondents in the control group.

Figure 8. Personal experience of corruption



Notes: because these survey questions are asked after information treatments, this figure uses only responses of respondents in the control group.

Figure 9. What are your news sources (up to 3 answers) and how often do you read news? (% of respondents)



Figure 10. Do you envision your future in Ukraine? (% of respondents)



Notes: because these survey questions are asked after information treatments, this figure uses only responses of respondents in the control group.

Figure 11. Would you make a donation or participate in a volunteer initiative if asked by X (% of respondents)



Notes: because these survey questions are asked after information treatments, this figure uses only responses of respondents in the control group.

Figure 12. Willingness to donate or volunteer in response to requests from various sources.



Notes: because these survey questions are asked after information treatments, this figure uses only responses of respondents in the control group.

Figure 13. Perceptions of corruption vs. the choice to stay in Ukraine.



Notes: because these survey questions are asked after information treatments, this figure uses only responses of respondents in the control group.

Figure 14. Treatment effects on donations and volunteering activities by prior beliefs



Notes: the figure reports point estimates (markers) and 90% confidence intervals (whiskers) for treatment effects on donations and volunteering activities that are organized by a given organization or government body. The specification is given by equation (5) which does not include priors.

Table 1. Summary of Ukraine's anti-corruption infrastructure established after 2014.

Institution	Acronym	Year Established	Primary Function
National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine	NABU	2014	Investigation: A law enforcement agency that investigates high-level corruption cases and prepares them for prosecution.
National Agency on Corruption Prevention	NACP (a.k.a NAZK)	2015	Prevention & Policy: Develops anti-corruption policies, monitors the lifestyles of public officials, and manages the mandatory electronic asset declaration system.
Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office	SAPO	2015	Prosecution: An independent branch within the Prosecutor General's Office that oversees NABU's investigations and prosecutes these cases in court.
Asset Recovery and Management Agency	ARMA	2016	Asset Recovery: Traces, recovers, and manages assets (such as real estate, funds, or businesses) seized in corruption and other criminal proceedings.
High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine	HACC	2018	Adjudication: A specialized independent court that hears and tries the high-level corruption cases investigated by NABU and prosecuted by SAPO (began operations in 2019).

Table 2. Attitudes towards corruption and corruption perception indices.

	Year											
	2007	2009	2011	2015	2017	2018	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Panel A. Can corruption be justified if it is needed to solve an important issue?												
always	8.1	7.6	6.1	3.2		2.3	1.1	2.2	1.8	1.6	3.1	1.3
in most cases can be justified				19.1		14.3	18.2	17.7	14.5	12.0	11.5	12.7
sometimes	43.1	43.5	41.9									
in most cases cannot be justified				27.5		30.2	33.5	38.6	34.6	32.7	30.0	32.2
never	36.8	36.9	41.2	37.4		41.5	32.0	31.5	38.1	43.9	48.1	46.9
n/a				12.8		11.7	15.2	10.0	11.0	9.8	7.3	6.9
Panel B. Share of people who refuse to participate in corruption, theoretically and practically												
would refuse to participate in corruption					43.3		46.8	49.4	57.4	56.0	57.9	58.4
would refuse to participate AND reported to law enforcement or media					10.9		8.1	9.8	11.2	10.2	12.3	12.4
share of population that were in a potentially corrupt situation but refrained from providing a bribe or a gift							-	12.4	9.7	10.5	12.8	12.1
share of people who reported facts of corruption related to them to competent authorities							3.3	5.7	5.2	6.5	9.7	7.3
Panel C. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index*	-	2.2/ 9.4	2.3/ 9.5	27/ 91		32/ 88	33/ 88	32/ 88	33/ 90	36/ 90	35/ 90	36/ 89

Notes: For Panel A, years 2007-2021 are from KIIS/USAID surveys (KIIS 2011, 2016, 2022); years 2020-2025 are from NACP/Info Sapiens survey for population (NACP 2022, 2025a, 2025b). For Panel B, data are from NACP / Info Sapiens surveys (NACP 2025a, 2025b). The shares are derived from a hypothetical question "What would you do if you needed to wait for 30 days for some document and then you learned that for paying UAH 1000 you could get this document in one day?". The answers included three "corrupt" options and four "honest" options, of which three included reporting about this case either to the authorities or to the media. The remaining two questions were direct questions about people's behavior in situations involving corruption. For Panel C, data are from Transparency International website, *scores are presented in the format Ukraine score / maximum score since CPI changed its methodology over time.

Table 3. Information interventions.

Group	Provided information
Control group	Before you proceed, we would like you to know that 75% of Ukrainians are preparing for blackouts in the winter, and 11% plan to move to another house within their settlement.
Treatment T1	Before you proceed, we would like you to know that since July 2021 the high anticorruption court convicted 75 high-level officials.
Treatment T2	Before you proceed, we would like you to know that in 2022 35% of firms paid a bribe at the customs office and 19% of firms that interacted with the judiciary system were involved in corruption.
Treatment T3	Before you proceed, we would like you to know that since July 2021 the high anticorruption court convicted 75 high-level officials. We would also like you to know that in 2022 35% of firms paid a bribe at the customs office and 19% of firms that interacted with the judiciary system were involved in corruption.
Treatment T4	Before you proceed, we would like you to know that in February 2023 the Supreme court confirmed the conviction of Hennadii Diachenko and Ivan Radyk who diverted UAH 116 million intended to build a rail link between Boryspil airport and Kyiv. They will serve 11 and 10.5 years in jail.

Table 4. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.
Male	0.47	0.50
Age	44.04	15.18
Number of children	0.79	1.11
Marital status		
Married	0.60	0.49
Divorced	0.12	0.32
Widowed	0.06	0.24
Single	0.22	0.42
Employment status		
Employee	0.41	0.49
Private entrepreneur	0.05	0.21
Self-employed	0.05	0.23
Study & work	0.02	0.14
Study and do not work	0.03	0.18
Pension and work	0.05	0.22
Pension and do not work	0.13	0.33
Household	0.06	0.24
Unemployed and looking for a job	0.13	0.33
Unemployed and not looking for a job	0.02	0.15
Taking care of children	0.02	0.13
Taking care of a family member	0.00	0.05
Disabled	0.01	0.08
Army	0.01	0.12
Type of settlement		
village	0.32	0.47
City <50k	0.23	0.42
City 51-100k	0.05	0.23
City 101-500k	0.16	0.37
City 500k+	0.24	0.43
Region		
Kyiv	0.08	0.28
North	0.15	0.35
West	0.26	0.44
Center	0.27	0.44
South	0.14	0.34
East	0.10	0.30
Stayed in the same place since Feb 24, 2022	0.77	0.42

Table 5. Shapley value decomposition.

	Shapley Share in R^2							
	Demographics	Employment	Geography	Media exposure	Knowledge about anticorr. agencies	Interaction with gov. agencies	Frequency of bribes when interacting with gov. agencies	R^2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Prevalence of corruption	0.26	0.05	0.04	0.16	0.07	0.22	0.21	0.088
Effectiveness of anticorr. agencies	0.29	0.02	0.02	0.16	0.07	0.10	0.34	0.076
Perception of corruption for specific government agencies								
President	0.12	0.01	0.09	0.26	0.10	0.08	0.33	0.058
President's office	0.23	0.01	0.08	0.29	0.06	0.18	0.15	0.084
Cabinet of Ministers	0.29	0.03	0.02	0.18	0.10	0.20	0.18	0.116
Parliament	0.26	0.01	0.04	0.20	0.09	0.22	0.17	0.114
Mayors	0.19	0.01	0.11	0.12	0.07	0.15	0.34	0.089
Tax inspection	0.23	0.02	0.08	0.14	0.09	0.21	0.23	0.118
Courts	0.33	0.01	0.05	0.18	0.10	0.20	0.13	0.146
Customs	0.36	0.02	0.06	0.17	0.09	0.17	0.13	0.180
Education	0.04	0.04	0.15	0.04	0.02	0.17	0.53	0.112
Healthcare	0.18	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.11	0.56	0.144
Social security	0.07	0.03	0.13	0.07	0.01	0.20	0.49	0.080
Police	0.17	0.02	0.07	0.09	0.03	0.18	0.43	0.077
Prosecution office	0.31	0.02	0.05	0.16	0.09	0.21	0.15	0.127
Conscription	0.28	0.03	0.05	0.13	0.07	0.21	0.23	0.114
Administrative service	0.05	0.02	0.11	0.06	0.05	0.22	0.48	0.090
National Bank of Ukraine	0.22	0.04	0.15	0.10	0.03	0.18	0.29	0.080
Average score	0.25	0.02	0.06	0.14	0.05	0.19	0.30	0.126

Notes: columns (1)-(7) report shares of the estimated R^2 attribute to a given block of variables. Column (8) reports the estimated R^2.

Table 6. Treatment effects on measures of overall corruption and will to fight corruption.

	Immediately after the treatment		Two months after the treatment	
	Importance of corruption	Will to fight corruption	Importance of corruption	Will to fight corruption
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment				
T1	0.051	0.323***	-0.001	0.231
	(0.061)	(0.106)	(0.086)	(0.159)
T2	-0.019	-0.078	0.030	0.171
	(0.067)	(0.105)	(0.086)	(0.156)
T3	0.013	0.172*	0.013	0.440**
	(0.065)	(0.103)	(0.081)	(0.171)
T4	0.010	0.189*	-0.130	0.396***
	(0.073)	(0.104)	(0.109)	(0.152)
Pre-treatment beliefs				
Effectiveness of anticorruption agencies	-0.002	0.508***	0.000	0.352***
(1=min, 10=max)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.030)
Prevalence of corruption	0.304***	-0.264***	0.283***	-0.303***
(1=min, 10=max)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.031)
Observations	7,324	7,324	4,888	4,888
R-squared	0.158	0.302	0.138	0.179

Notes: The table reports estimates of b_j and a_1, a_2 in specification (5). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 %.

Table 7. Prospect of reducing corruption.

	Ordered logit	OLS	Ordered logit	OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment				
T1	-0.124	-0.097	-0.105	-0.083
	(0.089)	(0.065)	(0.089)	(0.064)
T2	-0.051	-0.033	-0.044	-0.033
	(0.088)	(0.065)	(0.089)	(0.064)
T3	-0.161*	-0.114*	-0.146	-0.107*
	(0.089)	(0.065)	(0.090)	(0.064)
T4	-0.150*	-0.106*	-0.128	-0.092
	(0.086)	(0.063)	(0.086)	(0.062)
Pre-treatment beliefs				
Effectiveness of anticorruption agencies	-0.189***	-0.125***	-0.190***	-0.125***
(1=min, 10=max)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.010)
Prevalence of corruption	0.206***	0.147***	0.203***	0.143***
(1=min, 10=max)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.010)
Demographic controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,572	6,572	6,572	6,572
R-squared		0.130		0.145

Notes: The table reports estimates of b_j and a_1, a_2 in specification (5). The dependent variable is based on the following survey question: "B12. In your opinion, are these anticorruption institutions capable or incapable of reducing corruption?" Possible options are "They can almost completely eliminate corruption" (coded as 1); "They can reduce corruption by about half" (coded as 2); "They can reduce corruption by about a quarter" (coded as 3); "They can only slightly reduce corruption" (coded as 4); "They are incapable of reducing corruption" (coded as 5). Category "I don't know" is omitted from the estimations. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 %.

Table 8. Hypothetical donation (wave 1).

	Donation/volunteering to:				
	Central government	Local government	Volunteer organization	Friends	Army
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A. No demographic controls					
Treatment					
T1	0.069	0.039	0.071	0.028	0.072
	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.052)	(0.042)	(0.050)
T2	-0.019	-0.078	0.008	0.014	-0.006
	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.043)	(0.052)
T3	-0.014	-0.108*	-0.054	-0.010	0.074
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.045)	(0.050)
T4	-0.001	-0.069	0.048	0.047	0.109**
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.050)
Pre-treatment beliefs					
Effectiveness of anticorruption agencies	0.130***	0.091***	0.054***	0.010	0.037***
(1=min, 10=max)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Prevalence of corruption	-0.100***	-0.083***	-0.015*	0.035***	0.020**
(1=min, 10=max)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Observations	7,324	7,324	7,324	7,324	7,324
R-squared	0.098	0.061	0.016	0.006	0.007

Notes: The table reports estimates of b_j and a_1, a_2 in specification (5). The dependent variable is based on the survey question about willingness to donate to or volunteer for a given organization. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 %. Results for the specification with demographic controls included are in Appendix Table 4.

Table 9. Actual donation reported in the follow-up wave.

	Donation/volunteering to:							
	Central government	Local government	Volunteer organization	Friends	Army	Self-organized	Unable	Did not participate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)			
Treatment								
T1	0.008	0.002	-0.025	-0.006	-0.046*	-0.004	0.022	-0.007
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.030)	(0.004)
T2	-0.004	0.007	-0.040*	-0.013	-0.031	-0.011	0.001	0.000
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.006)
T3	0.000	-0.005	-0.025	-0.042	-0.043	-0.002	0.017	-0.000
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.006)
T4	0.027	0.023	-0.012	-0.051*	-0.033	-0.023*	0.025	-0.005
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.005)
Pre-treatment beliefs								
Effectiveness of anticorruption agencies	0.005*	-0.001	0.015***	-0.006	-0.005	0.002	-0.005	0.001
(1=min, 10=max)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Prevalence of corruption	-0.009***	-0.008**	-0.007*	0.002	-0.010**	-0.002	0.013**	0.001
(1=min, 10=max)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Observations	4,888	4,888	4,888	4,888	4,888	4,888	4,888	4,888
R-squared	0.009	0.004	0.012	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.001

Notes: The table reports estimates of b_j and a_1, a_2 in specification (5). The dependent variable is based on the survey question about actual donations or volunteering for a given organization. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 %. Results for the specification with demographic controls included are in Appendix Table 5.

Table 10. Treatment effects on beliefs about prevalence of corruption, by government office.

Government office or function	Treatment				Nobs
	T1	T2	T3	T4	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	5
President	0.079	0.100	0.079	0.119	5,587
	(0.125)	(0.127)	(0.136)	(0.126)	
President's office	0.006	0.021	0.101	-0.033	6,052
	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.113)	
Cabinet of Ministers	0.023	0.019	0.032	-0.042	6,358
	(0.101)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.098)	
Parliament	-0.243***	-0.137	-0.058	-0.171*	6,648
	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.100)	(0.096)	
Mayors	-0.107	-0.002	0.098	-0.100	6,574
	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.110)	
Tax inspection	-0.087	0.032	0.107	-0.017	6,421
	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.106)	
Courts	-0.038	0.077	0.101	0.089	6,761
	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.095)	
Customs	-0.118	0.058	0.139	0.040	6,578
	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.089)	
Education	-0.081	0.105	-0.117	-0.048	6,702
	(0.117)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.118)	
Healthcare	-0.253**	-0.124	-0.080	-0.076	6,827
	(0.110)	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.108)	
Social security	-0.237*	0.028	-0.118	-0.054	6,263
	(0.124)	(0.119)	(0.132)	(0.126)	
Police	-0.138	-0.039	0.027	-0.035	6,638
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.110)	(0.097)	
Prosecution office	-0.036	0.027	0.076	-0.074	6,529
	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.097)	(0.092)	
Conscription	-0.086	0.051	0.096	0.023	6,706
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)	
Administrative services	-0.058	0.036	0.036	0.141	6,199
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.134)	
National Bank of Ukraine	-0.161	-0.032	-0.043	-0.001	5,454
	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.129)	(0.121)	
Pooled	-0.098	0.013	0.030	-0.017	102,297
	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.066)	

Notes: The table reports estimates of b_j in specification (6). The dependent variable is based on the survey question about perceived corruption in a given government agency. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 %.

Table 11. Treatment effects on beliefs about prevalence of corruption, by government office, two months after treatment.

Government office or function	Treatment				Nobs
	T1	T2	T3	T4	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	5
President	-0.001	0.159	-0.035	-0.010	3,351
	(0.176)	(0.174)	(0.182)	(0.174)	
President's office	-0.048	0.097	-0.016	0.003	4,010
	(0.134)	(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.138)	
Cabinet of Ministers	-0.005	0.153	-0.025	-0.132	4,273
	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.121)	(0.127)	
Parliament	-0.052	0.037	0.089	-0.129	4,457
	(0.106)	(0.100)	(0.104)	(0.111)	
Mayors	-0.083	-0.003	-0.178	-0.096	4,393
	(0.122)	(0.120)	(0.130)	(0.122)	
Tax inspection	-0.107	-0.040	-0.047	-0.053	4,300
	(0.124)	(0.112)	(0.122)	(0.120)	
Courts	-0.024	-0.084	-0.050	0.071	4,541
	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.097)	(0.099)	
Customs	0.108	0.072	0.214**	0.003	4,413
	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.099)	(0.108)	
Education	0.131	0.107	-0.193	0.106	4,434
	(0.138)	(0.140)	(0.149)	(0.150)	
Healthcare	0.005	0.139	-0.062	0.054	4,557
	(0.128)	(0.122)	(0.125)	(0.130)	
Police	0.106	0.013	0.216*	0.137	4,427
	(0.134)	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.138)	
Prosecution office	-0.030	-0.102	-0.095	0.005	4,372
	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.105)	
Conscription	0.136	0.154	0.162	0.062	4,513
	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.102)	
Administrative services	0.041	0.175	0.057	0.157	3,986
	(0.152)	(0.157)	(0.154)	(0.158)	
National Bank of Ukraine	0.035	0.209	0.093	0.220	3,585
	(0.169)	(0.161)	(0.165)	(0.161)	
Pooled	0.015	0.068	0.009	0.024	63,612
	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.078)	

Notes: The table reports estimates of b_j in specification (6). The dependent variable is based on the survey question about perceived corruption in a given government agency. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 %.

Online Appendix

Appendix Table 1. Sample balance across treatment groups.

Group	Control	Treatment			
		T1	T2	T3	T4
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Number of respondents	1389	1452	1412	1395	1360
Mean age	44.8	43.1	44.1	44.7	43.5
Share of men, %	0.48	0.47	0.48	0.47	0.47
Share of married, %	0.60	0.58	0.58	0.61	0.61
Share of respondent with 0 children	0.56	0.52	0.57	0.53	0.51
Share of respondent with 1 child	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Share of respondent with 2 children	0.13	0.17	0.14	0.15	0.17
Employment sector					
Private sector	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.30	0.32
Civil servant	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.05
Public sector employee	0.15	0.12	0.15	0.12	0.13
NGOs	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.07

Appendix Table 2. Test randomization of treatment group.

	Control	T1	T2	T3	T4
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
male	0.002	-0.004	-0.003	0.002	0.003
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
age	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Family status: married	-0.013	-0.016	-0.019	0.020	0.028*
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Family status: divorced	-0.027	-0.005	-0.013	0.026	0.019
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Family status: widowed	-0.031	0.003	-0.033	0.003	0.058
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Number of children	-0.005	0.009	-0.009	0.003	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Employment status: employee	0.015	0.011	0.010	-0.033***	-0.003
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Employment status: private entrep.	0.055*	0.009	-0.018	-0.033	-0.012
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Employment status: self-employed	-0.037*	0.049*	0.025	-0.020	-0.017
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.022)
North	-0.011	-0.014	0.003	0.012	0.009
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
West	0.007	-0.004	-0.000	0.016	-0.020
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Center	-0.015	-0.011	0.015	0.025	-0.014
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
South	0.023	-0.020	0.002	0.027	-0.031
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
East	0.022	-0.029	-0.001	0.023	-0.015
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
City: population <50k	0.015	-0.035*	0.013	0.018	-0.011
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
City: 51-100k	0.017	-0.020	0.027	-0.035	0.010
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.024)
City: 101-500k	0.007	-0.019	0.000	0.022	-0.010
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
City: 500k+	0.005	-0.022	0.009	0.021	-0.012
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Observations	7,324	7,324	7,324	7,324	7,324
R-squared	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.003
p-value F-test	0.168	0.433	0.876	0.161	0.654

Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 %.

Appendix Table 3. Test how treatment status affects participation in the follow-up wave.

	$\mathbb{I}(respondent \in Followup)$	
	(1)	(2)
Treatment		
T1	-0.021	-0.011
	(0.017)	(0.017)
T2	0.002	0.008
	(0.017)	(0.017)
T3	-0.007	-0.003
	(0.017)	(0.017)
T4	-0.013	-0.003
	(0.018)	(0.017)
Demographic controls	No	Yes
Observations	7,324	7,324
R-squared	0.000	0.059
p-value(F-test)	0.658	0.854

Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 %.

Appendix Table 4. Hypothetical donation (wave 1); demographic controls are included.

	Donation/volunteering to:				
	Central government	Local government	Volunteer organization	Friends	Army
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment					
T1	0.057	0.019	0.060	0.028	0.068
	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.042)	(0.050)
T2	-0.025	-0.078	0.009	0.017	-0.007
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.042)	(0.052)
T3	-0.020	-0.111*	-0.057	-0.009	0.066
	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.049)
T4	-0.009	-0.080	0.039	0.047	0.099**
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.050)
Pre-treatment beliefs					
Effectiveness of anticorruption agencies	0.127***	0.089***	0.054***	0.013**	0.041***
(1=min, 10=max)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Prevalence of corruption	-0.097***	-0.079***	-0.013	0.034***	0.019*
(1=min, 10=max)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Observations	7,324	7,324	7,324	7,324	7,324
R-squared	0.110	0.089	0.050	0.028	0.038

Notes: The table reports estimates of b_j and a_1, a_2 in specification (5). The dependent variable is based on the following survey question about willingness to donate to or volunteer for a given organization. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 %.

Appendix Table 5. Actual donation reported in the follow-up wave; demographic controls are included.

	Donation/volunteering to:							
	Central government	Local government	Volunteer organization	Friends	Army	Self-organized	Unable	Did not participate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)			
Treatment								
T1	0.006	0.002	-0.024	-0.000	-0.041	-0.004	0.017	-0.006
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.030)	(0.004)
T2	-0.005	0.009	-0.041*	-0.008	-0.028	-0.011	-0.003	0.001
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.012)	(0.028)	(0.006)
T3	-0.000	-0.002	-0.024	-0.032	-0.036	-0.003	0.007	0.000
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.005)
T4	0.026	0.028	-0.013	-0.041	-0.028	-0.022*	0.019	-0.005
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.011)	(0.029)	(0.005)
Pre-treatment beliefs								
Effectiveness of anticorruption agencies	0.004*	-0.000	0.014***	-0.003	-0.003	0.001	-0.008*	0.001
(1=min, 10=max)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Prevalence of corruption	-0.009***	-0.007**	-0.006	0.003	-0.009**	-0.002	0.011**	0.001
(1=min, 10=max)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Observations	4,888	4,888	4,888	4,888	4,888	4,888	4,888	4,888
R-squared	0.019	0.023	0.024	0.036	0.018	0.013	0.026	0.007

Notes: The table reports estimates of b_j and a_1, a_2 in specification (5). The dependent variable is based on the survey question about actual donations or volunteering for a given organization. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 %. Results for the specification with demographic controls included are in Appendix Table 4.

Appendix Table 6. Predictors of corruption perception.

	Widespread corruption	Anticorruption effectiveness	president	President's office	Cabinet of Ministers	Parliament	mayors	Tax inspection	Courts
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
male	-0.101	-0.069	0.133	-0.097	-0.196**	-0.130*	-0.155*	0.008	-0.096
	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.124)	(0.092)	(0.077)	(0.070)	(0.085)	(0.080)	(0.070)
age	0.059***	-0.050***	0.058***	0.086***	0.107***	0.091***	0.066***	0.086***	0.125***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
age^2/100	-0.059***	0.032**	-0.061***	-0.073***	-0.106***	-0.088***	-0.067***	-0.077***	-0.113***
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)
# children	0.031	-0.039	0.077	0.038	0.004	-0.021	0.046	-0.005	-0.063*
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.038)
Marital status									
married	0.053	-0.164	-0.183	-0.024	0.137	0.125	0.157	0.004	0.008
	(0.092)	(0.103)	(0.161)	(0.124)	(0.112)	(0.103)	(0.116)	(0.112)	(0.100)
divorced	0.045	-0.013	-0.860***	-0.308*	0.059	-0.025	0.055	-0.263*	-0.008
	(0.118)	(0.146)	(0.220)	(0.164)	(0.147)	(0.132)	(0.154)	(0.149)	(0.123)
widowed	-0.029	-0.065	-0.039	-0.212	-0.111	-0.108	-0.389	-0.233	-0.117
	(0.199)	(0.194)	(0.328)	(0.232)	(0.209)	(0.209)	(0.264)	(0.213)	(0.184)
Employment status and sector									
Employee	0.048	-0.040	0.140	0.002	0.093	-0.010	-0.056	-0.002	-0.011
	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.141)	(0.106)	(0.089)	(0.080)	(0.096)	(0.092)	(0.081)
Self-employed	-0.082	0.037	0.209	-0.044	-0.021	-0.098	0.060	-0.067	-0.004
	(0.103)	(0.115)	(0.188)	(0.140)	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.129)	(0.127)	(0.114)
Public servant	-0.450***	0.207	-0.139	0.049	-0.089	-0.052	0.234	-0.103	-0.017
	(0.159)	(0.154)	(0.290)	(0.209)	(0.187)	(0.172)	(0.181)	(0.231)	(0.159)
Public sector	-0.153*	0.118	0.166	-0.023	-0.040	-0.073	0.064	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.092)	(0.109)	(0.189)	(0.132)	(0.108)	(0.100)	(0.122)	(0.116)	(0.096)
NGO	-0.015	-0.068	0.077	-0.031	0.110	0.100	0.122	0.157	0.019
	(0.111)	(0.130)	(0.215)	(0.163)	(0.131)	(0.115)	(0.141)	(0.134)	(0.124)
army	-0.240	0.316	0.369	0.654*	0.009	-0.216	0.572*	0.547*	-0.102
	(0.266)	(0.277)	(0.479)	(0.359)	(0.343)	(0.298)	(0.294)	(0.283)	(0.300)
Region									
North	0.048	-0.173	-0.385	-0.559***	-0.258	-0.218	0.282*	-0.235	-0.398***
	(0.128)	(0.144)	(0.255)	(0.186)	(0.160)	(0.141)	(0.171)	(0.159)	(0.137)
West	0.267**	-0.240*	0.147	-0.065	0.066	0.112	0.387**	0.040	-0.073
	(0.117)	(0.137)	(0.233)	(0.167)	(0.143)	(0.130)	(0.159)	(0.144)	(0.123)
Center	0.214**	-0.139	-0.233	-0.179	-0.029	-0.042	0.311**	-0.091	-0.148
	(0.107)	(0.128)	(0.219)	(0.159)	(0.133)	(0.120)	(0.149)	(0.136)	(0.111)
South	0.266**	-0.060	-0.332	-0.207	-0.019	0.132	0.577***	-0.015	-0.118
	(0.111)	(0.132)	(0.225)	(0.164)	(0.139)	(0.125)	(0.149)	(0.140)	(0.116)
East	0.088	-0.075	-0.020	-0.199	-0.045	-0.070	-0.065	-0.070	-0.257**
	(0.110)	(0.130)	(0.224)	(0.162)	(0.135)	(0.123)	(0.156)	(0.140)	(0.116)
Settlement type									
City <50k	-0.002	-0.030	-0.075	-0.227*	-0.146	-0.098	0.135	0.006	-0.006
	(0.101)	(0.107)	(0.184)	(0.135)	(0.116)	(0.106)	(0.125)	(0.122)	(0.106)
City 51-100k	0.232*	-0.107	0.534**	0.178	0.023	0.129	0.488***	0.243*	0.289**
	(0.122)	(0.130)	(0.230)	(0.172)	(0.143)	(0.133)	(0.150)	(0.144)	(0.127)
City 101-500k	0.030	0.224**	0.157	-0.220*	-0.168	-0.069	0.108	0.183	0.106
	(0.097)	(0.109)	(0.185)	(0.132)	(0.112)	(0.104)	(0.122)	(0.117)	(0.099)
City 500k+	0.107	0.141	0.042	-0.332**	-0.327***	-0.211*	0.107	0.213*	0.029
	(0.103)	(0.116)	(0.198)	(0.143)	(0.121)	(0.112)	(0.129)	(0.125)	(0.107)
Source of information									
TV	-0.104	0.209***	-0.688***	-0.517***	-0.370***	-0.220***	-0.127	-0.230***	-0.268***
	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.117)	(0.087)	(0.074)	(0.067)	(0.081)	(0.077)	(0.067)
online	0.221***	-0.329***	0.347***	0.511***	0.370***	0.362***	0.240***	0.336***	0.366***
	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.124)	(0.089)	(0.077)	(0.070)	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.070)
Soc. networks	0.298***	-0.216**	0.477***	0.600***	0.457***	0.504***	0.357***	0.375***	0.312***
	(0.092)	(0.098)	(0.161)	(0.124)	(0.104)	(0.099)	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.093)
Printed	0.134	-0.093	-0.045	0.153	0.091	0.047	0.021	0.133	0.029
	(0.129)	(0.163)	(0.240)	(0.184)	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.182)	(0.168)	(0.140)
Radio	-0.017	-0.102	0.080	0.202	0.018	0.149	0.042	0.281**	0.136
	(0.113)	(0.121)	(0.212)	(0.151)	(0.137)	(0.117)	(0.149)	(0.128)	(0.120)
Friends	0.141**	-0.110	0.332**	0.272***	0.138	0.250***	0.092	0.015	0.159**
	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.134)	(0.098)	(0.084)	(0.071)	(0.098)	(0.090)	(0.075)
Own experience	0.707*	-0.863**	1.283	1.400***	0.397	0.543	1.028*	0.636	0.318
	(0.396)	(0.429)	(0.920)	(0.540)	(0.504)	(0.480)	(0.599)	(0.427)	(0.459)
Freq. of information									
Once a day	-0.152*	-0.051	0.012	-0.124	-0.076	-0.033	-0.033	-0.270***	-0.115
	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.148)	(0.110)	(0.096)	(0.089)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.087)
Several times a week	-0.271**	0.272**	0.264	-0.144	-0.062	-0.083	0.107	-0.132	-0.184
	(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.228)	(0.171)	(0.153)	(0.147)	(0.168)	(0.156)	(0.151)
Once a week	-0.414*	0.534*	-0.006	-0.447*	-0.473*	-0.669***	-0.399	-0.574**	-0.462**
	(0.217)	(0.301)	(0.306)	(0.267)	(0.245)	(0.230)	(0.253)	(0.236)	(0.223)
Several times a month	-0.446	0.126	-0.254	-0.360	-0.779*	-0.743*	-0.458	-0.202	-0.814**
	(0.406)	(0.282)	(0.494)	(0.400)	(0.432)	(0.408)	(0.460)	(0.419)	(0.371)
Once a month or less	0.249	-0.572**	0.981**	0.509	0.173	0.127	0.077	0.037	0.130
	(0.284)	(0.269)	(0.463)	(0.350)	(0.336)	(0.288)	(0.369)	(0.351)	(0.308)
Knowledge about anti-corruption agencies									
NABU: know	0.232*	-0.219	-0.545**	0.072	0.487***	0.438***	0.452***	0.404**	0.424***
	(0.141)	(0.151)	(0.237)	(0.177)	(0.153)	(0.146)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.143)
NABU: heard	0.087	0.059	-0.341	-0.087	0.241*	0.116	0.059	0.093	-0.001
	(0.131)	(0.143)	(0.210)	(0.163)	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.135)
SAPO: know	-0.182*	0.084	0.575***	-0.211	-0.252**	-0.137	-0.138	-0.145	-0.287***
	(0.109)	(0.114)	(0.189)	(0.139)	(0.118)	(0.109)	(0.129)	(0.124)	(0.105)
SAPO: heard	-0.102	0.111	0.366***	-0.186*	-0.178**	-0.074	-0.147	-0.123	-0.144*
	(0.074)	(0.090)	(0.142)	(0.107)	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.081)

HACC: know	0.239**	0.026	-0.737***	-0.075	-0.080	0.010	-0.060	0.311**	0.312**
	(0.121)	(0.133)	(0.221)	(0.155)	(0.129)	(0.124)	(0.143)	(0.158)	(0.130)
HACC: heard	0.192*	-0.108	-0.559***	-0.134	-0.084	-0.088	0.030	0.184	0.262**
	(0.114)	(0.126)	(0.196)	(0.141)	(0.117)	(0.114)	(0.132)	(0.140)	(0.119)
NAPC: know	-0.122	0.027	0.225	0.117	-0.137	-0.106	-0.135	-0.149	-0.018
	(0.100)	(0.106)	(0.188)	(0.141)	(0.116)	(0.106)	(0.126)	(0.123)	(0.105)
NAPC: heard	-0.195**	0.172*	-0.081	-0.133	-0.358***	-0.219**	-0.251**	-0.225**	-0.172*
	(0.082)	(0.094)	(0.154)	(0.118)	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.089)
Freq. of interactions with government agencies									
Admin. service	-0.018	-0.018	0.026	0.058	0.021	-0.002	0.001	0.085**	0.001
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.030)
police	0.028	-0.037	0.066	0.073*	0.099**	0.082**	0.072*	0.111***	0.080**
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.034)
conscription	0.070**	-0.031	0.039	0.037	0.091***	0.052*	0.044	0.053	0.040
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.029)
Tax inspection	0.088**	-0.066**	0.083	0.109**	0.137***	0.143***	0.088**	0.179***	0.102***
	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.058)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.037)
Local gov.	-0.014	0.020	-0.001	-0.012	-0.011	-0.022	0.132***	0.044	-0.019
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.050)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.029)
Customs	0.173***	-0.076*	0.081	0.101*	0.092**	0.109**	0.074	0.059	0.073*
	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.067)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.043)
Education	0.020	-0.019	0.032	0.027	0.008	-0.005	-0.013	0.034	0.010
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Healthcare	-0.023	0.036	-0.006	-0.062*	-0.035	-0.047*	0.007	-0.027	-0.058**
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.025)
Courts	0.091**	-0.019	0.094	0.091*	0.035	0.090**	0.041	0.054	0.204***
	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.064)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.042)
Soc security	0.055*	-0.042	0.110**	0.100**	0.067**	0.084***	0.062*	0.038	0.082***
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.032)
Freq. of corruption in gov. interactions									
Admin. service	0.000	-0.001	0.004	0.001	-0.001	-0.002	0.000	0.003	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Police	0.005***	-0.008***	0.012***	0.007***	0.007***	0.006***	0.006***	0.008***	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Conscription	0.002*	-0.004***	0.006**	0.004**	0.005***	0.004***	-0.002	0.003	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Tax inspection	0.000	-0.002	0.003	0.004	0.004*	0.001	-0.003	0.007***	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Local gov.	0.003**	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.015***	0.002	0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
customs	0.002	-0.000	0.000	0.003	-0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
education	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
healthcare	0.005***	-0.008***	0.003*	0.005***	0.007***	0.006***	0.007***	0.007***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
courts	-0.003*	0.002	0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001	-0.003	0.001	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Soc. security	-0.001	0.005**	0.001	-0.001	-0.004	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	7,324	7,324	5,587	6,052	6,358	6,648	6,574	6,421	6,761
R-squared	0.079	0.076	0.063	0.087	0.109	0.113	0.085	0.113	0.147

(continued on the next page)

	customs	education	healthcare	Social security	police	prosecution	conscription	Admin. service	Central bank
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
male	0.078	0.005	-0.299***	0.072	-0.253***	-0.150**	-0.088	0.034	-0.292***
	(0.071)	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.096)	(0.083)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.099)	(0.104)
age	0.122***	0.040**	0.111***	0.039**	0.054***	0.100***	0.086***	0.023	0.086***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)
age^2/100	-0.106***	-0.038**	-0.105***	-0.039**	-0.049***	-0.088***	-0.084***	-0.024	-0.088***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)
# children	-0.035	-0.005	-0.002	0.068	0.079*	0.003	0.005	0.085*	0.170***
	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.053)
Marital status									
married	0.189*	-0.021	0.042	0.010	0.097	0.035	0.133	-0.269**	-0.255*
	(0.102)	(0.117)	(0.111)	(0.127)	(0.112)	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.137)	(0.138)
divorced	-0.059	-0.000	0.013	0.088	-0.051	-0.071	-0.009	0.089	-0.118
	(0.135)	(0.157)	(0.151)	(0.171)	(0.153)	(0.131)	(0.136)	(0.182)	(0.198)
widowed	0.134	0.007	0.033	-0.026	-0.257	-0.284	-0.020	-0.375	-0.424
	(0.175)	(0.236)	(0.213)	(0.262)	(0.250)	(0.198)	(0.209)	(0.279)	(0.305)
Employment status and sector									
employee	0.187**	-0.016	0.077	0.077	0.025	0.090	0.190**	-0.044	0.089
	(0.081)	(0.098)	(0.090)	(0.105)	(0.096)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.111)	(0.117)
Self-employed	0.164	-0.071	-0.065	0.015	-0.012	0.043	0.149	0.013	-0.061
	(0.102)	(0.130)	(0.121)	(0.149)	(0.125)	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.155)	(0.164)
Public servant	0.009	-0.242	0.107	0.021	0.059	-0.000	-0.004	0.260	0.139
	(0.177)	(0.183)	(0.201)	(0.236)	(0.179)	(0.168)	(0.164)	(0.252)	(0.211)
Public sector	0.004	-0.191	-0.047	-0.112	-0.171	-0.006	-0.078	0.020	-0.070
	(0.094)	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.137)	(0.117)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.144)	(0.151)
NGO	0.019	0.330**	0.223*	0.218	0.085	0.049	-0.026	0.235	0.407**
	(0.116)	(0.137)	(0.130)	(0.153)	(0.140)	(0.127)	(0.131)	(0.167)	(0.168)
army	-0.168	0.347	0.618*	0.140	-0.153	0.083	-0.441	0.667*	0.336
	(0.315)	(0.356)	(0.330)	(0.326)	(0.339)	(0.320)	(0.285)	(0.400)	(0.390)
Region									
North	0.026	-0.123	-0.010	-0.261	0.004	-0.345**	-0.060	-0.014	-0.337*
	(0.135)	(0.171)	(0.157)	(0.185)	(0.165)	(0.147)	(0.145)	(0.196)	(0.205)
West	0.245**	0.088	0.243*	-0.267	0.037	-0.013	0.364***	-0.068	-0.245
	(0.122)	(0.154)	(0.146)	(0.171)	(0.155)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.182)	(0.186)
Center	-0.068	-0.008	0.212	-0.312**	0.069	-0.140	0.035	-0.003	-0.111
	(0.115)	(0.145)	(0.134)	(0.159)	(0.143)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.168)	(0.174)
South	0.047	-0.056	0.074	-0.144	0.231	0.026	0.222*	0.110	0.059
	(0.117)	(0.149)	(0.138)	(0.161)	(0.147)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.172)	(0.180)
East	-0.135	-0.062	-0.107	-0.531***	0.047	-0.169	0.000	-0.401**	-0.199
	(0.119)	(0.149)	(0.141)	(0.162)	(0.144)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.170)	(0.178)
Settlement type									
City <50k	0.094	-0.229*	0.060	-0.256*	-0.123	-0.046	-0.031	-0.273*	-0.195
	(0.106)	(0.127)	(0.118)	(0.143)	(0.124)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.149)	(0.159)
City 51-100k	0.373***	0.508***	0.471***	0.417**	0.301**	0.218	0.227*	0.396**	0.502**
	(0.123)	(0.161)	(0.151)	(0.169)	(0.150)	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.188)	(0.202)
City 101-500k	0.192*	0.339***	0.046	0.106	-0.411***	0.002	0.017	-0.269*	0.212
	(0.103)	(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.137)	(0.122)	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.145)	(0.154)
City 500k+	0.219**	0.295**	0.019	0.068	-0.511***	0.009	0.045	-0.410***	0.375**
	(0.107)	(0.131)	(0.121)	(0.146)	(0.130)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.158)	(0.165)
Source of information									
TV	-0.330***	-0.123	-0.143*	-0.145	-0.219***	-0.244***	-0.115*	0.058	-0.386***
	(0.067)	(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.090)	(0.079)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.093)	(0.098)
online	0.362***	0.045	0.214***	0.058	0.067	0.310***	0.239***	-0.119	0.121
	(0.070)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.096)	(0.084)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.100)	(0.105)
Soc. networks	0.337***	0.184	0.295***	0.285**	0.385***	0.352***	0.336***	0.287**	0.466***
	(0.088)	(0.114)	(0.108)	(0.122)	(0.116)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.125)	(0.133)
Printed	-0.134	0.022	-0.006	0.235	-0.038	-0.009	-0.063	0.217	0.141
	(0.150)	(0.179)	(0.162)	(0.203)	(0.186)	(0.151)	(0.157)	(0.216)	(0.227)
Radio	0.201	0.013	-0.025	0.061	0.190	0.199	0.068	-0.042	-0.088
	(0.123)	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.157)	(0.145)	(0.127)	(0.125)	(0.170)	(0.169)
Friends	0.084	0.021	0.002	0.098	0.107	0.144*	0.094	0.157	0.180
	(0.075)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.105)	(0.088)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.106)	(0.114)
Own experience	0.424	-0.047	0.493	0.594	0.248	-0.007	0.447	1.824***	0.669
	(0.516)	(0.694)	(0.537)	(0.589)	(0.601)	(0.693)	(0.465)	(0.634)	(0.664)
Freq. of information									
Once a day	-0.268***	0.015	-0.011	-0.109	-0.204**	-0.126	-0.229**	-0.026	0.108
	(0.092)	(0.106)	(0.096)	(0.116)	(0.104)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.125)	(0.131)
Several times a week	-0.331**	0.112	-0.102	-0.041	-0.190	-0.139	-0.255	0.108	0.373*
	(0.150)	(0.166)	(0.172)	(0.186)	(0.165)	(0.153)	(0.161)	(0.187)	(0.207)
Once a week	-0.910***	-0.118	-0.465*	-0.052	-0.590**	-0.577**	-0.495**	0.168	-0.147
	(0.208)	(0.235)	(0.248)	(0.268)	(0.253)	(0.225)	(0.222)	(0.256)	(0.271)
Several times a month	-0.581	0.052	-0.585	-0.269	-0.424	-0.282	-0.027	0.443	0.545
	(0.376)	(0.417)	(0.442)	(0.413)	(0.416)	(0.369)	(0.357)	(0.395)	(0.467)
Once a month or less	0.002	0.963**	0.527	1.014***	0.623**	0.073	0.158	0.834**	0.979**
	(0.343)	(0.384)	(0.342)	(0.377)	(0.312)	(0.327)	(0.298)	(0.400)	(0.401)
Knowledge about anticorruption agencies									
NABU: know	0.346**	0.202	0.262	-0.040	0.205	0.419***	0.461***	-0.096	0.407*
	(0.147)	(0.175)	(0.162)	(0.199)	(0.171)	(0.148)	(0.151)	(0.194)	(0.211)
NABU: heard	-0.037	0.064	0.111	-0.001	0.202	0.060	0.253*	-0.104	0.238
	(0.141)	(0.161)	(0.149)	(0.180)	(0.158)	(0.141)	(0.145)	(0.171)	(0.194)
SAPO: know	-0.113	0.142	-0.078	-0.061	-0.116	-0.444***	-0.368***	-0.034	-0.005
	(0.104)	(0.133)	(0.126)	(0.148)	(0.127)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.154)	(0.167)
SAPO: heard	-0.056	-0.042	-0.121	-0.053	-0.074	-0.220***	-0.181**	-0.004	-0.013
	(0.082)	(0.101)	(0.094)	(0.111)	(0.098)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.116)	(0.128)
HACC: know	0.246*	0.035	0.032	0.061	-0.019	0.129	0.192	0.087	-0.096
	(0.133)	(0.150)	(0.148)	(0.184)	(0.148)	(0.133)	(0.129)	(0.182)	(0.180)

HACC: heard	0.091	0.134	0.140	0.119	-0.010	0.100	0.008	0.120	-0.074
	(0.123)	(0.132)	(0.134)	(0.160)	(0.138)	(0.125)	(0.122)	(0.156)	(0.165)
NAPC: know	-0.088	-0.260**	-0.197	-0.058	-0.088	0.098	-0.076	-0.298*	-0.199
	(0.108)	(0.127)	(0.123)	(0.145)	(0.124)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.154)	(0.164)
NAPC: heard	-0.134	-0.286***	-0.170*	-0.107	-0.232**	-0.167*	-0.134	-0.071	-0.209
	(0.092)	(0.106)	(0.099)	(0.119)	(0.105)	(0.095)	(0.091)	(0.126)	(0.136)
Freq. of interactions with government agencies									
Admin. service	0.028	0.033	0.070**	0.099**	0.056	0.028	0.011	0.225***	0.036
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.043)
police	0.109***	0.010	0.058	0.047	0.127***	0.124***	0.038	-0.043	0.097*
	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.052)
conscription	0.057**	0.047	0.054*	0.062*	0.064*	0.085***	0.134***	0.029	0.053
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.040)
Tax inspection	0.103***	0.049	0.087**	0.043	0.133***	0.099**	0.177***	0.030	0.118**
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Local gov.	-0.007	0.009	-0.022	0.003	-0.028	0.010	-0.030	0.056	0.010
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.043)
Customs	0.169***	-0.001	0.117**	-0.026	0.082	0.085*	0.180***	0.027	0.112*
	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.057)
Education	0.002	0.178***	0.085***	0.099***	0.051**	0.022	-0.001	0.096***	0.035
	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.031)
Healthcare	-0.059**	0.046	0.067**	-0.017	-0.032	-0.044*	-0.044*	0.067*	0.040
	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Courts	0.082**	-0.006	-0.066	-0.018	-0.019	0.094**	0.034	0.037	0.021
	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Soc security	0.054*	0.089**	0.054	0.172***	0.112***	0.079**	0.055*	0.073*	0.087**
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Freq. of corruption in gov. interactions									
Admin. service	-0.000	0.004*	0.002	0.008***	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.019***	0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Police	0.006***	0.000	0.003*	0.005**	0.015***	0.005***	0.006***	0.002	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Conscription	0.003**	0.002	0.002	0.004*	0.004**	0.002	0.009***	0.004*	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Tax inspection	0.003**	-0.004*	-0.003	-0.001	0.004*	0.003	0.003*	-0.002	0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Local gov.	0.000	0.002	-0.000	0.004	0.004**	0.004**	0.001	0.003	0.007***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
customs	0.004**	-0.004*	-0.001	-0.004	-0.003	-0.001	0.003*	-0.004	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
education	0.001	0.019***	0.004***	0.003	0.001	0.000	-0.001	0.004**	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
healthcare	0.007***	0.009***	0.020***	0.005***	0.005***	0.006***	0.006***	0.003**	0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
courts	-0.002	-0.004*	-0.002	-0.002	-0.005**	0.002	-0.003*	0.001	-0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Soc. security	-0.005**	0.003	0.002	0.014***	0.003	-0.001	-0.003	0.009***	0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	6,578	6,702	6,827	6,263	6,638	6,529	6,706	6,199	5,454
R-squared	0.177	0.104	0.141	0.070	0.077	0.120	0.108	0.088	0.079

Notes: The table reports results for OLS regressions where the dependent variable is indicated in the column headers. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level.

Appendix Table 7. Statistics on prosecution of corruption.

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
registered criminal deeds related to corruption	6406	8857	9163	9492	8305	8689	5612	7456	8014	9234
suspicion notices served to persons	1408	1819	2413	2102	2064	2327	1990	3269	3316	3855
accusation sent to courts	1137	1409	1989	1760	1691	1822	1528	2633	2606	2956
number of people convicted in criminal cases by local courts	730	746	1265	1295	1177	1371	1370	1837	2757	3272
sentenced	584	561	643	810	848	1125	1107	1498	2135	2561
acquitted	41	37	23	20	37	30	29	29	47	51
case closed	105	148	599	465	291	216	234	310	575	660
number of people convicted by higher AC court*, of them				1	11	37	48	86	98	147
sentenced				1	6	26	30	60	79	133
acquitted						2	7	3	3	3
case closed					5	8	11	23	16	11
number of administrative cases related to corruption that came to courts			9833	10519	7987	9510	2745	2871	5661	8769
number of administrative cases related to corruption considered by courts			7973	9688	7113	8929	2482	1909	4618	7747
administrative punishment (cases)			4064	4682	4582	5883	1354	937	3577	6318
number of people with administrative punishment			4136	4871	4631	5993	1369	944	3771	6736
cases closed			3909	5006	2531	3046	1128	972	1041	1429

Source: NACP, https://dap.nazk.gov.ua/kpi/3/ . *HACC started operations in the fall of 2019.