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Flexibility and Social Protection in the Gig Economy: Experimental Evidence on Work Location and Scheduling

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Abstract

Debates about gig work often frame flexibility and social protection as substitutes. This paper shows that gig workers value different forms of flexibility in distinct ways and may simultaneously demand greater social protection. Using survey-based discrete-choice experiments among digital freelancers in Malaysia, with workers in standard employment included as a benchmark, we compare preferences over two forms of autonomy: work location and work scheduling, while holding total weekly hours constant. Four findings emerge. First, gig workers display a strong preference for spatial autonomy and are significantly more willing to pay for work-from-home arrangements. Second, preferences over scheduling autonomy are more heterogeneous, with many respondents, including freelancers, preferring fixed work schedules. Third, the willingness to pay for long-horizon protection in the form of retirement savings is positively associated with both spatial and scheduling autonomy. Fourth, the willingness to pay for unemployment insurance is positively associated only with preferences for work-location flexibility. Gig workers associate remote work, but not flexible hours, with greater employment uncertainty and therefore demand stronger protection against unemployment risks. Flexibility and protection therefore appear complementary rather than substitutes in the gig economy.

JEL classification

J31, J22, J41, J65, D81

Keywords

gig economy, flexible work arrangements, work-from-home, work scheduling, job amenities, social insurance, labor market risk, discrete choice experiments

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1. Introduction

The rapid expansion of gig work has intensified debates about whether workers face a trade-off between flexibility and social protection. A common interpretation in both compensating differentials models and the emerging literature on alternative work arrangements is that workers who select flexible jobs reveal a preference for autonomy that substitutes for institutional protections such as social insurance. Standard models of job amenities predict that workers may trade wages or benefits for nonpecuniary attributes including flexibility and control over work conditions (Rosen, 1986; Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009). Consistent with this view, empirical studies of gig and platform work often emphasize that workers value flexible schedules despite weaker access to employer-provided benefits (Hall and Krueger, 2018; Katz and Krueger, 2019; Abraham et al., 2019). Policy debates have therefore framed flexibility and protection as opposing poles of labor market design. However, existing evidence rarely distinguishes between different dimensions of autonomy or examines whether workers who select certain forms of flexibility simultaneously demand mechanisms that mitigate perceived income risk.

Yet flexibility is rarely a single attribute: autonomy over *where* work occurs may carry different implications from autonomy over *when* work is performed. However, empirical evidence rarely separates these dimensions or examines how they relate to workers' willingness to insure against income risk.

This paper develops a multidimensional conception of flexibility by separating autonomy over work location from autonomy over work scheduling. Because total weekly hours are held fixed, any differences in preferences must arise from how these forms of flexibility reshape workers' exposure to uncertainty rather than labor supply. Spatial autonomy can modify monitoring intensity, the possibility and frequency of informal communication with coworkers, and visibility to supervisors, potentially affecting perceived job stability and career progression even when work hours remain unchanged (Bloom et al., 2015; Gibbs, Mengel, and Siemroth, 2021; Mas and Pallais, 2017). Scheduling autonomy, in contrast, primarily changes the timing of effort while preserving organizational context, and is therefore more closely linked to work–life balance and routine than to income risk (Golden, 2012; Mas and Pallais, 2017). If social insurance buffers workers against employment-related uncertainty, this distinction generates a testable hypothesis: a preference for spatial (but not necessarily scheduling) autonomy should be more strongly associated with a willingness to pay for social insurance.

To test this idea, we implement two parallel discrete-choice experiments among freelancers and workers in standard employment. In both experiments total weekly hours are held constant at 40, isolating preferences over autonomy rather than labor supply. The first experiment varies work location while introducing wage trade-offs, allowing us to estimate the economic value of spatial flexibility. The second experiment varies control over work schedules under comparable wage trade-offs, permitting a direct comparison between spatial and temporal flexibility. Yet

another experimental module elicits willingness to pay for retirement savings and unemployment insurance under otherwise identical job characteristics.

Four results emerge. First, freelancers attach a large and economically meaningful premium for spatial flexibility, accepting substantial earnings reductions to work remotely (from home). Second, differences in preferences for schedule flexibility are small and statistically imprecise, indicating that flexibility is not a single latent trait. Third, the willingness to contribute to retirement savings (a form of long-term protection) is positively related to preferences for both work-location and scheduling autonomy. Finally, the willingness to pay for unemployment insurance is positively related only to preferences for work-location flexibility, not to a preference for schedule flexibility. Taken together, the results indicate that flexibility does not substitute for protection; workers who prefer home-based work are also more willing to contribute to social insurance in the form of retirement savings and unemployment insurance. This is consistent with the idea that spatial autonomy is associated with greater concern about job stability and career progression, against which unemployment insurance can provide a buffer. In contrast, schedule flexibility (when there is certainty in the hours and conditions of work) primarily reflects individual preferences for daily routines rather than concerns about employment uncertainty, and is therefore not strongly associated with a greater willingness to pay for unemployment insurance. In sum, flexibility and protection are not substitutes, but can meaningfully complement each other, including (especially) in the gig economy setting.

The paper contributes to the literature on job amenities and labor market preferences by demonstrating that flexibility is multidimensional and linked to perceived risk exposure. By experimentally holding hours constant while varying autonomy, we show that the complementarity between flexibility and insurance arises primarily in relation to spatial and not scheduling autonomy. This reframes debates about gig work away from a simple flexibility-security trade-off towards a richer understanding of how workers may jointly demand some forms of flexibility and protection.

The results also speak to ongoing debates about the expansion of non-standard employment, particularly through gig work and digital labor platforms. Existing evidence from advanced economies often frames flexible arrangements as trading autonomy for stability, reflecting concerns about declining worker protections (Berger et al., 2019). However, in many developing-country contexts where informal employment is pervasive, gig work may not represent a shift toward greater precarity but rather an alternative form of flexible labor market participation (Ghorpade et al., 2024). This distinction suggests that workers' valuation of flexible work arrangements and their relationship to social insurance coverage may differ substantially across institutional settings. While recent studies document heterogeneous valuation of alternative work arrangements in countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, and Denmark (Mas and Pallais, 2020; Chen et al., 2019; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018; Angelici and Profeta, 2020; Eriksson and Kristensen, 2014), little is known about how such preferences differ between gig and standard workers in developing economies, or indeed how they relate to willingness to pay for social

insurance. The experimental evidence presented here addresses this gap by isolating preferences over spatial and scheduling autonomy under otherwise comparable labor supply conditions.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data collected for the survey and experiment used in this paper. Section 3 presents the methodology including the experimental design. Section 4 presents results including (a) descriptive statistics, (b) T-Test results for assessing the randomized allocation of attributes in job descriptions, (c) econometric analysis, and (d) correlates and likely mechanisms of the preference for flexible work arrangements. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of results and their implications for policy.

2. Data

Our sample consists of 1,338 respondents of which 1,038 were freelancers and gig economy workers (subsequently referred to collectively as 'freelancers'), and 300 were workers in standard employment. The data was collected through an online survey administered by a private survey firm, Ipsos. We partnered with the Malaysia Digital Economy Corporation (MDEC) to tap into their network of digital freelancers via their Global Online Work Force (GLOW)[3] members (resulting in 738 respondents), as well as an online panel of (300) gig workers and (300) workers in standard employment. The data collection period lasted between February and May 2022.

The online survey questionnaire was divided into four parts: (i) respondents' demographic background, which asks details on age, gender, schooling and marital status; (ii) employment characteristics, which asks details on respondents' current employment such as their status in employment, occupation, duration of employment, weekly pay, and other occupations if they are working more than one job; (iii) an experimental section with sets of hypothetical job descriptions with randomly assigned attributes for the respondent to choose from; and lastly (iv) preferred work characteristics, which solicits respondents' valuations of alternative work characteristics. The online survey took about 15 minutes to complete on average and could be done on a mobile phone or a laptop/ desktop computer.

3. Methodology

We attempt to understand better the reasons underlying heterogeneity in workers' preferences for flexibility and draw lessons for management practices and wider employment policies. We deploy a vignette-based discrete choice experiment to ascertain whether workers in non-standard employment are willing to forgo defined percentages of their current incomes to have greater flexibility in the choice of the location of work (home v/s office) and the hours of work (fixed v/s determined by the worker/ employer). Discrete-choice experiments are widely used to elicit preferences for job attributes when direct observation of counterfactual job offers is infeasible (Mas and Pallais, 2017; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018). While such designs rely on stated preferences

[3] GLOW is a training program offered by MDEC for individuals interested in becoming digital freelancers. During COVID-19, MDEC created a new program called GLOW *Penjana*, a targeted program to help individuals affected by movement restrictions.

rather than realized choices, recent evidence suggests that experimentally elicited preferences for work arrangements can strongly predict subsequent real-world behavior; Lewandowski et al. (2026) show that workers' preferences for working from home revealed in a discrete-choice experiment predict their actual remote-work usage several years later.

We describe our experiment in Figures 1 and 2 below, that describe the characteristics of Job A, and four versions of Job B, each of which vary only in terms of flexibility (of the location of work in Fig. 1 and hours of work in Fig. 2), shown in row 3, and the associated income from such a job, shown in row 4. While each respondent sees the same description of Job A, s/he is shown one randomly assigned job description from B1-B4, and is asked to choose their preferred job.

Figure 1: Hypothetical Jobs offered to respondents: Location of Work (Job A versus one of Jobs B1 – B4)

	Standard	Most Flexible		More Flexible than standard	
	Job A	**Job B1**	**Job B2**	**Job B3**	**Job B4**
Hours worked per week	40 hours	40 hours	40 hours	40 hours	40 hours
Work Hours	Monday to Friday, 9 AM to 5 PM	Monday to Friday, 9 AM to 5 PM	Monday to Friday, 9 AM to 5 PM	Monday to Friday, 9 AM to 5 PM	Monday to Friday, 9 AM to 5 PM
Location of Work	Fixed Office	WFH 5d/ week	WFH 5d/ week	WFH 2d of your choice/ week	WFH 2d of your choice/ week
Monthly Take-Home Salary	Equal to your current take-home salary	**10% less** than your current take-home salary	**20% less** than your current take-home salary	**10% less** than your current take-home salary	**20% less** than your current take-home salary

Note: The respondent is shown Job A, and one of Jobs B1, B2, B3 and B4 (randomly assigned), and asked to choose their preferred job.

Figure 2: Hypothetical Jobs offered to respondent: Hours of Work (Job A versus one of Jobs B1 – B4)

	Standard	More Autonomy		Less Autonomy	
	Job A	**Job B1**	**Job B2**	**Job B3**	**Job B4**
Hours worked per week	40 hours	40 hours	40 hours	40 hours	40 hours
Work Hours	Monday to Friday, 9 AM to 5 PM	8 hours / day from Monday to Friday, you decide the work hours	8 hours /day from Monday to Friday, you decide the work hours	8 hours / day from Monday to Friday, client/ employer decides work hours	8 hours / day from Monday to Friday, client/ employer decides work hours
Location of Work	Fixed Office	Fixed Office	Fixed Office	Fixed Office	Fixed Office
Monthly Take-Home Salary	Equal to your current take-home salary	**10% less** than your current take-home salary	**20% less** than your current take-home salary	**10% more** than your current take-home salary	**20% more** than your current take-home salary

Note: The respondent is shown Job A, and one of Jobs B1, B2, B3 and B4 (randomly assigned), and asked to choose their preferred job between the two.

Identification

We seek to examine the effect of the combination of spatial and scheduling flexibility, and earnings on the likelihood of selecting the baseline job. Causal identification is determined by the randomized allocation of the description of job B (from B1 to B4) to respondents, i.e. the attributes of the social insurance package and the earnings offered in job B are orthogonal to respondents' observable and unobservable characteristics.

We estimate a Linear Probability Model (LPM) as depicted by the following equation

$$Prob(F) = \beta \Sigma B_{ij} + \epsilon_i$$

Equation 1

Where:

Prob (F) is the likelihood of the respondent *i* preferring Job B, allowing flexible work

B is the randomly allocated hypothetical job description for job B *j* from 1 to 4 to individual *i*

ϵ *is the error term*

We further analyze the correlates of the preference for a more flexible job description by estimating a Linear Probability Model with the following specification:

$$Prob(FLEX) = \alpha + \beta_1 \Sigma B_{ij} + \beta_2 J_i + \beta_3 P_i + \beta_4 X_i + \epsilon_i$$

Equation 2

Where:

Prob (FLEX) is the likelihood of the respondent *i* preferring the more flexible job option between the two choices presented, implying also a certain percentage cut in earnings compared to the less flexible option

B is again the randomly allocated hypothetical job description *j* from 1 to 4 to individual *i*

J is the matrix of self-reported characteristics of individual *i*'s current job

P is the matrix of individual *i*'s valuations of alternate job characteristics

X is the matrix of individual (demographic and economic) characteristics

ϵ *is the error term*

4. Results

This section presents empirical results in three steps. We begin by briefly validating our experimental design and sample characteristics. We then examine workers' valuation of spatial autonomy through the work-location experiment, followed by a parallel analysis of temporal autonomy through the scheduling experiment. Finally, we test whether willingness to pay for social insurance varies systematically across these dimensions of flexibility, consistent with the proposed link between spatial autonomy and perceived employment uncertainty discussed in Section 1.

4.1. Experimental Validation and Sample Overview

Table A1 in the Annex presents descriptive statistics for the main sample, including demographic characteristics, employment status, and baseline preferences over work arrangements. Freelancers and workers in standard employment differ along several observable dimensions, reinforcing the importance of distinguishing between these groups when interpreting flexibility choices. To ensure internal validity, we verify that experimental attributes were randomly assigned across respondents. Mean comparison tests reported in Annex Table A2 confirm that respondent baseline characteristics are balanced across the treatment arms, ruling out systematic differences in sample composition. These checks support the interpretation that observed differences in choices reflect preferences over experimental attributes rather than systematic differences in job descriptions. We now turn to the main analysis of flexibility preferences.

To provide additional context for the experimental results, Figure 3 reports respondents' assessments of the importance of different job attributes and the extent to which their current work provides these characteristics. Panel (a) shows that freelancers and workers in standard employment rank core attributes such as earning opportunities and skill utilization as highly important, with relatively small differences across employment types. However, Panel (b) reveals notable differences in reported access to these attributes. Freelancers report fewer opportunities for stable earnings, collaboration with colleagues, and participation in international teams, while reporting greater flexibility in their work arrangements. Although workers share similar preferences over core job attributes, freelancers may experience work environments that differ in ways plausibly linked to channels that can shape how spatial autonomy interacts with perceived employment risk, namely the extent of monitoring, coworker interaction, and career visibility.

Figure 3. Work Characteristics in Freelance and Standard jobs

a. Work Characteristics Deemed "Very Important"



b. Current Job Adequately Provides Opportunities for…

4.2 Spatial Autonomy: Valuation of Work Location

We first examine preferences over spatial autonomy, defined as the ability to perform work from home rather than from an office setting. Theory and emerging empirical evidence suggest that spatial autonomy may alter exposure to monitoring environments, patterns of collaboration, and visibility to supervisors, potentially shaping perceptions of employment stability and career progression (Bloom et al., 2015; Mas and Pallais, 2017; Gibbs, Mengel, and Siemroth, 2021). If workers view remote work as affecting these domains, we should observe strong willingness to accept wage trade-offs for location flexibility.

Table 4 presents regression estimates of the probability of choosing a home-based arrangement under varying wage penalties and employment conditions. Freelancers exhibit a substantially higher likelihood of selecting work-from-home options relative to workers in standard employment. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the earnings penalty (column 5) confirms that respondents trade off wages against spatial autonomy, implying a measurable economic valuation of remote work. The estimated coefficient on the earnings penalty is −0.0083, implying that a one-percentage-point increase in the wage penalty reduces the probability of choosing a work-from-home arrangement by approximately 0.83 percentage points.

Table 4 Likelihood of Choosing to work from Home (v/s working from office 5 days/ week)

	All	Freelancer	Standard Worker	Wage-equivalent Benchmark
WFH 5d/week, 10% lower earnings	0.619***	0.652***	0.493***	
	(0.0267)	(0.0294)	(0.0606)	
WFH 5d/week, 20% lower earnings	0.527***	0.572***	0.380***	
	(0.0273)	(0.0309)	(0.0550)	
WFH 2d/week, 10% lower earnings	0.617***	0.686***	0.382***	
	(0.0265)	(0.0288)	(0.0561)	
WFH 2d/week, 20% lower earnings	0.536***	0.574***	0.408***	
	(0.0274)	(0.0310)	(0.0568)	
Freelancer =1				0.206***
				(0.0322)
Earnings penalty (pp)				-0.00832**
				(0.00266)
WFH 5 days/week				-0.00522
				(0.0266)
Constant				0.542***
				(0.0510)
N	1338	1038	300	1338

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Dep Var = 1 if Job B preferred to Job A, else 0. Job A implies working from an office 5 days/week and earnings equal to respondents' current income

Predicted probabilities from the benchmark specification indicate that freelancers remain more likely to choose remote arrangements even as wage penalties increase, suggesting that spatial autonomy carries substantial utility beyond earnings considerations. Wage-equivalent calculations imply that the freelancer premium for location flexibility is economically meaningful, reinforcing the interpretation that remote work represents a valued job amenity rather than a marginal preference.

The econometric results indicate that respondents respond meaningfully to wage trade-offs, and that location flexibility remains a highly valued job amenity. A one percentage-point increase in earnings penalties reduces the probability of choosing work-from-home arrangements by approximately 0.83 percentage points, confirming that workers do take wage reductions into account when making job choices (column 5). At the same time, freelancers exhibit a substantially higher baseline propensity to select flexible work arrangements. Holding wage penalties

constant, freelancers are about 20.6 percentage points more likely to choose the WFH option than workers in standard employment.

Scaling the freelancer premium by the estimated wage slope yields an intuitive wage-equivalent interpretation. The freelancer–non-freelancer gap in flexibility preference is comparable in magnitude to the effect of increasing earnings penalties by roughly 25 percentage points. The difference in work-from-home choices between freelancers and standard workers is as large as the effect of a roughly 25 percentage-point increase in earnings penalties; freelancers would require substantially high wage incentives to forgo flexible work arrangements. In practical terms, this implies that occupational status exerts a stronger influence on flexibility choices than moderate wage changes within the experimental range. These findings reinforce the interpretation that location flexibility is valued as a distinct job amenity rather than merely as a compensating differential tied to income trade-offs. Consistent with the mechanisms explored in the following section, the results suggest that workers who select into flexible work arrangements do not do so because they are indifferent to wages or risk, but because they place a high intrinsic value on autonomy over work location.

4.3 Temporal Autonomy: Valuation of Work Scheduling

We next examine preferences over the timing of work hours while holding total weekly hours constant at 40. Unlike spatial autonomy, schedule flexibility primarily alters the timing of work effort while leaving the broader organizational environment largely unchanged and is therefore often associated with work-life balance and convenience rather than changes in monitoring or collaboration structures (Mas and Pallais, 2017; Golden, 2012; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018; Baltes et al., 1999). Consistent with this interpretation, a review of the working-time literature by Golden (2012) finds that worker discretion over schedules is generally associated with higher job satisfaction, lower absenteeism, and improved retention. These findings suggest that schedule autonomy is often welfare-enhancing rather than closely tied to monitoring or career-risk channels (see also Ortega, 2009; Lee and DeVoe, 2012). If this interpretation is correct, we should observe little systematic difference between freelancers and standard employees in their valuation of scheduling flexibility. If, however, flexibility reflects a single underlying preference for autonomy, patterns observed in the work-location experiment should replicate in this setting.

Table 5 below examines the preference for working a fixed work schedules (from 9 AM to 5 PM from Monday to Friday) when offered alternate options of the work hours chosen[4] either by the worker (Jobs B1 and B2) or by their client/ employer (B3 and B4). Options B1 and B2 imply greater autonomy for a worker and therefore include a 10 and 20 percent decrease in earnings, respectively. As options B3 and B4 involve a loss of autonomy for the worker, they include a 10 and 20 percent *increase* in earnings.

[4] For the same total number of hours worked in a day (8) and week (40).

Table 5. Likelihood of choosing more flexible work hours, by treatment arms

	All	Freelancer	Standard Worker	Wage-equivalent Benchmark
You decide work hours, 10% lower earnings	0.446***	0.436***	0.479***	
	(0.0273)	(0.0309)	(0.0589)	
You decide work hours, 20% lower earnings	0.439***	0.435***	0.453***	
	(0.0271)	(0.0307)	(0.0579)	
Employer decides work hours, 10% higher earnings	0.455***	0.464***	0.418***	
	(0.0273)	(0.0306)	(0.0607)	
Employer decides work hours, 20% higher earnings	0.507***	0.532***	0.435***	
	(0.0274)	(0.0316)	(0.0541)	
Freelancer =1				0.0210
				(0.0327)
Signed wage change (pp)				-0.00300
				(0.00273)
Scheduling autonomy				0.0512
				(0.0863)
Constant				0.420***
				(0.0524)
N	1338	1038	300	1338

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Flexible work described as the choice of job B when presented B1 or B2 (implying worker chooses work hours) and the choice of Job A when presented B3 or B4 (implying client employer choose workhours); job A has a fixed work schedule of 9 AM to 5 PM Monday – Friday.

In contrast to the strong freelancer premium observed for spatial autonomy, differences between freelancers and standard workers in the probability of selecting flexible schedules are small and statistically imprecise. Although respondents respond to wage incentives with higher earnings premiums associated with lower selection of flexible hours, the magnitude of wage sensitivity is modest relative to the work-location experiment.

The results of the worker control over scheduling experiment in Table 5 point to substantial heterogeneity in preferences over work schedules and suggest that flexibility is not uniformly valued across workers. Across treatment arms, approximately 44–51 percent of respondents choose flexible schedules, indicating that a large share of both freelancers and standard workers

continue to value regularity in work hours. In contrast to the work-location experiment, differences between employment groups are limited: while freelancers appear slightly more inclined toward flexible hours in some treatment arms, the pooled regression (column 5) shows no statistically significant freelancer premium once wage changes and autonomy attributes are taken into account. This contrasts with the work-location experiment, where freelancers exhibit a large and statistically significant preference for spatial autonomy. Further, wage trade-offs are economically meaningful in the work-location experiment but weak and imprecisely estimated in the scheduling experiment.

These patterns imply that many workers prioritize predictable routines even when offered greater control over scheduling or modest wage premiums. Rather than indicating a strong aversion among standard employees to employer-determined schedules, the evidence suggests that both freelancers and standard workers attach meaningful value to the stability of fixed hours. Taken together with the earlier results on work location, the findings underscore that flexibility is multi-dimensional: freelancers exhibit a strong and economically meaningful preference for spatial autonomy, whereas preferences for temporal autonomy are more evenly distributed and less tightly linked to employment status. Regularity in work hours therefore emerges as a valued job attribute for its own sake, rather than simply the absence of flexibility. In sum, Tables 4 and 5 provide evidence that spatial and temporal autonomy capture distinct dimensions of job choice, motivating an examination of the mechanisms underlying these differences.

Overall, the evidence suggests that workers differentiate sharply across dimensions of flexibility. Spatial autonomy commands large economic value and strongly differentiates freelancers from standard employees, whereas temporal autonomy appears more evenly valued and often secondary to schedule regularity. The contrast between Tables 4 and 5 therefore challenges the notion that freelancers simply prefer "more flexibility," and instead points to a more nuanced pattern in which workers selectively value specific forms of autonomy while continuing to place substantial weight on predictable work routines.

4.4 Mechanisms: Flexibility and Willingness to Pay for Social Insurance

The multidimensional framework developed in Section 1 predicts that only forms of flexibility associated with greater perceived uncertainty should correlate with demand for social protection. To test this mechanism, we examine whether willingness to pay for retirement savings and unemployment insurance, elicited through a parallel experimental module assessing the willingness to pay for social insurance coverage is associated with flexibility choices across autonomy dimensions.

As the social insurance experiment has been analyzed extensively in another paper, we focus here only on its relationship with the flexibility choices studied in this paper. Table 6 reports regression estimates linking willingness to pay for insurance to the probability of selecting flexible work arrangements, controlling for demographic characteristics, treatment arms, and stated preference measures.

Table 6 Correlates of Work Location and Scheduling Flexibility preference

	Preference for Work Location Flexibility			Preference for Work Hour Flexibility		
	All	Freelancing	Standard Employment	All	Freelancing	Standard Employment
Willing to pay for Retirement Savings^	0.083***	0.088***	0.039	0.103***	0.119***	0.034
	[0.026]	[0.030]	[0.061]	[0.027]	[0.031]	[0.059]
Willing to pay for Unemployment Insurance^	0.230***	0.294***	0.078	-0.050	-0.050	-0.002
	[0.034]	[0.041]	[0.063]	[0.035]	[0.044]	[0.062]
Standard Employment	-0.102***	-	-	-0.048	-	-
	[0.039]			[0.040]		
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Stated preference Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Treatment Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income Level Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	0.575	0.621	0.413	0.462	0.466	0.447
N	1338	1038	300	1338	1038	300
R-squared	0.128	0.134	0.148	0.067	0.088	0.187

See Online appendix sections A2 and A3 for full regression output.

^Respondents' willingness to pay a share of their wages for retirement savings (5-10 percent) or unemployment insurance (1-2%) expressed in a separate experiment holding other work characteristics constant.

Table 6 reveals an important asymmetry in how flexibility preferences relate to demand for social protection. The willingness to pay for retirement savings (a form of long horizon protection) is positively associated with both work-location and work-hour flexibility, suggesting that workers who value autonomy may also place broader value on future-oriented forms of security. In contrast, the willingness to pay for unemployment insurance (short horizon protection) is positively associated only with work-location flexibility, particularly among freelancers, and shows no systematic relationship with preferences over work scheduling. This pattern is consistent with the interpretation that spatial autonomy may expose workers to greater uncertainty regarding monitoring environments, career visibility, and employment stability, whereas schedule flexibility primarily alters the timing of work effort without substantially changing the organizational context of work working from an office five days a week, for the same number of hours, with implied same potential opportunities for office-based skills acquisition and interaction with colleagues). As a result, spatial autonomy appears more closely linked to concerns about employment and career-related risk, while schedule flexibility is more closely associated with routine preferences and work–life balance.

Extended specifications reported in Annex Tables A2 and A3 indicate that the experimentally elicited preference for flexibility is consistent with stated preferences. Respondents who report valuing flexibility highly are more likely to choose both work-location and scheduling autonomy, while those who place greater importance on earning well are less likely to do so. Preferences for work-from-home arrangements are negatively associated with respondents' valuation of

opportunities for acquiring new skills. Workers who consider skill development an important feature of jobs are significantly less likely to choose home-based work arrangements. This pattern suggests that working from home may be perceived as limiting opportunities for learning, mentoring, and informal knowledge exchange that occur in shared workplaces. Such perceptions are consistent with recent evidence showing that remote work can reduce opportunities for collaboration, feedback, and skill accumulation (Bloom et al., 2015; Gibbs et al., 2021). Viewed together with the results in Table 6, these findings support the interpretation that spatial rather than scheduling autonomy may expose workers to greater short-horizon employment and career-related uncertainty, helping explain why demand for unemployment insurance is more strongly associated with preferences for work-location flexibility than with scheduling flexibility.

5. Discussion and Conclusions

This paper examines how workers value different dimensions of flexibility and whether these preferences substitute for or complement the demand for social insurance. Using a survey-based discrete-choice experiment among freelancers and workers in standard employment in Malaysia, we compare preferences over two forms of autonomy, work location and work scheduling, while holding total weekly hours constant. This design allows us to isolate preferences for flexibility from changes in labor supply and to assess whether workers associate different forms of autonomy with distinct domains of uncertainty.

Four main findings emerge. First, workers display a strong and economically meaningful preference for spatial autonomy. Freelancers are substantially more likely to choose work-from-home arrangements, even when doing so involves accepting lower earnings, indicating that the ability to determine where work is performed is a valued job attribute.

Second, preferences over temporal autonomy are relatively more heterogeneous. When flexibility is defined viz. scheduling of work during the day, rather than work location, differences between freelancers and standard workers largely disappear, and a sizeable share of respondents in both groups prefer fixed work schedules. This suggests that flexibility is not a single latent trait and that spatial and scheduling autonomy capture distinct dimensions of job choice.

Third, the relationship between flexibility and protection varies across different *types* of protection. The willingness to pay for retirement savings, a form of long-horizon protection, is positively associated with both work-location and work-hour flexibility. Workers who value autonomy therefore appear to also place broader value on future-oriented forms of economic security. Workers do not treat flexibility as a substitute for long-term protection, but simultaneously value and seek both.

Finally, scheduling flexibility may have limited implications for short-horizon unemployment or career risks. The absence of a relationship between scheduling autonomy and the willingness to pay for unemployment insurance likely reflects the fact that the scheduling experiment holds the organizational environment constant. Respondents continue to work the same total number of

hours and remain in the office, with only the timing of work varying. Unlike spatial autonomy, which may alter visibility to supervisors, opportunities for interaction with colleagues, and perceived career progression risks, scheduling flexibility primarily affects the timing of effort rather than the broader employment environment. As a result, workers who prefer scheduling autonomy do not appear to associate it with an increased likelihood of job loss and therefore show no greater demand for insurance against unemployment risk. Taken together, these results suggest that workers do not treat flexibility as a substitute for protection. Instead, flexibility and protection appear to operate as complementary mechanisms through which workers manage different forms of risk over the life cycle.

While the results are consistent with the interpretation that spatial autonomy alters workers' perceived employment and career risks, the data does not directly measure these mechanisms. The evidence presented here should therefore be interpreted as suggestive of the channels through which spatial flexibility may influence demand for social protection. Future research could examine these mechanisms more directly by measuring workers' perceptions of monitoring, career progression, or employment stability under different work arrangements.

These findings carry implications for labor market policy and management practices in an environment where flexible work arrangements are becoming increasingly common. Policy debate surrounding gig work have framed flexibility and protection as opposing poles of labor market design. Our results suggest a more nuanced interpretation: workers who value autonomy, particularly over work location, may simultaneously anticipate unemployment and long-term income security risks, *and* seek institutional protection to mitigate such risks. Social insurance schemes may therefore complement, rather than undermine, the appeal of flexible work.

For firms and clients, the results also highlight the heterogeneity of worker preferences. While many workers value spatial autonomy, a substantial share of both freelancers and standard employees prefer regular work schedules. Hybrid work arrangements that combine moderate location flexibility with predictable schedules may therefore align better with worker preferences compared to fully flexible or fully fixed arrangements. At the same time, the willingness of workers to accept wage trade-offs for the flexibility to work from home suggests scope for negotiated equilibria between earnings and autonomy that improve worker utility without necessarily increasing labor costs.

These findings also point to several directions for future research. First, while the analysis focuses on workers' preferences, understanding how employers and clients value different forms of flexibility remains essential for determining equilibrium work arrangements in labor markets where digital platforms and hybrid work models are increasingly common. Second, as the results highlight the importance of distinguishing between spatial and temporal autonomy, future work could explore how additional job attributes, such as task autonomy, contractual security, performance monitoring, and opportunities for skill development, interact with workers' preferences for flexibility and protection.

More broadly, the evidence presented here suggests that autonomy and protection need not be opposing pillars of labor market design but may instead operate as complementary mechanisms through which workers manage risk in increasingly flexible labor markets.

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Online Appendix

Table A1 Descriptive Statistics

	Freelancers		Standard Employment	
	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev
Age (years)	35.577	10.655	36.183	9.734
Female = 1	0.453	0.498	0.500	0.501
Single = 1	0.487	0.500	0.373	0.484
Has children = 1	0.382	0.486	0.560	0.497
Household size	4.122	1.907	4.090	1.698
Risk Appetite (1 - 10)	6.625	2.242	5.753	2.685
Time Preference Index (0-1)	0.499	0.500	0.377	0.485
Education Level				
Secondary Education	0.180	0.385	0.190	0.393
Postsecondary Education	0.250	0.433	0.213	0.410
Bachelor's degree	0.422	0.494	0.430	0.496
Professional Education	0.047	0.212	0.027	0.161
Master's Education	0.101	0.302	0.140	0.348
Ethnicity				
Bumiputera	0.750	0.433	0.673	0.470
Chinese	0.167	0.373	0.150	0.358
Indian	0.063	0.242	0.157	0.364
N	1,038		300	

Table A2(a): F test of joint significance of treatment arm means (H0: $\underline{X}$B1 = $\underline{X}$B2 = $\underline{X}$B3 = $\underline{X}$B4): Location of Work

	WFH everyday		WFH 2 days a week			
	10% lower earnings	20% lower earnings	10% lower earnings	20% lower earnings		
Variable	**Job B1**	**Job B2**	**Job B3**	**Job B4**	**F-stat**	**P-value**
Male	0.47	0.56	0.55	0.57	2.42*	0.064
Has Children	0.40	0.40	0.47	0.41	1.61	0.186
Single/ Unmarried	0.48	0.45	0.44	0.48	0.65	0.583
Age	35.22	35.84	35.82	35.96	0.34	0.799
Chinese	0.18	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.68	0.564
Indian	0.06	0.08	0.10	0.10	1.70	0.166
Bumiputera	0.75	0.75	0.73	0.70	0.74	0.527
EDU: up to secondary	0.20	0.16	0.22	0.16	2.12*	0.096
EDU: Post-secondary	0.23	0.21	0.25	0.28	1.70	0.165
EDU: Bachelor's	0.41	0.48	0.40	0.41	1.90	0.128
EDU: Professional	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.03	2.80**	0.039
EDU: Masters+	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.13	0.92	0.431
Low Income	0.29	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.44	0.722
Med Income	0.30	0.30	0.36	0.31	1.13	0.335
High Income	0.41	0.44	0.39	0.45	1.02	0.384
In Standard Employment	0.21	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.28	0.843
Time Preference Index	0.47	0.49	0.46	0.46	0.30	0.823
Risk Appetite (0-10)	6.30	6.54	6.47	6.40	0.59	0.621
N	333	336	337	332		

Table A2(b). F-test of joint significance of treatment arm means (H_0: $\underline{X}_{B1} = \underline{X}_{B2} = \underline{X}_{B3} = \underline{X}_{B4}$): Hours of Work

	Worker Decides Hours		Client/ Employer decides hours			
	10% lower earnings	20% lower earnings	10% higher earnings	20% higher earnings		
Variable	**Job B1**	**Job B2**	**Job B3**	**Job B4**	**F-stat**	**P-value**
Male	0.54	0.52	0.53	0.55	0.29	0.832
Has Children	0.41	0.41	0.44	0.42	0.26	0.851
Single/ Unmarried	0.44	0.46	0.47	0.48	0.28	0.841
Age	35.67	36.24	35.55	35.39	0.42	0.741
Ethnicity: Chinese	0.15	0.19	0.16	0.15	0.93	0.423
Ethnicity: Indian	0.09	0.10	0.05	0.10	2.54*	0.055
Ethnicity: Bumiputera	0.73	0.70	0.78	0.72	2.06	0.104
EDU: up to secondary	0.15	0.19	0.20	0.20	1.31	0.270
EDU: Post-secondary	0.26	0.22	0.25	0.23	0.64	0.589
EDU: Bachelor's	0.44	0.43	0.42	0.41	0.26	0.855
EDU: Professional	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.61	0.610
EDU: Masters+	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.36	0.781
Low Income	0.25	0.24	0.27	0.29	0.75	0.524
Med Income	0.32	0.34	0.30	0.31	0.48	0.698
High Income	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.40	0.19	0.902
In Standard Employment	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.03	0.992
Time Preference Index	0.50	0.49	0.44	0.45	1.25	0.290
Risk Appetite (0-10)	6.47	6.44	6.47	6.34	0.21	0.889
N	334	335	335	334		

For both sets of experiments (tables A2a and A2b), we find that the randomized allocation of hypothetical job descriptions to respondents is balanced, with only very few variables showing a moderate level of statistical significance between group means. Results are robust to the inclusion of these variables as controls.

Table A2. Full regression: Correlates of choice of Working from Home (v/s working from a fixed office for 5days/ week)

	(1) All	(2) Freelancers	(3) Standard Employment	(4) Female	(5) Male
Willing to pay for Retirement Savings^	0.083***	0.088***	0.039	0.099**	0.069*
	[0.026]	[0.030]	[0.061]	[0.040]	[0.037]
Willing to pay for Unemployment Insurance^	0.230***	0.294***	0.078	0.196***	0.251***
	[0.034]	[0.041]	[0.063]	[0.053]	[0.047]
Standard Employment	-0.102***	-	-	-0.115*	-0.090*
	[0.039]			[0.059]	[0.054]
Age	0.002	0.005	-0.027	-0.010	0.009
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.018]	[0.007]	[0.010]
Age-squared	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000**	-0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Female	-0.021	-0.047	0.026	-	-
	[0.036]	[0.040]	[0.091]		
Single	-0.091**	-0.054	-0.265***	-0.106*	-0.072
	[0.039]	[0.045]	[0.088]	[0.056]	[0.055]
Has children	-0.050	-0.042	-0.118	-0.060	-0.036
	[0.045]	[0.051]	[0.098]	[0.054]	[0.052]
Female*Has children	0.005	0.074	-0.117	-	-
	[0.053]	[0.059]	[0.122]		
HH Size	-0.003	-0.004	0.006	0.009	-0.010
	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.018]	[0.011]	[0.010]
GLOW Member	0.119***	0.109***	0.000	0.165***	0.076*
	[0.034]	[0.035]	[0.000]	[0.053]	[0.046]
Risk Appetite (0-10)	-0.000	-0.003	0.006	-0.002	-0.001
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.012]	[0.009]	[0.008]
Time Preference Index	0.019	0.008	0.077	0.012	0.037
	[0.026]	[0.029]	[0.061]	[0.039]	[0.036]
Edu: Up to Secondary	-0.062	-0.057	-0.022	-	0.009
	[0.069]	[0.061]	[0.116]		[0.091]
Edu: Postsecondary	-0.038	-0.019	-0.058	0.045	0.028
	[0.068]	[0.054]	[0.112]	[0.070]	[0.090]
Edu: Bachelors	-0.023	0.002	-0.073	0.048	0.057
	[0.066]	[0.050]	[0.101]	[0.064]	[0.088]
Edu: Professional	-	0.056	-0.291*	0.213*	-
		[0.081]	[0.175]	[0.121]	
Edu: Masters	-0.010	-	-	0.070	0.067
	[0.074]			[0.078]	[0.105]
Chinese	0.043	0.016	0.163*	0.060	0.028
	[0.038]	[0.043]	[0.087]	[0.059]	[0.052]
Indian	0.021	0.007	0.037	-0.049	0.077
	[0.049]	[0.063]	[0.082]	[0.068]	[0.071]
Med Income	0.004	0.005	0.190	0.020	-0.000
	[0.035]	[0.036]	[0.130]	[0.049]	[0.051]
High Income	-0.008	-0.034	0.248*	0.036	-0.038
	[0.036]	[0.038]	[0.127]	[0.055]	[0.050]

Deemed as Very Important' feature of job:					
Earning Well	-0.056*	-0.066*	-0.042	-0.010	-0.105**
	[0.032]	[0.035]	[0.073]	[0.048]	[0.044]
Flexibility	0.128***	0.139***	0.041	0.094**	0.157***
	[0.030]	[0.033]	[0.075]	[0.046]	[0.041]
Interaction with colleagues	-0.002	-0.011	0.016	0.043	-0.048
	[0.034]	[0.039]	[0.075]	[0.053]	[0.047]
Making Use of my Skills	0.032	0.009	0.106	-0.046	0.103**
	[0.036]	[0.040]	[0.085]	[0.055]	[0.049]
Opportunities for acquiring new skills	-0.087**	-0.085**	-0.077	-0.071	-0.093*
	[0.037]	[0.042]	[0.084]	[0.060]	[0.049]
Building professional profile	-0.020	0.006	-0.076	-0.024	-0.021
	[0.034]	[0.038]	[0.077]	[0.055]	[0.045]
Working in International Teams	0.000	-0.031	0.122	-0.039	0.031
	[0.036]	[0.040]	[0.077]	[0.056]	[0.047]
Current Job Adequately Provides Opportunities for …					
Earning Well	0.069*	0.095**	0.012	0.053	0.067
	[0.038]	[0.045]	[0.077]	[0.056]	[0.055]
Flexibility	0.067**	0.084**	-0.085	0.042	0.082**
	[0.031]	[0.033]	[0.079]	[0.047]	[0.042]
Making Good Use of my Skills	-0.027	-0.048	0.035	0.029	-0.065
	[0.040]	[0.046]	[0.081]	[0.057]	[0.057]
Acquiring New Skills	-0.050	-0.020	-0.139*	-0.057	-0.043
	[0.038]	[0.043]	[0.081]	[0.058]	[0.051]
Building my Professional Profile	-0.038	-0.041	0.003	-0.088	-0.005
	[0.041]	[0.045]	[0.085]	[0.060]	[0.056]
Working in international teams	-0.026	-0.053	0.044	-0.026	-0.020
	[0.040]	[0.045]	[0.088]	[0.063]	[0.054]
	0.042	0.046	0.021	0.089*	0.011
Interacting with colleagues	[0.035]	[0.039]	[0.070]	[0.053]	[0.047]
	0.069*	0.095**	0.012	0.053	0.067
Treatment Arms:					
WFH 5d/week, 20% earnings cut	-0.086**	-0.077*	-0.058	-0.087*	-0.099*
	[0.036]	[0.040]	[0.085]	[0.053]	[0.050]
WFH 2d/week, 10% earnings cut	0.002	0.036	-0.086	0.006	-0.002
	[0.036]	[0.041]	[0.084]	[0.055]	[0.050]
WFH 2d/week, 20% earnings cut	-0.098***	-0.094**	-0.081	-0.058	-0.141***
	[0.037]	[0.041]	[0.090]	[0.055]	[0.051]
Constant	0.394**	0.273	0.843**	0.432**	0.245
	[0.156]	[0.167]	[0.417]	[0.186]	[0.217]
Mean	0.575	0.621	0.413	0.565	0.584
N	1338	1038	300	620	718
R-squared	0.128	0.134	0.148	0.141	0.152

Standard errors in brackets

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors

Dep var = choice of Job allowing working from home (choosing i.e., Job B1/ B2 or B3/B4 allowing 5 or 2 days of working from home per week, respectively, compared to Job A implying working from a fixed office 5d/ week)

Table A3. Full regression: Correlates of choosing More Flexible Hours of Work

	(1) All	(2) Freelancers	(3) Standard Employment	(4) Female	(5) Male
Willing to pay for Retirement Savings^	0.103***	0.119***	0.034	0.135***	0.069*
	[0.027]	[0.031]	[0.059]	[0.040]	[0.039]
Willing to pay for Unemployment Insurance^	-0.050	-0.050	-0.002	-0.018	-0.072
	[0.035]	[0.044]	[0.062]	[0.054]	[0.047]
Standard Employment	-0.048	-	-	-0.198***	0.087
	[0.040]			[0.058]	[0.057]
Age	-0.004	-0.004	0.005	-0.006	-0.005
	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.018]	[0.010]	[0.011]
Age-squared	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Female	0.003	0.036	-0.090	-	-
	[0.037]	[0.041]	[0.092]		
Single	0.006	0.010	-0.013	0.041	-0.020
	[0.041]	[0.047]	[0.088]	[0.059]	[0.059]
Has children	0.013	0.030	-0.131	0.051	-0.017
	[0.048]	[0.054]	[0.100]	[0.056]	[0.057]
Female*Has children	0.013	0.056	0.009	-	-
	[0.056]	[0.064]	[0.122]		
HH Size	-0.001	-0.004	0.019	-0.007	0.004
	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.016]	[0.011]	[0.011]
GLOW Member	-0.022	-0.009	-	-0.125**	0.053
	[0.036]	[0.036]		[0.054]	[0.049]
Risk Appetite (0-10)	-0.009	-0.009	-0.007	0.000	-0.016*
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.011]	[0.009]	[0.009]
Time Preference Index	-0.021	-0.029	0.011	-0.003	-0.030
	[0.027]	[0.031]	[0.060]	[0.040]	[0.038]
Edu: Up to Secondary	-0.064	0.015	0.016	-	0.005
	[0.073]	[0.065]	[0.107]		[0.094]
Edu: Postsecondary	-0.093	-0.044	0.097	-0.010	-0.042
	[0.071]	[0.059]	[0.101]	[0.070]	[0.092]
Edu: Bachelors	-0.108	-0.064	0.073	-0.044	-0.060
	[0.069]	[0.054]	[0.090]	[0.065]	[0.090]
Edu: Professional	-	0.054	0.239	0.118	-
		[0.086]	[0.179]	[0.117]	
Edu: Masters	-0.074	-	-	0.004	-0.060
	[0.077]			[0.080]	[0.106]
Chinese	0.033	0.082*	-0.144*	0.040	0.038
	[0.039]	[0.045]	[0.084]	[0.055]	[0.058]
Indian	-0.033	0.017	-0.100	0.061	-0.117*
	[0.051]	[0.064]	[0.084]	[0.075]	[0.070]
Med Income	-0.010	-0.009	-0.145	-0.003	-0.027
	[0.037]	[0.039]	[0.143]	[0.052]	[0.055]
High Income	-0.019	-0.007	-0.129	-0.040	-0.020
	[0.039]	[0.041]	[0.137]	[0.058]	[0.054]

Deemed as Very Important' feature of job:					
Earning Well	-0.122***	-0.118***	-0.131*	-0.101**	-0.145***
	[0.033]	[0.037]	[0.068]	[0.049]	[0.046]
Flexibility	0.120***	0.120***	0.087	0.095**	0.129***
	[0.031]	[0.035]	[0.078]	[0.047]	[0.043]
Interaction with colleagues	0.026	0.033	0.016	0.006	0.053
	[0.035]	[0.040]	[0.074]	[0.051]	[0.049]
Making Use of my Skills	0.012	-0.005	0.055	-0.017	0.056
	[0.037]	[0.041]	[0.084]	[0.053]	[0.052]
Opportunities for acquiring new skills	-0.036	-0.041	-0.040	0.001	-0.075
	[0.039]	[0.044]	[0.085]	[0.060]	[0.053]
Building professional profile	-0.043	-0.044	-0.027	-0.019	-0.074
	[0.036]	[0.040]	[0.081]	[0.057]	[0.048]
Working in International Teams	0.032	0.016	0.147**	0.027	0.034
	[0.036]	[0.042]	[0.073]	[0.052]	[0.050]
Current Job Adequately Provides Opportunities for …					
Earning Well	0.078*	0.071	0.081	0.149**	0.002
	[0.041]	[0.048]	[0.073]	[0.059]	[0.058]
Flexibility	0.023	0.017	0.023	0.041	0.014
	[0.032]	[0.036]	[0.083]	[0.047]	[0.045]
Making Good Use of my Skills	-0.042	-0.020	-0.095	-0.041	-0.037
	[0.040]	[0.046]	[0.077]	[0.056]	[0.057]
Acquiring New Skills	0.080**	0.098**	-0.022	0.075	0.095*
	[0.039]	[0.045]	[0.083]	[0.058]	[0.055]
Building my Professional Profile	-0.073*	-0.088*	-0.010	-0.076	-0.063
	[0.040]	[0.045]	[0.087]	[0.055]	[0.059]
Working in international teams	-0.034	-0.044	-0.073	-0.059	-0.043
	[0.042]	[0.047]	[0.089]	[0.060]	[0.058]
Interacting with colleagues	0.009	0.001	0.093	-0.041	0.059
	[0.036]	[0.042]	[0.070]	[0.054]	[0.050]
Treatment Arms:					
Worker decides, -20% earnings	0.019	0.042	-0.047	0.056	-0.011
	[0.038]	[0.043]	[0.081]	[0.054]	[0.054]
Employer decides, +10% earnings	0.072*	0.002	0.335***	0.132**	0.013
	[0.038]	[0.043]	[0.082]	[0.056]	[0.053]
Employer decides, +20% earnings	-0.041	-0.102**	0.199**	-0.016	-0.062
	[0.038]	[0.044]	[0.084]	[0.058]	[0.052]
Constant	0.649***	0.589***	0.318	0.503**	0.728***
	[0.169]	[0.186]	[0.442]	[0.227]	[0.245]
Mean	0.462	0.466	0.447	0.453	0.469
N	1338	1038	300	620	718
R-squared	0.067	0.088	0.187	0.111	0.077

Standard errors in brackets; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors

Dep var = choice of Job with More flexible work hours (i.e. Job B in Treatment Arms 1/2, and Job A in Treatment Arms 3/4)