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How Everyday Threats Undermine Trust and Hope: Experimental Evidence

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Abstract

Trust in others is essential for the well-functioning of societies. While economists often study its longer-term determinants – such as cultural norms and historical shocks – short-term fluctuation may be equally critical, particularly during pivotal moments (e.g, elections) or periods requiring social cohesion (e.g., pandemics). Hope, though less studied, plays a similarly vital role in shaping individual well-being, behavior, and societal stability. We investigate the short-run plasticity of trust and hope by reactivating threat exposure similar to that encountered in media coverage. In an online experiment, individuals are randomly exposed to short videos depicting terrorism, natural disasters, or war. Both social trust and hope are significantly malleable, declining by 12%-28% of a standard deviation (across models) in response to these brief interventions. We observe strong heterogeneity in these effects, particularly along lines of political orientation and social media usage, and explore their co-movements with basic emotions. Our findings suggest that routine exposure to threatening content can destabilize the emotional underpinnings of trust and hope, with potential implications for key individual and collective behaviors, underscoring the need for research on emotional resilience and mitigation strategies.

JEL classification

C91, D91, Z13

Keywords

social trust, hope, threat exposure, emotional responses, experimental economics

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1 Introduction

Trust is a cornerstone of social life.[1] In particular, trust facilitates exchanges, collaboration and cooperation, fostering economic growth and well-being (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Algan and Cahuc, 2014), promoting trade (Guiso et al., 2009), encouraging civic engagement (Devine, 2024), and conditioning policy legitimacy and effectiveness (Knack, 2002). The role of trust in others and in authorities becomes even more critical in times of perils—such as pandemics, natural disasters, and wars—where trust serves as the glue of social cohesion, enabling effective crisis management and ensuring compliance with vital policies (e.g., Bargain and Aminjonov, 2020). Hope is a more recent focus of study by economists (Graham and Pozuelo, 2023), yet it may be equally crucial for social stability. Indeed, while simplistically framed as a form of trust in the future, hope also embodies a sense of agency and serves as an empowering belief that fosters individual and collective resilience (Snyder, 1994; Lybbert and Wydick, 2018). Recent evidence shows that its absence, or despair, has severe consequences for health and survival but also far-reaching societal repercussions (Graham and Pozuelo, 2023; Graham and Pinto, 2019; Graham, 2023a).[2]

Economists have primarily focused on the long-term determinants of these social constructs. Many studies examine how trust has been transformed by past crises and shocks, such as exposure to epidemics (Aassve et al., 2021; Eichengreen et al., 2024), conflicts (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011) or weather changes (Buggle and Durante, 2021). Trust is often seen as grounded in foundational beliefs shaped by persistent local norms and institutions.[3] Similarly, emerging research has begun to explore the rooted part of hope, describing how it varies with individual predisposition or socio-economic contexts and cultural differences across communities (e.g., O'Connor and Graham, 2019; Graham, 2023a). However, trust and hope are not immutable properties. They might fluctuate quickly in response to current crises and threats. Understanding these dynamics is crucial, particu-

1. It has been extensively studied in most social and human sciences-including economics (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002), philosophy (e.g., Faulkner and Simpson, 2017), psychology (e.g., Simpson and Vieth, 2021), political science (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995), and neuroscience (e.g., Fehr, 2009).

2. Alongside declining trust (Algan et al., 2017), the growing *crisis of despair* has been identified as a catalyst for civil unrest (Graham and Pozuelo, 2023), vulnerability to conspiracy theories and populism (Young and McGrath, 2020), propensity to radicalize (Graham, 2023b), resistance to policy interventions (Franko and Pacheco, 2024) and in particular non-compliance with health or environmental policies (Van Zomeren et al., 2019; Schornick et al., 2023; Douenne and Fabre, 2022).

3. See for instance Tabellini (2010), Meier et al. (2016), Guiso et al. (2016), Lowes and Montero (2018), Ramos-Toro (2023), Lichter et al. (2015), and Karaja and Rubin (2022), and see Dohmen et al. (2012) regarding long-term transmission of trust across generations.

larly in an era marked by recurring crises, such as pandemics, natural disasters, political instability, and conflicts. While trust and hope are especially vital during such periods, crises might test social resilience and cohesion by challenging their very foundations.

Against this backdrop, this paper investigates the short-term malleability of trust and hope in response to immediate circumstances and perceived threats. We have designed an experiment to test how everyday threats,frequently propagated and amplified by the media,can influence these attitudes in the very short term. Our experimental survey involved randomized video exposure with three treatment groups and a control group, and a follow-up questionnaire. The three treatment groups were each exposed to a different threat video: natural disasters (e.g., floods and wildfires), terrorist attacks, or military conflicts (including threats of nuclear war). The control group was exposed to a neutral placebo video. The treatment videos depicted threats through carefully selected footage resembling content commonly found in news reports, documentaries, or social media. After watching the videos, participants completed a survey assessing their perceived level of threat, trust in others, trust in institutions, hope, emotional states, risk and time preferences, and standard socio-demographic characteristics. The experiment was conducted online with a representative sample of 2,787 participants from France, recruited through the Panelabs platform. The sample was stratified by key demographic factors, including age, gender, and socio-economic status, in order to improve balanced tests and statistical power. The effectiveness of the threat induction was validated through an initial assessment, which confirmed significant increases in self-reported feelings of threat among participants exposed to the treatment videos compared to the control group.

Our findings suggest that social trust and hope are malleable: even brief video exposure can significantly affect them, and by a sizable margin. Across treatments and specifications, social trust declines by 12%-26% of a standard deviation, and hope by 15%-28%. It is very likely that these effects are not long-lasting, but they remain important for four reasons. First, they reveal that a substantial portion of hope and trust is inherently unstable, with effects comparable in magnitude to those observed in studies of real-world shocks and long-term determinants. Second, such threats are routinely repeated in daily life, as individuals are constantly exposed to alarming news on social media or fear-inducing political discourse. Given their frequency in media coverage, these threats may influence trust and hope well beyond the experimental setting, gradually shaping public perceptions. Third, the impact may be amplified for certain individuals—especially those who consume large amounts of threatening content (e.g., through doom-scrolling)—a possibility we explore through heterogeneity analyses.

Moreover, even short-lived threats can have significant consequences during critical periods, such as the run-up to an election. A temporary erosion of trust or hope in such moments may carry serious implications for political outcomes or civic stability. Notably, our experiment was conducted during the electoral week of late June 2024, amid a politically fraught period marked by the anticipated rise to power of the far-right in France. This timing adds contextual relevance, offering insight into how an additional trigger, such as a natural disaster or terrorist attack, might influence trust and hope amid heightened societal tensions. To ensure external validity, however, we conducted a replication one year later, confirming that our results hold beyond the specific context of the initial study.

Heterogeneity analyses reveal sharp differences across the political spectrum: for both social trust and our basic hope index (hope for the future and optimism), effects are concentrated among right-leaning voters, whereas left-wing respondents remain unaffected. This pattern likely reflects greater sensitivity to threats and/or more frequent exposure to fear-inducing narratives. Additionally, for social trust, evidence points to stronger effects among heavy and rare social media users, compared to moderate users: for the former, repeated exposure to threatening content may create a heightened state of vigilance, while the latter may be less desensitized or interpret threats more literally, making treatments more impactful.

We also explore potential mechanisms, though the evidence remains suggestive. The malleable components of social trust and hope may be linked, to some extent, to the emotional shifts we observe. We first find that changes in basic emotions broadly reflect the sense of threat: fear, anger, disgust, and sadness increase, while joy declines in response to treatment. However, the co-movements between attitudes and emotions are more nuanced, highlighting in particular the role of anger (for interpersonal trust) and fear (for hope). This co-evolution may indicate a mediating role of key emotions or suggest that attitudes and basic emotions resonate jointly in response to the threat.[4]

This paper contributes to the understanding of trust and hope in several ways. *First*, it advances knowledge on trust, particularly its short-run plasticity. Specifically, it completes a growing body of research exploring how trust in others or in governments are shaped by shocks and perceived threats, as detailed in Table A1.[5] The table is organized into

4. It is plausible that individuals react simultaneously on multiple psychological levels to the heightened uncertainty, helplessness, and fear of death conveyed by the videos. Prior research has explored how mortality salience influences prosocial behavior (Jonas et al., 2002; Zaleskiewicz et al., 2015) and political attitudes (Lerner et al., 2003; Huddy et al., 2007).

5. Existing research has examined various types of threats, including health and material threats (for instance, natural disasters in Mackay et al., 2023 or pandemics in Eichengreen et al., 2021; Eichengreen

broad threat categories: pandemics, natural disasters, terrorism, and conflict/war. This classification coincides with the sensitivity analysis in our experimental design, which involves videos varying across these categories (for pandemic threats, see Ric et al., 2024). The studies in this review are ordered lexicographically, ranking first those focusing on interpersonal trust (followed by trust in institutions/governments). Within each group, studies are further ordered by time horizon, with short-term impacts presented first, followed by medium- and long-term effects. The table thereby underscores the scarcity of empirical evidence on trust's short-term responsiveness to perceived threats, which motivates the present study.[6]

The *second* contribution is methodological. Quasi-experimental studies, such as those listed in table A1 for climate shocks, terrorism, or war, are seldom complemented by experiments that actively recreate threats or the sense of danger. In this regard, our study represents one of the rare attempts to experimentally induce shocks to trust. While psychologists and economists have extensively examined the determinants of trust through behavioral experiments,[7] our approach is more closely aligned with research that introduces perceived threats in an experimental setting. For example, online experiments conducted during and after the COVID-19 pandemic have examined trust responses to threat reactivation via images (Meuer and Imhoff, 2021), videos (Rico et al., 2017; Ric et al., 2024), or priming of pandemic-related risks (Daniele et al., 2020; Aksoy et al., 2021). Beyond trust, similar experimental designs have been used to explore related outcomes: fear and anger have been elicited through videos of terrorist attacks (Davis and Stephan, 2011), time perception has been manipulated using virtual reality simulations of danger (Sadeghi et al., 2023), and risk aversion has been influenced by frightening video stimuli (Guiso et al., 2018). To our knowledge, no such experimental research has focused on hope.

et al., 2024), physical threats (violent conflict in Bauer et al., 2016, terrorist acts in Couttenier et al., 2024), and economic threats (job insecurity following crises in Stevenson and Wolfers, 2011 and economic austerity in Algan et al., 2017).

6. For interpersonal trust, the main contributions on short-term effects are pandemic-related experiments (such as Aksoy et al., 2021 in economics and Potts et al., 2019 and Meuer and Imhoff, 2021 in psychology). Overall, note that the impact on trust is predominantly negative. In fewer cases, trust may increase, for example in the aftermath of natural disasters, when community spirit and solidarity emerge (Cassar et al., 2017; Toya and Skidmore, 2014), or following conflicts (Hall and Werner, 2022; Gilligan et al., 2014).

7. This literature explores psychological, evolutionary, and biological drivers of trust in social interactions (e.g. Simpson, 2007; Krueger and Meyer-Lindenberg, 2019; Hardin, 2002), often using behavioral games (e.g. Suchon and Villeval, 2019; Johnson and Mislin, 2011; Balliet and Van Lange, 2013) and biological measures (e.g. Fehr, 2009; Li et al., 2009).

A *third* objective of our study is to shed further light on the emotional underpinnings of trust and hope in the face of threats. Overall, the role of emotions has been largely neglected in traditional economic decision-making theories (Loewenstein, 1996; Rick and Loewenstein, 2007). Only a few behavioral economics studies have attempted to test how modulating emotions affects cooperation and sanctioning behaviors in games, either by inducing emotions (Drouvelis and Grosskopf, 2016) or venting emotions (Dickinson and Masclet, 2015).[8] In social sciences more generally, few studies have explicitly examined how emotions may shape trust (Engelmann et al., 2019; Myers and Tingley, 2016; Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005). These studies consistently find that negative emotions tend to erode trust, but report mixed evidence on which specific emotions (particularly anger versus fear) are most influential, as well as on the primary psychological mechanism, namely whether trust is undermined by appraisals of low certainty or low controllability. Our results document a simple co-movement between interpersonal trust and several emotions (including anger, fear and joy), which is consistent with—but does not constitute evidence of—emotional mediation. Finally, our work is also relevant for political sciences and in relation to recent research on how threat-induced emotions contribute to the erosion of beliefs central to democratic functioning.[9]

Fourth, we add to the emerging literature on hope in economics.[10] Like trust, hope plays a critical role during crises, acting as a motivational force that enables individuals to envision a positive future and engage in constructive behaviors. Yet hope can be fragile: repeated threats or unresolved crises may erode it, leading to despair (Graham and Pozuelo, 2023). We illustrate this dynamic in our experiment, where hope declines in response to three types of perceived menace. This pattern holds whether we use a simple index combining hope for the future and optimism, or a broader measure that also includes perceived control. Our findings corroborate prior research showing that locus of control is not fixed (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013). We further uncover a complex

8. See also the comprehensive framework of 'psychological' game theory, which allows introducing psychological elements such as emotions, in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2022).

9. Ali et al. (2024) show that anger does not drive populist voting once other emotions are accounted for, instead reflecting a broader emotional state of malaise. Similarly, Auer and Freitag (2025) find that threat-induced anger leads to populist support only when threats are clearly identified and perceived as mishandled by authorities.

10. A growing body of literature examines the role of optimism in economic and life decisions (Puri and Robinson, 2007). In contrast, hope distinguishes itself by not merely stemming from external circumstances—as is typical of wishful or optimistic attitudes—but by being aspirational and grounded in a sense of agency (Snyder, 1994; Lybbert and Wydick, 2018). Note also that hope and social trust are related. In particular, both reflect the role of social connectedness, which provides emotional support and strengthens confidence and motivation (e.g., Schornick et al., 2023; Merolla et al., 2024).

emotional pattern in which the loss of hope is accompanied by rising levels of anger and fear. These results contribute to the growing literature on despair, not only as a dimension of individual well-being and resilience, but also as a force with broader implications for political behavior and social cohesion (Graham and Pinto, 2019; O'Connor and Graham, 2019; Graham and Pinto, 2021; Piper, 2022).

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental setting, the data and balance tests. The results and sensitivity checks are presented in section 3, while section 4 concludes.

2 Empirical Approach

2.1 Experiment: Description

Data Collection: General Points. We begin by outlining the experimental study, conducted over three days in June 2024. Participants were recruited through Panelabs, a research-focused data provider specializing in questionnaire-based studies across Europe. Panelabs operates via an online survey platform and draws from a large pool of registered respondents.[11] The experiment was conducted entirely online, with participants viewing the videos and responding to the survey on their personal devices. The online format allowed for a large-scale experimental setting while facilitating data collection from a geographically diverse sample.[12] Participants were informed about the nature of the videos before the experiment began.[13] Each participant was asked to watch a video lasting approximately 3–4 minutes, followed by a questionnaire.[14]

Context. The study was carried out from June 25 to June 27, 2024, the week preceding the first round of the French legislative elections. This is an especially relevant period for our research, as it was marked by heightened political tensions, with the far-right

11. This pool comprises up to 1.5 million individuals across France, Italy, and the UK, ensuring high response rates and a tightly timed data collection. Respondents are compensated at a rate of €13.14 per hour. See: https://en.panelabs.com/

12. Several studies have demonstrated the reliability of online experiments, which are increasingly used through platforms such as Prolific and Panelabs (see for instance Palan and Schitter, 2018.

13. The study adhered to strict ethical guidelines, including informed consent and the right to withdraw at any stage. Debriefing materials were provided after the survey to mitigate any potential psychological discomfort caused by the emotionally charged stimuli. The multidisciplinary ethics committee at the University of Bordeaux (CER-UB) approved the study on April 17, 2024 (file reference: CER-UB-2024-7B-F).

14. The total task took around 8–10 minutes to complete (median time: 9 minutes). The videos and the questionnaire are placed on the Dropbox repository. The data is available upon request.

Rassemblement National positioned as a potential parliamentary majority following the dissolution of the National Assembly by the President of the Republic. This context provided an opportunity to explore how trust and hope respond to perceived threats in a highly charged social and political environment. More generally, external threats may be more consequential near an election, especially if the media or populist candidates play with fear.[15] To assess the external validity of our findings, we nonetheless conducted a follow-up experiment early July 2025, using the same design, sampling strategy, and threat-based video treatments as in the original study. This replication took place during a non-electoral period, under calmer domestic political conditions, providing a valuable benchmark for testing the stability of the treatment effects outside of a highly charged electoral context.

Figure 1: Screenshots of the four videos

Control (placebo video)

Natural disaster

Terrorism

War

Notes: This figure presents screenshots of the four videos, which can be watched here on this Dropbox repository

Videos. The videos were designed to reactivate standard threat perceptions in respondents' minds. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions:

15. Several studies provide insights into how political campaigns may leverage fears of terrorism to shape public opinion on immigration policies (Oates, 2006; Akay et al., 2020).

any of three threat video groups or a placebo video group. The first treatment group, labeled *environmental/natural disasters*, watched a video depicting recent natural disasters such as floods, droughts, storms, and wildfires. The second treatment group, *terrorism*, viewed footage illustrating acts of terrorism and their aftermath (e.g., the 2015 Paris Bataclan attacks). The third treatment group, *war*, saw videos portraying scenes of armed conflict, including footage from recent wars (e.g., the Russia-Ukraine war). These videos were designed to evoke threat perceptions, featuring selected images from global news outlets, documentaries, and social media clips that emphasize existential and societal risks.[16] Importantly, the content did not differ from what participants might typically encounter in their daily media consumption, although the footage specifically highlighted the dramatic aspects of each threat scenario. At the same time, the images provide no indication of their sources, specific media outlets, or any cues that could create a framing effect. The control group viewed a placebo video depicting slow-moving countryside scenes devoid of any threatening content. This neutral, emotionally unprovocative video served as a baseline for comparison with the treatment conditions. Screenshots of the four videos are shown in Figure 1. Note that similar procedures have been employed in previous studies using video-based interventions to influence attitudes and perceptions.[17]

Sampling and Experimental Design. A total of 2,877 participants completed the survey, with around 700 respondents in each of the four groups. The sample was stratified along four dimensions: gender, age, socio-economic status, and broad geographic region. The main objective was to improve comparability between the treatment and control groups by minimizing potential demographic imbalances, thereby increasing the statistical power of the randomized experiment. Stratification along the specified dimensions also ensured that the sample was broadly representative of the French population, using target quotas for each dimension based on reference data from the national statistical institute (INSEE). The questionnaire consists of three main blocks measuring trust, emotions, and political attitudes, followed by questions on standard socio-demographic characteristics. To reduce order effects, the sequence of the three main blocks, and the individual items within them, were randomized.

16. The videos were produced by Leia Marie Bliedtner, a professional video editor based in Germany.

17. A standard approach consists in showing informational videos (for instance Alesina et al., 2023, on attitudes toward migration) while other studies present videos of role models to enhance aspirations (Bernard et al., 2014). Closer to us, a few studies have used movie excerpts designed to elicit risk-aversion responses to fear (Guiso et al., 2018; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014), pro-social behavior response to emotional induction (Drouvelis and Grosskopf, 2016), or attitudinal response to threats (terrorism- and pandemic-related threats in Ric et al., 2024).

Sample Selection and Key Variables. To ensure data quality, responses were screened, and observations with inconsistencies (n = 21) or implausibly fast completion times (n = 69) were excluded. After data cleaning, the final sample consisted of 2,787 participants, evenly distributed across groups.[18] All attitudinal and emotional variables were measured using seven-point Likert scales. Each construct was assessed through multiple items with slight variations in wording, and the final score was computed as the average of responses across these items, as detailed below.[19] Threat perception was measured by asking participants to what extent they "feel threatened" and to what extent they "feel in danger." Trust in others was assessed with two statements: "most people can be trusted" and "most people try to take advantage of others", with the latter item reverse-coded. Hope was measured by averaging responses to two items: the respondent's degree of "hope for the future" and "optimism about what lies ahead." While the first item may capture the agentic dimension of hope (Snyder, 1994; Lybbert and Wydick, 2018), we also conduct sensitivity checks using an extended measure that explicitly incorporates agency, based on an additional question assessing the extent to which respondents "feel they have control over their destiny." Trust in institutions was computed as the average of responses to questions about trust in French institutions, the French government, and the European Union. Note that we will not consider institutional trust as a primary outcome given the specific pre-election context.

Table A2 reports the correlation among the different outcome variables. The strong association between related items used to construct each outcome (in bold) are comforting. Regarding hope, we find a high correlation between hope and optimism, as expected, but also a sizable one between these measures and the control question. Emotions were measured by averaging responses to related questions: fear was assessed through reported levels of fear and anxiety, anger through levels of anger and irritation, disgust through levels of disgust and nausea, joy through responses on joy and feeling happy, and sadness through responses on sadness and feeling depressed. Correlations are presented in Table A3. The correlation between pairs of items aimed to measure each emotion is high, as expected. We also find interesting correlations across emotions, aligning with the psychological literature on co-occurrence or blending of emotions (e.g., Zelenski and Larsen, 2000; Vansteelandt et al., 2005).

18. The exact distribution is as follows: 696 observations in the control group, 699, 704, and 688 in the natural disaster, terrorism, and war treatment groups, respectively.

19. This approach is standard practice and helps reduce the noise inherent in attitudinal and emotional measurement (Fehr, 2009).

2.2 Balance Tests and Treatment Effectiveness

Balance Tests: Comparisons Margin by Margin. In our experiment, internal validity should be ensured by random group assignment. Nevertheless, we conduct several validity checks, starting with a comparison of the control and treatment groups based on observed demographic characteristics, including gender, age, socio-economic status, and broad geographic region. In Table A4, we first present national mean statistics (from INSEE), followed by the mean values for each group in our experimental sample. As shown, our sample broadly reflects the actual structure of the French population.[20] More importantly, stratification was designed to enhance balance across experimental groups along these four dimensions. To facilitate margin-by-margin comparisons, the last columns of the table report the mean difference for each characteristic between the control group and each treatment group. None of these differences is statistically significant. These results confirm that experimental groups are well-balanced according to these comparisons.

Balance Tests: Interacted margins. We then conduct a more demanding balance test by considering all stratification margins simultaneously. To do so, we construct detailed cells, (i) beginning with gender, (ii) then interacting it with age groups, (iii) further combining these with socio-economic categories, and (iv) finally with socio-demographic characteristics.[21] For each approach (i)-(iv), corresponding to the four rows of Table 1, we regress the treatment assignment on the full set of cell dummies, thereby testing whether fine-grained individual characteristics predict treatment status. Table 1 reports the p-values from F-tests corresponding to each model specification. Results are shown for the full sample (where treatment is coded as 1 for any of the threat videos; see column 1) as well as for each treatment separately (based on subsamples including only the control group and one treatment group at a time; see columns 2–4). In all specifications, the joint significance of the interaction dummies is consistently rejected, confirming that the four experimental groups remain well balanced, even when accounting for more granular demographic interactions. These findings further support the robustness of the randomization process and the validity of our experimental design.

20. For instance, while women represent a large proportion of the French population (52.6%), there is a slight over-representation in our sample (e.g., 56.6% in the control group). However, this does not pose a concern, as our primary objective is internal validity rather than perfect population representativeness.

21. For instance, one of the dummies for the full interaction setting captures being a woman aged 20–24, working as an employee, and living in the Paris region.

Table 1: Balance Tests (interacted margins)

Treatment:	Any threat videos	Env.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Gender	0.94	0.94	0.89	0.89
Gender x age group	0.98	0.94	0.98	0.87
Gender x age group x socio-prof. category	0.65	0.75	0.74	0.21
Gender x age group x socio-prof. category x region	0.19	0.20	0.18	0.58
Observations	2,787	1,395	1,400	1,384

Note: This table summarizes the difference between control and treated groups based on demographic cells. The cells are constructed as the interaction of four demographic variables: gender, age groups, socio-professional categories and regions (French metropolitan regions grouped in 5 categories). Each row corresponds to different definitions of cells: gender only, then interacting gender and age groups, gender x age groups x socio-professional categories, and finally gender x age groups x socio-professional categories x regions. Treatment effects are reported in Column (1) for all treatments pooled, and in Columns (2)-(4) for the environmental, terrorism and war videos, respectively. The coefficients corespond to the p-value of the F-test for each model regressing each treatment on these cells.

Informal Check of Treatment Effectiveness. One can rigorously argue that exposure to the videos defines *assignment* to treatment, rather than the treatment itself. Nonetheless, we have several reasons to believe that the vast majority of respondents in the treatment groups were effectively treated. First, the videos were short (3–4 minutes), minimizing the risk of disengagement, and the video had to be fully played before participants could proceed with the survey. Moreover, all participants received payment for their participation, creating an incentive to watch the video carefully, especially given the expectation that the survey would relate to its content.

However, some participants may have been distracted or not fully engaged with the content. Although we cannot directly verify attention, we asked respondents to report their perceived level of threat after viewing the videos. As previously described, the threat intensity measure is calculated as the average of two items assessing how threatened and how "in danger" participants felt, each rated on a 1–7 scale (yielding a composite score on the same scale, in 0.5 increments). While this measure serves as a proxy for attention, it also helps confirm that the videos effectively induced a sense of threat, providing an informal check of effective treatment.

Figure 2: Distribution of the Threat Feeling (index)



Notes: This figure shows the relative frequency of the feeling of threat by group. 'Level of threat' is an index calculated as the average of answers to two questions on how much respondents feel threatened and feel in danger (each answered on a 1-7 Likert scale). Observations: 696 in the control group, 2,091 in the treatment groups.

Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the average threat score in treated and control groups. The results clearly show that threat perception first-order statistically dominates the control group for middle to high threat scores (i.e., values from 4 to 7), while the reverse is true for zero or low threat levels. Figure A1 extends these results to each treatment group, revealing very similar patterns in perceived threat across the different threat videos. Table A5 shows that exposure to any treatment condition leads to a statistically significant increase in perceived threat. The effect is substantial, corresponding to a 39–43% increase (depending on the video) relative to the control group. Differences in perceived threat across treatment types are not statistically significant (p=0.48). Therefore, any observed differences in outcomes across the three treatment groups (environment, terrorism, war) are unlikely to result from variation in threat intensity.[22]

22. They are more likely driven by other factors, such as differences in informational content or the salience of a specific threat in relation to the questionnaire items.

Figure 3: Average Outcome by Treatment Group



Notes: This figure shows the mean levels of indices for trust in others and hope across the different experimental groups. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Reported percentages correspond to the difference between each treatment and the control group. Trust in others is calculated using two questions (answered on a 1-7 scale): 'most people can be trusted' and 'most people try to take advantage of others' (reversed). Hope is calculated using answers to respondents' 'hope for the future' and 'optimism regarding the future' (1-7 scale). Observations: 696 in the control group, 699 in the environmental treatment, 704 in the terror treatment, and 688 in the war treatment. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

3 Results

Given the convincing balance check results, we proceed directly with a comparison of the average outcomes of interest between the treatment and control groups. Figure 3 provides a summary of the main findings, illustrating the average outcome values across experimental groups, for interpersonal trust and hope, alongside 95% confidence intervals. It shows that treated individuals report significantly lower levels of trust and hope compared to the control group, whether considering all treatment types together or examining each specific treatment video separately. In the rest of this section, we examine these results in detail, conduct robustness checks, and explore additional findings, including the potential role of emotions in shaping these responses. Note that all the estimations presented below control for flexible cell dummies as previously used in the balance tests (i.e., accounting

for interactions of gender, age group, socio-economic category, and region), risk aversion, time preferences, and education.

3.1 Trust in others

Baseline Estimations. Beginning with interpersonal trust, we examine the results of various estimations of trust response to video treatments, incorporating the aforementioned controls. Table 2 presents the effects on the 'trust in others' index, focusing on the general effect of threats ('any video'), using the whole sample, or on the specific effects of individual threat videos. Across all models, the treatment coefficients are negative and statistically significant, indicating a robust decline in trust following exposure to these videos. Among them, the war-themed video has the strongest impact; however, we cannot reject the hypothesis that its effect is statistically equivalent to that of other threat videos ($p > .10$ across different specifications). Thus, we confirm that all three threat videos induce a significant shift in interpersonal trust.

Table 2: Effect of Treatments on Trust in Others (index)

	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.20^{***}	-0.17^{**}	-0.19^{**}	-0.29^{***}
	(0.059)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.074)
Relative to the mean (in %)	5.95	5.05	5.53	8.63
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	15.7	13.3	14.6	22.8
Observations	2,787	1,395	1,400	1,384
R^2	0.139	0.206	0.216	0.224

Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of threats on trust in others. the average of agreement with the statements 'Most people can be trusted' and 'Most people try to take advantage of others' (each rated on a 1-7 scale, with the second inverted). The variable has a mean of 3.36 and the standard deviation of 1.27 in the control group. Treatment effects are reported in Column (1) for all treatments pooled, and in Columns (2)-(4) for the environmental, terrorism and war videos, respectively. All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Magnitude and Comparisons. Relative to the control group's standard deviation (resp. mean) of trust, this effect represents a decrease of 13.3%-22.8% (resp. 5%-8.6%),

indicating that the malleable component of trust is substantial. To contextualize the magnitude of this effect, we extract estimates from the studies reported in Table A1, when these estimates are available and can be expressed, for the sake of comparability, relative to a baseline. Standard deviations for trust are often unreported, whereas mean levels (or control group means in experiments and quasi-experiments) are frequently available. We therefore base our comparison on relative effects expressed as a proportion of the mean.

Figure 4: Effects of Shocks/Threats on Trust: a Comparison



Notes: This figure shows the estimated coefficients and, when available, standard errors for trust in others and trust in government/institutions (the latter is indicated with authors' names in italic), extracted from our review in Table A1.

Figure 4 illustrates this comparison, categorizing studies by method (survey, experiment, or quasi-experiment), time horizon, and type of trust (while most studies focus on interpersonal trust, those addressing institutional or government trust are indicated by italicized author names). As previously noted, short-term estimates, particularly those based on (quasi-)experimental designs, remain scarce. Most importantly, our findings suggest that despite the brevity of the intervention, it induces a meaningful shift in trust, comparable to or within the mid-range of effects reported in studies examining longer-term exposure to experienced or perceived shocks and threats.[23]

23. For comparability, we exclude the few studies reporting positive effects on trust, typically in the

Sensitivity Analyses and Perceived Threats. We conduct a series of alternative estimations to assess the robustness of our results across different samples and treatment definitions. These results are presented in Table B1. The first concern relates to treatment effectiveness – specifically, whether our estimated effect represents an Intention to Treat (ITT) rather than the actual Average Treatment Effect (ATE). To address this, we use threat feeling: in the first panel, we identify and exclude 111 individuals who were assigned to a treatment video but reported only a minimal feeling of threat. While we cannot confirm that they were true non-compliers, we treat them as such for this analysis. With their exclusion, the treatment effects closely align with the main results (it even increases by approximately 10% in absolute terms, but not significantly so). This suggests that our baseline estimates likely represent a lower bound of the ATE.

Next, we retain the full sample but redefine treatment as exposure to threat video *and* reporting a threat feeling above the minimal value of one. In this approach, individuals classified as non-compliers are simply considered untreated. The resulting estimates are very similar to those obtained previously and remain statistically indistinguishable from the baseline. In the last panel of Table B1, we introduce an alternative estimation approach, replacing binary video treatments with the threat feeling variable as a continuous treatment measure. The estimates remain strongly significant, indicating that potential nonlinearities in the threat variable do not alter our results.[24]

Table B2 provides additional regressions. We first use the control group alone to characterize a significant cross-sectional negative correlation between the threat feeling and interpersonal trust (column 1). This negative association becomes substantially stronger following exposure to the threat videos (column 2), confirming that the threat variable captures the treatment effect. As a result, when controlling for threat intensity (columns 3-6), treatment effects on trust largely disappear: the impact of the videos operates primarily through their threatening nature. The war video is a notable exception: even after controlling for perceived threat, a mildly significant effect on trust persists. This indicates that, beyond its emotional impact, the war video may influence trust through other channels, possibly more cognitive mechanisms linked to its informational content.

context of natural disasters (see Table A1). To improve readability, we also omit exceptionally large negative estimates (greater than a 40% decrease) reported in Meuer and Imhoff (2021), Carlin et al. (2014), Cassar et al. (2013), and Algan et al. (2017). When considering all studies (resp. those reporting null or negative effects), our mean estimate of –0.059 ranks at the 66th (resp. 57th) percentile among the most negative effects.

24. For continuous treatments, we compute relative effects by multiplying the coefficient by the mean difference in perceived threat between the treatment and control groups.

External Validity. As argued, external threats may be more consequential near an election, which makes the context of our study conducted just before the legislative elections of June 29–30, 2024, particularly relevant. At the same time, it is important to assess whether the effect of threats on trust also holds in more ordinary times. To that end, we carried out a replication of our experiment approximately one year later, in July 2025. For simplicity, this replication focused solely on the terror video (versus the control group). Conducting the study during a non-electoral period and under more stable domestic conditions could, in principle, attenuate treatment effects. However, the broader geopolitical environment remained volatile in 2025 (Ukraine-Russia war, Gaza, bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities, etc.), which may have sustained the salience of threats. In any case, this replication serves as a reasonable external validity check, given the substantial contextual differences. The results, reported in Table B3, confirm that the negative effects on interpersonal trust remain statistically significant and of similar magnitude (cf. columns 1 and 2 for the 2024 and 2025 experiments, respectively). Pooling both datasets, we estimate treatment effects and test for a potential change in the control group (column 3). The latter is not statistically significant, and a t-test (reported in the table footnote) confirms that treatment effects do not differ significantly across the two experiments. These findings underscore the remarkable stability of our results across varying socio-political conditions.

Discussion. Across all robustness checks, our findings consistently confirm that even brief exposure to reactivated threats significantly reduces interpersonal trust. While these effects may dissipate quickly, the result remains important for several key reasons. *First*, it highlights that a component of trust is inherently unstable, with variations of a magnitude comparable to those observed in studies examining real-world shocks or longer-term determinants, as previously illustrated. *Second*, our videos are designed to concentrate threats commonly portrayed in the media. Given the frequency with which such threats are reactivated by media coverage, their potential influence on trust may extend beyond the experimental setting, shaping public perceptions over time. *Third*, there may be a cumulative effect for some people. For example, repeated exposure to frightening news on social media or doomscrolling behavior could amplify the impact (Buoncompagni, 2023). *Fourth*, even short-lived threats can seriously undermine interpersonal trust, and if they occur during times of critical choices, such as the run-up to an election, they may have far-reaching repercussions on civil peace or democratic stability.

Heterogeneity. The impact of threat on interpersonal trust may vary across subpopulations. To check this, we report heterogeneous effects in Table B4. The three most salient

results are highlighted in Figure 5.[25] *First*, although risk aversion itself is unaffected by exposure to threat videos (see below), the decline in interpersonal trust is significantly more pronounced among individuals with above-median risk aversion, across all videos. *Second*, political orientation plays a key role. We confirm previous findings (Algan et al., 2018) that right-wing voters exhibit lower levels of interpersonal trust (column 2, Table B4) but also reveal that threat exposure amplifies this gap: individuals on the right show a significantly greater decline in trust, suggesting that such threats may reinforce a sense of vulnerability (Oxley et al., 2008). When political orientation is combined with risk aversion, even more contrasted patterns emerge (cf. last panel of Table B4). While the treatment effect does not vary significantly with risk aversion among right-wing voters, it becomes insignificant for center voters and even positive for left-wing voters with low risk aversion—particularly in response to environmental and terrorism videos. Rather than reacting defensively, these groups might interpret threats as a call for greater solidarity. *Third*, we observe a stronger decline in interpersonal trust among both heavy social media users and non-users, compared to individuals with moderate use. For heavy users, this is consistent with the phenomenon of doomscrolling: continuous exposure to alarming content fosters a heightened sense of threat, making individuals more susceptible to reactivation and amplification when confronted with a new or particularly salient stimulus.[26] At the opposite end, rare or non-users of social media may lack prior exposure to similar threats or take them more literally, making treatment videos more impactful.[27]

25. Other results reported in the table do not show marked patterns. The treatment effect tends to be stronger for women (see also Marin. et al., 2012), and in some cases (environmental and terrorism videos), it is not significant for men, but the gender difference is never statistically significant.

26. Heavy users may also develop cognitive biases, such as availability heuristics, leading them to overestimate the likelihood of negative events based on frequent exposure. Other unobserved characteristics may also contribute to their heightened sensitivity.

27. Significant differences are found between moderate and frequent/never users, both overall and for environmental and terrorism videos. Differences are less pronounced for the war video, whose effect appears more uniform across groups.

Figure 5: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Trust in Others



Notes: This figures shows the coefficients on the interactions between the respective subpopulations and treatment in the regression of 'trust in others'. The latter is an index calculated using using two questions (answered on a 1-7 scale): 'most people can be trusted' and 'most people try to take advantage of others' (reversed). Control variables are cells made up of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Observations: 696 in the control group, 699 in the environmental treatment, 704 in the terror treatment, and 688 in the war treatment.

3.2 Hope

Baseline Estimations. Hope is generally understood as an attitude characterized by positive expectations about the future, often accompanied by feelings of optimism, anticipation, and confidence. Accordingly, we first examine the effects of threat videos on a hope index combining two primary questions: hope for the future and optimism. As shown in panel (a) of Table 3, all videos significantly reduce the hope levels of treated participants. The magnitude of these effects is comparable to those observed for trust, with a decline of 5.5%–7.4% (depending on the treatment) relative to the control group's mean hope index, and a reduction of 14.8%–19.8% as a fraction of the standard deviation. The strongest effects are observed for videos depicting environmental disasters and war, suggesting that these existential threats are particularly effective in diminishing future outlooks and optimism. However, these differences are not statistically significant. We also check that the treatment effect is driven by the threat channel (see Table C2). The

key takeaway is that, like trust, hope is an individual characteristic that can fluctuate significantly in the short run in response to simple visual threats. Unlike trust, there is no established empirical literature on the impact of shocks and threats on hope that could serve as a benchmark for comparison.

Locus of Control and Sensitivity Analysis. Hope is described as a positive motivational state involving a sense of agency (Graham, 2023a; Snyder, 1994). It is therefore closely related to locus of control, a psychological trait that reflects the extent to which individuals believe their life outcomes are within their control. In panel (b) of Table 3, we show that our different treatments significantly affect reported locus of control, with a relative impact as high as 23%–27% of a standard deviation. This result adds to the literature showing that control is not a stable individual trait (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013). In panel (c), we consistently find that when the hope index incorporates perceived control, the treatment effects on hope become even larger. This suggests that an individual's sense of control is somewhat more volatile than optimism and contributes to greater fluctuations in hope when facing threatening contexts. We also conduct a sensitivity analysis as we did for interpersonal trust. Results reported in Table C1 present alternative ways to deal with the potential non-compliers. Consistent with our previous observations, excluding them from our sample (panel a) or from the treated group (panel b) leads to larger estimated effects, confirming that our main estimates capture an ITT and likely represent a lower bound of the ATE.

Heterogeneity. Heterogeneous effects are presented in Table C3. Unlike trust, no clear patterns emerge, particularly with respect to risk aversion or social media usage. Only political orientation reveals some contrasting results. In the case of environmental and terrorist threats, the effect is primarily driven by right-wing voters. Conservatism here does not necessarily reflect a stronger preference for isolationism or protection from threats, as observed with social trust, but rather a sharper decline in both hope for the future and optimism. This political contrast does not appear for locus of control, as individuals across the political spectrum, left and right, are similarly affected (see Table D1 in the online Appendix), which contributes to the overall loss of control previously documented (Table 3).

3.3 Mechanisms and Additional Results

This section aims at discussing some possible pathways, even though causal analyses of underlying mechanisms are out of reach, as further explained below. What we suggest

Table 3: Effect of Treatments on Hope and Locus of Control

	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(a) Baseline estimates				
Treatment	-0.27^{***}	-0.30^{***}	-0.22^{**}	-0.28^{***}
	(0.069)	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.087)
Relative to the mean (in %)	6.67	7.37	5.52	7.11
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	17.9	19.8	14.8	19.1
Observations	2,787	1,395	1,400	1,384
R^2	0.152	0.253	0.217	0.228
	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
(b) Impact of treatments on locus of control				
Treatment	-0.37***	-0.38***	-0.34***	-0.39***
	(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.087)
Relative to the mean (in %)	8.73	8.88	7.93	9.22
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	25.8	26.3	23.5	27.3
Observations	2,787	1,395	1,400	1,384
R^2	0.148	0.244	0.266	0.217
	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
(c) Hope index with locus of control				
Treatment	-0.30^{***}	-0.32^{***}	-0.26^{***}	-0.32^{***}
	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Relative to the mean (in %)	7.38	7.89	6.36	7.84
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	23.0	24.6	19.8	24.5
Observations	2,787	1,395	1,400	1,384
R^2	0.159	0.268	0.242	0.237

Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of threats on locus of control and different definition of the hope index. 'Hope' in the baseline results of panel (a) is defined as the average of hope for the future and optim regarding the future. 'Locus of control' in panel (b) is the self reported feeling of control over their destiny. 'Hope' in panel (c) is defined as a new index including the locus of control on top of the two previous questions (each rated on a 1-7 scale). The baseline hope index in had a mean of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 1.49 in the control group. The locus of control has a mean of 4.25 and a standard deviation of 1.43 in the control group. Finally, the last 'hope' index with the inclusion of the locus of control in the control group is has a meand of 4.08 and a standard deviation of 1.31 in the control group. Treatment effects are reported in Column (1) for all treatments pooled, and in Columns (2)-(4) for the environmental, terrorism and war videos, respectively. All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

is primarily to mobilize recorded information about basic emotions, which may initially correlate with interpersonal trust and hope (i.e. as captured in the control group) and possibly co-move with these attitudes in response to perceived threats. Emotional dimensions are often neglected in economics (Loewenstein, 1996; Rick and Loewenstein, 2007) or when studying pro-social behavior (Drouvelis and Grosskopf, 2016), while they may be particularly relevant in contexts where feelings of vulnerability or uncertainty can disrupt trust and hope.

Emotional Response to Threats. We begin by examining how the treatments elicit emotional responses, which are expected to be closely tied to the increase in perceived threat. Emotional scores are presented in Figure 6 for the different experimental groups. We find that exposure to threats amplifies negative emotions (namely fear, anger, and disgust) while diminishing positive emotions (joy), in line with psychological evidence (e.g., Aubé and Ric, 2019). Fear, a primary reaction to threat, is associated with physical danger and loss of control. It is elicited by all videos, whether through the reactivation of climate anxiety by natural disasters or the immediate threat to life and safety in the terrorism and war scenarios. Sadness is also a natural response to the images of destruction and helplessness among victims. Anger is provoked by perceived intentional harm, such as that inflicted by terrorists or authoritarian actors in the war video, and by the sense of injustice felt toward the victims. Disgust arises from the sight of injured individuals, or from moral repulsion toward terrorist acts and war atrocities. Both anger and disgust are typically elicited by the actions of other human beings, which is less the case for natural disasters.[28] Given the observed responses for all of these emotions, our results are consistent with these interpretations. In addition, Figure 6 displays above each bar the percentage change in emotional responses relative to the control group. The magnitude of treatment effects is generally similar across the threat videos, except for natural disasters: as alluded to, they elicit slightly, but significantly, smaller increases in anger and disgust compared to the terrorism and war treatments.

28. Nevertheless, ecological destruction can also trigger disgust (due to aversion to decay or harm), and anger may arise from the perception that climate-related disasters result from human negligence.

Figure 6: Effect of Treatments on Emotions



Notes: This figure shows the mean levels of indices for emotions across the different experimental groups. The coefficients represent the change relative to the control group. They are measured on a Likert scale (1 to 7). The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Observations: 696 in the control group, 699 in the environmental treatment, 704 in the terror treatment, and 688 in the war treatment. Significance levels: *** p $<$ 0.01, ** p $<$ 0.05, * p $<$ 0.1.

Interpersonal Trust and Emotions. Trust is commonly described as a multidimensional concept encompassing cognitive, emotional, and behavioral components (Lewis and Weigert, 1985; McAllister, 1995). Thus, it is not only based on rational evaluation but also rooted in feelings of safety, emotional security, and connection with others. These dimensions may be particularly sensitive to perceived threats and may manifest in changes in primary emotions. To analyze it, we explore the role of emotions when considering the average difference between treated and control groups, then examine more complex patterns driven by the specific contribution of each emotion. For the moment, we restrict the analysis to three negative emotions (anger, disgust, fear), to limit potential difficulties surrounding multicollinearity across emotions and for the ease of interpretations.[29] Complementary analyses including sadness and joy are presented in the online Appendix.

29. Basic emotions tend to be mutually correlated as they share underlying psychological and physiological mechanisms. For instance, a regression of sadness on other emotions yields an R^2 of 0.61. See Zelenski and Larsen (2000) and Vansteelandt et al. (2005).

To begin, Table B5 reports estimates of interpersonal trust while including one emotion at a time, controlling for risk preferences, education, and socio-demographic factors.[30] Within the control group (column 1), the results indicate a significant correlation between trust and the emotions of anger, disgust, and fear. When turning to the full sample (column 2), the trust–emotion correlations increase, which may suggest that individuals who experience emotional reactions to the threats also tend to reduce their trust in others. Since all emotions shift in response to threats and thus capture the threat effect, the results closely mirror those in Table B2: controlling for any single emotion renders the treatment effect statistically insignificant, both overall (column 3) and for specific videos (columns 4–5), with the exception of the war video (column 6).[31]

Next, we examine the role of anger, disgust, and fear when included simultaneously in the trust estimations. Results are presented in Table 4. In the control group (column 1), the three emotions are jointly significant (p-value shown in the last row). However, unlike in Table B2, where emotions were included individually, only disgust emerges as a significant correlate. This likely reflects collinearity among the emotions, with disgust exhibiting stronger or more distinct effects. Turning to the full sample (column 2), we first observe an increase in the adjusted R^2, consistent with the idea that average emotional shifts capture treatment status. Beyond this common component, the simultaneous inclusion of the three emotions helps identify their distinct contributions, along with some heterogeneity across video types. Terror and war images tend to strengthen the association between distrust and anger, while this effect is weaker for environmental disasters, likely because, as previously discussed, climate-related threats are less interpersonal in nature. All three videos appear to reinforce fear-related distrust. By contrast, the pattern for disgust partially reverses: the link between disgust and distrust weakens in the case of terrorism and war.[32] Similarly, analyses presented in the online Appendix show a strong co-movement for joy and a decoupling, with sign reversal, for sadness (see Table

30. If the correlation between trust and emotion were specific to certain population groups, our highly granular fixed effects structure would capture it. This is broadly not the case: emotion and attitudes (as well as emotional and attitudinal responses to threat) show little association with individual characteristics. Nonetheless, we adopt a less demanding specification here, using gender-age cells instead of fully granular ones, which leads to smaller R^2.

31. A fortiori, similar results are obtained when including all emotions simultaneously or when using the first component from a Principal Component Analysis (not reported). Precisely, we run a PCA on detailed emotions: the first component identifies the main pattern of shared variance across those emotions. The second component, despite having an eigenvalue larger than one, has very little explanatory power on trust.

32. Note that these results may also reflect some confusion between emotions, as people may not always be able to accurately identify the dominant emotions they experience after a shock (Lindquist and Barrett, 2008).

E1).

Table 4: Association between Interpersonal Trust and Emotions by Experimental Group

	Control	All treat.	Environm.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Anger	0.02	-0.08***	-0.05	-0.10**	-0.10**
	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.042)
Disgust	-0.10***	-0.05**	-0.08*	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Fear	-0.02	-0.08***	-0.09**	-0.08**	-0.06*
	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)
N	696	2091	699	704	688
R^2	0.073	0.105	0.126	0.137	0.095
Adj. R^2	0.040	0.094	0.094	0.107	0.062
Test emotions (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of emotions on the outcome.
Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Discussion. Several remarks can be made. *First*, our interpretation in terms of co-movement between distrust and anger/fear (and between trust and joy) remains suggestive. Stronger trust responses could reflect individuals with higher initial *levels* of anger or fear, rather than those experiencing a simultaneous *shift* in these emotions. However, we also observe an overall increase in these emotions, which suggests that the increased correlation may largely reflect co-movement. A more robust interpretation of these heterogeneous patterns would require panel data, allowing us to identify how people respond to threats relative to their pre-treatment levels of emotions and attitudes.[33] *Second*, co-movements do not imply emotional mediation. Although threat-induced emotions may influence interpersonal trust, other mechanisms may also be at play. For instance, some underlying factors might simultaneously drive both emotional activation and trust dynamics. Reverse causal pathways are also possible, whereby threat-induced distrust could, in turn, affect emotional regulation. Addressing these questions would require a

33. Note also that the cross-sectional picture based on the control group (columns 1 of Tables B5 and 4) reflects between-subject variability in the trust–emotion relationship. In contrast, the co-movements observed under threat exposure likely reflect a combination of between-subject variation (some persons react emotionally) and within-subject variation (an angry person becomes angrier after treatment). Once again, panel data would be essential to disentangle these sources of variation and to clarify the specific role of each emotion.

causal mediation analysis, which remains particularly challenging in this context, as it would entail randomizing both threat exposure (the treatment) and emotional states (the potential mediator).[34] *Third*, the literature provides conflicting evidence on which basic emotions reduce trust and through which underlying mechanisms, specifically, appraisals of low certainty versus low controllability. For example, Myers and Tingley (2016) argue that low-certainty emotions such as anxiety are particularly influential, while Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) emphasize the impact of low self-control emotions like joy or high other-control emotions like anger. Our findings align with both perspectives by revealing co-movements between interpersonal trust and both fear and anger. Additional sensitivity analyses presented in the online Appendix further underscore the role of joy/happiness and confirm that the dynamics related to sadness remain more ambiguous.

Hope and Emotions. Hope is a positive and future-oriented mental state that combines motivation, optimism, and a sense of agency, particularly when facing obstacles. In contrast, classical philosophers often described hope as an emotion, typically opposed to fear, as both emerge in contexts of uncertainty (Blöser and Stahl, 2019). In more recent psychological frameworks, hope is viewed as both affective and cognitive, involving beliefs, expectations, and goal-directed thinking, though generally considered to rest on a stronger emotional foundation than trust (Snyder, 2002). We first explore this point using data from our control group. A model of hope that includes granular cell fixed effects, risk aversion, and education yields an R^2 of 0.37, which rises substantially to 0.58 when emotions are added. By contrast, the trust model starts with an R^2 of 0.35 and increases only marginally to 0.37 when controlling for emotions. These results corroborate a stronger emotional basis for hope than for trust.

This emotional grounding does not imply that hope is more reactive to shocks. As shown above, exposure to threatening content reduces interpersonal trust by 5%–8.6% and our basic hope index by a comparable margin (5.5%–7.4%) across video types, while perceived control was slightly more affected (7.9%–9.2%). In Table C4 (columns 3-6), we find that, similar to trust, the coefficient on hope becomes insignificant once any basic emotion is included in the model, again reflecting a broad threat effect (as characterized directly with the threat index in Table C2). Table 5 presents estimations of the hope index on the three main negative emotions simultaneously. In the absence of threat (column 1), and

34. Previous studies using emotion-elicitation designs face a common challenge: truly isolating the effects of emotions. Elicitation mechanisms themselves may directly influence trust, thereby confounding interpretations of the threat–emotion–trust pathway. For example, in deception-based designs such as Dunn and Schweitzer (2005), reductions in trust may result from violated expectations rather than from emotional processes per se.

similarly to trust, cross-sectional variation in hope is negatively associated with disgust and fear especially. After threat exposure (columns 2–5), consistent co-movements emerge between hope and fear, mirroring patterns observed for trust.[35] However, emotional dynamics along the threat gradient are nuanced. As for trust, the correlation between hope and disgust disappears. Additional analyses (Table E2) show a strong cross-sectional correlation between hope and joy, which also weakens following exposure to threats. This pattern of decoupling suggests that under stress, hope and joy begin to follow distinct paths.

Table 5: Association between Hope and Emotions by Experimental Group

	Control	All treat.	Environm.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Anger	-0.08	-0.08***	-0.04	-0.10**	-0.09*
	(0.049)	(0.028)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.048)
Disgust	-0.12***	-0.06**	-0.08*	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.044)	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.040)
Fear	-0.13***	-0.20***	-0.18***	-0.21***	-0.20***
	(0.045)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.042)
N	696	2091	699	704	688
R^2	0.186	0.166	0.158	0.210	0.193
Adj. R^2	0.156	0.156	0.128	0.182	0.164
Test emotions (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of emotions on the outcome.
Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Deep parameters and other results. We present hereafter a series of results on additional outcomes. First, we focus on risk aversion and time preferences. Previous research has shown that these "deep parameters" tend to be more stable traits than attitudes like trust and hope. Nonetheless, some studies have documented the impact of shocks, such as conflicts, on these preferences,[36] as well as the connection between risks and attitudes such as trust (Dohmen et al., 2011; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). Panel

35. Additional estimations show that locus of control also co-moves with fear (see also Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013). This effect further strengthens the negative correlation between hope and fear when hope is augmented with the control variable.

36. See for instance Callen et al. (2014), Voors et al. (2012), and Chuang and Schechter (2015) and Boutin et al. (2023) for a recent review and new evidence from pandemic-related threats.

data evidence points to time variation in response to life event (Cobb-Clark et al., 2016). Closer to us, some studies experimentally manipulate fear and find an impact on risk aversion (Guiso et al., 2018). In our setting, additional estimations in Tables F1 and F2 indicate that threat videos have no measurable effect on risk aversion or time preferences. This finding holds both overall and for each specific video, whether analyzed on average or through interactions with individual characteristics.[37] Second, we examine the impact of threats on trust in institutions. As noted earlier, these findings should be interpreted with caution due to the pre-election context; however, similar results are obtained in the 2025 replication experiment. Several results are noteworthy. On average, trust in institutions is not significantly affected by threat videos (see Table G1). Interestingly, however, it decreases in specific cases (Table G2): for women with the environmental threat, for right-wing voters with terrorism, and for young men with the threat of war. There are also traces of a possible solidarity effect opposing the potentially disrupting role of anger and fear on trust. Precisely, an overall positive treatment effect emerges when accounting for emotions. Hypothetically, this could reflect a "rally around the flag" effect, whereby individuals respond to perceived threats by showing increased support for political leaders.[38] A more detailed discussion is provided in the online Appendix.

4 Conclusion

This study contributes to the literature on trust and hope by examining their short-term malleability. We explore how reactivating perceived threats linked to natural disasters, terrorism, and war, can disrupt these mental states. Using randomized video treatments, we show that even brief exposure to threatening stimuli significantly alters interpersonal trust and hope. While hope is more closely tied to emotional heterogeneity across persons in the absence of treatment, both interpersonal trust and hope respond to threats in ways that align with specific emotional reactions, particularly through co-movements with anger (for trust) and fear (for hope).[39]

37. Note that despite the observed stability in risk preferences, all our previous estimations on interpersonal trust control for risk aversion. This precaution helps avoid biased interpretations that could arise from potential confounding effects due to simultaneous changes in trust and risk preferences, as e.g., in Cassar et al. (2017), where climate shocks seem to increase both trust and risk aversion.

38. Note that this phenomena is generally short-lived. See in particular Geys and Qari (2017), Dinesen and Jæger (2013), Jha and Tripathi (2024), Ananyev and Guriev (2019), and Aksoy et al. (2021).

39. While basic emotions exhibit similar responses to perceived threats, the complex shifts in the associations between emotions and attitudes likely reflect the fact that trust and hope are higher-order emotional constructs. They involve cognitive appraisal, anticipation, and goal-directed reasoning. As

Understanding the contextual sensitivity of trust and hope—particularly their responsiveness to threats during critical periods—is essential for developing strategies to reduce their volatility, restore them when eroded, and ultimately sustain societal cohesion and resilience. Our findings may inform further research on interventions aimed at reinforcing trust and hope in times of crisis. Several examples already show how policy responses influence these dynamics.[40] Our findings underscore the fragility of social cohesion under conditions of heightened threat, particularly in moments of political uncertainty. Co-movements with emotions suggest that policymakers and communicators should be cautious about messaging that amplifies fear or anxiety, as these may inadvertently erode interpersonal trust. Instead, strategies that balance realism with constructive narratives could mitigate adverse effects while preserving the social fabric. Our heterogeneity results additionally point to the importance of tailoring messages not only to the most sensitive groups but also to the channels through which people receive information. In particular, the role of social media, as both a source of exposure and amplification, calls for careful attention to how threat-related content is framed and disseminated across platforms.

Further research could build on these findings in several directions. *First*, panel data could be used for different purposes. Surveying individuals prior to video exposure would provide more precise understanding of heterogeneous trajectories in trust, hope, and emotional responses to the videos, enabling a more detailed examination of potential co-movements than was possible in the present study. Panel data could also inform whether threat responses are triggered more by between- or within-subject variation.[41] *Second*, while these co-movements may suggest a mediating role for certain emotions, it remains important to assess whether emotional changes drive short-term shifts in trust and hope, or whether threat exposure affects these attitudes independently through other mechanisms.

such, their responses to threats can only be partially attributed to basic emotional reactions.

40. Some studies examine the role of policies during the pandemic, including unintended effects, such as the detrimental effect of lockdowns on interpersonal trust (Casoria et al., 2024), or ways to restore trust (Lei et al., 2014), for instance by priming role models (Abel and Brown, 2022) or highlighting government intervention (Flückiger et al., 2019; Martinez-Bravo and Sanz, 2025; Khan et al., 2021). Others have studied the positive impact of local support interventions following natural disasters (Andrabi et al., 2017), or explored aspirational programs aimed at reigniting hope (Beaman et al., 2012; Bernard et al., 2014; Lybbert and Wydick, 2018; Lybbert, 2022; Cecchi et al., 2022).

41. Panel data where subjects are re-interviewed after the experiment could also be used to analyze post-treatment dynamics. However, we do not expect short video exposures to generate lasting effects on attitudinal or emotional states. In addition, re-exposing participants to the same experimental setting in subsequent panel waves may introduce bias, as the context itself could prompt memory recall and reactivate associated emotional responses. Similar concerns apply to repeated interventions within a longitudinal framework, even though such designs could help assess potential cumulative effects, such as those documented in doomscrolling, or, conversely, signs of habituation.

Causal mediation analysis is particularly challenging, as it would require an exogenous modulation of emotions during the threat experiment (or similar instrumental variable strategies). One of the difficulties lies in identifying a manipulation of emotions that does not directly influence trust or hope through alternative channels. *Third*, expanding the experimental framework to include behavioral measures would strengthen the connection between attitudinal changes and consequential actions, helping to bridge the gap between experimental findings and real-world decision-making.

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Main Appendix

Figures

Figure A1: Threat Distribution by Treatment



Notes: This figure shows the relative frequency of the feeling of threat by treatment group. 'Level of threat' is an index calculated as the average of answers to two questions on how much respondents feel threatened and in danger (each answered on a 1-7 Likert scale). Observations: 696 in the control group, 699 in the environmental treatment, 704 in the terror treatment, and 688 in the war treatment.

Figure A2: Effect of Treatments on Emotions by political orientation



Notes: This figure shows the effect of treatments on emotions by political orientations. They are measured on a Likert scale (1 to 7). The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Observations: 696 in the control group, 699 in the environmental treatment, 704 in the terror treatment, and 688 in the war treatment.

Tables: Literature, Descriptive Statistics, and Balance Tests

Table A1: Literature Review

Authors	Outcome	Effect on trust*	Treatment / shocks	Method	Time horizon	Time horizon (detailed)	Discipline	Data years	Country	Sample size
Lab or online experiments (short-term effect)										
This paper	Trust in others	significant<0	Reactivation of terror, war & climate threats	Online expe.: random videos	Short-term	Instantaneous	Economics	2024	France	2 787
Aksoy et al. (2021)	Trust in others	insignificant	Pandemics: priming info. about Covid-19 deaths	Online expe.: random priming	Short-term	Instantaneous	Economics	2020	9 EU countries	25 720
Ric et al. (2024)	Trust in others	insignificant	Reactivation of terror & Covid-19 threats	Online expe.: random videos	Short-term	Instantaneous	Psychology	2022	France	318
Potts et al. (2019)	Trust in others	significant<0	Acute stressors	Lab: trust game	Short-term	Instantaneous	Psychology	2018	USA	96
Meuer & Imhoff (2021)	Trust in others	significant<0	Social threat (& heterog. in conspiracy attitude)	Lab: random threat, trust game	Short-term	Instantaneous	Psychology	2020	Germany	347
This paper	Trust in government	insignificant	Reactivation of terror, war & climate threats	Online expe.: random videos	Short-term	Instantaneous	Economics	2024	France	2 787
Daniele et al. (2020,23)	Trust in gov./institutions	significant<0	Pandemics: reactivated health and econ. Risks	Online expe.: random reactivation	Short-term	Instantaneous	Economics	2020	4 EU countries	8 235
Specific threats: other pandemics papers										
Aassve et al. (2020)	Trust in others	significant<0	Past exposure to Spanish flue	Quasi-expe: double difference	Long-term	Intergenerational	Economics	since 1972	USA	36
Kritzinger et al. (2021)	Trust in institutions	significant<0	Exposure to Covid-19	Observational, survey	Short-term	Bi-weekly	Political sciences	2020	Austra, France	17 672
Amat et al. (2020)	Trust in government	significant<0	Exposure to Covid-19	Correlation	Short-term	During 2020	Political sciences	2020	Spain	1 604
Eichengreen et al. (2024)	Trust in inst. / leaders	significant<0	Epidemic exposure in impressionable years	Within-country-year between-cohort variation	Long-term	Intragenerational	Economics	2006-18	142 countries	760 099
Eichengreen et al. (2021)	Trust in scientists	significant<0			Long-term	Intragenerational	Economics	since 1970	138 countries	83 014
Specific threat: natural disaster										
Carlin et al. (2014)	Trust in others	significant<<0	Earthquakes	Observational, survey	Middle-term	< 1 year later	Political sciences	2001, 2010	Salvador, Haiti, Chile	1 410
Cassar et al. (2017)	Trust in others	significant>0	Tsunami	Lab: trust game	Long-term	5 years later	Economics	2009	Thailand	167
MacKay et al. (2024)	Trust in others	significant<0	Various climate events in impressionable years	Climate-spatial variation	Long-term	Intragenerational	Economics	1999–2015	36 African nations	52 916
Skidmore and Toya (2014)	Trust in others	significant>0	Various climate events	Observational, survey	Long-term	Cum. Shocks	Economics	1990-2010	146 countries	339
Chantarat et al. (2015)	Trust in neighbors	significant<0	Flooding	Observational, survey	Long-term	2.5 years later	Economics	2011	Cambodia	256
Specific threat: terrorism										
Geys & Qari (2017)	Trust in others	insignificant	Terrorism (Stockholm bombings)	Event studies (online survey)	Middle-term	Within a year	Economics	2011	Sweden	408
Colombo et al. (2022)	Trust in others	significant<0	Terrorism (France, Belgium, Germany, 2010-17)	Observational, ESS	Middle-term	1 year after	Economics	2010-2017	Europe	35 240
Godefroidt & Langer (2020)	Trust in others	significant<0	Terrorism / mediation of fear (various events)	Observational, WVS	Middle-term	Yearly variation	Political sciences	2010-14	World	76 254
Harding & Nwokolo (2024)	Trust in government	significant>0	Terrorism (Boko Haram)	Observational, survey	Short-term	Within few days	Political sciences	2014	Nigeria	592
Dinesen and Jaeger (2013)	Trust in institutions	insignificant	Terrorism (Madrid attacks)	Observational, survey	Middle-term	14 months	Psychology	2004	Spain	1 000
Jha & Tripathi (2024)	Trust in institutions	significant<0	Terrorism (various events)	Event studies	Middle-term	Within a year	Economics/socio	2002-20	EU	350 000
Specific threat: conflicts										
Hall & Werner (2022)	Trust in others	significant>0	War, traumatic experience (refugees)	Observational, survey	Middle-term	0 to 4 years	Psychology	2020	Turkey	791
Gilligan et al. (2014)	Social trust / soc. capital	significant>0	Civil war	Lab: trust game	Middle-term	3 years	Political sciences	2009-10	Nepal	252
Conzo & Salustri (2019)	Trust in others	significant<0	War (World War II)	Observational, SHARE data	Long-term	Intragenerational	Economics	1945	Europe	6 555
Cassar et al. (2013)	Trust in others	significant<0	Civil war	Survey, trust game	Long-term	10 years after	Economics	2007+	Tajikistan	426
Hutchison (2011)	Trust in government	significant<0	War, territorial threat (various events)	Observational, survey	Middle-term	0 to 5 years	Political sciences	2004	Afrobarometer	45 778
De Luca & Verpoorten (2015)	Generalized trust	significant<0	Civil war	Observational, survey	Long-term	12 years after	Economics	2000,05,12	Uganda	4 671
Bellows & Miguel (2009)	Attendance community	significant>0	Civil war	Observational, survey	Long-term	3 to 16 years	Economics	2006	Sierra Leone	10 471
Grosjean (2014)	Trust in government	significant<0	War (World War II)	Observational, survey	Long-term	since WWII	Economics	2010	39 countries	39 500
Specific threat: economic crises										
Alesina & La Ferrara (2002)	Trust in others	significant<0	Trauma in past year (health, divorce, finance)	Observational / GSS	Middle-term	Intragenerational	Economics	1974-1994	USA	7 326
Ananiev & Guriev (2019)	Trust in others	significant<0	Economic shock, income effect	IV	Middle-term	With a year	Economics	2009	Russia	189
Algan et al. (2017)	Trust in others	significant<0	Economic shocks, austerity policies	Observational, survey	Middle-term	1-2 years	Economics	2014	Europe	1 051
	Trust in institutions	significant<0								
Bietenbeck et al. (2023)	Trust in others	significant<0	Experiencing recession in impressionable years	Observational, GPS	Long-term	Intragenerational	Economics	2012/13	75 countries	56 655
Roth et al. (2022)	Trust in institutions	significant<0	Economic shock, unemployment	Observational, survey	Middle-term	yearly variation (panel)	Economics	2009	Europe	305

In each section of the table, papers are presented in a lexicographic order, starting with the type of trust (priorizing trust in others) then the time horizon (priorizing short-term studies)

* Some studies highlight a positive effect of threats on trust described as a solidarity effect (or 'rally around the flag' situation when the focus is on trust in governments). Underlined studies: indicate when this effect tends to be short-lived (eventually turning insignificant or negative); if positive, it indicates that, on the contrary, the effect stays (other studies with a positive effect do not suggest this type of mechanism). In our case, it indicates that negative emotions might be offset by this solidarity effect, explaining an overall insignificant effect of threats on trust in institutions.

Table A2: Correlation across Detailed Outcomes

	Trust in others		Trust in institutions			Hope		
Trust in others								
Trust in others	1							
Trust abuse	-0.400	1						
Trust in institutions								
Trust in institutions	0.346	-0.201	1					
Trust in government	0.294	-0.146	0.668	1				
Trust in EU	0.332	-0.191	0.663	0.755	1			
Hope								
Hope	0.292	-0.150	0.323	0.273	0.296	1		
Optimism	0.290	-0.148	0.322	0.274	0.281	0.847	1	
Locus of control	0.237	-0.109	0.210	0.177	0.192	0.510	0.526	1

Notes: This table reports the correlation of all outcome questions in the whole sample.

Table A3: Correlation across Detailed Emotions

	Threat		Fear		Anger		Disgust		Sadness		Joy	
Threat												
Threat	1											
Danger	0.861	1										
Fear												
Anxiety	0.590	0.625	1									
Fear	0.664	0.712	0.826	1								
Anger												
Anger	0.590	0.601	0.583	0.627	1							
Annoyance	0.545	0.538	0.563	0.556	0.774	1						
Disgust												
Disgust	0.532	0.556	0.545	0.584	0.718	0.652	1					
Nausea	0.544	0.563	0.552	0.589	0.735	0.679	0.926	1				
Sadness												
Sadness	0.545	0.549	0.655	0.664	0.634	0.557	0.612	0.627	1			
Despressed	0.436	0.499	0.700	0.667	0.517	0.468	0.499	0.505	0.729	1		
Joy												
Joy	−0.289	−0.281	−0.345	−0.353	−0.352	−0.281	−0.363	−0.369	−0.451	−0.382	1	
Happiness	−0.313	−0.306	−0.394	−0.391	−0.390	−0.311	−0.398	−0.398	−0.492	−0.435	0.914	1

Notes: This table reports the correlation of all the emotionnally charged questions in the whole sample.

Table A4: Statistics and Balance Tests (one margin at a time)

		Mean Statistics					Testing differences			
	Quotas	Control	Treated				Control VS Treated			
			Any	Env.	Terrorism	War	Any	Env.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Gender										
Men	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.43	0.44	0.44	−0.002	0.002	−0.004	−0.004
		(0.496)	(0.496)	(0.496)	(0.497)	(0.497)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Age group										
20-24	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.05	−0.005	−0.006	−0.007	−0.002
		(0.219)	(0.228)	(0.230)	(0.232)	(0.223)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
25-34	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.007	0.004	0.013	0.004
		(0.360)	(0.353)	(0.356)	(0.346)	(0.356)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
35-44	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.19	−0.004	−0.001	−0.004	−0.008
		(0.384)	(0.387)	(0.385)	(0.387)	(0.391)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
45-54	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.005	0.007	0.004	0.005
		(0.393)	(0.389)	(0.388)	(0.391)	(0.389)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
55-64	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	−0.002	−0.004	−0.004	0.001
		(0.377)	(0.378)	(0.380)	(0.380)	(0.376)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
65+	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	−0.001	−0.000	−0.003	−0.000
		(0.437)	(0.437)	(0.437)	(0.438)	(0.437)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Socio-prof category										
Independent	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.005	0.010	0.002	0.002
		(0.216)	(0.205)	(0.193)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Executives	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.13	−0.004	−0.001	−0.001	−0.009
		(0.326)	(0.330)	(0.327)	(0.328)	(0.336)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Intermediary	0.15	0.16	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.012	0.008	0.013	0.016
		(0.362)	(0.350)	(0.355)	(0.349)	(0.347)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Employees	0.30	0.29	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.30	−0.009	−0.012	−0.008	−0.006
		(0.456)	(0.460)	(0.461)	(0.460)	(0.459)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Retired	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.28	−0.002	−0.002	−0.005	0.001
		(0.452)	(0.453)	(0.453)	(0.455)	(0.452)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Other inactives	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	−0.003	−0.004	−0.000	−0.004
		(0.293)	(0.297)	(0.298)	(0.294)	(0.299)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Region										
Paris	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.18	−0.003	−0.006	−0.004	0.001
		(0.389)	(0.391)	(0.394)	(0.392)	(0.388)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
West	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.003	−0.005	0.007	0.006
		(0.424)	(0.422)	(0.427)	(0.419)	(0.420)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
North East	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.24	−0.010	−0.008	−0.005	−0.017
		(0.419)	(0.425)	(0.424)	(0.422)	(0.430)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)
South West	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.015
		(0.324)	(0.310)	(0.312)	(0.312)	(0.306)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
South East	0.24	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.24	0.24	−0.002	0.008	−0.009	−0.004
		(0.424)	(0.425)	(0.419)	(0.429)	(0.426)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Obs.	2787	696	2091	699	704	688	2787	1395	1400	1384

Notes: This table reports the variables' mean and standard deviation in parentheses in Columns (1)-(5) for different samples. Column (1) corresponds to the control group, Columns (2) includes all the treatments pooled and Columns (3)-(5) correspond to the environmental, terrorism, and war threat video, respectively. Columns (6)-(9) present the estimated differences in means between the different treated groups and the control group. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A5: Effect of Treatments on Threat Intensity Feeling (index)

	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	1.31***	1.31***	1.37***	1.25***
	(0.078)	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.105)
Relative to the mean (in %)	41.33	41.21	43.24	39.39
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	67.8	67.6	70.9	64.6
Observations	2,787	1,395	1,400	1,384
R^2	0.210	0.293	0.323	0.283

Note: This table reports the estimated impact of threats on level of threat. the average of threat and danger feelings (each rated on a 1-7 scale). The variable has a mean of 3.17 and the standard deviation of 1.93 in the control group. Treatment effects are reported in Column (1) for all treatments pooled, and in Columns (2)-(4) for the environmental, terrorism and war videos, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Estimations: Trust in Others

Table B1: Effect of Treatments on Trust in Others, Sensitivity Analysis

	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(a) Discarding non-compliers				
Treatment	-0.22^{***}	-0.19^{**}	-0.20^{***}	-0.32^{***}
	(0.059)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.075)
Relative to the mean (in %)	6.43	5.55	6.10	9.42
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	17.0	14.7	16.1	24.9
Observations	2,676	1,355	1,364	1,349
R^2	0.141	0.202	0.219	0.230
	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
(b) Treatment: treated and threat feeling > 1				
Treatment	-0.22^{***}	-0.18^{**}	-0.21^{***}	-0.33^{***}
	(0.057)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.074)
Relative to the mean (in %)	6.70	5.29	6.39	9.79
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	17.7	14.0	16.9	25.9
Observations	2,787	1,395	1,400	1,384
R^2	0.140	0.207	0.217	0.227
	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
(c) Continuous treatment				
Treatment	-0.16^{***}	-0.11^{***}	-0.14^{***}	-0.14^{***}
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Relative to the mean (in %)	6.19	4.45	5.92	5.32
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	16.4	11.7	15.6	14.1
Observations	2,787	1,395	1,400	1,384
R^2	0.175	0.225	0.247	0.246

Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of threats on trust in others. the average of agreement with the statements 'Most people can be trusted' and 'Most people try to take advantage of others' (each rated on a 1-7 scale, with the second inverted). The variable has a mean of 3.36 and the standard deviation of 1.27 in the control group. Treatment effects are reported in Column (1) for all treatments pooled, and in Columns (2)-(4) for the environmental, terrorism and war videos, respectively. All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B2: Effect of Treatments on Trust in Others, controlling for Threat Feeling Index

	Control	All treat.	All treat.	Environm.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment			0.00	−0.03	0.01	−0.13*
			(0.061)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.077)
Threat index	−0.07**	−0.16***	−0.16***	−0.11***	−0.15***	−0.12***
	(0.030)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Observations	696	2787	2787	1395	1400	1384
R^2	0.36	0.18	0.18	0.22	0.25	0.25

Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of threats on trust in others, controlling for the threat index. the average of agreement with the statements 'Most people can be trusted' and 'Most people try to take advantage of others' (each rated on a 1-7 scale, with the second inverted). The variable has a mean of 3.36 and the standard deviation of 1.27 in the control group. the average of threat and danger feelings (each rated on a 1-7 scale). The variable has a mean of 3.17 and the standard deviation of 1.93 in the control group. Treatment effects are reported in Column (1) for all treatments pooled, and in Columns (2)-(4) for the environmental, terrorism and war videos, respectively. All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B3: Effect of Terrorism Treatment on Trust in Others by Experiment

	2024	2025	Pooled
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Terrorism 2024	−0.19**		−0.19***
	(0.076)		(0.070)
Terrorism 2025		−0.17**	−0.17***
		(0.070)	(0.065)
Experiment 2025			−0.00
			(0.063)
Relative to the mean (in %)	5.53	5.18	
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	14.6	13.6	
Observations	1,400	1,717	3,117
R^2	0.216	0.194	0.166

Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of threats on trust in others. the average of agreement with the statements 'Most people can be trusted' and 'Most people try to take advantage of others' (each rated on a 1-7 scale, with the second inverted). The variable has a mean of 3.36 and the standard deviation of 1.27 in the control group. Treatment effects reported in Column (1) and (2) correspond respectively to the 2024 and 2025 experiments with the same videos. The pooled sample estimation in Column (3) compares the treatment groups to their respective control groups. The estimated treatment effects in Column (3) are not statistically significant at a 5% level (p-value = .824). All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B4: Heterogeneous Effect of Treatments on Trust in Others

		Trust in others				
	Group size	Control	Any video	Environment	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gender						
Men	1,217	3.34	−0.15*	−0.07	−0.10	−0.28**
		(1.303)	(0.090)	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.112)
Women	1,570	3.38	−0.24***	−0.24**	−0.25**	−0.30***
		(1.249)	(0.078)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.099)
Men = Women			0.476	0.273	0.301	0.886
Age group						
20-29	317	3.31	−0.26	0.05	−0.38	−0.42*
		(1.210)	(0.180)	(0.238)	(0.240)	(0.233)
30-54	1,274	3.34	−0.18**	−0.22*	−0.09	−0.27**
		(1.243)	(0.088)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.110)
55+	1,196	3.39	−0.21**	−0.17	−0.23**	−0.28**
		(1.322)	(0.089)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.111)
20-29 = 30-54 = 55+			0.905	0.597	0.484	0.841
Social media usage						
Never	1,062	3.44	−0.28***	−0.29**	−0.24**	−0.36***
		(1.353)	(0.094)	(0.119)	(0.122)	(0.120)
Sometimes	1,038	3.27	−0.02	0.05	0.07	−0.16
		(1.254)	(0.096)	(0.126)	(0.121)	(0.120)
Often	687	3.37	−0.36***	−0.30*	−0.52***	−0.38**
		(1.149)	(0.123)	(0.160)	(0.155)	(0.154)
Never = Sometimes			0.053	0.053	0.067	0.246
Often = Sometimes			0.025	0.085	0.003	0.269
TV usage						
Never	303	3.25	−0.17	−0.00	−0.10	−0.39
		(1.371)	(0.187)	(0.245)	(0.235)	(0.239)
Sometimes	916	3.37	−0.23**	−0.20	−0.24*	−0.24*
		(1.273)	(0.102)	(0.135)	(0.132)	(0.128)
Often	1,568	3.37	−0.19**	−0.18*	−0.17*	−0.30***
		(1.255)	(0.078)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.097)
Never = Sometimes			0.749	0.474	0.589	0.589
Never = Often			0.918	0.494	0.788	0.729
Political wing						
Left	309	3.53	0.10	0.32	0.14	−0.11
		(1.409)	(0.178)	(0.222)	(0.235)	(0.224)
Center	1,707	3.42	−0.16**	−0.14	−0.13	−0.25***
		(1.218)	(0.072)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.092)
Right	771	3.13	−0.37***	−0.44***	−0.34**	−0.43***
		(1.324)	(0.114)	(0.145)	(0.143)	(0.142)
Left = Center			0.172	0.054	0.293	0.574
Left = Right			0.025	0.004	0.084	0.228
Observations	2787	696	2787	1395	1400	1384

Table continued on next page.

Table B4: Heterogeneous Effect of Treatments on Trust in Others (continued)

		Trust in others				
	Group size	Control	Any video	Environment	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Risk aversion						
Low	1,617	3.39	−0.07	−0.02	−0.06	−0.19*
		(1.236)	(0.077)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.098)
High	1,170	3.32	−0.38***	−0.37***	−0.36***	−0.44***
		(1.323)	(0.091)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.114)
Low = High			0.011	0.027	0.046	0.098
Political wing × Risk aversion						
Left Low	165	3.33	0.52**	1.01***	0.58*	0.20
		(1.366)	(0.261)	(0.318)	(0.330)	(0.317)
Center Low	996	3.46	−0.05	−0.03	0.02	−0.18
		(1.205)	(0.094)	(0.120)	(0.124)	(0.120)
Right Low	456	3.23	−0.31**	−0.41**	−0.33*	−0.36*
		(1.265)	(0.146)	(0.188)	(0.183)	(0.189)
Left High	144	3.68	−0.24	−0.31	−0.20	−0.33
		(1.439)	(0.248)	(0.312)	(0.339)	(0.327)
Center High	711	3.36	−0.31***	−0.29**	−0.33**	−0.35**
		(1.237)	(0.114)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.144)
Right High	315	2.96	−0.47**	−0.50**	−0.39*	−0.52**
		(1.415)	(0.182)	(0.227)	(0.225)	(0.221)
Risk-lovers: Left = Right			0.005	0.000	0.017	0.128
Risk averse: Left = Right			0.464	0.604	0.626	0.618
Risk-lovers: Left = Center = Right			0.020	0.001	0.047	0.309
Risk averse: Left = Center = Right			0.703	0.714	0.888	0.792
Observations	2787	696	2787	1395	1400	1384

Note: This table reports the estimated impact of threats exposure on trust in others computed as the average of agreement with the statements 'Most people can be trusted' and 'Most people try to take advantage of others' (each rated on a 1-7 scale, with the second inverted). The variable has a mean of 3.36 and the standard deviation of 1.27 in the control group. Column (1) reports the number of observations in each subpopulation. Control group means and sandard deviations are shown in Column (2). Treatment effects (treated minus control) are reported in Column (3) fir all treatments pooled, and in Columns (4)-(6) for the environmental, terrorism, and war videos, respectively. P-values from equality tests appear below each panel. All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table B5: Effect of Emotions and Treatments on Trust in Others

	Control	All treat.	All treat.	Environm.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment			-0.03	-0.07	0.02	-0.13*
			(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Anger	-0.08***	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***
	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
N	696	2787	2787	1395	1400	1384
R^2	0.062	0.079	0.079	0.070	0.079	0.070
Adj. R^2	0.031	0.072	0.071	0.054	0.064	0.055
Treatment			-0.04	-0.06	0.03	-0.13*
			(0.057)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.071)
Disgust	-0.10***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.12***	-0.12***
	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
N	696	2787	2787	1395	1400	1384
R^2	0.073	0.079	0.079	0.078	0.083	0.075
Adj. R^2	0.043	0.072	0.072	0.063	0.067	0.060
Treatment			-0.06	-0.06	-0.02	-0.17**
			(0.057)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Fear	-0.08***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.13***	-0.12***
	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)
N	696	2787	2787	1395	1400	1384
R^2	0.062	0.076	0.076	0.070	0.078	0.067
Adj. R^2	0.031	0.068	0.068	0.055	0.062	0.051

Note: This table reports the estimated impact of treatments and emotions on the outcome. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Estimations: Hope

Table C1: Effect of Treatments on Hope, Sensitivity Analysis

	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(a) Discarding non-compliers				
Treatment	−0.34***	−0.36***	−0.33***	−0.34***
	(0.068)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.087)
Relative to the mean (in %)	8.50	8.95	8.14	8.45
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	22.8	24.0	21.8	22.6
Observations	2,676	1,355	1,364	1,349
R^2	0.163	0.267	0.234	0.239
	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
(b) Treatment: treated and threat feeling > 1				
Treatment	−0.48***	−0.42***	−0.38***	−0.39***
	(0.066)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Relative to the mean (in %)	11.93	10.41	9.50	9.79
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	32.0	27.9	25.5	26.2
Observations	2,787	1,395	1,400	1,384
R^2	0.165	0.260	0.226	0.234
	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
(c) Continuous treatment				
Treatment	−0.24***	−0.20***	−0.23***	−0.25***
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Relative to the mean (in %)	8.19	6.56	7.90	8.15
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	22.0	17.6	21.2	21.8
Observations	2,787	1,395	1,400	1,384
R^2	0.219	0.293	0.278	0.298

Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of threats on hope. the average of hope in the future and optimism regarding the future (each rated on a 1-7 scale). The variable has a mean of 4.00 and the standard deviation of 1.49 in the control group. Treatment effects are reported in Column (1) for all treatments pooled, and in Columns (2)-(4) for the environmental, terrorism and war videos, respectively. All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table C2: Effect of Treatments on Hope, controlling for Threat Feeling Index

	Control	All treat.	All treat.	Environm.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment			0.06	−0.05	0.11	0.03
			(0.070)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.089)
Threat index	−0.21***	−0.24***	−0.25***	−0.19***	−0.24***	−0.25***
	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Observations	696	2787	2787	1395	1400	1384
R^2	0.42	0.22	0.22	0.29	0.28	0.30

Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of threats on hope, controlling for the threat index. the average of hope in the future and optimism regarding the future (each rated on a 1-7 scale). The variable has a mean of 4.00 and the standard deviation of 1.49 in the control group. the average of threat and danger feelings (each rated on a 1-7 scale). The variable has a mean of 3.17 and the standard deviation of 1.93 in the control group. Treatment effects are reported in Column (1) for all treatments pooled, and in Columns (2)-(4) for the environmental, terrorism and war videos, respectively. All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table C3: Heterogeneous Effect of Treatments on Hope

		Hope				
	Group size	Control	Any video	Environment	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gender						
Men	1,217	4.10	−0.22**	−0.13	−0.16	−0.28**
		(1.566)	(0.106)	(0.136)	(0.135)	(0.132)
Women	1,570	3.93	−0.30***	−0.41***	−0.27**	−0.29**
		(1.432)	(0.092)	(0.114)	(0.118)	(0.117)
Men = Women			0.559	0.121	0.563	0.980
Age group						
20-29	317	4.03	−0.21	−0.18	−0.13	−0.50*
		(1.513)	(0.211)	(0.274)	(0.280)	(0.275)
30-54	1,274	3.96	−0.27***	−0.35***	−0.16	−0.31**
		(1.493)	(0.103)	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.129)
55+	1,196	4.05	−0.28***	−0.27**	−0.30**	−0.22*
		(1.492)	(0.105)	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.131)
20-29 = 30-54 = 55+			0.956	0.827	0.711	0.643
Social media usage						
Never	1,062	4.00	−0.28**	−0.22	−0.27*	−0.35**
		(1.474)	(0.110)	(0.137)	(0.143)	(0.141)
Sometimes	1,038	4.06	−0.27**	−0.35**	−0.14	−0.35**
		(1.496)	(0.113)	(0.146)	(0.143)	(0.141)
Often	687	3.93	−0.25*	−0.35*	−0.28	−0.09
		(1.527)	(0.144)	(0.184)	(0.182)	(0.182)
Never = Sometimes			0.940	0.521	0.545	0.988
Often = Sometimes			0.929	0.994	0.566	0.251
TV usage						
Never	303	3.78	−0.25	−0.43	−0.17	−0.10
		(1.566)	(0.219)	(0.280)	(0.275)	(0.282)
Sometimes	916	3.94	−0.13	−0.17	0.01	−0.21
		(1.539)	(0.119)	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.151)
Often	1,568	4.09	−0.35***	−0.34***	−0.35***	−0.36***
		(1.447)	(0.092)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.114)
Never = Sometimes			0.648	0.407	0.572	0.739
Never = Often			0.675	0.771	0.553	0.389
Political wing						
Left	309	3.55	0.07	0.12	0.27	−0.12
		(1.540)	(0.212)	(0.259)	(0.276)	(0.268)
Center	1,707	4.12	−0.26***	−0.27**	−0.19*	−0.38***
		(1.396)	(0.086)	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.110)
Right	771	3.90	−0.37***	−0.49***	−0.40**	−0.10
		(1.668)	(0.135)	(0.169)	(0.168)	(0.169)
Left = Center			0.146	0.167	0.120	0.381
Left = Right			0.080	0.047	0.036	0.933
Observations	2787	696	2787	1395	1400	1384

Table continued on next page.

Table C3: Heterogeneous Effect of Treatments on Hope (continued)

		Hope				
	Group size	Control	Any video	Environment	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Risk aversion						
Low	1,617	4.17	−0.25***	−0.23**	−0.23**	−0.29**
		(1.495)	(0.091)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.116)
High	1,170	3.77	−0.29***	−0.38***	−0.21	−0.27**
		(1.461)	(0.107)	(0.134)	(0.137)	(0.135)
Low = High			0.797	0.395	0.906	0.922
Political wing × *Risk aversion*						
Left Low	165	3.58	0.18	0.35	0.42	−0.02
		(1.587)	(0.310)	(0.372)	(0.389)	(0.379)
Center Low	996	4.27	−0.27**	−0.15	−0.27*	−0.40***
		(1.403)	(0.112)	(0.141)	(0.147)	(0.144)
Right Low	456	4.09	−0.31*	−0.55**	−0.26	−0.06
		(1.646)	(0.174)	(0.220)	(0.216)	(0.226)
Left High	144	3.54	0.01	−0.05	0.15	−0.18
		(1.522)	(0.295)	(0.365)	(0.399)	(0.391)
Center High	711	3.89	−0.25*	−0.42**	−0.07	−0.35**
		(1.358)	(0.135)	(0.168)	(0.172)	(0.172)
Right High	315	3.58	−0.46**	−0.41	−0.62**	−0.09
		(1.671)	(0.216)	(0.266)	(0.266)	(0.264)
Risk-lovers: Left = Right			0.173	0.036	0.127	0.920
Risk averse: Left = Right			0.196	0.423	0.106	0.844
Risk-lovers: Left = Center = Right			0.361	0.088	0.238	0.349
Risk averse: Left = Center = Right			0.423	0.641	0.141	0.697
Observations	2787	696	2787	1395	1400	1384

Note: This table reports the estimated impact of threats exposure on hope computed as the average of hope in the future and optimism regarding the future (each rated on a 1-7 scale). The variable has a mean of 4.00 and the standard deviation of 1.49 in the control group. Column (1) reports the number of observations in each subpopulation. Control group means and sandard deviations are shown in Column (2). Treatment effects (treated minus control) are reported in Column (3) fir all treatments pooled, and in Columns (4)-(6) for the environmental, terrorism, and war videos, respectively. P-values from equality tests appear below each panel. All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table C4: Effect of Emotions and Treatments on Hope

	Control	All treat.	All treat.	Environm.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment			0.00	-0.11	0.12	0.02
			(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.082)
Anger	-0.26***	-0.25***	-0.25***	-0.24***	-0.27***	-0.26***
	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
N	696	2787	2787	1395	1400	1384
R^2	0.161	0.136	0.136	0.146	0.155	0.153
Adj. R^2	0.133	0.129	0.129	0.131	0.141	0.139
Treatment			-0.03	-0.13*	0.11	-0.01
			(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Disgust	-0.25***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.23***	-0.24***	-0.23***
	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
N	696	2787	2787	1395	1400	1384
R^2	0.163	0.131	0.131	0.148	0.147	0.153
Adj. R^2	0.136	0.124	0.124	0.134	0.133	0.138
Treatment			-0.02	-0.07	0.06	-0.03
			(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Fear	-0.28***	-0.29***	-0.29***	-0.27***	-0.29***	-0.29***
	(0.030)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
N	696	2787	2787	1395	1400	1384
R^2	0.160	0.156	0.156	0.159	0.167	0.166
Adj. R^2	0.132	0.149	0.149	0.145	0.153	0.152

Note: This table reports the estimated impact of treatments and emotions on the outcome. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Online Appendix

Hope: Additional Results

Table D1: Heterogeneous Effect of Treatments on Locus of Control

		Locus of control				
	Group size	Control	Any video	Environment	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gender						
Men	1,217	4.35	−0.35***	−0.37***	−0.31**	−0.35***
		(1.497)	(0.103)	(0.132)	(0.126)	(0.131)
Women	1,570	4.17	−0.38***	−0.38***	−0.36***	−0.42***
		(1.380)	(0.090)	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.116)
Men = Women			0.831	0.947	0.759	0.670
Age group						
20-29	317	4.05	−0.14	−0.04	−0.18	−0.27
		(1.431)	(0.206)	(0.264)	(0.262)	(0.272)
30-54	1,274	4.16	−0.27***	−0.26**	−0.21	−0.30**
		(1.403)	(0.100)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.128)
55+	1,196	4.39	−0.53***	−0.57***	−0.50***	−0.50***
		(1.458)	(0.102)	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.130)
20-29 = 30-54 = 55+			0.090	0.090	0.197	0.499
Social media usage						
Never	1,062	4.39	−0.52***	−0.51***	−0.50***	−0.65***
		(1.427)	(0.108)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.139)
Sometimes	1,038	4.21	−0.26**	−0.27*	−0.21	−0.21
		(1.372)	(0.110)	(0.141)	(0.133)	(0.140)
Often	687	4.06	−0.27*	−0.31*	−0.27	−0.24
		(1.527)	(0.140)	(0.178)	(0.170)	(0.180)
Never = Sometimes			0.092	0.211	0.127	0.024
Often = Sometimes			0.972	0.845	0.781	0.885
TV usage						
Never	303	4.28	−0.48**	−0.49*	−0.49*	−0.33
		(1.589)	(0.214)	(0.272)	(0.258)	(0.278)
Sometimes	916	4.12	−0.18	−0.09	−0.24*	−0.15
		(1.407)	(0.117)	(0.150)	(0.145)	(0.150)
Often	1,568	4.32	−0.46***	−0.51***	−0.36***	−0.54***
		(1.420)	(0.090)	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.113)
Never = Sometimes			0.220	0.197	0.396	0.565
Never = Often			0.961	0.948	0.630	0.474
Political wing						
Left	309	4.07	−0.44**	−0.55**	−0.35	−0.58**
		(1.447)	(0.208)	(0.253)	(0.261)	(0.266)
Center	1,707	4.22	−0.34***	−0.30***	−0.29***	−0.39***
		(1.390)	(0.084)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.109)
Right	771	4.38	−0.43***	−0.49***	−0.45***	−0.34**
		(1.533)	(0.133)	(0.165)	(0.158)	(0.168)
Left = Center			0.647	0.362	0.855	0.505
Left = Right			0.975	0.855	0.724	0.452
Observations	2787	696	2787	1395	1400	1384

Table continued on next page.

Table D1: Heterogeneous Effect of Treatments on Locus of Control (continued)

		Locus of control				
	Group size	Control	Any video	Environment	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Risk aversion						
Low	1,617	4.39	−0.38***	−0.43***	−0.33***	−0.31***
		(1.382)	(0.089)	(0.112)	(0.109)	(0.115)
High	1,170	4.04	−0.36***	−0.30**	−0.34***	−0.49***
		(1.484)	(0.105)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.133)
Low = High			0.851	0.428	0.960	0.319
Political wing × Risk aversion						
Left Low	165	4.13	−0.41	−0.61*	−0.23	−0.34
		(1.476)	(0.305)	(0.363)	(0.368)	(0.377)
Center Low	996	4.34	−0.34***	−0.28**	−0.34**	−0.29**
		(1.354)	(0.110)	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.143)
Right Low	456	4.59	−0.47***	−0.73***	−0.39*	−0.33
		(1.411)	(0.171)	(0.215)	(0.204)	(0.224)
Left High	144	4.02	−0.45	−0.44	−0.46	−0.84**
		(1.440)	(0.290)	(0.357)	(0.377)	(0.388)
Center High	711	4.06	−0.33**	−0.33**	−0.23	−0.52***
		(1.429)	(0.133)	(0.165)	(0.163)	(0.171)
Right High	315	4.02	−0.36*	−0.16	−0.54**	−0.29
		(1.672)	(0.213)	(0.260)	(0.251)	(0.262)
Risk-lovers: Left = Right			0.857	0.777	0.697	0.990
Risk averse: Left = Right			0.816	0.519	0.845	0.244
Risk-lovers: Left = Center = Right			0.811	0.184	0.926	0.982
Risk averse: Left = Center = Right			0.938	0.785	0.546	0.498
Observations	2787	696	2787	1395	1400	1384

Note: This table reports the estimated impact of threats exposure on locus of control computed as the self reported feeling of control over their destiny. The variable has a mean of 4.25 and the standard deviation of 1.43 in the control group. Column (1) reports the number of observations in each subpopulation. Control group means and sandard deviations are shown in Column (2). Treatment effects (treated minus control) are reported in Column (3) fir all treatments pooled, and in Columns (4)-(6) for the environmental, terrorism, and war videos, respectively. P-values from equality tests appear below each panel. All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Emotional Patterns: Sensitivity Analysis

A few studies suggest that affective states contribute to shape trust in both experimental and real-world settings. Engelmann et al. (2019) provide neuroeconomic evidence that negative emotions disrupt trust by altering brain activity patterns associated with emotional processing, risk perception and cooperative behavior.[42] Myers and Tingley (2016) show that the impact of negative emotions on trust depends on the type of affective response they generate. Specifically, anxiety increases risk aversion and uncertainty, leading individuals to withdraw trust, whereas anger can have more varied effects, depending on whether it triggers a desire for retribution or a mobilization toward action. In our study, both fear and anger increased in response to threat exposure, suggesting that heightened emotional arousal compounds trust erosion. Results are confirmed in a richer specification including sadness and joy, as reported in Table E1.

Further distinctions between emotional effects on trust are made by Dunn and Schweitzer (2005), who find that happiness fosters cooperation and strengthens trust, while negative emotions—particularly anger—undermine trust when blame is attributed to others. These patterns are consistent with our findings. Interestingly, the authors also report that sadness does not always reduce trust, as it is often linked to external, uncontrollable events rather than interpersonal betrayal. In Table E1, results show that sadness increases following threat exposure, yet its correlation with trust exhibited a sign reversal, implying that its effect on trust may be contingent on whether the threat is perceived as a personal or systemic risk.[43] Future research should examine different threat types, and question whether perceived agency over threats moderates the emotional pathways potentially affecting trust.

Finally, we examine the pattern of emotional associations with hope. In Table 5, which focuses on anger, disgust, and fear, fear emerged as the most consistent correlate of hope, aligning with classical philosophical perspectives (Blöser and Stahl, 2019). However, additional (unreported) estimations suggest that sadness may play an even more prominent

42. In particular, the amygdala is key in processing fear and detecting threats, while its activation is also associated with lower trust in threatening contexts. Nonetheless, Engelmann et al. (2019) also indicates that trust erosion reflects deeper neurological changes in how individuals assess social interactions. Other studies also show that the prefrontal cortex can regulate emotional effects, allowing for rational assessment of threats and not just instinctive distrust (e.g., Todorov et al., 2008; Declerck et al., 2013; Filkowski et al., 2016).

43. Note that this result on sadness is not due to the presence of joy in the model. Additional (unreported) estimations with the four negative-valenced emotions only point to the same results on comovements (anger and fear) and decoupling/sign-reversal (sadness).

role among negative emotions. In the more comprehensive specification presented in Table E2, joy appears as the dominant emotional correlate of hope. The correlation with anger increases slightly in response to terrorism-related threats, while the association with fear strengthens more systematically across all threat types (columns 3–4). At the same time, we observe a decoupling between hope and joy. Although both hope and joy decrease on average following a threat, the weakening of their correlation indicates greater individual variability in emotional responses. For some, hope may persist as a cognitive or motivational strategy despite the loss of joy. For others, hope may diminish due to bleak future expectations, while joy, as a present-oriented emotion, may be less affected.

Table E1: Association between Trust in Others and Emotions by Experimental Group (extended)

	Control	All treat.	Environm.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Anger	0.03	-0.09***	-0.05	-0.10**	-0.12***
	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.043)
Disgust	-0.08**	-0.04*	-0.07*	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Fear	0.05	-0.09***	-0.08*	-0.08*	-0.10**
	(0.048)	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Sadness	-0.10**	0.06**	0.03	0.05	0.10**
	(0.045)	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Joy	0.06*	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.10***
	(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.032)
N	696	2091	699	704	688
R^2	0.088	0.116	0.135	0.147	0.112
Adj. R^2	0.052	0.105	0.102	0.114	0.077
Test emotions (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of emotions on the outcome.
Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E2: Association between Hope and Emotions by Experimental Group (extended)

	Control	All treat.	Environm.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Anger	-0.06	-0.08***	-0.04	-0.08	-0.09**
	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.045)
Disgust	-0.06	0.01	-0.07*	0.04	0.04
	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Fear	-0.03	-0.12***	-0.13***	-0.11**	-0.12***
	(0.047)	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.047)
Sadness	-0.02	-0.01	0.06	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.044)	(0.027)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Joy	0.48***	0.31***	0.31***	0.34***	0.30***
	(0.037)	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.034)
N	696	2091	699	704	688
R^2	0.366	0.261	0.241	0.314	0.288
Adj. R^2	0.341	0.251	0.212	0.288	0.260
Test emotions (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of emotions on the outcome.
Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Deep parameters

Table F1: Effect of Treatments on Risk Preference

	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.04	0.02	0.08	0.03
	(0.107)	(0.140)	(0.138)	(0.137)
Relative to the mean (in %)	0.64	0.39	1.31	0.49
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	1.5	0.9	3.1	1.2
Observations	2,787	1,395	1,400	1,384
R^2	0.145	0.208	0.220	0.246

Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of threats on risk aversion. the self reported position on a 1-10 scale where 1 means loving risk and 10 means being very cautious. The variable has a mean of 5.77 and the standard deviation of 2.43 in the control group. Treatment effects are reported in Column (1) for all treatments pooled, and in Columns (2)-(4) for the environmental, terrorism and war videos, respectively. All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table F2: Effect of Treatments on Preference for the Future

	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.07	0.05	0.10	0.09
	(0.108)	(0.142)	(0.139)	(0.140)
Relative to the mean (in %)	1.09	0.74	1.56	1.51
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	2.7	1.8	3.9	3.7
Observations	2,787	1,395	1,400	1,384
R^2	0.137	0.205	0.205	0.236

Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of threats on preference for the future. the self reported position on a 1-10 sale where 1 means living day by day and 10 means thinking ahead. The variable has a mean of 6.14 and the standard deviation of 2.47 in the control group. Treatment effects are reported in Column (1) for all treatments pooled, and in Columns (2)-(4) for the environmental, terrorism and war videos, respectively. All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Estimations: Trust in Institutions

We examine here the impact of threats on trust in institutions. Several results are noteworthy. On average, trust in institutions is not significantly affected by threat videos (see Table G1). However, heterogeneous patterns do emerge (Table G2). Notably, while gender differences were not significant for interpersonal trust and hope, women's trust in institutions declines significantly following the environmental threat video, with a statistically significant gender gap in this case. Trust in institutions also decreases among right-wing voters in response to terrorist threats and among young men exposed to the war threat. We examine emotional variation in Tables G3 and G4. In the control group, opposing emotional forces are at play: while disgust is negatively correlated with institutional trust, fear shows a positive association when controlling for other negative emotions. Anger, by contrast, does not significantly influence trust, suggesting it may be less of a persistent emotional state. However, anger can be triggered by threat exposure: in the treated groups, we observe co-movements between trust and anger across all threat types. A similar pattern emerges for fear, as in Table G3, the positive coefficient observed in the control group tends to vanish following treatment. Furthermore, Table G3 shows that the treatment effect, when conditioned on emotions, becomes significantly *positive* in response to terrorism and war. This pattern appears not only with anger and disgust, but also in unreported estimations combining multiple emotions. One possible interpretation is the emergence of a solidarity or "rally around the flag" effect, partially offsetting the distrust generated by threats and their associated emotional responses.[44] Still, this remains a speculative interpretation, both regarding the existence of such a rally effect and the role of emotional mediation, as previously discussed.[45]

44. Dinesen and Jæger (2013) show that institutional trust can temporarily rise after terrorist attacks as citizens defer to authority figures. This 'rally around the flag' effect has also been observed in response to pandemics, economic crises, and other threats, though it is typically short-lived and depends on perceived institutional performance and transparency (Kritzinger et al., 2021; Jha and Tripathi, 2024; Ananyev and Guriev, 2019; Geys and Qari, 2017; Aksoy et al., 2021; Sullivan and Young, 2020).

45. Our measure of trust in institutions combines trust in the government, trust in French institutions, and trust in the EU. While this broad scope might dilute feelings of specific blame (for natural disasters) or lack of protection (against terror), additional analyses focused on trust in government alone yield similar results, with slightly stronger patterns for anger and fear (see Table G3).

Table G1: Effect of Treatments on Trust in Institutions (index)

	Any video	Env.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	−0.04	−0.12	0.02	−0.02
	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.086)
Relative to the mean (in %)	1.22	3.61	0.63	0.52
Relative to the std. dev. (in %)	2.7	8.0	1.4	1.1
Observations	2,787	1,395	1,400	1,384
R^2	0.149	0.216	0.232	0.235

Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of threats on trust in institutions. the average of trust in French insitutions, the current government and the European Union (each rated on a 1-7 scale). The variable has a mean of 3.36 and the standard deviation of 1.51 in the control group. Treatment effects are reported in Column (1) for all treatments pooled, and in Columns (2)-(4) for the environmental, terrorism and war videos, respectively. All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table G2: Heterogeneous Effect of Treatments on Trust in Institutions (index)

		Trust in institutions				
	Group size	Control	Any video	Environment	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gender						
Men	1,217	3.30	0.09	0.18	0.08	0.06
		(1.585)	(0.103)	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.129)
Women	1,570	3.40	−0.14	−0.33***	−0.03	−0.08
		(1.456)	(0.090)	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.115)
Men = Women			0.100	0.004	0.538	0.439
Age group						
20-29	317	3.36	−0.04	0.00	0.08	−0.26
		(1.390)	(0.206)	(0.270)	(0.277)	(0.269)
30-54	1,274	3.16	0.03	−0.04	0.17	−0.01
		(1.420)	(0.100)	(0.129)	(0.132)	(0.127)
55+	1,196	3.57	−0.12	−0.23*	−0.13	0.02
		(1.615)	(0.102)	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.128)
20-29 = 30-54 = 55+			0.598	0.509	0.250	0.636
Social media usage						
Never	1,062	3.46	−0.02	−0.11	0.01	0.02
		(1.618)	(0.108)	(0.136)	(0.141)	(0.138)
Sometimes	1,038	3.27	0.00	−0.06	0.22	−0.07
		(1.467)	(0.110)	(0.144)	(0.141)	(0.139)
Often	687	3.31	−0.13	−0.24	−0.29	0.00
		(1.393)	(0.140)	(0.182)	(0.180)	(0.178)
Never = Sometimes			0.851	0.794	0.314	0.649
Often = Sometimes			0.444	0.447	0.027	0.756
TV usage						
Never	303	2.72	0.05	−0.03	0.27	−0.08
		(1.351)	(0.210)	(0.273)	(0.268)	(0.271)
Sometimes	916	3.09	0.11	0.07	0.18	0.08
		(1.413)	(0.115)	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.146)
Often	1,568	3.64	−0.14	−0.25**	−0.08	−0.06
		(1.542)	(0.088)	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.110)
Never = Sometimes			0.805	0.756	0.781	0.596
Never = Often			0.394	0.467	0.224	0.933
Political wing						
Left	309	3.07	0.04	−0.09	0.11	0.04
		(1.322)	(0.199)	(0.251)	(0.262)	(0.256)
Center	1,707	3.62	0.05	−0.06	0.27**	0.03
		(1.475)	(0.081)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.105)
Right	771	2.81	−0.18	−0.19	−0.36**	−0.07
		(1.526)	(0.127)	(0.164)	(0.159)	(0.162)
Left = Center			0.968	0.905	0.560	0.984
Left = Right			0.351	0.734	0.125	0.721
Observations	2787	696	2787	1395	1400	1384

Table continued on next page.

Table G2: Heterogeneous Effect of Treatments on Trust in Institutions (continued)

		Trust in institutions				
	Group size	Control	Any video	Environment	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Risk aversion						
Low	1,617	3.38	0.06	0.08	0.12	0.08
		(1.533)	(0.088)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)
High	1,170	3.33	−0.19*	−0.39***	−0.11	−0.17
		(1.487)	(0.104)	(0.132)	(0.135)	(0.131)
Low = High			0.063	0.007	0.185	0.157
Political wing × *Risk aversion*						
Left Low	165	3.11	0.10	0.06	0.16	0.32
		(1.235)	(0.291)	(0.359)	(0.368)	(0.361)
Center Low	996	3.63	0.16	0.23*	0.35**	0.11
		(1.499)	(0.105)	(0.136)	(0.139)	(0.137)
Right Low	456	2.83	−0.10	−0.21	−0.17	−0.04
		(1.549)	(0.163)	(0.212)	(0.204)	(0.215)
Left High	144	3.04	0.02	−0.21	0.11	−0.22
		(1.401)	(0.277)	(0.352)	(0.377)	(0.372)
Center High	711	3.59	−0.10	−0.46***	0.17	−0.10
		(1.444)	(0.127)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.164)
Right High	315	2.77	−0.34*	−0.22	−0.70***	−0.19
		(1.495)	(0.203)	(0.257)	(0.251)	(0.251)
Risk-lovers: Left = Right			0.558	0.514	0.428	0.395
Risk averse: Left = Right			0.292	0.981	0.074	0.950
Risk-lovers: Left = Center = Right			0.398	0.216	0.107	0.673
Risk averse: Left = Center = Right			0.492	0.653	0.012	0.921
Observations	2787	696	2787	1395	1400	1384

Note: This table reports the estimated impact of threats exposure on trust in institutions computed as the average of trust in French insitutions, the current government and the European Union (each rated on a 1-7 scale). The variable has a mean of 3.36 and the standard deviation of 1.51 in the control group. Column (1) reports the number of observations in each subpopulation. Control group means and sandard deviations are shown in Column (2). Treatment effects (treated minus control) are reported in Column (3) fir all treatments pooled, and in Columns (4)-(6) for the environmental, terrorism, and war videos, respectively. P-values from equality tests appear below each panel. All models control for risk aversion, education and interaction of gender, age-group, socio-economic category, and region. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table G3: Effect of Emotions and Treatments on Trust in Institutions

	Control	All treat.	All treat.	Environm.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment			0.13*	-0.00	0.20**	0.13
			(0.067)	(0.081)	(0.085)	(0.084)
Anger	-0.08***	-0.13***	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.14***	-0.11***
	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
N	696	2787	2787	1395	1400	1384
R^2	0.084	0.068	0.069	0.077	0.074	0.067
Adj. R^2	0.054	0.061	0.062	0.061	0.058	0.051
Treatment			0.12*	0.00	0.22***	0.14*
			(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.083)
Disgust	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.14***	-0.11***
	(0.028)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
N	696	2787	2787	1395	1400	1384
R^2	0.098	0.069	0.070	0.084	0.080	0.072
Adj. R^2	0.068	0.061	0.062	0.069	0.064	0.056
Treatment			0.01	-0.09	0.09	0.01
			(0.067)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.083)
Fear	-0.02	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.04*	-0.08***	-0.03
	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
N	696	2787	2787	1395	1400	1384
R^2	0.074	0.047	0.047	0.059	0.054	0.051
Adj. R^2	0.044	0.039	0.039	0.043	0.039	0.035

Note: This table reports the estimated impact of treatments and emotions on the outcome. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table G4: Association between Trust in Institutions and Emotions by Experimental Group

	Control	All treat.	Environm.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Anger	-0.03	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.16***	-0.16***
	(0.052)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.049)
Disgust	-0.18***	-0.07***	-0.09**	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Fear	0.14***	0.06**	0.08**	0.02	0.09**
	(0.048)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.043)
N	696	2091	699	704	688
R^2	0.110	0.086	0.115	0.114	0.097
Adj. R^2	0.078	0.075	0.083	0.083	0.064
Test emotions (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of emotions on the outcome.
Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table G5: Association between Trust in Government and Emotions by Experimental Groups

	Control	All treat.	Environm.	Terrorism	War
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Anger	-0.08	-0.18***	-0.16***	-0.24***	-0.15***
	(0.062)	(0.033)	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.057)
Disgust	-0.17***	-0.07**	-0.09*	-0.03	-0.09*
	(0.056)	(0.028)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.048)
Fear	0.20***	0.09***	0.11**	0.07	0.11**
	(0.057)	(0.027)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.050)
N	696	2091	699	704	688
R^2	0.092	0.075	0.110	0.096	0.098
Adj. R^2	0.059	0.065	0.078	0.064	0.065
Test emotions (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: This table reports the estimated effect of emotions on the outcome.
Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.