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ABSTRACT

Bridging Welfare and Work: Assessing Intensive Job Placement for Minimum Income Recipients*

We evaluate the effects of a randomized activation program targeting recipients of the Spain's national Minimum Income Scheme. The intervention combined personalized coaching, job-search assistance, soft-skills training, and, in one treatment arm, also digital-skills workshops. While short-run employment effects were limited, the program significantly reduced the prevalence of informal work and improved participants' financial resilience. Gains were particularly pronounced among those who received the digital-skills component, who reported large improvements in digital task performance. Half a year after receiving the treatment, administrative social security records show emerging positive effects on days worked, contract stability, and full-time employment, especially in the digital-skills group. We also find evidence of a psychological awareness effect: low-engagement participants reported lower self-assessed transversal skills, possibly reflecting a shift in self-perception. Our findings highlight the potential of multidimensional, personalized activation strategies to foster formalization and digital inclusion among low-income populations.

JEL Classification: I32, I38, E24, C93

Keywords: social inclusion, active labor market policies, randomized controlled trial

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1 Introduction

Minimum income schemes (MIS) have become a cornerstone of last-resort safety nets across many European countries. While their primary aim is to alleviate poverty and provide a financial floor for the most vulnerable, numerous studies suggest that monetary transfers alone are insufficient to facilitate the labor market inclusion of vulnerable populations (Banerjee, Duflo, & Kremer, 2019; Card, Kluve, & Weber, 2018). Active labor market policies (ALMPs), which combine income support with job training and placement services, have shown promise in addressing both the economic and social dimensions of poverty. Nevertheless, considerable debate persists regarding their effectiveness, particularly with respect to long-term employment outcomes (Crépon & Van Den Berg, 2016; Kluve, 2010).

Spain’s labor market is characterized by a pronounced duality: strict dismissal costs for open-ended contracts coexist with one of the highest shares of temporary work in the EU (20.6% in 2024, vs. an EU-27 average of 12.8%)(Eurostat, 2024). This segmentation disproportionately affects low-skilled and long-term unemployed individuals, for whom informal or unstable jobs often represent the only available entry point. As a result, policies that not only provide income support but also facilitate access to formal employment are increasingly seen as essential.

Spain introduced a nationwide Minimum Income Scheme (MIS, or Ingreso Mínimo Vital in Spanish) in May 2020, amid the COVID-19 crisis. While regional schemes existed prior to that, the national MIS marked a shift toward a more comprehensive and centrally administered system. Despite its growing importance, rigorous evidence on how to support labor market reintegration among MIS recipients remains scarce. To address this evidence gap, the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration launched a series of pilot interventions co-funded by the Next Generation EU program, aimed at complementing the MIS with targeted activation measures.

The EMPLEA LAB pilot project, implemented by Cáritas España, is part of this national strategy. It aims to enhance the labor insertion and employability of individuals aged 16 to 65 residing in various provinces of Spain who are recipients of the MIS or at risk of social exclusion. The initiative provides intensive support, including group training in job search techniques, transversal and digital skills development, and connections to the local business network. Participants were randomly assigned into three groups—one control and two treatment groups—through randomized controlled trials (RCTs), which are recognized for their ability to provide credible estimates of causal effects (Bouguen, Huang, Kremer, & Miguel, 2019).

Our intervention delivered individualized support through structured itineraries that combined job search assistance, soft skills training, and, in one treatment arm, also digital skills training. While all participants received some form of light-touch guidance, the treatment groups differed in intensity and content: one group received a comprehensive mix of personalized coaching and group

workshops focused on transversal skills and labor intermediation, while the second group received the same package with the addition of digital skills training. The program design reflects recent insights emphasizing that long-term welfare recipients often lack non-cognitive (rather than cognitive) and digital competencies that are crucial for successful labor market reintegration (Heckman, Stixrud, & Urzua, 2006; Lindqvist & Vestman, 2011).

Non-cognitive skills—such as self-discipline, self-efficacy, and perseverance—are increasingly recognized as critical determinants of economic and behavioral outcomes, including employment, earnings, and the ability to withstand adverse shocks (Heckman & Kautz, 2012; Kautz, Heckman, Diris, Ter Weel, & Borghans, 2014). Their importance has grown in recent decades as labor markets increasingly reward social and interpersonal abilities (Deming, 2017). Although once regarded as stable personality traits, there is now substantial evidence that non-cognitive skills can be developed through well-designed interventions, even in adulthood—especially when these programs are intensive, sustained, and tailored to individual needs (Kautz et al., 2014). These insights have yet to be fully integrated into activation strategies for MIS recipients, especially in Southern European countries.

Alongside these soft skills, digital competencies have become increasingly central to employability and social inclusion. Digital proficiency has moved from “desirable” to “essential” in the post-pandemic workplace. The European Commission’s *Digital Economy and Society Index 2024* still ranks Spain only 15th out of 27 on basic digital skills, with gaps especially large among low-income adults. Embedding a structured digital-skills module in an ALMP therefore addresses a nationally recognized bottleneck while providing evidence that is scarce in the evaluation literature.

Our study makes several contributions to the literature on ALMPs and poverty alleviation. First, it offers one of the earliest RCT-based evaluations of an activation strategy for MIS recipients in Spain—a context marked by persistent structural unemployment and social exclusion, and where rigorous evaluation of social programs has been relatively limited. Second, it contributes to the growing literature on soft and digital skills as malleable, policy-relevant inputs into employability, particularly among vulnerable populations (Crépon & Van Den Berg, 2016; Schlosser & Shanan, 2025). Finally, by comparing two treatment arms that differ in intensity and content, we examine not only whether activation is effective, but also which combination of supports yields the greatest impact.

We find that, in the short run, the program had limited effects on overall employment levels but contributed to a meaningful shift in the nature of employment: treated individuals were significantly less likely to engage in informal or precarious work, indicating improved access to formal labor market opportunities. Additionally, the intervention improved participants’ economic resilience, as measured by a reduced likelihood of default. These effects were particularly pronounced among those who received the digital skills module, underscoring the importance of equipping vul-

nerable individuals with competencies increasingly essential in a digitalized labor market. While we observe robust improvements in self-assessed digital skills, the effects on transversal (soft) skills were more nuanced: participants with low engagement in the training program reported lower self-assessments, possibly reflecting updated self-awareness or discouragement. These findings highlight the importance of program design and sustained engagement in shaping both skills and self-efficacy.

Overall, our results suggest that personalized, multidimensional activation strategies—combining coaching, skill development, and digital inclusion—hold promise in supporting labor market inclusion for MIS recipients. They also point to the need to tailor interventions not only to labor demand conditions but also to the psychological and technical preparedness of program participants. These insights are timely as Spain and other countries seek to improve the effectiveness and fiscal sustainability of their guaranteed income programs.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional context and the details of the intervention. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the main results and explores underlying mechanisms. Section 5 concludes.

2 Background: Institutional Context and Experimental Details

2.1 The EMPLEA-LAB pilot project

The EMPLEA LAB pilot project, implemented by Cáritas Española—a non-profit organization affiliated with the Catholic Church—is part of the national portfolio of activation programs launched alongside the MIS. The program targets individuals aged 16 to 65 residing in the provinces of Albacete, Barcelona, Cuenca, Girona, Guadalajara, León, Lugo, Menorca, Ourense, Valladolid, and Zamora. Eligible participants include recipients of the national or the regional MIS or individuals identified as being at risk of or experiencing social exclusion.

The core objective of the pilot is to assess whether personalized and intensive support—including group training in job search strategies, transversal and digital skills, and facilitated engagement with local employers—can enhance beneficiaries’ employability and subjective well-being. Participants were recruited through multiple channels: administrative lists of MIS recipients provided by the Ministry, referrals from local social services in participating municipalities, and outreach efforts by Cáritas and other partnering social organizations.

To estimate the causal impact of the intervention, we implemented a randomized controlled trial (RCT), a method widely regarded as the gold standard for program evaluation (Bouguen et al., 2019). The random assignment was conducted by the General Secretariat for Inclusion (SGI), which allocated participants into one control group and two treatment groups. Randomization was stratified by province across the 11 participating locations, and was carried out at the household level, with only one individual per household participating in the vast majority of cases.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups. The control group received a light-touch intervention consisting of three group training sessions on career guidance, each lasting 1.5 hours. The first treatment group was offered a more intensive three-month itinerary, which included the same three career guidance sessions, plus seven additional sessions focused on active job search, eight workshops aimed at improving basic and soft/transversal skills, individual counseling sessions tailored to participants' needs, and four intermediary-led sessions designed to facilitate contact with potential employers. The group workshops followed a hands-on, participatory format that encouraged peer support and mutual engagement. Individual sessions were personalized based on the specific reinforcement needs of each participant. The second treatment group received the full itinerary of the first treatment group, along with eight additional sessions focused on developing digital skills relevant to job search and labor market access.¹

Recognizing that individuals at risk of social exclusion often face barriers related to unmet basic needs, the program offered financial support to all participants, regardless of group assignment, including conditional assistance to help cover essential expenses such as food, hygiene, clothing, energy, and transportation. Attendance-based stipends (5 euros per hour of participation in any of the activities) were provided to support adherence and encourage completion of the program.

Program implementation began in February 2023 and was delivered over a period of three months per participant. To manage logistics and ensure effective delivery, the intervention was organized into three sequential waves or *editions* with activities extending through the end of November 2023. Because not all participants entered the program simultaneously, both random assignment and data collection (at baseline and endline) were conducted separately for each wave. Table 1 presents the implementation timeline showing the sequential interventions analyzed in here.

The EMPLEA LAB program was designed to improve the labor market integration of vulnerable individuals—specifically, recipients of the MIS or those at risk of social exclusion. The program combined personalized coaching, soft skills workshops, and, in one treatment arm, digital literacy training. To guide the evaluation, we defined a set of hypotheses covering key dimensions of economic resilience, labor market activity, and skill development.

The first domain concerns material well-being. Beyond employment, the intervention may enhance participants' ability to stabilize their income or reduce financial strain. To capture this, we examine effects on net monthly income (averaged over the past six months) and on self-reported financial security, proxied by the absence of arrears in the previous year.

The second domain focuses on labor market activity. We assess changes in employment status and job quality, including the prevalence of informal or precarious work. We also track job search effort—such as the number of applications and interviews—as intermediate outcomes likely to respond to activation support.

¹See Appendix A for more details about the group sessions.

A third dimension relates to transversal or soft skills. These include self-knowledge, emotional regulation, and communication, which are increasingly rewarded in the labor market (Deming, 2017; Kautz et al., 2014). While challenging to measure, we use self-assessed indices of participants’ perceived strengths and readiness for employment as proxies for non-cognitive development.

Finally, we evaluate digital literacy, especially relevant in the digitally enhanced treatment arm. Outcomes include the use of digital tools for job search (such as sending CVs online and navigating public platforms) as well as broader digital competencies, like using email, cloud storage, or video conferencing tools.

Although our analysis presents results across all domains, we place particular emphasis on three aspects that are both policy-relevant and theoretically salient: the shift toward formal employment, improvements in digital literacy, and the evolution of perceived soft skills. Together, these outcomes reflect the multidimensional nature of employability and the potential of integrated activation strategies to support labor market reintegration.

2.2 Data

Sample A total of 2,364 individuals completed the baseline survey. Based on the randomization conducted by the SGI, 1,055 participants (44.6%) were assigned to the control group, 656 (27.8%) to Treatment 1 group, and 653 (27.6%) to Treatment 2 group.²

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the stratification variables, and Table 3 for the baseline characteristics of participants and pre-intervention outcome measures.³ Both tables are based on information collected before the start of the intervention (Pre survey).

Among the 2,364 participants in our sample, the provincial distribution mirrors the program’s geographic coverage, with the largest shares located in Barcelona (19%), León (14%), and Ourense (13%). The average age is 44 years. Women represent a clear majority, comprising 69% of respondents, and 75% hold Spanish nationality. Regarding educational attainment, 62% have completed compulsory education or basic vocational training (FP), while 18% did not complete compulsory education. Only 7% have attained university-level education, and 14% hold a baccalaureate or higher vocational degree. Non-formal training is reported by just 1% of the sample.

In terms of household structure, 30% of participants live in single-parent households, and 18% live alone. The average household size is 2.9 people. About 65% of respondents live in rented accommodation, while 19% are homeowners and 16% live in other types of housing. Additionally, 11% of participants report having a recognized disability.

²During fieldwork for the third wave, a transmission error in the parish-level assignment resulted in 45 individuals being incorrectly allocated to the wrong treatment group. Accordingly, we report results based both on the original random assignment and on the actual treatment received, and we provide robustness checks excluding the misassigned cases.

³As detailed in Appendix B, outcome indicators are constructed from multiple survey items and the missing responses are imputed using group-specific means within each treatment arm and the control group.

Labor market attachment is limited. More than half (54%) report being unemployed and actively seeking work, while 76% are considered active in the labor market. Only 23% are currently employed, and among them, 29% report holding a job without a formal contract.

Self-assessed availability for participation in training activities is generally high: over half report availability in the morning, 18% in the afternoon, and 30% at any time. Twelve percent were already enrolled in another program at baseline.

With respect to income, the average monthly earnings over the prior six months was 782 euros. However, this figure is highly skewed, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 3,200 euros.

Indicators related to job search behavior show low levels of engagement: participants submitted, on average, fewer than two job applications and attended fewer than one interview over the previous three months. Only 5% had been selected in a recruitment process, and 4% reported having declined a job offer.

Finally, digital competencies vary substantially across participants. Around 27% had submitted a CV online in the previous week, and 84% reported being able to obtain information from government websites or applications. However, more advanced digital tasks—such as attaching files to emails, managing cloud storage, or using video conferencing tools—show more limited proficiency, with mean scores generally between 2.0 and 2.6 on a 1–4 scale.

Balance in experimental groups Tables 4, 5 and 6 report the balance contrasts between the control group and the two treatment groups. All data reflected in these tables refer to the survey conducted before the intervention (baseline). Table 4 shows that the stratification variables (edition and province) are balanced. In Table 5 we include individual characteristics and in 6 we include outcome indicators measured at baseline. All statistical tests in Tables 5 and 6 include the randomization strata as controls. As explained above, the variables used in the stratification are edition (1, 2 or 3) and province (11 provinces), so there are a total of 33 randomization strata.

Among the demographic characteristics, the only unbalanced variables are the number of people residing in the home, the composition of the household (one-person and single-parent households), the housing tenure regime (ownership vs. rental), availability at any time, and the employment status of activity and of being unemployed but looking for work. As for the outcome indicators, the unbalanced indicators are the average income in the last 6 months, having been selected in a process in the last month, the ability to use communication tools for interviews, and finally, the indicator of sending completed forms. In the estimates, all these imbalances will be controlled except for availability at any time and for the number of people residing in the home because they are not balanced in only one of the two treatment groups versus the control, while in the regressions we will always include the two treatment groups and the control group.

Degree of participation in the intervention and sample attrition Table 7 shows the total number of participants who agreed to take part in the evaluation. Of the 2,364 who responded to the initial survey, 1,880 (79.5%) also responded to the first endline survey (Post1). The percentage is similar among the 656 initially assigned to treatment 1 (79.1% of them responded to that Post1 survey), the 653 initially assigned to treatment 2 (79.2%) and the 1,055 initially assigned to the control (80%). This is relevant for the variables used to construct the outcome indicators, because the sample size is reduced in the regressions presented in the next section. If, instead of the initial assignment in columns (1) and (2), we consider the assignment that occurred in the field after the fortuitous error in the third edition in which 45 cases were assigned to the wrong group, we see that the attrition percentages do not vary (columns (3) and (4)). Finally, if we exclude those 45 problematic cases, the attrition percentage remains at 79% (columns (5) and (6)).⁴ The percentages are very similar for the second endline survey that was conducted (Post2).

To assess whether this difference in sample attrition rate across groups is statistically significant, a regression of the non-conducted endline survey binary variable on assignment to each treatment group is estimated, including strata as regressors.

Table 8 shows the results corresponding to the first endline survey (Post 1). The coefficient on the treatment variable in column (1) is 0.008 and is not statistically significant. It is also not statistically significant when we consider each treatment group separately in column (2). Finally, to test whether sample attrition is selective, regressions are estimated, including as additional regressors, family characteristics and the interactions of each of these with the treatment variables. Column (3) shows the estimated coefficients for the interactions. Only the interaction with age is significant at the 5% level.⁵

Table 9 shows the results corresponding to the second endline survey (Post 2). The coefficient on the treatment variable in column (1) is 0.027 and is statistically significant only at the 10% level. It is also statistically significant for Treatment 1 but not for Treatment 2 (as shown in column (2)). Column (3) shows the estimated coefficients for the interactions. The interaction with Disability is significant at the 10% level.⁶

3 Econometric specification

The regression model specified to estimate the causal effect in a randomized experiment is often simply the difference in the variable of interest between each treatment group and the control group, since these groups are statistically comparable due to randomization, conditional on taking into

⁴Technically, we give more credibility to the first (initial) assignment because it is the one that responds to the random assignment designed in the SGI. In any case, given that the error appears to have been fortuitous, the other two assignments should not give very different results, as we will indeed see is the case.

⁵This variable enters as an additional control in the regressions of the short-term effect we perform.

⁶This variable enters as an additional control in the regressions of the medium-term effect we perform.

account stratification and unbalanced variables at baseline (this ensures that differences between treatment and control groups before the intervention are accounted for in the analysis). In addition, the analysis that follows presents regressions that control for the baseline, i.e., pre-intervention value of the dependent variable whenever possible, which improves the precision of the estimates.

Specifically, the base specification of the regressions presented below is as follows:

$$Y_{i,t=1,2} = \alpha + \beta T_i + \gamma Y_{i,t=0} + X_i' \delta + \epsilon_i$$

where $Y_{i,t=1,2}$ is the dependent variable of interest for family i observed right after the intervention ($t = 1$, short-run effect) or three months after the program finished ($t = 2$, medium-run effect), T_i indicates whether the family has been assigned to either of the two treatment groups, $Y_{i,t=0}$ is the initial value of the dependent variable (i.e., before the intervention), X_i is a vector of controls that includes the randomization strata and the unbalanced variables in Tables 4-6 and Tables 8-9, and ϵ_i is the error term.

In addition, a specification such as the following is also considered:

$$Y_{i,t=1,2} = \alpha + \beta T_{1i} + \mu T_{2i} + \gamma Y_{i,t=0} + X_i' \delta + \epsilon_i$$

where $Y_{i,t=1,2}$ is the dependent variable of interest for family i observed right after the intervention ($t = 1$, short-run effect) or three months after the program finished ($t = 2$, medium-run effect), T_{1i} indicates whether the family has been assigned to treatment 1 ($=1$), T_{2i} indicates whether the family has been assigned to treatment 2 ($=1$), $Y_{i,t=0}$ is the initial value of the dependent variable (i.e., before the intervention), X_i is a vector of controls that includes the randomization strata and the unbalanced variables in Tables 4-6 and Tables 8-9, and ϵ_i is the error term.

Standard errors are clustered at the household level because in some cases there is more than one participant from the same family (always belonging to the same experimental group).

4 Main Results

This section presents the causal impacts of the program, right after finishing the intervention (Post1, short-run effect) and three months after (Post2, medium-run effect).⁷ Following best practices for interpretability, all outcome variables—except for income and raw counts of job

⁷The results reported in the main text correspond to the initial randomly assigned treatment status of the participants. As a robustness check, Appendix C presents parallel results using both the final field assignment and the sample excluding the small number of misassigned cases. These results are substantively identical to those presented here, and any minor differences are noted in the text.

applications/interviews—have been standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.⁸ This allows the regression coefficients to be interpreted in terms of standard deviation units, facilitating the comparison of effect sizes.

4.1 Effects on Economic Conditions

We first analyze the program’s impact on participants’ economic well-being, focusing on income and financial hardship. The results are presented in Table 10. We find no statistically significant effects on average monthly income in either the short-term (Panel A, columns (1)-(2)) or the medium-term (Panel B, columns (1)-(2)). However, the intervention had a positive and significant impact on financial resilience for participants in Treatment 2. As shown in panel B, column (4), in the medium term, participants who received digital skills training were 0.099 standard deviations more likely to report having avoided payment arrears over the past year ($p < 0.10$).

4.2 Effects on Labor Market Outcomes and Job Quality

We next examine the program’s effect on employment and job search. The results, shown in Tables 11 and 12, reveal a complex story centered on a shift in job *quality* rather than an immediate increase in the employment rate.

The most prominent positive result is a significant shift towards formal employment. As shown in Table 11, panel A, column (6), participants in Treatment 1 were 0.125 standard deviations less likely to be working without a formal contract in the short term ($p < 0.05$). This effect on formalization is substantial. Given that we find no significant increase in the overall short-term employment rate (Table 11, panel A, column (4)), this suggests the program’s primary achievement was helping participants already in precarious jobs to secure formal contracts, a critical step towards stability in Spain’s dual labor market [Bentolila and Dolado \(1994\)](#). Interestingly, in the medium term, we observe a small but statistically significant *negative* effect on the probability of being employed. Table 11, panel B, column (4) shows that participants in Treatment 1 were 0.140 standard deviations less likely to be working compared to the control group ($p < 0.01$). This reduction in employment does not, however, reflect a withdrawal from the labor market; as shown in column (8) of the same table, there is no corresponding decrease in the likelihood of being unemployed and actively looking for work. One interpretation is that the intervention, by improving skills and awareness, may have empowered participants to leave low-quality jobs to search for better, more formal opportunities.

Consistent with a focus on job quality over quantity, we find no evidence that the intervention increased overall job search intensity, as measured by applications or interviews (Table 12). It is

⁸For indices that combine multiple survey items (e.g., soft skills), we use [Anderson \(2008\)](#)’s method to create a weighted aggregate of the standardized components. This approach addresses multiple inference challenges by creating a single summary measure for each conceptual domain.

also important to note that, as measured by these employment indicators, the additional digital skills sessions in Treatment 2 did not translate into higher employment rates relative to Treatment 1 within this time frame.

4.3 Effects on Skills and Self-Perception

Finally, we evaluate the program’s direct goal of improving skills. The intervention was highly effective at improving *digital skills*, the specific goal of Treatment 2. The results in Table 13 show large and statistically significant improvements across a range of digital tasks, including creating a cloud account (+0.165 SD) and using e-government portals (+0.126 SD). However, this acquisition of skills did not always translate into more frequent use of digital devices or procedures for job searching (Tables 14 and 15) suggesting a potential gap between competence and application.

The impact on self-perceived transversal skills is more complex, potentially reflecting an *awareness effect* (Belot, Kircher, & Muller, 2019). On average, the main treatment effect on self-knowledge and soft skills is negative (Table 16, panel A, columns (1) and (5)). However, this is mediated by engagement. As shown in Table 16, panel A, columns (4) and (8), the interaction between Treatment 1 and frequent attendance is positive and significant (+0.206 and +0.202, respectively), indicating that fully engaged participants reported significant improvements in their self-knowledge and soft skills. These patterns persist in the medium term (Table 16, panel B), underscoring that sustained engagement was essential. However, it should be noted that the attendance to the sessions can be the result of the intervention itself.

4.4 Validation using administrative data on employment

To supplement our survey-based findings, we analyze administrative data on employment from the Spanish Social Security Administration.⁹

The administrative data broadly corroborates and further extends our survey results. While the survey data pointed to an immediate improvement in job quality, the administrative data reveals positive effects on the quantity and stability of work that emerge over a longer time horizon. Specifically, we find significant positive effects on the number of days worked, the probability of working full-time, and holding a permanent contract in the later measurement periods, particularly for Treatment 2 (see Appendix D for details). This reinforces the conclusion that the program had a meaningful positive impact on participants’ integration into the formal labor market.

⁹A full description of the variables and time periods is provided in Appendix D.

5 Conclusions

This paper presents evidence from a large-scale randomized controlled trial evaluating an intensive job placement program for recipients of Spain’s MIS. In a context where ALMPs often yield modest results, our study provides nuanced insights by testing two distinct interventions: an intensive coaching and mediation program (treatment 1) and an identical program with an additional digital skills component (treatment 2). Our findings contribute to the literature by demonstrating that a multifaceted intervention can have significant impacts not just on employment status, but on job quality, financial stability, and skill formation.

Our results paint a picture of distinct but complementary successes for the two treatment arms. The core intervention proved most effective at improving job quality. Its primary achievement was facilitating a significant shift from informal to formal employment for participants, a critical step towards economic stability in a dual labor market like Spain’s. This move to formalization, however, was accompanied by a temporary decrease in the overall employment rate in the medium term, suggesting that the program may have empowered participants to leave low-quality jobs to search for better opportunities.

The addition of digital skills training yielded a different key benefit: enhanced economic resilience. While not immediately translating into higher employment rates, this component significantly improved participants’ ability to avoid financial default. This demonstrates that targeted, modern skills can provide a tangible buffer against economic hardship, even before they lead to a new job. The training was also highly effective in its direct goal, producing large and significant improvements in participants’ digital competencies.

Our analysis also uncovers a complex relationship between training and self-perception. On average, the intervention led to a decrease in self-reported soft skills, a result we interpret as an *awareness effect* where participants develop a more realistic assessment of their own limitations. Crucially, however, this effect was reversed for those with high program engagement, who reported significant gains in their skills. This highlights that the benefits of such intensive support are conditional on active participation.

These findings offer several important policy implications for institutional bodies designing welfare-to-work programs. First, success should be measured beyond headline employment rates; improving job quality and formalization is a valuable and achievable outcome. Second, digital skills training is not an optional add-on but a core component for building economic resilience in a modern economy. Third, program design must account for participant engagement as the benefits of intensive coaching are not realized without sustained attendance. Our results, validated by administrative data showing a delayed but positive impact on formal work, underscore the potential for well-designed ALMPs to foster meaningful and lasting integration into the labor market.

Data availability statement

All data, both raw and processed, for this paper are kept at the Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones. The data used in this paper are only available to the researchers through a virtual desktop at the Ministerio's server, after being anonymized, and they cannot be downloaded. The results can be downloaded after verification by the Ministerio. The researchers can only use these data for the purpose of the evaluation implemented in this paper. The researchers have signed an agreement with the Ministry that indicates that they cannot share any of these data through any means and the Ministerio has not indicated their willingness to share the data with journal editors or referees for the purpose of refereeing the paper for its potential publication.

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Tables

Table 1: EMPLEA LAB pilot project timeline

		Edition 1	Edition 2	Edition 3
Participant recruitment	Start	Nov. 2022	Jan. 2023	Jun. 2023
	Finish	Dec. 2022	Mar. 2023	Jul. 2023
Randomization		Dec. 2022	Mar. 2023	Jul. 2023
Treatment	Start	Feb. 2023	May 2023	Sep. 2023
	Finish	Apr. 2023	Jul. 2023	Nov. 2023
Tests	Baseline (Pre)	Jan. 2023	Apr. 2023	Sep. 2023
	Endline 1 (Post1)	Apr. 2023	Jul. 2023	Nov. 2023
	Endline 2 (Post2)	Jul. 2023	Oct. 2023	Feb. 2024

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

	Obs.	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Treatment	2364	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
Treatment 1	2364	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
Treatment 2	2364	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
Stratification variables:					
Edition 1	2364	0.27	0.45	0.00	1.00
Edition 2	2364	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
Edition 3	2364	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
Albacete	2364	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
Menorca	2364	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Barcelona	2364	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Cuenca	2364	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
Girona	2364	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
Sigüenza-Guadalajara	2364	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
León	2364	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Lugo	2364	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
Ourense	2364	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00
Valladolid	2364	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
Zamora	2364	0.07	0.25	0.00	1.00

Table 3: Descriptive statistics (cont'd)

	Obs.	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Characteristics of the participants:					
Age	2364	44.41	10.85	16.00	73.00
Male	2364	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
Country of birth	2364	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
Nationality	2364	0.75	0.44	0.00	1.00
Compulsory education not completed	2364	0.18	0.37	0.00	1.00
Compulsory education and Basic FP	2364	0.62	0.47	0.00	1.00
Baccalaureate and Higher FP	2364	0.14	0.33	0.00	1.00
University	2364	0.07	0.24	0.00	1.00
Professional certificate	2364	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
Non-formal training	2364	0.61	0.46	0.00	1.00
Degree of disability	2364	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00
People residing in the home	2364	2.91	1.85	0.00	25.00
One-person household	2364	0.18	0.39	0.00	1.00
Single parent household	2364	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Home of a couple with children	2364	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Another type of home	2364	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
Property	2364	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Rent	2364	0.65	0.48	0.00	1.00
Other type of housing	2364	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
Going to another program	2364	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00
Unavailable	2364	0.01	0.09	0.00	1.00
Morning schedule availability	2364	0.51	0.49	0.00	1.00
Afternoon schedule availability	2364	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00
Availability any time	2364	0.30	0.45	0.00	1.00
Active	2364	0.76	0.42	0.00	1.00
Working	2364	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Without contract	2364	0.19	0.38	0.00	1.00
Unemployed, looking for	2364	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00
Outcome variables:					
Average income in the last 6 months	2364	782.38	421.36	0.00	3200.00
Average number of offers submitted in the last 3 months	2364	1.82	3.97	0.00	30.00
Average number of interviews conducted in the last 3 months	2364	0.20	0.62	0.00	7.67
You have been selected in some process	2364	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00
You have said no to some offer	2364	0.04	0.19	0.00	1.00
Self-knowledge	2364	-0.00	1.00	-1.53	0.95
Soft skills	2364	0.00	1.00	-1.33	1.75
You have used a digital device	2364	0.92	0.27	0.00	1.00
Have you sent your CV online in the last week using the internet?	2364	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
Have you managed to access any job offers online?	2364	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Obtain information from government websites or apps	2364	0.84	0.34	0.00	1.00
Download or print official forms	2364	0.56	0.46	0.00	1.00
Send completed forms	2364	0.38	0.45	0.00	1.00
Able to manage online tasks	2364	2.66	1.21	1.00	4.00
Able to use email	2364	2.98	1.21	1.00	4.00
Able to attach files to an email	2364	2.75	1.32	1.00	4.00
Able to create a Cloud account (Drive)	2364	2.14	1.30	1.00	4.00
Able to create folders on the computer	2364	2.45	1.34	1.00	4.00
Able to use job search applications (infojobs, Job Today...)	2364	2.60	1.30	1.00	4.00
Able to use electronic administration applications	2364	2.58	1.28	1.00	4.00
Able to use communication tools for interviews (Zoom, Teams, Google...)	2364	2.51	1.21	1.00	4.00

Table 4: Balancing tests among experimental groups: stratification variables

Variable	(1) Control		(2) Treatment 1		(3) Treatment 2		F-test for equality		(1)-(2)		(1)-(3)		(2)-(3)	
	(N)	(Mean)	(N)	(Mean)	(N)	(Mean)	in all groups				t-test for pairs			
		(Var.)		(Var.)		(Var.)	N	p-value	N	p-value	N	p-value	N	p-value
Edition 1	1055	0.28 (0.20)	656	0.27 (0.20)	653	0.27 (0.20)	2364	0.90	1711	0.71	1708	0.70	1309	0.99
Edition 2	1055	0.35 (0.23)	656	0.37 (0.23)	653	0.37 (0.23)	2364	0.78	1711	0.56	1708	0.56	1309	1.00
Edition 3	1055	0.37 (0.23)	656	0.36 (0.23)	653	0.36 (0.23)	2364	0.96	1711	0.82	1708	0.82	1309	1.00
Albacete	1055	0.07 (0.06)	656	0.07 (0.07)	653	0.07 (0.07)	2364	0.95	1711	0.76	1708	0.83	1309	0.93
Menorca	1055	0.05 (0.05)	656	0.04 (0.04)	653	0.04 (0.04)	2364	0.72	1711	0.44	1708	0.65	1309	0.77
Barcelona	1055	0.18 (0.15)	656	0.19 (0.15)	653	0.19 (0.15)	2364	0.96	1711	0.87	1708	0.78	1309	0.91
Cuenca	1055	0.08 (0.07)	656	0.07 (0.07)	653	0.07 (0.06)	2364	0.81	1711	0.84	1708	0.51	1309	0.68
Girona	1055	0.08 (0.07)	656	0.08 (0.07)	653	0.08 (0.07)	2364	0.97	1711	0.82	1708	0.89	1309	0.94
Sigüenza-Guadalajara	1055	0.07 (0.07)	656	0.07 (0.07)	653	0.07 (0.07)	2364	0.97	1711	0.82	1708	0.97	1309	0.81
León	1055	0.14 (0.12)	656	0.14 (0.12)	653	0.14 (0.12)	2364	1.00	1711	0.93	1708	0.97	1309	0.96
Lugo	1055	0.06 (0.06)	656	0.06 (0.06)	653	0.06 (0.06)	2364	0.92	1711	0.77	1708	0.70	1309	0.92
Ourense	1055	0.13 (0.11)	656	0.13 (0.12)	653	0.13 (0.12)	2364	0.89	1711	0.69	1708	0.67	1309	0.97
Valladolid	1055	0.08 (0.07)	656	0.07 (0.07)	653	0.07 (0.07)	2364	0.97	1711	0.84	1708	0.86	1309	0.98
Zamora	1055	0.07 (0.06)	656	0.07 (0.06)	653	0.07 (0.06)	2364	0.98	1711	0.89	1708	0.87	1309	0.98

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Balancing tests among experimental groups: characteristics of the participants

Variable	(1) Control		(2) Treatment 1		(3) Treatment 2		F-test for equality		(1)-(2)		(1)-(3)		(2)-(3)	
	(N)	(Mean)	(N)	(Mean)	(N)	(Mean)	in all groups				t-test for pairs			
		(Var.)		(Var.)		(Var.)	N	p-value	N	p-value	N	p-value	N	p-value
Age	1055	44.40 (115.92)	656	44.41 (125.95)	653	44.42 (112.35)	2364	0.99	1711	0.92	1708	0.99	1309	0.99
Male	1055	0.31 (0.21)	656	0.30 (0.21)	653	0.32 (0.22)	2364	0.57	1711	0.46	1708	0.68	1309	0.30
Country of birth	1055	0.51 (0.25)	656	0.52 (0.25)	653	0.52 (0.25)	2364	1.00	1711	0.97	1708	0.98	1309	0.97
Nationality	1055	0.75 (0.19)	656	0.73 (0.20)	653	0.77 (0.18)	2364	0.31	1711	0.45	1708	0.38	1309	0.12
Compulsory education not completed	1055	0.18 (0.14)	656	0.18 (0.14)	653	0.17 (0.13)	2364	0.87	1711	0.73	1708	0.62	1309	0.85
Compulsory education and Basic FP	1055	0.62 (0.22)	656	0.62 (0.22)	653	0.62 (0.22)	2364	0.96	1711	0.98	1708	0.82	1309	0.82
Baccalaureate and Higher FP	1055	0.14 (0.11)	656	0.13 (0.11)	653	0.14 (0.11)	2364	0.95	1711	0.80	1708	0.98	1309	0.78
University	1055	0.06 (0.05)	656	0.07 (0.06)	653	0.06 (0.06)	2364	0.67	1711	0.37	1708	0.79	1309	0.60
Professional certificate	1055	0.26 (0.19)	656	0.30 (0.21)	653	0.30 (0.21)	2364	0.22	1711	0.16	1708	0.13	1309	0.92
Non-formal training	1055	0.60 (0.21)	656	0.62 (0.21)	653	0.61 (0.21)	2364	0.55	1711	0.30	1708	0.44	1309	0.82
Degree of disability	1055	0.10 (0.09)	656	0.11 (0.10)	653	0.11 (0.09)	2364	0.95	1711	0.74	1708	0.88	1309	0.81
People residing in the home	1055	2.85 (2.94)	656	3.00 (4.73)	653	2.91 (2.85)	2364	0.20	1711	0.08*	1708	0.41	1309	0.39
One-person household	1055	0.20 (0.16)	656	0.17 (0.14)	653	0.17 (0.14)	2364	0.14	1711	0.08*	1708	0.17	1309	0.73
Single parent household	1055	0.28 (0.20)	656	0.34 (0.22)	653	0.31 (0.21)	2364	0.06*	1711	0.02**	1708	0.33	1309	0.23
Home of a couple with children	1055	0.30 (0.21)	656	0.29 (0.20)	653	0.31 (0.21)	2364	0.73	1711	0.49	1708	0.87	1309	0.46
Another type of home	1055	0.21 (0.17)	656	0.21 (0.17)	653	0.21 (0.17)	2364	0.96	1711	0.83	1708	0.96	1309	0.79
Property	1055	0.20 (0.16)	656	0.16 (0.14)	653	0.21 (0.17)	2364	0.05**	1711	0.06*	1708	0.44	1309	0.02**
Rent	1055	0.64 (0.23)	656	0.68 (0.22)	653	0.61 (0.24)	2364	0.03**	1711	0.10	1708	0.21	1309	0.01***
Other type of housing	1055	0.16 (0.13)	656	0.16 (0.13)	653	0.17 (0.14)	2364	0.68	1711	0.91	1708	0.43	1309	0.43
Going to another program	1055	0.12 (0.10)	656	0.12 (0.10)	653	0.11 (0.10)	2364	0.94	1711	0.85	1708	0.86	1309	0.74
Active	1055	0.75 (0.19)	656	0.80 (0.16)	653	0.76 (0.18)	2364	0.07*	1711	0.02**	1708	0.66	1309	0.08*
Working	1055	0.22 (0.17)	656	0.23 (0.17)	653	0.23 (0.18)	2364	0.87	1711	0.81	1708	0.61	1309	0.81
Without contract	1055	0.20 (0.15)	656	0.18 (0.14)	653	0.18 (0.14)	2364	0.45	1711	0.22	1708	0.41	1309	0.74
Unemployed, looking for	1055	0.53 (0.25)	656	0.57 (0.24)	653	0.52 (0.25)	2364	0.15	1711	0.08*	1708	0.96	1309	0.09*
Unavailable	1055	0.01 (0.01)	656	0.01 (0.01)	653	0.01 (0.01)	2364	0.93	1711	0.75	1708	0.97	1309	0.76
Morning schedule availability	1055	0.50 (0.24)	656	0.52 (0.25)	653	0.52 (0.24)	2364	0.51	1711	0.32	1708	0.36	1309	0.95
Afternoon schedule availability	1055	0.18 (0.14)	656	0.18 (0.15)	653	0.20 (0.16)	2364	0.60	1711	0.72	1708	0.33	1309	0.56
Availability any time	1055	0.32 (0.21)	656	0.29 (0.20)	653	0.28 (0.20)	2364	0.16	1711	0.21	1708	0.08*	1309	0.61

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$. Randomization strata included as controls.

Table 6: Balancing tests among experimental groups: outcome variables

Variable	(1) Control		(2) Treatment 1		(3) Treatment 2		F-test for equality		(1)-(2)		(1)-(3)		(2)-(3)	
	(N)	(Mean)	(N)	(Mean)	(N)	(Mean)	in all groups				t-test for pairs			
		(Var.)		(Var.)		(Var.)	N	p-value	N	p-value	N	p-value	N	p-value
Average income in the last 6 months	1055	775.66 (166913.56)	656	815.52 (179678.07)	653	759.94 (191438.05)	2364	0.03**	1711	0.04**	1708	0.44	1309	0.01**
Average number of offers submitted in the last 3 months	1055	1.79 (15.35)	656	1.82 (14.94)	653	1.86 (17.17)	2364	0.93	1711	0.82	1708	0.71	1309	0.93
Average number of interviews conducted in the last 3 months	1055	0.22 (0.43)	656	0.17 (0.28)	653	0.19 (0.39)	2364	0.28	1711	0.11	1708	0.40	1309	0.52
You have been selected in some process	1055	0.05 (0.04)	656	0.04 (0.04)	653	0.07 (0.07)	2364	0.03**	1711	0.70	1708	0.02**	1309	0.02**
You have said no to some offer	1055	0.04 (0.04)	656	0.03 (0.03)	653	0.05 (0.05)	2364	0.26	1711	0.50	1708	0.25	1309	0.11
Self-knowledge	1055	-0.01 (1.02)	656	0.04 (0.99)	653	-0.02 (0.98)	2364	0.43	1711	0.24	1708	0.97	1309	0.25
Soft skills	1055	0.01 (1.00)	656	0.01 (0.99)	653	-0.02 (1.01)	2364	0.83	1711	0.81	1708	0.68	1309	0.52
You have used a digital device	1055	0.92 (0.07)	656	0.92 (0.08)	653	0.93 (0.07)	2364	0.77	1711	0.95	1708	0.55	1309	0.53
Have you sent your CV online in the last week using the internet?	1055	0.26 (0.19)	656	0.27 (0.19)	653	0.28 (0.20)	2364	0.48	1711	0.54	1708	0.22	1309	0.61
Have you managed to access any job offers online?	1055	0.27 (0.20)	656	0.24 (0.18)	653	0.28 (0.20)	2364	0.33	1711	0.25	1708	0.64	1309	0.14
Obtain information from government websites or apps	1055	0.84 (0.11)	656	0.83 (0.12)	653	0.83 (0.12)	2364	0.80	1711	0.65	1708	0.52	1309	0.83
Download or print official forms	1055	0.56 (0.21)	656	0.56 (0.22)	653	0.55 (0.22)	2364	0.82	1711	0.90	1708	0.51	1309	0.66
Send completed forms	1055	0.36 (0.20)	656	0.40 (0.21)	653	0.38 (0.21)	2364	0.09*	1711	0.03**	1708	0.54	1309	0.17
Able to manage online tasks	1055	2.64 (1.48)	656	2.70 (1.45)	653	2.67 (1.46)	2364	0.49	1711	0.24	1708	0.52	1309	0.63
Able to use email	1055	2.95 (1.46)	656	3.00 (1.44)	653	3.01 (1.47)	2364	0.44	1711	0.34	1708	0.25	1309	0.85
Able to attach files to an email	1055	2.72 (1.76)	656	2.79 (1.69)	653	2.75 (1.78)	2364	0.55	1711	0.28	1708	0.61	1309	0.61
Able to create a Cloud account (Drive)	1055	2.14 (1.67)	656	2.13 (1.68)	653	2.13 (1.71)	2364	1.00	1711	0.92	1708	0.94	1309	0.99
Able to create folders on the computer	1055	2.43 (1.81)	656	2.51 (1.78)	653	2.41 (1.82)	2364	0.35	1711	0.22	1708	0.80	1309	0.19
Able to use job search applications (infojobs, Job Today. . .)	1055	2.58 (1.68)	656	2.62 (1.63)	653	2.63 (1.74)	2364	0.70	1711	0.51	1708	0.48	1309	0.95
Able to use electronic administration applications	1055	2.59 (1.65)	656	2.62 (1.59)	653	2.53 (1.64)	2364	0.46	1711	0.68	1708	0.35	1309	0.23
Able to use communication tools for interviews (Zoom, Teams, Google...)	1055	2.45 (1.47)	656	2.54 (1.46)	653	2.57 (1.44)	2364	0.02**	1711	0.06*	1708	0.01**	1309	0.56

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$. Randomization strata included as controls.

Table 7: Sample size and attrition rate

	Initial assignment			Field assignment			Excluding problematic cases		
	Pre	Post1	Post2	Pre	Post1	Post2	Pre	Post1	Post2
Control	1055	844 (80.0%)	859 (81.4%)	1057	846 (80.0%)	860 (81.3%)	1039	828 (79.7%)	844 (81.2%)
Treatment 1	656	519 (79.1%)	511 (77.9%)	654	517 (79.1%)	510 (78.0%)	642	505 (78.7%)	499 (77.7%)
Treatment 2	653	517 (79.2%)	521 (79.8%)	653	517 (79.2%)	521 (79.8%)	638	502 (78.7%)	509 (79.8%)
Total	2364	1880 (79.5%)	1891 (80.0%)	2364	1880 (79.5%)	1891 (80.0%)	2319	1835 (79.1%)	1852 (79.9%)

Table 8: Regressions of the probability of not responding to the first endline survey (Post1)

POST1 survey not completed	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	0.008 (0.016)		0.237 (0.272)
Treatment 1		0.009 (0.020)	
Treatment 2		0.007 (0.020)	
Treatment and Male			0.056 (0.040)
Treatment and Age			-0.004** (0.002)
Treatment and Nationality			-0.028 (0.044)
Treatment and People residing in the home			-0.003 (0.011)
Treatment and Compulsory education and Basic FP			-0.010 (0.052)
Treatment and Baccalaureat and Higher FP			-0.104 (0.065)
Treatment and University			-0.000 (0.084)
Treatment and Morning schedule availability			-0.045 (0.226)
Treatment and Afternoon schedule availability			0.012 (0.228)
Treatment and Availability any time			-0.040 (0.226)
Treatment and Disability			0.065 (0.054)
Treatment and One-person household			0.040 (0.057)
Treatment and Single parent household			0.049 (0.051)
Treatment and Home of a couple with children			0.016 (0.054)
Treatment and Property			0.011 (0.055)
Treatment and Rent			-0.046 (0.047)
Observations	2364	2364	2364

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$. All columns include the randomization strata as controls. Columns 2 and 3 also include the non-interacted variables as additional controls.

Table 9: Regressions of the probability of not responding to the second endline survey (Post2)

Second POST survey not completed	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	0.027*		0.292
	(0.016)		(0.250)
Treatment 1		0.036*	
		(0.020)	
Treatment 2		0.017	
		(0.019)	
Treatment and Male			0.053
			(0.040)
Treatment and Age			-0.002
			(0.002)
Treatment and Nationality			-0.031
			(0.043)
Treatment and People residing in the home			-0.005
			(0.011)
Treatment and Compulsory education and Basic FP			-0.004
			(0.052)
Treatment and Baccalaureate and Higher FP			-0.032
			(0.064)
Treatment and University			0.009
			(0.086)
Treatment and Morning schedule availability			-0.116
			(0.201)
Treatment and Afternoon schedule availability			-0.043
			(0.203)
Treatment and Availability any time			-0.115
			(0.202)
Treatment and Disability			0.101*
			(0.054)
Treatment and One-person household			-0.037
			(0.056)
Treatment and Single parent household			0.013
			(0.051)
Treatment and Home of a couple with children			-0.000
			(0.053)
Treatment and Property			-0.008
			(0.054)
Treatment and Rent			-0.034
			(0.045)
Observations	2364	2364	2364

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$. All columns include the randomization strata as controls. Columns 2 and 3 also include the non-interacted variables as additional controls.

Table 10: Effect on income and ability to make ends meet

A) Short-term (Post1)	Income		Not to incur in default	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	24.241 (15.676)		-0.032 (0.046)	
Treatment 1		17.891 (18.653)		-0.030 (0.055)
Treatment 2		30.622 (19.277)		-0.035 (0.056)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880
R^2	0.46	0.46	0.06	0.06
Control mean dep. var.	822.344	822.344	0.020	0.020
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	No	No
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Income		Not to incur in default	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	23.399 (17.136)		0.045 (0.045)	
Treatment 1		21.175 (21.113)		-0.010 (0.055)
Treatment 2		25.591 (20.507)		0.099* (0.054)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891
R^2	0.41	0.41	0.08	0.08
Control mean dep. var.	855.697	855.697	-0.018	-0.018
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	No	No

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 11: Effect on employment

A) Short-term (Post1)	Active		Working		Without contract		Unemployed, looking for	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.010 (0.044)		-0.036 (0.042)		-0.079* (0.045)		0.044 (0.044)	
Treatment 1		0.008 (0.053)		-0.074 (0.050)		-0.125** (0.051)		0.077 (0.054)
Treatment 2		0.013 (0.053)		0.002 (0.051)		-0.032 (0.055)		0.011 (0.053)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880
R^2	0.16	0.16	0.21	0.21	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.13
Control mean dep. var.	-0.017	-0.017	0.019	0.019	0.061	0.061	-0.032	-0.032
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Active		Working		Without contract		Unemployed, looking for	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.006 (0.043)		-0.078* (0.042)		-0.034 (0.044)		0.071 (0.044)	
Treatment 1		-0.065 (0.054)		-0.140*** (0.049)		-0.016 (0.053)		0.078 (0.053)
Treatment 2		0.052 (0.050)		-0.018 (0.052)		-0.052 (0.052)		0.064 (0.053)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891
R^2	0.18	0.18	0.21	0.21	0.15	0.15	0.13	0.13
Control mean dep. var.	-0.009	-0.009	0.033	0.033	0.032	0.032	-0.040	-0.040
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 12: Effect on job search

A) Short-term (Post1)	Mean		Mean		Have you been selected		Have you said "no"	
	offers		interviews		in any process		to any offer	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.263		-0.018		-0.019		0.039	
	(0.177)		(0.031)		(0.045)		(0.047)	
Treatment 1		0.229		-0.042		-0.043		0.017
		(0.220)		(0.034)		(0.053)		(0.054)
Treatment 2		0.296		0.006		0.005		0.060
		(0.215)		(0.038)		(0.056)		(0.058)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880
R^2	0.17	0.17	0.10	0.10	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.04
Control mean dep. var.	1.998	1.998	0.248	0.248	0.001	0.001	-0.027	-0.027
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Mean		Mean		Have you been selected		Have you said "no"	
	offers		interviews		in any process		to any offer	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.187		0.012		-0.000		0.022	
	(0.169)		(0.023)		(0.044)		(0.044)	
Treatment 1		-0.256		-0.002		-0.015		-0.021
		(0.206)		(0.027)		(0.054)		(0.051)
Treatment 2		-0.118		0.025		0.015		0.064
		(0.195)		(0.029)		(0.054)		(0.060)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891
R^2	0.15	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.09	0.05	0.05
Control mean dep. var.	2.033	2.033	0.195	0.195	-0.018	-0.018	-0.021	-0.021
Initial value dep. var.	Sí	Sí	Sí	Sí	Sí	Sí	Sí	Sí

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 13: Effect on digital skills

A) Short-term (Post1)	Online tasks		Email		Attachments		Cloud		Folders		Employment apps		Admin. apps		Interview tools	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Treatment	-0.003 (0.034)		0.017 (0.033)		0.040 (0.031)		0.107*** (0.033)		0.041 (0.030)		0.067** (0.034)		0.061* (0.033)		0.015 (0.036)	
Treatment 1		-0.020 (0.040)		-0.003 (0.040)		0.006 (0.038)		0.050 (0.039)		0.023 (0.037)		0.011 (0.042)		-0.003 (0.040)		-0.051 (0.043)
Treatment 2		0.015 (0.042)		0.037 (0.040)		0.074* (0.038)		0.165*** (0.040)		0.059 (0.037)		0.123*** (0.041)		0.126*** (0.040)		0.082* (0.044)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880
R^2	0.48	0.48	0.50	0.50	0.55	0.55	0.51	0.51	0.56	0.56	0.47	0.47	0.50	0.50	0.43	0.43
Control mean dep. var.	-0.021	-0.021	-0.027	-0.027	-0.041	-0.041	-0.071	-0.071	-0.039	-0.039	-0.059	-0.059	-0.038	-0.038	-0.040	-0.040
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Online tasks		Email		Attachments		Cloud		Folders		Employment apps		Admin. apps		Interview tools	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Treatment	0.016 (0.034)		0.027 (0.033)		0.014 (0.033)		0.072** (0.034)		0.026 (0.032)		0.028 (0.034)		0.027 (0.034)		-0.002 (0.036)	
Treatment 1		-0.000 (0.042)		0.038 (0.041)		0.008 (0.040)		0.042 (0.042)		0.000 (0.039)		-0.006 (0.042)		-0.010 (0.040)		-0.060 (0.043)
Treatment 2		0.032 (0.042)		0.017 (0.040)		0.019 (0.040)		0.102** (0.042)		0.051 (0.039)		0.062 (0.041)		0.065 (0.043)		0.055 (0.044)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891
R^2	0.47	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.46	0.46	0.53	0.53	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.41	0.42
Control mean dep. var.	-0.040	-0.040	-0.038	-0.038	-0.033	-0.033	-0.057	-0.057	-0.042	-0.042	-0.042	-0.042	-0.023	-0.023	-0.032	-0.032
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 14: Effect on the use of devices for job search

A) Short-term (Post1)	Mobile		Computer		Tablet	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.052		0.017		0.015	
	(0.049)		(0.038)		(0.041)	
Treatment 1		0.089*		0.027		0.020
		(0.051)		(0.045)		(0.050)
Treatment 2		0.015		0.007		0.010
		(0.060)		(0.046)		(0.050)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.36	0.36	0.23	0.23
Control mean dep. var.	-0.032	-0.032	-0.017	-0.017	-0.009	-0.009
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Mobile		Computer		Tablet	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.065		0.009		0.004	
	(0.050)		(0.038)		(0.042)	
Treatment 1		0.028		0.010		0.022
		(0.062)		(0.046)		(0.053)
Treatment 2		0.103**		0.008		-0.014
		(0.052)		(0.046)		(0.050)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.33	0.33	0.18	0.18
Control mean dep. var.	-0.033	-0.033	-0.009	-0.009	-0.012	-0.012
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 15: Effect on online procedures

A) Short-term (Post1)	Have you sent your CV online?		Have you accessed offers online?		Download forms		Fill out forms	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.058 (0.042)		0.013 (0.040)		-0.002 (0.041)		0.044 (0.041)	
Treatment 1		0.050 (0.051)		-0.017 (0.048)		-0.032 (0.048)		0.033 (0.048)
Treatment 2		0.065 (0.052)		0.043 (0.049)		0.029 (0.050)		0.055 (0.050)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880
R^2	0.19	0.19	0.28	0.28	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.25
Control mean dep. var.	-0.055	-0.055	-0.011	-0.011	-0.016	-0.016	-0.050	-0.050
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Have you sent your CV online?		Have you accessed offers online?		Download forms		Fill out forms	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.068 (0.042)		-0.001 (0.039)		-0.005 (0.042)		-0.054 (0.041)	
Treatment 1		-0.097* (0.051)		-0.014 (0.048)		-0.052 (0.051)		-0.054 (0.050)
Treatment 2		-0.038 (0.051)		0.012 (0.048)		0.043 (0.050)		-0.053 (0.050)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891
R^2	0.20	0.20	0.29	0.29	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.23
Control mean dep. var.	0.019	0.019	-0.009	-0.009	-0.017	-0.017	-0.000	-0.000
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 16: Effect on self-knowledge and soft skills

A) Short-term (Post1)	Self-knowledge				Soft skills			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.059 (0.039)	-0.134* (0.070)			-0.064* (0.036)	-0.053 (0.065)		
Treatment and frequent attendance		0.156* (0.086)				-0.007 (0.081)		
Treatment 1			-0.072 (0.047)	-0.170** (0.079)			-0.043 (0.043)	-0.137* (0.073)
Treatment 1 and frequent attendance				0.206** (0.100)				0.202** (0.093)
Treatment 2			-0.047 (0.048)	-0.097 (0.080)			-0.084* (0.044)	0.035 (0.074)
Treatment 2 and frequent attendance				0.105 (0.100)				-0.216** (0.094)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880
R^2	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Control mean dep. var.	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Self-knowledge				Soft skills			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.050 (0.039)	-0.040 (0.065)			-0.135*** (0.037)	-0.079 (0.065)		
Treatment and frequent attendance		0.005 (0.083)				-0.071 (0.081)		
Treatment 1			0.046 (0.047)	0.044 (0.075)			-0.132*** (0.044)	-0.112 (0.073)
Treatment 1 and frequent attendance				0.024 (0.098)				0.001 (0.093)
Treatment 2			0.054 (0.048)	0.035 (0.075)			-0.139*** (0.046)	-0.046 (0.075)
Treatment 2 and frequent attendance				0.013 (0.099)				-0.142 (0.097)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891
R^2	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37
Control mean dep. var.	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A List of group sessions

Table A1: Description of group sessions

Soft skills applied to job search (2h)		Active Job Seeker Competencies (2h)
Session 1	Expectations and introduction of skills	
Session 2	Self-knowledge	Action plan and employability (joint session with intermediary)
Session 3	Identifying and debunking limiting beliefs	CV session
Session 4	Time management	Resources for my job search
Session 5	Emotional management	Job interview
Session 6	Verbal and non-verbal communication	Portals for job search
Session 7	Teamwork and conflict resolution	Temporary Work and Placement Agencies
Session 8	Mindfulness and stress management	Labor rights
Digital skills (2h)		
Session 1	Introduction to digital skills	
Session 2	Mobile connectivity, tools and resources	
Session 3	Email	
Session 4	The Cloud	
Session 5	Communication apps and Google Maps	
Session 6	Apps for the Active Job Seeker: Infojobs, Job Today	
Session 7	Social networks	
Session 8	Communication with the administration	
Group mediation spaces for mutual support in job searches		
Session 1	Analysis of job offers	
Session 2	CV revision and Elevator pitch	
Session 3	The interview (joint session with counselor)	
Session 4	The Company	

B Definition of the outcome indicators

Table B1 shows the construction of the outcome indicators used in the analysis, referring to the original names of the survey variables described in Table B2.

Table B1: Description of the outcome indicators

Code	Description	Original variable or formula
HP1a1	Net monthly income	Average of the last 6 months: $(1/6) \times (ING111 + ING112 + ING113 + ING114 + ING115 + ING116)$
HP1b1	Ability to make ends meet	Home has not been in arrears in the last 12 months: ING220
HP2a1	Access to employment when the intervention finished	1 if he/she is working or looking for a job, 0 if not: OCU511-OCU513
HP2a2		1 if he/she is working, 0 if not: OCU511-OCU512
HP2a3		1 if he/she had a contract in his last job, 0 if not: OCU614
HP2a4		1 if he/she is unemployed but looking for a job, 0 if not: OCU513
HP2b1		Average number of job offers he/she applied for in the last 3 months: $(1/3) \times (OCU411 + OCU412 + OCU413)$
HP2b2		Average number of job interviews he/she had in the last 3 months: $(1/3) \times (OCU421 + OCU422 + OCU423)$
HP2b3		If he/she has been selected in any process: OCU440
HP2b4		If he/she said "no" to any offer: OCU430
HP3a1	Awareness of transversal skills for any type of employment	Self-knowledge: Anderson index with 3 components:
HP3a2		1. He/she would be able to describe his/her strengths to obtain a job in the sector: indicator of EMP711==4 or EMP711==5 2. He/she would be able to describe his/her weaknesses to obtain a job in the sector: indicator of EMP712==4 or EMP712==5 3. He/she feels capable of obtaining a job: indicator of EMP713==4 or EMP713==5 "Soft" skills: Anderson index with 6 components: 1. Personal care and image: "I manage my personal image appropriately in the work environment and adapt to different social situations" 2. Verbal and non-verbal communication: "I communicate easily, naturally and I adapt to different situations and people" 3. Conflict resolution: "I seek and promote personal relationships with colleagues, managers or clients" 4. Teamwork skills: "I promote a good group climate, I contribute ideas and support other people" 5. Emotional management and self-control: "With my actions I provide peace of mind and offer constructive solutions to situations of stress or conflict" 6. Planning and time management: "I am able to organize and plan new tasks"
HP4a1	Digital skills for job search	Use of any digital device for job search: DIG1620, DIG1631-DIG1633
HP4b1		Sending CV online: DIG1520
HP4b2		Access to online job offers: DIG1530
HP4b3		To obtain information from AAPP websites or apps: DIG1641-DIG1643
HP4c1		Capacity to manage online tasks, use of email, attachments, cloud, online tools for interviews: DIG1661-DIG1668

Table B2: Description of the survey variables included in the calculation of indicators

Collection time	Code	Description	Units
Pre-Post	ING111-ING116	Net monthly income (from 1 to 6 months ago)	Euros
Post	ING220	Home in arrears in the last 12 months	Yes/No
Pre-Post	OCU511-OCU512	Employment situation: working	Yes/No
Pre-Post	OCU511-OCU513	Employment situation: active	Yes/No
Pre-Post	OCU614	Employment situation: without contract	Yes/No
Pre-Post	OCU513	Employment situation: unemployed, but looking for a job	Yes/No
Pre-Post	OCU411-413	Job offers that the participant has applied for (from 1 month to 3 months ago)	Nº offers
Pre-Post	OCU421-OCU423	Job interviews that the participant has had (from 1 month to 3 months ago)	Nº interviews
Pre-Post	OCU440	Being selected in any process	Yes/No
Pre-Post	OCU430	Having said no to any offer	Yes/No
Pre-Post	EMP711	Being able to describe my strengths to get a job	1-5
Pre-Post	EMP712	Being able to describe my weaknesses to get a job	1-5
Pre-Post	EMP713	With the information I have about myself at this moment, I feel capable of working	1-5
Pre-Post	EMP810	Presence and personal image	4 categories
Pre-Post	EMP910	Communication	4 categories
Pre-Post	EMP1020	Conflicts resolution	4 categories
Pre-Post	EMP1010	Teamwork	4 categories
Pre-Post	EMP1110	Emotional management and self-control	4 categories
Pre-Post	EMP1410	Planning and time management	4 categories
Post	DIG1610	Level of internet knowledge	1-4
Pre-Post	DIG1620 DIG1631 DIG1632 DIG1633	Have you used any digital device - Mobile - Computer - Tablet	Yes/No
Pre-Post	DIG1520	Have you sent your CV online in the last week using the internet?	Yes/No
Pre-Post	DIG1530	Have you managed to access any job offer online?	Yes/No
Pre-Post	DIG1641 DIG1642 DIG1643	To obtain information from AAPP websites or apps Download and print forms Send completed forms	Yes/No
Pre-Post	DIG1661 DIG 1662 DIG 1663 DIG 1664 DIG 1665 DIG 1666 DIG 1667 DIG 1668	Capable of: - to manage online tasks - to use email - to create an account in the cloud (Drive) - to create folders in the computer - to use online apps to look for a job - to use apps from the electronic administration - to use communication online tools for interviews	1-4

C Results with other assignments

Table C1: Effect on income

A) Short-term (Post1)	Field assignment		Without problematic cases	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	17.838		21.337	
	(15.664)		(15.796)	
Treatment 1		14.236		14.356
		(18.728)		(18.856)
Treatment 2		21.445		28.373
		(19.141)		(19.431)
Observations	1880	1880	1835	1835
R^2	0.46	0.46	0.45	0.45
Control mean dep. var.	825.786	825.786	820.667	820.667
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Field assignment		Without problematic cases	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	17.089		19.883	
	(17.138)		(17.313)	
Treatment 1		12.740		15.685
		(21.088)		(21.317)
Treatment 2		21.371		24.026
		(20.564)		(20.791)
Observations	1891	1891	1852	1852
R^2	0.41	0.41	0.40	0.40
Control mean dep. var.	859.456	859.456	854.330	854.330
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C2: Effect on ability to make ends meet

A) Short-term (Post1)	Field assignment		Without problematic cases	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.017 (0.046)		-0.029 (0.047)	
Treatment 1		-0.023 (0.056)		-0.032 (0.056)
Treatment 2		-0.010 (0.055)		-0.025 (0.057)
Observations	1880	1880	1835	1835
R^2	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
Control mean dep. var.	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012
Initial value dep. var.	No	No	No	No
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Field assignment		Without problematic cases	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.044 (0.045)		0.045 (0.046)	
Treatment 1		-0.019 (0.055)		-0.012 (0.056)
Treatment 2		0.107** (0.054)		0.100* (0.055)
Observations	1891	1891	1852	1852
R^2	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Control mean dep. var.	-0.017	-0.017	-0.023	-0.023
Initial value dep. var.	No	No	No	No

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C3: Effect on employment - Field assignment

A) Short-term (Post1)	Active		Working		Without contract		Unemployed, looking for	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.015 (0.044)		-0.035 (0.042)		-0.080* (0.045)		0.046 (0.044)	
Treatment 1		0.010 (0.053)		-0.076 (0.050)		-0.128** (0.051)		0.081 (0.054)
Treatment 2		0.020 (0.052)		0.005 (0.051)		-0.033 (0.054)		0.011 (0.053)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880
R^2	0.16	0.16	0.21	0.21	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.13
Control mean dep. var.	-0.021	-0.021	0.017	0.017	0.060	0.060	-0.034	-0.034
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Active		Working		Without contract		Unemployed, looking for	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.001 (0.043)		-0.080* (0.042)		-0.025 (0.044)		0.077* (0.044)	
Treatment 1		-0.051 (0.054)		-0.141*** (0.049)		0.004 (0.053)		0.091* (0.053)
Treatment 2		0.051 (0.050)		-0.020 (0.052)		-0.053 (0.051)		0.064 (0.053)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891
R^2	0.18	0.18	0.21	0.21	0.15	0.15	0.13	0.13
Control mean dep. var.	-0.015	-0.015	0.033	0.033	0.025	0.025	-0.044	-0.044
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C4: Effect on employment - Assignment without problematic cases

A) Short-term (Post1)	Active		Working		Without contract		Unemployed, looking for	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.011 (0.044)		-0.036 (0.043)		-0.077* (0.045)		0.045 (0.045)	
Treatment 1		0.009 (0.053)		-0.074 (0.051)		-0.123** (0.051)		0.080 (0.054)
Treatment 2		0.013 (0.053)		0.003 (0.051)		-0.031 (0.055)		0.009 (0.054)
Observations	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835
R^2	0.17	0.17	0.21	0.21	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.13
Control mean dep. var.	-0.022	-0.022	0.022	0.022	0.059	0.059	-0.040	-0.040
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Active		Working		Without contract		Unemployed, looking for	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.003 (0.043)		-0.082* (0.042)		-0.030 (0.044)		0.077* (0.044)	
Treatment 1		-0.062 (0.054)		-0.142*** (0.050)		-0.007 (0.054)		0.083 (0.054)
Treatment 2		0.056 (0.050)		-0.022 (0.052)		-0.052 (0.052)		0.071 (0.053)
Observations	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852
R^2	0.18	0.18	0.21	0.21	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.14
Control mean dep. var.	-0.009	-0.009	0.039	0.039	0.030	0.030	-0.045	-0.045
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C5: Effects on job search - Field assignment

A) Short-term (Post1)	Mean		Mean		Have you been selected		Have you said "no"	
	offers		interviews		in any process		to any offer	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.283		-0.015		-0.013		0.051	
	(0.178)		(0.031)		(0.045)		(0.046)	
Treatment 1		0.336		-0.030		-0.033		0.025
		(0.225)		(0.035)		(0.054)		(0.054)
Treatment 2		0.231		-0.001		0.007		0.077
		(0.208)		(0.037)		(0.055)		(0.059)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880
R^2	0.17	0.17	0.10	0.10	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.04
Control mean dep. var.	1.986	1.986	0.247	0.247	-0.004	-0.004	-0.034	-0.034
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Mean		Mean		Have you been selected		Have you said "no"	
	offers		interviews		in any process		to any offer	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.142		0.017		0.013		0.022	
	(0.169)		(0.023)		(0.044)		(0.044)	
Treatment 1		-0.148		0.012		0.000		-0.021
		(0.208)		(0.051)		(0.054)		(0.051)
Treatment 2		-0.137		0.048		0.026		0.065
		(0.193)		(0.054)		(0.054)		(0.060)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891
R^2	0.15	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.09	0.05	0.05
Control mean dep. var.	2.007	2.007	0.192	-0.028	-0.027	-0.027	-0.021	-0.021
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C6: Effect on job search - Assignment without problematic cases

A) Short-term (Post1)	Mean		Mean		Have you been selected		Have you said "no"	
	offers		interviews		in any process		to any offer	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.281		-0.020		-0.020		0.045	
	(0.178)		(0.032)		(0.046)		(0.047)	
Treatment 1		0.312		-0.039		-0.042		0.017
		(0.224)		(0.035)		(0.054)		(0.054)
Treatment 2		0.249		0.000		0.003		0.073
		(0.213)		(0.038)		(0.056)		(0.060)
Observations	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835
R^2	0.18	0.18	0.10	0.10	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.04
Control mean dep. var.	1.963	1.963	0.245	0.245	-0.001	-0.001	-0.030	-0.030
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Mean		Mean		Have you been selected		Have you said "no"	
	offers		interviews		in any process		to any offer	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.163		0.014		0.006		0.023	
	(0.171)		(0.023)		(0.045)		(0.046)	
Treatment 1		-0.213		0.002		-0.008		-0.021
		(0.207)		(0.028)		(0.054)		(0.052)
Treatment 2		-0.114		0.026		0.020		0.067
		(0.197)		(0.030)		(0.054)		(0.061)
Observations	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852
R^2	0.15	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.09	0.05	0.05
Control mean dep. var.	2.003	2.003	0.194	0.194	-0.026	-0.026	-0.018	-0.018
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C7: Effects on digital skills - Field assignment

A) Short-term (Post1)	Online tasks		Email		Attachments		Cloud		Folders		Employment apps		Administration apps		Interview tools	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Treatment	0.004 (0.033)		0.020 (0.033)		0.046 (0.031)		0.107*** (0.033)		0.030 (0.030)		0.082** (0.034)		0.076** (0.033)		0.017 (0.036)	
Treatment 1		-0.008 (0.040)		0.005 (0.040)		0.005 (0.038)		0.045 (0.039)		0.004 (0.037)		0.030 (0.042)		0.013 (0.040)		-0.052 (0.043)
Treatment 2		0.016 (0.041)		0.035 (0.040)		0.087** (0.038)		0.169*** (0.040)		0.056 (0.037)		0.134*** (0.041)		0.139*** (0.040)		0.087** (0.043)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880
R^2	0.48	0.48	0.50	0.50	0.55	0.55	0.51	0.51	0.56	0.56	0.47	0.47	0.50	0.50	0.43	0.43
Control mean dep. var.	-0.027	-0.027	-0.030	-0.030	-0.045	-0.045	-0.074	-0.074	-0.035	-0.035	-0.068	-0.068	-0.045	-0.045	-0.042	-0.042
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Online tasks		Email		Attachments		Cloud		Folders		Employment apps		Administration apps		Interview tools	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Treatment	0.026 (0.034)		0.032 (0.033)		0.024 (0.033)		0.088** (0.034)		0.031 (0.032)		0.027 (0.034)		0.037 (0.034)		0.004 (0.036)	
Treatment 1		0.012 (0.042)		0.041 (0.041)		0.017 (0.040)		0.067 (0.042)		0.004 (0.039)		-0.001 (0.042)		-0.003 (0.040)		-0.049 (0.044)
Treatment 2		0.039 (0.041)		0.023 (0.040)		0.030 (0.040)		0.109*** (0.042)		0.058 (0.039)		0.054 (0.041)		0.077* (0.043)		0.057 (0.043)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891
R^2	0.47	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.46	0.46	0.53	0.53	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.41	0.42
Control mean dep. var.	-0.046	-0.046	-0.041	-0.041	-0.038	-0.038	-0.068	-0.068	-0.046	-0.046	-0.043	-0.043	-0.028	-0.028	-0.036	-0.036
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C8: Effect on digital skills - Assignment without problematic cases

A) Short-term (Post1)	Online tasks		Email		Attachments		Cloud		Folders		Employment apps		Administration apps		Interview tools	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Treatment	-0.002 (0.034)		0.015 (0.033)		0.042 (0.031)		0.107*** (0.033)		0.041 (0.031)		0.074** (0.034)		0.068** (0.034)		0.015 (0.036)	
Treatment 1		-0.019 (0.041)		-0.001 (0.041)		0.006 (0.039)		0.045 (0.039)		0.014 (0.037)		0.023 (0.043)		0.003 (0.041)		-0.054 (0.043)
Treatment 2		0.016 (0.042)		0.031 (0.041)		0.079** (0.039)		0.170*** (0.041)		0.068* (0.037)		0.126*** (0.041)		0.135*** (0.040)		0.085* (0.044)
Observations	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835
R^2	0.49	0.49	0.51	0.51	0.55	0.55	0.52	0.52	0.57	0.57	0.47	0.47	0.50	0.50	0.43	0.43
Control mean dep. var.	-0.025	-0.025	-0.034	-0.034	-0.048	-0.048	-0.075	-0.075	-0.046	-0.046	-0.075	-0.075	-0.055	-0.055	-0.049	-0.049
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Online tasks		Email		Attachments		Cloud		Folders		Employment apps		Administration apps		Interview tools	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Treatment	0.021 (0.035)		0.032 (0.034)		0.020 (0.033)		0.077** (0.034)		0.031 (0.032)		0.025 (0.034)		0.031 (0.035)		-0.000 (0.036)	
Treatment 1		0.008 (0.042)		0.040 (0.041)		0.015 (0.040)		0.051 (0.042)		0.003 (0.040)		-0.007 (0.042)		-0.009 (0.040)		-0.052 (0.044)
Treatment 2		0.033 (0.042)		0.023 (0.040)		0.025 (0.041)		0.103** (0.042)		0.059 (0.039)		0.057 (0.042)		0.071 (0.043)		0.051 (0.044)
Observations	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852
R^2	0.47	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.47	0.47	0.53	0.53	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.42	0.42
Control mean dep. var.	-0.047	-0.047	-0.047	-0.047	-0.042	-0.042	-0.068	-0.068	-0.050	-0.050	-0.053	-0.053	-0.036	-0.036	-0.037	-0.037
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C9: Effects on the use of devices for job search - Field assignment

A) Short-term	Mobile		Computer		Tablet	
(Post1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.053		0.000		0.009	
	(0.049)		(0.038)		(0.041)	
Treatment 1		0.090*		0.017		0.007
		(0.051)		(0.045)		(0.050)
Treatment 2		0.016		-0.017		0.012
		(0.061)		(0.046)		(0.050)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.36	0.36	0.23	0.23
Control mean dep. var.	-0.031	-0.031	-0.009	-0.009	-0.010	-0.010
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term	Mobile		Computer		Tablet	
(Post2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.066		0.002		0.001	
	(0.049)		(0.038)		(0.042)	
Treatment 1		0.027		0.010		0.020
		(0.062)		(0.046)		(0.053)
Treatment 2		0.103**		-0.005		-0.017
		(0.052)		(0.047)		(0.050)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.33	0.33	0.18	0.18
Control mean dep. var.	-0.033	-0.033	-0.006	-0.006	-0.012	-0.012
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C10: Effect on the use of devices for job search - Assignment without problematic cases

A) Short-term	Mobile		Computer		Tablet	
(Post1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.053		0.007		0.012	
	(0.050)		(0.038)		(0.042)	
Treatment 1		0.092*		0.016		0.008
		(0.052)		(0.045)		(0.050)
Treatment 2		0.015		-0.001		0.016
		(0.062)		(0.047)		(0.051)
Observations	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.35	0.35	0.22	0.22
Control mean dep. var.	-0.034	-0.034	-0.023	-0.023	-0.018	-0.018
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term	Mobile		Computer		Tablet	
(Post2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.067		0.006		0.004	
	(0.051)		(0.038)		(0.043)	
Treatment 1		0.028		0.006		0.022
		(0.063)		(0.047)		(0.054)
Treatment 2		0.105**		0.005		-0.013
		(0.053)		(0.047)		(0.051)
Observations	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852
R^2	0.04	0.04	0.33	0.33	0.18	0.18
Control mean dep. var.	-0.035	-0.035	-0.018	-0.018	-0.006	-0.006
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C11: Effects on online procedures - Field assignment

A) Short-term (Post1)	Have you sent your CV online?		Have you accessed offers online?		Download forms		Fill out forms	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.070*		0.023		0.017		0.060	
	(0.042)		(0.040)		(0.041)		(0.041)	
Treatment 1		0.068		-0.006		-0.009		0.050
		(0.051)		(0.048)		(0.048)		(0.048)
Treatment 2		0.073		0.052		0.044		0.071
		(0.052)		(0.048)		(0.050)		(0.050)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880	1880
R^2	0.19	0.19	0.28	0.28	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.25
Control mean dep. var.	-0.061	-0.061	-0.020	-0.020	-0.031	-0.031	-0.061	-0.061
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Have you sent your CV online?		Have you accessed offers online?		Download forms		Fill out forms	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.053		0.017		-0.003		-0.033	
	(0.042)		(0.039)		(0.042)		(0.041)	
Treatment 1		-0.076		0.007		-0.046		-0.032
		(0.051)		(0.048)		(0.051)		(0.050)
Treatment 2		-0.032		0.028		0.039		-0.034
		(0.051)		(0.048)		(0.050)		(0.050)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891	1891
R^2	0.20	0.20	0.29	0.29	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.23
Control mean dep. var.	0.010	0.010	-0.022	-0.022	-0.022	-0.022	-0.012	-0.012
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C12: Effect on online procedures - Assignment without problematic cases

A) Short-term (Post1)	Have you sent your		Have you accessed		Download		Fill out	
	CV online?		offers online?		forms		forms	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	0.067		0.018		0.004		0.054	
	(0.043)		(0.040)		(0.042)		(0.042)	
Treatment 1		0.067		-0.011		-0.024		0.043
		(0.051)		(0.049)		(0.049)		(0.049)
Treatment 2		0.068		0.046		0.031		0.065
		(0.053)		(0.049)		(0.050)		(0.051)
Observations	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835	1835
R^2	0.19	0.19	0.28	0.28	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.25
Control mean dep. var.	-0.065	-0.065	-0.026	-0.026	-0.031	-0.031	-0.055	-0.055
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	Have you sent your		Have you accessed		Download		Fill out	
	CV online?		offers online?		forms		forms	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.058		0.004		-0.004		-0.041	
	(0.042)		(0.040)		(0.042)		(0.041)	
Treatment 1		-0.087*		-0.007		-0.050		-0.039
		(0.051)		(0.048)		(0.051)		(0.050)
Treatment 2		-0.029		0.015		0.041		-0.043
		(0.052)		(0.048)		(0.051)		(0.051)
Observations	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852	1852
R^2	0.20	0.20	0.29	0.29	0.20	0.21	0.23	0.23
Control mean dep. var.	0.010	0.010	-0.028	-0.028	-0.025	-0.025	-0.006	-0.006
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C13: Effects on self-knowledge

A) Short-term	Field assignment				Without problematic cases			
(Post1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.029 (0.039)	-0.034 (0.066)			-0.049 (0.040)	-0.112 (0.071)		
Treatment and frequent attendance		0.054 (0.081)				0.140 (0.087)		
Treatment 1			-0.043 (0.047)	-0.073 (0.076)			-0.056 (0.047)	-0.148* (0.080)
Treatment 1 and frequent attendance				0.106 (0.097)				0.199** (0.100)
Treatment 2			-0.015 (0.048)	0.003 (0.074)			-0.041 (0.048)	-0.075 (0.081)
Treatment 2 and frequent attendance				0.005 (0.092)				0.081 (0.102)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880	1835	1835	1835	1835
R^2	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.33
Control mean dep. var.	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term	Field assignment				Without problematic cases			
(Post2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.029 (0.039)	0.018 (0.062)			-0.040 (0.040)	-0.035 (0.066)		
Treatment and frequent attendance		-0.052 (0.078)				0.018 (0.084)		
Treatment 1			-0.033 (0.047)	-0.002 (0.071)			-0.042 (0.048)	-0.043 (0.076)
Treatment 1 and frequent attendance				-0.020 (0.092)				0.030 (0.099)
Treatment 2			-0.026 (0.047)	0.035 (0.071)			-0.038 (0.048)	-0.027 (0.076)
Treatment 2 and frequent attendance				-0.082 (0.094)				0.007 (0.100)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891	1852	1852	1852	1852
R^2	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31
Control mean dep. var.	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C14: Effects on soft skills

A) Short-run	Field assignment				Without problematic cases			
(Post1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.052 (0.036)	-0.020 (0.061)			-0.061* (0.037)	-0.038 (0.066)		
Treatment and frequent attendance		-0.040 (0.076)				-0.027 (0.082)		
Treatment 1			-0.041 (0.043)	-0.116 (0.071)			-0.042 (0.043)	-0.127* (0.074)
Treatment 1 and frequent attendance				0.176* (0.090)				0.191** (0.094)
Treatment 2			-0.063 (0.043)	0.067 (0.068)			-0.081* (0.044)	0.055 (0.074)
Treatment 2 and frequent attendance				-0.244*** (0.088)				-0.245*** (0.095)
Observations	1880	1880	1880	1880	1835	1835	1835	1835
R^2	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.42
Control mean dep. var.	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term	Field assignment				Without problematic cases			
(Pot2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.136*** (0.037)	-0.079 (0.059)			-0.138*** (0.038)	-0.083 (0.065)		
Treatment and frequent attendance		-0.074 (0.074)				-0.071 (0.082)		
Treatment 1			-0.128*** (0.044)	-0.101 (0.067)			-0.132*** (0.044)	-0.119 (0.074)
Treatment 1 and frequent attendance				-0.012 (0.086)				0.012 (0.095)
Treatment 2			-0.143*** (0.046)	-0.058 (0.069)			-0.144*** (0.047)	-0.048 (0.076)
Treatment 2 and frequent attendance				-0.132 (0.089)				-0.154 (0.099)
Observations	1891	1891	1891	1891	1852	1852	1852	1852
R^2	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37
Control mean dep. var.	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D Results with administrative data on individual working lives from the Social Security Administration

Based on the information contained in the Social Security records, we construct several variables that capture the employment situation of participants across different editions of the project and over a longer period than that covered by the survey data. These variables include: employment indicator, contract type (permanent, fixed-term, none), type of work schedule (full-time or part-time), the total number of days worked, the number of days in full-time employment, and labor intensity (defined as the ratio of days worked to the total number of days in the reference period).¹⁰ For each variable, four reference periods are considered, with three-month intervals between them:

- Pre: before the intervention
- Post1: first measurement after the intervention
- Post2: second measurement after the intervention
- Post3: third measurement after the intervention

Exact dates vary across editions:

Edition	Pre	Post1	Post2	Post3
1	January 1 to 31, 2023	April 1 to 30, 2023	July 1 to 31, 2023	November 1 to 30, 2023
2	April 1 to 30, 2023	July 1 to 31, 2023	October 1 to 31, 2023	December 1 to 31, 2023
3	August 1 to 31, 2023	November 1 to 30, 2023	January 1 to 31, 2024	–

For variables measured at a given time (employment indicator, contract type, or type of work schedule), we take the 10th day of each of the months of the previous periods as a reference point.

Table D1 shows that all variables are balanced across experimental groups at baseline.

Tables D2 and D3 show no significant effects on either the probability of being employed or the likelihood of working without a contract, respectively. By contrast, tables D4 and D5 reveal positive program effects. Table D4 documents a long-run positive impact on the likelihood of holding a permanent contract, while Table D5 reports medium-run effects, with positive and statistically significant coefficients at the 5% level of 0.023 and 0.022 (without and with controls, respectively) in the medium run. These effects are larger in magnitude and estimated with greater precision for the Treatment 2 group (0.038 and 0.037, respectively).

The program has no statistically significant effect on point-in-time employment probabilities; however, it does exert a positive and significant effect on cumulative days employed. Consistent with this, Tables D6 and D7 report long-run effects—statistically significant at the 10% level—of 0.93 additional days worked and an increase of 0.03 standard deviations in labor intensity for the treatment group.

Finally, Tables D8 and D9 show that, for the Treatment 2 group in the medium term, the program produced positive effects—statistically significant at the 10% level—on the number of full-time days worked (0.82 days) and on full-time labor intensity (0.03 standard deviations).

¹⁰Analogously, full-time labor intensity is defined as the ratio of days in full-time employment to the total number of days in the reference period.

Table D1: Balancing tests among experimental groups

Variable	(1) Control		(2) Treatment 1		(3) Treatment 2		F-test of equality		(1)-(2)		(1)-(3)		(2)-(3)	
	(N)	(Mean)	(N)	(Mean)	(N)	(Mean)	in all groups		t-test for pairs		t-test for pairs		t-test for pairs	
		(Var.)		(Var.)		(Var.)	N	p-value	N	p-value	N	p-value	N	p-value
PRE: N ^o days worked	1051	6.12 (140.58)	655	5.94 (137.16)	650	5.77 (134.00)	2356	0.14 0.87	1706	0.79	1701	0.59	1305	0.82
PRE: N ^o days worked full-time	1051	4.14 (78.52)	655	3.95 (76.50)	650	3.84 (75.23)	2356	0.20 0.82	1706	0.70	1701	0.53	1305	0.85
PRE: Labor intensity	1051	0.20 (0.15)	655	0.19 (0.15)	650	0.19 (0.14)	2356	0.13 0.88	1706	0.79	1701	0.61	1305	0.83
PRE: Full-time labor intensity	1051	0.13 (0.08)	655	0.13 (0.08)	650	0.13 (0.08)	2356	0.19 0.83	1706	0.70	1701	0.55	1305	0.87
PRE: Working	1051	0.23 (0.18)	655	0.23 (0.18)	650	0.22 (0.17)	2356	0.08 0.92	1706	0.79	1701	0.68	1305	0.91
PRE: Without contract	1051	0.02 (0.02)	655	0.02 (0.02)	650	0.03 (0.03)	2356	0.17 0.84	1706	0.64	1701	0.93	1305	0.58
PRE: Permanent contract	1051	0.09 (0.08)	655	0.09 (0.08)	650	0.09 (0.08)	2356	0.05 0.95	1706	0.78	1701	0.99	1305	0.81
PRE: Full-time contract	1051	0.05 (0.04)	655	0.05 (0.05)	650	0.05 (0.04)	2356	0.24 0.79	1706	0.51	1701	0.97	1305	0.60

Table D2: Effects on the employment situation: working

A) Short-term (Post1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.004 (0.014)		-0.006 (0.014)	
Treatment 1		-0.005 (0.016)		-0.008 (0.016)
Treatment 2		-0.003 (0.017)		-0.003 (0.017)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.45	0.45	0.46	0.46
Control mean dep. var.	0.277	0.277	0.277	0.277
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.007 (0.015)		0.004 (0.015)	
Treatment 1		-0.002 (0.018)		-0.006 (0.018)
Treatment 2		0.016 (0.019)		0.015 (0.019)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.34	0.35	0.35	0.35
Control mean dep. var.	0.291	0.291	0.291	0.291
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
C) Long-term (Post3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.023 (0.019)		0.018 (0.019)	
Treatment 1		0.028 (0.023)		0.019 (0.023)
Treatment 2		0.018 (0.023)		0.016 (0.023)
Observations	1501	1501	1501	1501
R^2	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.32
Control mean dep. var.	0.252	0.252	0.252	0.252
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D3: Effects on the employment situation: working without a contract

A) Short-term (Post1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.001 (0.003)		0.001 (0.003)	
Treatment 1		0.001 (0.004)		0.001 (0.004)
Treatment 2		0.001 (0.004)		0.001 (0.004)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75
Control mean dep. var.	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.004 (0.004)		-0.004 (0.004)	
Treatment 1		-0.007 (0.005)		-0.007 (0.005)
Treatment 2		-0.001 (0.004)		-0.001 (0.005)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63
Control mean dep. var.	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
C) Long-term (Post3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.002 (0.006)		-0.003 (0.006)	
Treatment 1		-0.004 (0.008)		-0.005 (0.008)
Treatment 2		-0.000 (0.007)		-0.000 (0.006)
Observations	1501	1501	1501	1501
R^2	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52
Control mean dep. var.	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D4: Effects on the employment situation: working with a permanent contract

A) Short-term (Post1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.001 (0.008)		-0.001 (0.008)	
Treatment 1		0.003 (0.009)		0.001 (0.010)
Treatment 2		-0.001 (0.010)		-0.002 (0.010)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.61	0.61	0.62	0.62
Control mean dep. var.	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.014 (0.010)		0.013 (0.010)	
Treatment 1		0.014 (0.012)		0.012 (0.012)
Treatment 2		0.015 (0.012)		0.014 (0.012)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43
Control mean dep. var.	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
C) Long-term (Post3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.024* (0.014)		0.020 (0.014)	
Treatment 1		0.027 (0.017)		0.020 (0.017)
Treatment 2		0.021 (0.017)		0.020 (0.017)
Observations	1501	1501	1501	1501
R^2	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.35
Control mean dep. var.	0.118	0.118	0.118	0.118
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D5: Effects on the employment situation: working full-time

A) Short-term (Post1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.007 (0.009)		0.006 (0.009)	
Treatment 1		-0.001 (0.011)		-0.003 (0.011)
Treatment 2		0.014 (0.011)		0.014 (0.011)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27
Control mean dep. var.	0.064	0.064	0.064	0.064
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.023** (0.011)		0.022** (0.011)	
Treatment 1		0.008 (0.013)		0.006 (0.013)
Treatment 2		0.038*** (0.014)		0.037*** (0.014)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.15
Control mean dep. var.	0.073	0.073	0.073	0.073
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
C) Long-term (Post3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.009 (0.013)		0.006 (0.013)	
Treatment 1		0.016 (0.015)		0.013 (0.015)
Treatment 2		0.002 (0.015)		-0.001 (0.015)
Observations	1501	1501	1501	1501
R^2	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.14
Control mean dep. var.	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.067
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D6: Effects on the number of days worked

A) Short-term (Post1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.027 (0.371)		-0.097 (0.371)	
Treatment 1		-0.190 (0.432)		-0.340 (0.433)
Treatment 2		0.138 (0.454)		0.148 (0.454)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.50	0.50	0.51	0.51
Control mean dep. var.	7.298	7.298	7.298	7.298
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.484 (0.439)		0.416 (0.438)	
Treatment 1		0.314 (0.533)		0.187 (0.532)
Treatment 2		0.656 (0.527)		0.647 (0.527)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
Control mean dep. var.	7.737	7.737	7.737	7.737
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
C) Long-term (Post3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.934* (0.544)		0.785 (0.540)	
Treatment 1		0.972 (0.658)		0.711 (0.655)
Treatment 2		0.895 (0.661)		0.859 (0.656)
Observations	1501	1501	1501	1501
R^2	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.34
Control mean dep. var.	6.826	6.826	6.826	6.826
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D7: Effects on labor intensity

A) Short-term (Post1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.001 (0.012)		-0.003 (0.012)	
Treatment 1		-0.006 (0.014)		-0.011 (0.014)
Treatment 2		0.004 (0.015)		0.005 (0.015)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.50	0.50	0.51	0.51
Control mean dep. var.	0.240	0.240	0.240	0.240
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.016 (0.014)		0.013 (0.014)	
Treatment 1		0.010 (0.017)		0.006 (0.017)
Treatment 2		0.021 (0.017)		0.021 (0.017)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.35	0.35	0.36	0.36
Control mean dep. var.	0.250	0.250	0.250	0.250
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
C) Long-term (Post3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.030* (0.018)		0.026 (0.018)	
Treatment 1		0.032 (0.022)		0.023 (0.021)
Treatment 2		0.029 (0.022)		0.028 (0.021)
Observations	1501	1501	1501	1501
R^2	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.34
Control mean dep. var.	0.223	0.223	0.223	0.223
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D8: Effects on the number of days worked full-time

A) Short-term (Post1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.166 (0.297)		0.115 (0.298)	
Treatment 1		-0.021 (0.345)		-0.135 (0.348)
Treatment 2		0.354 (0.371)		0.366 (0.369)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.45	0.45	0.46	0.46
control mean dep. var.	4.926	4.926	4.926	4.926
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.483 (0.359)		0.430 (0.357)	
Treatment 1		0.149 (0.426)		0.065 (0.425)
Treatment 2		0.820* (0.444)		0.798* (0.443)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.30
Control mean dep. var.	5.400	5.400	5.400	5.400
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
C) Long-term (Post3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.713 (0.440)		0.601 (0.437)	
Treatment 1		0.710 (0.530)		0.531 (0.530)
Treatment 2		0.716 (0.534)		0.670 (0.532)
Observations	1501	1501	1501	1501
R^2	0.28	0.28	0.30	0.30
Control mean dep. var.	4.705	4.705	4.705	4.705
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D9: Effects on full-time labor intensity

A) Short-term (Post1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.005 (0.010)		0.004 (0.010)	
Treatment 1		-0.001 (0.011)		-0.004 (0.011)
Treatment 2		0.011 (0.012)		0.012 (0.012)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.45	0.45	0.46	0.46
Control mean dep. var.	0.162	0.162	0.162	0.162
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
B) Medium-term (Post2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.015 (0.012)		0.014 (0.012)	
Treatment 1		0.005 (0.014)		0.002 (0.014)
Treatment 2		0.026* (0.014)		0.026* (0.014)
Observations	2356	2356	2356	2356
R^2	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.30
Control mean dep. var.	0.174	0.174	0.174	0.174
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
C) Long-term (Post3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.023 (0.014)		0.020 (0.014)	
Treatment 1		0.023 (0.017)		0.017 (0.017)
Treatment 2		0.023 (0.017)		0.022 (0.017)
Observations	1501	1501	1501	1501
R^2	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.29
Control mean dep. var.	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154
Initial value dep. var.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.