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DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 18073

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ABSTRACT

Can't Buy Me Home: Beliefs, Facts, and Policy in the Housing Affordability Crisis*

Our study investigates public opinion on the housing affordability crisis in Portugal through a nationally representative survey combined with an information provision experiment. Participants were asked to identify perceived causes of rising housing prices, assess their factual knowledge of the housing market and sociodemographic trends, and indicate their preferred policy solutions, carefully framed to reflect trade-offs. Half of the respondents were randomly assigned to receive official statistical information on these trends before indicating their policy preferences. The findings reveal significant heterogeneity in beliefs about the causes of the crisis, pervasive misperceptions regarding market trends, and a limited impact of information provision on policy preferences. These results underscore the challenges of addressing housing policy through informational interventions alone and highlight the need for strategies that integrate behavioral and contextual factors to foster informed public engagement.

JEL Classification: R31, F60, J18
Keywords: information provision experiment, housing, Portugal

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1 Introduction

Rapid increases in housing prices, stagnant incomes, and limited housing supply have strained household budgets, particularly among low- and middle-income young people. This has broad economic implications, including lower labor mobility, greater wealth inequality, and disruptions to urban development (Ioannides and Ngai, 2025; Howard and Liebersohn, 2025). But from a policy perspective, the housing affordability crisis also presents critical challenges. Policymakers face difficult trade-offs between promoting housing supply, implementing demand-side interventions, and addressing potential market distortions (Saiz, 2023). Understanding how people perceive the causes of the crisis, their factual knowledge of key trends, and their preferred policy responses is therefore essential to designing effective and publicly supported interventions. Large-scale surveys can therefore be particularly useful in this context by uncovering factors that are otherwise intangible or invisible to researchers and policymakers (Stantcheva, 2023; Haaland et al., 2023; Fuster and Zafar, 2023).

Portugal's housing market, characterized by one of the fastest price growth rates in Europe – a surge of 90% between 2015 and 2022 compared to the EU average of 48% – combined with its distinctive policies such as the Golden Visa program, tax benefits for non-habitual residents and visas for digital nomads, provides a compelling case study to understand the interaction between housing affordability and public policy responses. According to the OECD, the price-to-income ratio in Portugal increased by more than 150% between 2015 and 2024 — the highest rise among the organization's member countries (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). As highlighted by *The Guardian* in July 2023, "Portugal's bid to attract foreign money backfires as rental market goes 'crazy'", underscoring the growing strain on housing affordability. However, these concerns are not new; as early as May 2018, *The New York Times* observed: "Lisbon is thriving. But at what price for those who live there?" reflecting the long-standing tension between urban development and local housing needs.

In this paper, we present findings from a nationally representative survey of over 1,000 Portuguese respondents, combined with an information provision experiment, to examine three research questions related to the housing affordability crisis. Conducted between late August and early September 2023, our approach proceeds in three steps.

First, we ask how people in Portugal perceive the causes of the housing affordability crisis and whether there is a consensus on these factors. After answering standard sociodemographic questions, we asked respondents to rank their beliefs on the main reasons that, in their opinion, contributed to the recent surge in real estate prices, considering both supply- and demand-driven explanations.

Second, we examine the accuracy of their knowledge about the evolution of key housing

market and social trends between 2015 and 2022 to gauge their factual knowledge. Indicators included questions on the percentage increase in average real estate prices for family housing, changes in housing stock size, growth in total and foreign resident populations, and the number of houses registered as short-term rentals.

Third, we investigate whether providing factual information can shift citizen's policy preferences regarding housing solutions. More specifically, for a randomly selected half of the sample, we confront their stated beliefs with the official figures published by Statistics Portugal and Eurostat.[1] We then collect all respondents' views on potential solutions to the housing affordability crisis and study the socioeconomic determinants of these preferences. In our information provision experiment, we compare the responses between the treated (i.e., those presented with official statistics) and the control respondents on a series of questions designed to elicit policy preferences. These questions cover key areas, including public investments, regulations, restrictions on foreign investment, architectural decisions, and taxation. Importantly, each question is framed to present simple trade-offs, enabling respondents to weigh both the benefits and costs of their choices.

Our main findings are as follows. When asked to evaluate the main factors that contribute to the housing affordability crisis between the six possible options that we proposed, we find that the responses do not exhibit a clear consensus. Although respondents appear to be slightly more inclined to rank supply-side factors, such as the shortage of familiar housing and low public investment in housing, as the main perceived causes of the housing crisis, when compared with demand-side factors, such as the rise of foreign investment or in the number of short-term rental accommodations, these differences are, however, small.

We then elicit factual knowledge about the evolution of the housing market and related sociodemographic variables. While respondents believe that the price of houses has increased by 64%, on average, the actual rise was 90%. Similarly, people estimate, on average, that the number of houses grew by 19%, when the actual growth was 2%. These misperceptions also extend to population-related issues. The respondents think that the total population increased by 43%, on average, and that the foreign population rose by 50%, but official data show that the total population grew by just 1%, while the foreign population increased by 104%. In addition, we study the determinants of these differences and find that factors such as having a higher education degree, being a foreigner, and age are related to the accuracy of the answers or the distance to the correct statistical value related to the housing market.

We observe that the public policies that received more support are those related to the regulation of the rental market, the end of Golden visas, and the lowering of taxes on urban

[1] Other survey experiments that provide respondents with quantitative information based on official statistical data include Kuziemko et al. (2015); Roth et al. (2022b); Bottan and Perez-Truglia (2025).

regeneration. In contrast, the least popular policies are related to the construction of taller buildings, raising taxes on vacant houses, and the introduction of tax benefits to motivate people to move to smaller houses. We also show that having a higher education degree, being a foreign resident, a renter, or right-wing respondent are associated with heterogeneity in these preferences.

Finally, we examine the effects of our information experiment aimed at understanding how providing reliable quantitative information affects public policy preferences. Treated survey respondents observe signals about the state of the world that are open to interpretation. These signals may or may not change their posterior thoughts.[2] We show that, for most of the questions, providing information and updating beliefs on the evolution of variables related to the housing market has no effect on changing policy preferences. These results do not change when we condition on a vector of sociodemographic controls and when we considered the accuracy of the answers for each respondent (i.e, when previous beliefs are further away from the official number), measured as the average of z-scores for each answer. Our findings are in line with Stantcheva (2021), Douenne and Fabre (2022), and Dolls et al. (2025b) who reject the hypothesis that rational agents update their beliefs accordingly in response to new information, as respondents with large misperceptions are barely affected by the provision of information.

Our paper complements the findings of Elmendorf et al. (2025), who document the inability of regular voters to recognize that significant increases in regional housing supply would lead to lower prices. They show instead that nationally representative surveys of US respondents tend to blame housing developers and landlords for high prices. In our paper, we show not only that respondents tend to overestimate construction numbers and are not in favor of constructing taller buildings, but they don't move their political preferences when provided with information.

The literature also highlights that more reliable information on the evolution of the housing market can have significant effects on its functioning. Eerola and Lyytikäinen (2015) analyze the impact of introducing an online page with detailed information on house transactions in Finland and show that this initiative contributed to speeding up the house buying and selling process. A similar policy in Israel, studied by Ben-Shahar and Golan (2019), reveals that better knowledge of the evolution of the real estate market leads to less dispersion between the prices of houses of comparable quality.

Our paper further relates to a growing body of work that relies on survey experiments to study how people reason about policies, including social mobility and inequality (Alesina

[2]Fryer Jr et al. (2019) model these situations and conclude that information can lead to polarization when the information presented confirms their previous views, while respondents are largely not affected when they obtain information that goes against their prior beliefs.

et al., 2018), gender (Settele, 2022) and racial discrimination (Haaland and Roth, 2023), migration (Facchini et al., 2022; Alesina et al., 2023), environmental policies (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2025), taxation and government spending (Kuziemko et al., 2015; Stantcheva, 2021; Roth et al., 2022a; Douenne and Fabre, 2022), and trade (Alfaro et al., 2023). Specifically related to our work, Dolls et al. (2025b) conducted survey experiments to study public support for a rental control program in Germany. They show that highlighting unintended negative aspects of the policy decreases support, while putting emphasis on gentrification effects for incumbent tenants increases it. Providing factual information on the evolution of the housing market does not change responses.

This work has implications for policy. Documenting public (mis)perceptions about housing indicators is important, as these beliefs can shape both individual behavior and collective support for policy interventions, potentially distorting democratic decision-making and market dynamics. At the same time, the limited effect of factual information on policy preferences underscores the importance of other factors such as values, identity, and past experiences in shaping public attitudes, suggesting that informational interventions alone may be insufficient to foster support for reforms. This implies that policymakers may need to go beyond information provision – e.g., using framing, narratives, or experiential interventions – to shift public attitudes.

2 Data and survey

2.1 Sample data

We analyze data from a large-scale survey conducted across Portugal between late August and early September 2023. The housing module of the questionnaire was created by two of the authors at the request of the Francisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation (FFMS). Housing was featured as the central topic in the first edition of FFMS's quarterly Barometer, an initiative aimed at examining critical societal issues in Portugal, where data are notably lacking. DOMP, a prominent data analytics firm commissioned by FFMS, handled sample design, questionnaire programming, and fieldwork. The survey targeted Portuguese-speaking residents of mainland Portugal, aged 18 years old and over, who had landline telephone or internet access. The sample was selected using a stratified quota system based on sex, age group, and region. In total, 1,086 fully completed and validated questionnaires were collected, with 673 responses obtained through an online survey (CAWI; 62%) and 413 via telephone interviews (CATI; 38%).

The sample includes 1,031 respondents, with 52.3% male and 47.7% female participants.

The average age is 51.3 years old, distributed as follows: 30.0% are aged 18–34, typically at the beginning of their residential careers; 32.4% are aged 35–54; and 46.7% are 55 or older. Regarding education, 37.8% have tertiary qualifications. Employment data shows that 65.9% are economically active, of whom 60.6% are employed. Among the inactive, 21.1% are retirees, 4.8% homemakers, and 2.4% students.

The respondents have lived in their current dwellings for an average of 22.1 years. Homeownership is common, with 66.3% owning their homes - 35.5 percentage points of these with no outstanding mortgage, and 30.8 currently paying one off. The remaining respondents live in privately rented accommodations (17.3%), public housing (2%), or other arrangements, such accommodations provided for free.

Among respondents with regular housing expenses (47.1%), the average monthly cost is €561.5. Private renters bear the highest burden, paying an average of €685.5 per month, followed by mortgage holders at €522.3, and those in public or third-sector housing at €369.1. Notably, 62.4% report difficulty covering these costs, with 13.6% experiencing significant financial hardship.

A comparison with the 2021 Census highlights some disparities. The average age of the sample (51.3 years) is higher than the Census average of 45.4 years, and males are overrepresented in the sample relative to the Census figure of 47.6%. The sample also exhibits a pronounced difference in educational attainment, with more than twice as many respondents having tertiary education (37.8%) compared to the Census (19.8%). Additionally, the homeownership in the sample is slightly lower (66.3%) than the Census figure (70%). These variations may arise from sampling methodology, the exclusion of individuals under 18 years of age, or changes since the Census was conducted.

2.2 Survey Structure

The survey starts with questions regarding basic demographic information, as presented above, including age, gender, nationality, and some other background socioeconomic information, including education and political views. We also ask respondents about their ownership status. Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes the descriptive statistics of our sample.

We then inquire the participants about their beliefs regarding the factors that shaped the housing crisis. We ask them to rank six possible causes by order of importance. Afterwards, we elicit their perceptions about the evolution of key statistical indicators that we consider fundamental to understand the housing crisis in Portugal. At this point, half of the survey participants were randomly presented with the official numbers on the statistical indicators.[3]

[3]We do not ask participants the same numbers as this could reflect spurious reactions rather than genuine learning.

Lastly, we ask respondents about their policy preferences regarding a battery of housing policies, dividing the focus into these areas: public investments, regulation, restrictions to foreign investments, architectural restrictions, and taxation. In all cases, we present trade-off situations to motivate respondents to carefully consider both the costs and benefits of these policy prescriptions.

3 Is there a consensus regarding the factors causing the housing affordability crises?

The knowledge, perceptions, and beliefs that individuals have about a particular issue shape their opinions on its significance and their viewpoints on viable solutions.[4] In our survey, participants were instructed to rank six potential factors that, in their opinion, influenced the current housing situation in Portugal, from most to least significant. These factors comprise both supply- and demand-side considerations, and the order of presentation was randomized. Respondents were asked to choose between the lack of regulation, the low levels of public investment, the low construction numbers, the increase in the number of short-term holiday rentals, the incentives to attract foreign investment (such as the Golden Visa scheme and the fiscal benefits for expatriates and digital nomads), and the increase in the number of real estate investment funds. These factors were selected taking into account recent empirical work in the Portuguese context.[5] The distribution of responses is shown in Figure 1.

[4] Kuchler and Zafar (2019) show that individuals extrapolate from personal experiences when forming expectations about aggregate economic outcomes.

[5] Franco and Santos (2021); Garha and Azevedo (2022) show that short-term rentals are associated with higher housing prices in Lisbon, while Gonçalves et al. (2022) find that the 2018 ban in some areas of the city caused a modest relative reduction in housing trends for affected dwellings, and Batalha et al. (2022) show that tourism disruption during the Covid-19 pandemic had asymmetric effects on housing prices depending on the previous share of short-term holiday rentals. Cruz et al. (2024) finds positive effects for local businesses. In addition, Kalin et al. (2024) shows that tax exemptions of foreign-source pensions are important drivers of migration to Portugal, and Pereira dos Santos and Strohmaier (2024) examine the real estate effects of the Golden Visa scheme.

Figure 1: Ranking of six factors influencing the Portuguese housing crisis



We find considerable variability in the participants' perceptions of the topic. The participants attribute the housing situation in Portugal mainly to factors related to supply. When asked to choose the most relevant factor, the respondents selected the shortage of available familiar housing (23%), low public investment in housing (23%), and the lack of market regulation (20%). In contrast, factors related to demand are deemed less relevant as the main causes of the crisis, notably: the increase in properties registered for local accommodation (13%), the increase in investment by real estate funds (12%), and the demand for housing by foreigners driven by state incentives (11%).

The significant dispersion in the participants' perceptions is evident, for instance, regarding the scarcity of familiar housing as a crucial factor in understanding the current housing situation in Portugal. Although approximately half of the respondents identify this as an important factor (53%), it is also mentioned as the least important by the highest proportion of the respondents (24%).

Thus, our findings indicate a lack of public consensus on the causes of the housing situation, with a collection of highly diverse and, in some cases, polarizing opinions. These results are consistent with housing supply skepticism in the mass public hypothesis (Elmendorf et al., 2025). We acknowledge that listing only six factors could be limited, but even in this simplified and stylized setting, many individuals consider certain factors to be highly significant, while others believe that the same factors have little influence on the rise in housing prices. Moreover, we note that this lack of consensus does not appear to be caused by political orientation, rental status, education, or age. As shown in Figure A.2 the Appendix,

when we divide our sample according to several characteristics, the results are very similar. This disparity makes it more challenging to reach agreements on priorities and to formulate effective public policy measures.

4 Knowledge about the housing market and its determinants

This section discusses the respondents' factual knowledge regarding the crisis in the Portuguese housing market. We asked survey participants to guess the evolution of six statistical indicators that were selected to cover supply- and demand-side aspects.[6] The time period was the same for all and fixed between 2015 and 2022, after the sovereign debt crisis and the assistance plan negotiated with the troika composed of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, in Portugal from 2011 to 2014. The questions appeared to the participants in random order.

We present the results in Figure 2, where the distribution and the average (in light green) of the responses of the respondents are contrasted with the official statistical value obtained from Statistics Portugal (in dark green). To reduce the influence of extreme values while looking at averages, we excluded 1% of the extreme values on each side of the distributions.

Starting with supply-side indicators, we find that, despite being a salient topic in Portugal (Rodrigues et al., 2022), survey participants underestimated the magnitude of the rise in real estate prices. Approximately three out of four respondents believe that the increase in the average price of housing was lower than reported in official data (90%). The average value of the increase reported by the respondents was 64%.

At the same time, participants overestimated the extent of recent housing construction. Official data report only a 2% increase in housing available to families during the period of analysis, while the respondents believe that the average increase was much higher (19%). This might be particularly surprising when we recall that one of the main factors identified by survey participants as contributing to the housing crisis was the lack of houses available to families.

Looking at the demand side, we asked the respondents about the evolution of the total number of residents and the total number of foreign residents in Portugal. In these questions, we observe the following pattern: while survey participants overestimated the growth of the total population (43% on average versus the modest 1% from official data), they underestimated the increase in foreign resident population (50% average increase reported by

[6] Schlag et al. (2015) and Charness et al. (2021) survey the literature on eliciting beliefs. We note that, in our case, truth (i.e., the official statistical number) is verifiable.

Figure 2: Distribution of beliefs on the evolution of six statistical indicators in Portugal between 2015 and 2022 and official value



(a) Average price of houses for family housing



(b) Number of houses available for family housing



(c) Resident Population



(d) Resident Foreign Population



(e) Number of Overnight stays



(f) Number of houses registered for touristic accommodation

Perceived values Official data

Note: We excluded respondents who did not answer or did not know, as well as the top and bottom 1% of extreme values.

respondents, far from the actual 104% in foreign residents reported by official statistics for this period).[7]

Finally, we examine participants' knowledge of the evolution in the tourism sector. We show that the survey respondents reported a significant increase in the number of overnight stays, estimating an average growth of 46%, compared to the official figure of 30%. For houses registered as short-term rentals, the participants noted an average increase that was lower than the official (49% on average in the sample vs. 126% from the official data).

We now examine how individual characteristics influenced differences in responses. To do so, we regress, for each indicator, the difference (computed as the respondent's answer minus the official value, weighted by the official value) on a vector of socioeconomic variables. Table 1 displays the results.

Table 1: Differences between the perceived indicators and actual results for housing market

	Price of houses	Houses available	Total resident population	Foreign population	Number of overnight stays	Touristic Short-term rentals
Differences in perceptions	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	0.046	0.710	4.752**	0.054	0.063	0.010
	(0.038)	(0.650)	(2.328)	(0.038)	(0.082)	(0.023)
Age	-0.0012*	-0.387***	-1.446***	-0.009	0.000	0.003
	(0.006)	(0.120)	(0.543)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.004)
Age^2	0.000	0.004**	0.012**	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.022)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.080)
High Education	-0.006	-1.863***	-7.204***	0.007	0.099	0.029
	(0.041)	(0.656)	(2.444)	(0.041)	(0.090)	(0.026)
Foreigner	0.002	0.498	3.004	-0.057	-0.231**	-0.106***
	(0.069)	(1.021)	(3.661)	(0.047)	(0.116)	(0.030)
Renter	0.131**	-0.558	7.609**	0.077	-0.042	0.006
	(0.063)	(0.861)	(3.753)	(0.056)	(0.110)	(0.036)
Right	0.042	0.901	-0.692	0.054	-0.020	-0.043*
	(0.041)	(0.660)	(2.326)	(0.040)	(0.087)	(0.024)
Obs	921	896	912	863	875	912
Adjusted R^2	.012	.107	.043	.006	.008	.015
Mean	-0.304	8.131	25.086	-0.517	0.377	-0.618
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Each row reports results from a separate regression. The differences in perceptions are computed as an index of (Answer-Correct answer)/Correct answer for each question. Controls: survey method and regions (NUTS II). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%.** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

We start by investigating the determinants of differences between the stated answer and the official values for the appreciation of housing prices in column (1). Considering that, on average, respondents underestimated the appreciation in real estate by more than 30

[7]This discrepancy can partly be explained by the survey's national scope, which included respondents from all NUTS II of Portugal mainland. However, the increase in foreign residents has been particularly pronounced in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA) and in the Algarve. According to the 2021 Census data, the proportion of foreign nationals living in the Algarve is 15% and 9% for LMA, but less than 5% for the other NUTS II (North, Centre, and Alentejo).

percentage points, we find that older respondents are more likely to be even further away from the official numbers. In contrast, renters report, on average, higher values for the evolution of prices than non-renters. The fact that they are more informed about the evolution of market prices is consistent with recent empirical evidence showing that renters spending reactions to realized (Aladangady, 2017) and expected future (Chopra et al., 2023) changes in housing valuations are different from those of owners.

In columns (2) and (3), we focus on the differences for the evolution of the housing stock and on the total resident population, respectively. We recall that, in both cases, the respondents believed that there had been more construction and an increase in population than what, in fact, happened: the official numbers point to an evolution close to zero in the two indicators. We find that this was less likely to happen for older respondents and for those with a higher education degree, which were, on average, more accurate in their beliefs. We also find that renters overestimated the increase in total population, which can possibly reflect their perception of competition in the market.

Lastly, we show that foreign residents, when compared with the Portuguese-born, are more informed about the recent trends in tourism in column (4), but less informed about the evolution of houses in the short-term holiday rental market in column (5). In addition, considering that respondents underestimated the recent boom in Airbnb and in other short-term rental platforms online, we find that right-wing respondents believe, on average, that this boom was even less pronounced than left-wing respondents.

5 Policy views

5.1 Preferences and determinants

One of the core contributions of this study is to obtain detailed reasoning about housing policies. In the final block of the survey, we explore how respondents think about a series of policies in different dimensions that are related to housing policy. Before we proceed to the experimental results, we discuss the perceptions of the respondents and examine the socioeconomic determinants of these preferences.

We asked respondents to consider sixteen statements that we designed taking into account the Portuguese context. Their answers are recorded in a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is totally disagree and 5 is totally agree.

The survey statements are designed to be simple and include a trade-off associated with each policy measure. So, the questions make it clear that when choosing a policy, there are costs associated with that choice. This is done to incentivize respondents to carefully

consider each question and to increase awareness of the dynamics and complexity of the housing market problem (Kendall and Oprea, 2024). As an example, we can think about the question "are you in favor of tax reductions?". Most likely respondents will be inclined to say yes, but would probably think twice if we include a trade-off such as "...even though the tax reduction may lead to disinvestment in healthcare and public schools".

To choose the trade-offs to associate with each measure, we based ourselves in the literature on each topic. For example, regarding rent control and its effects on long-term housing supply, we took inspiration from the conclusions of Coulson et al. (2025), Autor et al. (2014) for Massachussetts, Diamond et al. (2019) for San Francisco (USA), Mense et al. (2023) for Germany, and Garcia-López et al. (2020) for Barcelona. For questions about the impact of short-term rentals on the overall housing market and the efficacy of regulations that limit its supply, we used the results from Koster and Ozgen (2021) for Los Angeles and Falk and Scaglione (2024) for Geneva. For questions related to the incidence of taxes on housing we based on the results by Besley et al. (2014) and Best and Kleven (2018) for the UK, Slemrod et al. (2017) in Washington D.C, and Dolls et al. (2025a) for Germany. And for the effects of foreign investments on affordability we refer to Sá (2025) for the England and Wales. Once again, the order of the questions was random to reduce any potential contagious effects or saturation effects caused by the order of the questions.

The average scores for each question are shown in Figure 3a. We observe that the public policies that received more support are those related to the regulation of the rental market, the end of Golden Visas, and lowering the taxes on urban regeneration.[8] On the contrary, the least popular policies are related to the construction of taller buildings, raising taxes on vacant houses, and the introduction of tax benefits to motivate people to move to smaller houses.

Next, we investigate the socioeconomic determinants of the preferences for these public policies. Our findings are presented in Table 2. Our vector of controls comprise region and survey method fixed effects, gender, age, education level, nationality, renting status, and political preferences.

[8] Pereira dos Santos and Strohmaier (2024) show that there is an arguably causal effect of the Golden Visa program on the appreciation of the real estate market in Portugal.

(a) Figure 3 – panel a): Questions for survey participants and its average score



(b) Figure 3 – panel b): Effects of treatment on policy views %



Notes: Each dot represents the treatment effect coefficient corresponding to each policy question, alongside 90% confidence intervals. Coefficients are estimated in a regression with a vector of sociodemographic controls.

Table 2: Determinants of policy preferences

Questions	Q1 (1)	Q2 (2)	Q3 (3)	Q4 (4)	Q5 (5)	Q6 (6)	Q7 (7)	Q8 (8)	Q9 (9)	Q10 (10)	Q11 (11)	Q12 (12)	Q13 (13)	Q14 (14)	Q15 (15)	Q16 (16)
Female	-0.203***	-0.091	-0.001	-0.012	0.081	0.072	0.129*	0.013	0.064	-0.155*	-0.026	-0.042	-0.020	-0.110	-0.008	-0.137*
	(0.079)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.072)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.086)	(0.081)
Age	0.020	0.014	-0.001	-0.009	-0.017	0.021	0.050***	0.005	0.050***	-0.038**	0.014	0.011	0.009	-0.017	0.046***	-0.009
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Age^2	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000	-0.000***	0.000**	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.051	-0.121	-0.063	-0.087	-0.382***	-0.038	0.096	0.182**	0.247***	-0.002	-0.267***	0.141**	-0.093	0.032	0.001	-0.175**
	(0.086)	(0.076)	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.089)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.093)	(0.088)
Foreigner	-0.218	-0.010	-0.157	-0.182	0.003	-0.382***	-0.484***	-0.391***	-0.311*	-0.148	-0.005	-0.056	-0.078	-0.038	-0.441**	-0.041
	(0.152)	(0.120)	(0.132)	(0.144)	(0.137)	(0.142)	(0.152)	(0.150)	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.135)	(0.120)	(0.129)	(0.137)	(0.160)	(0.144)
Renter	0.165	0.205**	0.234**	0.369***	0.294***	0.148	-0.018	-0.153	0.030	0.336***	0.199**	-0.196**	-0.006	0.098	0.561***	0.061
	(0.112)	(0.091)	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.111)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.102)	(0.115)	(0.116)
Right	-0.065	0.021	0.096	-0.018	-0.145*	-0.130	0.046	0.002	-0.029	0.313***	0.015	0.139**	0.214***	0.080	-0.072	0.059
	(0.084)	(0.071)	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.077)	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.091)	(0.085)
Obs	1012	1006	1010	987	1010	997	971	976	973	1006	993	1014	1007	1000	1001	992
Adjusted R^2	0.019	0.040	0.021	0.041	0.037	0.019	0.051	0.047	0.034	0.034	0.022	0.021	0.003	0.001	0.075	0.008
Mean	3.189	3.692	3.486	3.381	3.750	3.240	3.793	3.589	3.283	2.793	3.646	3.850	3.632	3.560	2.952	2.851
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table presents regression estimates of the determinants of the sixteen policy questions numbered from 1 to 16. Controls: survey method and regions (NUTS II). Outcomes are measured from 1 (Totally disagrees) to 5 (Totally agrees) and the questions considered in this table are: Q1 "The State must invest more in public housing, even if it leads to a tax increase in the present and/or future taxes "; Q2 "The State must invest more in public housing, even if this means reduction in public investment in other areas in the present and/or in the future"; Q3 "The State must invest more in public housing, even if it means reducing investment in public transport"; Q4 "The State must increase the regulation of the private rental market, even if this reduces the number of available houses and deters owners from putting their houses up for rent"; Q5 "The State must introduce ceilings on the value of rents, even if this reduces the number of available houses"; Q6 "The State must introduce restrictions on local accommodation, even if these harm the country's economy."; Q7 "The State must put an end to Golden Visas, even if it harms the country's economy"; Q8 "The State must end tax benefits for non-habitual residents and digital nomads, even if this harms the country's economy"; Q9 "The State must end tax benefits for real estate investment funds, even if this reduces the construction of houses"; Q10 "The State must allow the construction of more tall buildings in areas under urban pressure, even if this affects the architecture of cities" and Q11 "The State should impose a predefined percentage of affordable housing in new developments, even if this reduces housing construction"; Q12 "The State must lower taxes on urban regeneration, even if this increases the budget deficit."; Q13 "The State must lower construction taxes, even if this increases the budget deficit"; Q14 "The State must lower taxes on private leases, even if this increases the budget deficit"; Q15 "The State must raise taxes on houses that remain vacant, even if this affects private property rights"; Q16 "The State must provide tax benefits for families who live with more rooms than necessary to move to smaller houses, even if this increases the budget deficit". Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%.** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

We highlight the following results. More educated respondents are, on average, less inclined to support rent controls and more likely to support the termination of tax benefits for non-habitual residents and digital nomads and for real estate investment funds.[9] There is also an association between being highly educated and being less in favour of imposing a predefined percentage of affordable housing in new developments, more likely to support decreasing taxes on urban regeneration, and less likely to defend tax benefits for families who live in houses with more rooms than necessary to move to smaller houses.

Furthermore, foreign residents are, on average, less inclined to advocate for the introduction of restriction on local short-term rentals, the end of the Golden Visa program, and the termination of tax benefits for non-habitual residents and digital nomads and for real estate investment funds. They are also against raising taxes for houses that remain vacant for a long time.

Our findings show that renters defend investing more in public housing, even if this means a reduction in public investment in other areas in the present and/or in the future or if this specifically means reducing investment in public transport. However, we do not find any differences between renters and non-renters in support of higher investments in public housing when the stated trade-off is increasing taxes in the present and/ or in the future. Moreover, renters are in favor of increasing regulation in the private rental market and of the introduction of ceilings on rental values.[10]. Regarding architectural restrictions, they support the construction of taller buildings and think that the State should impose a predefined percentage of affordable housing in new developments. At the same time, they are less positive about lowering taxes on urban regeneration, possibly anticipating that this would contribute to more evictions to free houses for the short-term rental market, but are more in favour of raising taxes on houses that remain vacant.

Lastly, we highlight some ideologically motivated differences in preferences. We observe that right-wing respondents are, on average, slightly less inclined to defend rent controls. They are more likely to support the construction of taller buildings, and not surprisingly (Stantcheva, 2021), they are also more favourable to lowering taxes for urban regeneration and for construction.

[9] Kleven et al. (2020) review the literature that shows that high-income workers may be quite responsive to changes in taxes in their location decisions.

[10] These results are consistent with the findings of Diamond et al. (2019) who show that rent controls prevented displacement of incumbent renters from San Francisco in the short run.

5.2 Experimental evidence

This subsection presents the experimental results, where half of the respondents were randomly selected to receive factual information about the housing statistics before we asked for their policy preferences. These respondents were able to compare their beliefs about the housing market with factual information and possibly update their beliefs. Having a pure control group facilitates the interpretation of the correlations between the pretreatment beliefs and the outcomes of interest, as beliefs among control group respondents are not affected by the treatment. This experimental variation enables us to determine the causal effects of providing this information (Stantcheva, 2023; Haaland et al., 2023; Fuster and Zafar, 2023).

In the first econometric specification, we simply compare the treatment and control groups. Specifically, we estimate the following equation for individual i:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta\, Treatment_i + X_i'\gamma + \mu_i \tag{1}$$

where Y_i represents one of our outcomes of interest measured at the individual level (outcomes are described in detail in the next section); T_i is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the respondent received information and zero otherwise; X_i' is a vector of control variables for NUTS II region, survey method (CATI vs CAWI), age and age squared, and binary indicators that take value one if the respondent is a female, has a tertiary education degree, is a foreign resident in Portugal, is a renter, and voted in a right-wing party in the previous legislative elections.[11] The coefficient β captures the effect of interest. As stated in the pre-analysis plan, and to enhance the quality of the survey data, we exclude observations in which respondents took an abnormally short time to answer. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the balance checks for these variables, confirming that the outcomes are balanced between the treatment and control groups.

The experimental results are shown in Figure 3b.[12] For most of our policy questions, we do not find significant changes motivated by the treatment. This suggests that presenting factual information about the evolution of the housing market, even when respondents are uninformed, does not seem to change the policy preferences of respondents. Our findings are consistent with Stantcheva (2021), Douenne and Fabre (2022), and Dolls et al. (2025b), who reject the hypothesis that rational agents update their beliefs accordingly in response to new information, as respondents with large misperceptions are barely affected by the provision of

[11] Andersen et al. (2021) show that the idea that men secure better prices than women in negotiations over real estate is not robust to the inclusion of appropriate controls.

[12] We show the results in a regression table, without and with a vector of sociodemographic controls in Tables A2 to A6 in the Appendix. As can be seen, the results are very similar for all outcomes in both cases.

information.

There are, however, some marginal effects of the information provision in two questions: "The State must end tax benefits for real estate investment funds, even if this reduces the construction of houses" and "The State must lower taxes on urban regeneration, even if this increases the budget deficit". For the latter case, one potential explanation is that our treatment made the cost of not fostering housing construction more salient. Given the low increase in the availability of housing for families, which was significantly lower than the participants' prior beliefs, the cost might be perceived as relatively higher.

We also include an analysis where we aggregate responses over a mean index for each of the five categories: public investment, regulation, restrictions on foreign investments, architectural restrictions, and taxation, as pre-specified in the pre-analysis plan. The results of estimating Equation (1) are presented in Table A.7 in the Appendix and show that taxation is the only policy category that suffers some change in the treatment group, but the effects of information provision are only marginally significant.

So far, we have not considered how much the respondents updated their beliefs. If their insights were close to the official values, new information might not be as impactful as that for those respondents who were substantially less informed about the evolution of some key statistical indicators. We examine this possibility by re-estimating Equation (1) and interacting treatment with the normalized mean difference between the respondent i's answer and the official values for the six statistical indicators.

Tables A.8 to A.12 in the Appendix display the treatment effects conditional on the distance between respondents' answers and the correct values for the six statistical indicators presented earlier. Once again, we do not find strong evidence in favour of information provision being able to shift policy preferences.

6 Concluding remarks

Our study provides empirical evidence from a nationally representative sample in a country facing acute housing pressures, offering insights into the political feasibility of housing reforms. We explore population perceptions of the housing affordability crisis in Portugal, focusing on the causes of the surge in housing prices, factual knowledge of trends in the real estate market, and the impact of information provision on policy preferences. Our findings highlight significant heterogeneity in the beliefs about the housing affordability crisis and widespread misperceptions of key housing indicators. We also show that there are some significant differences in the accuracy of the answers depending on the level of education, age, ownership status, and nationality of the respondents.

The experimental design then offers official statistical information on housing market indicators, as well as other factors that have a strong influence on the housing market dynamics, to the randomly drawn treatment group. As a result, we can contrast their policy preferences on housing topics with those of the control group. Our findings suggest that providing reliable information on the severity of the housing crisis does not change housing policy preferences, with some marginal exceptions. This aligns with existing research indicating that belief updating is often constrained by entrenched perceptions and the complexity of policy trade-offs.

Our findings have important implications for the design of housing policy and the broader strategy of public communication in democratic policymaking. The limited effect of the provision of factual information on policy preferences suggests that addressing the housing affordability crisis requires more than correcting statistical misperceptions. Policymakers must recognize that citizens' views are shaped not only by knowledge gaps, but also by entrenched beliefs and lived experiences. This underscores the need for policy strategies that go beyond informational interventions, focusing instead on structural reforms that directly address the root causes of housing insecurity and make policy trade-offs visible and credible to the public. By clearly linking policy actions to outcomes that people can observe and experience, such as increased public investment in housing or changes in rental market conditions, governments may be better positioned to build trust, shift public attitudes, and mobilize support for necessary but politically challenging reforms.

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Appendix

Additional Figures

Figure A.1: Housing affordability in Portugal



Source: https://data-explorer.oecd.org.

Figure A.2: Heterogeneity



Each dot represents the share of respondents choosing a given cause as being among the top two causes of Housing crisis, alongside 90% confidence intervals.

Additional Tables

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Balance for Select Covariates

Means, sample after cleaning

Variables	Full sample	Treatment	Control	Joint F-test p-value
Female	0.477	0.477	0.478	0.972
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.022)	
Age	51.332	51.307	51.356	0.963
	(0.520)	(0.753)	(0.720)	
Higher Education	0.378	0.372	0.384	0.653
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.021)	
Foreigner	0.102	0.093	0.110	0.371
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.014)	
North	0.361	0.350	0.372	0.473
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.021)	
Center	0.226	0.238	0.214	0.359
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.018)	
Lisbon	0.288	0.277	0.300	0.415
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)	
Algarve	0.046	0.043	0.049	0.640
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	
Rigth-wing	0.406	0.402	0.411	0.789
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.022)	
Method	0.399	0.422	0.375	0.124
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.021)	
Renter	0.173	0.169	0.176	0.774
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.018)	
Owner with Costs	0.307	0.298	0.317	0.462
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)	

Note: Robust standard errors of the differences reported in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A2: Public Investment

Questions	Q1		Q2		Q3	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.097	0.092	0.001	0.023	-0.042	-0.039
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.072)
Observations	1012	1012	1006	1006	1010	1010
Adj. R^2	0.001	0.020	-0.000	0.039	-0.000	0.021
Control Mean	3.140	3.140	3.691	3.691	3.513	3.513
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table presents regression estimates of the treatment effect of receiving truthful information about six statistical indicators about the housing market on a set of three questions related to Public Investment policies. Each row reports results from a separate regression related to these questions with and without controls. Controls: survey method, regions (NUTS II), gender, age and age^2, Higher education, foreigner, renter and right-leaning. Outcomes are measured from 1 (Totally disagrees) to 5 (Totally agrees) and the questions considered in this table are: Q1 "The State must invest more in public housing, even if it leads to a tax increase in the present and/or future taxes"; Q2 "The State must invest more in public housing, even if this means reduction in public investment in other areas in the present and/or in the future" and Q3 "The State must invest more in public housing, even if it means reducing investment in public transport". Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%.** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Table A3: Regulations

Questions	Q4		Q5	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.069	0.097	0.095	0.101
	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.075)
Observations	987	987	1010	1010
Adj. R^2	-0.000	0.041	0.001	0.038
Control Mean	3.346	3.346	3.702	3.702
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table presents regression estimates of the treatment effect of receiving truthful information about six statistical indicators about the housing market on a set of three questions related to Regulation policies. Each row reports results from a separate regression related to these questions with and without controls. Controls: survey method, regions (NUTS II), gender, age and age^2, Higher education, foreigner, renter and right-leaning. Outcomes are measured from 1 (Totally disagrees) to 5 (Totally agrees) and the questions considered in this table are: Q4 "The State must increase the regulation of the private rental market, even if this reduces the number of available houses and deters owners from putting their houses up for rent" and Q5 "The State must introduce ceilings on the value of rents, even if this reduces the number of available houses". Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%.** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Table A4: Foreign Investment

Questions	Q6		Q7		Q8		Q9	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.027	-0.016	-0.050	-0.026	-0.035	-0.015	-0.150**	-0.129*
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.075)
Observations	997	997	971	971	976	976	973	973
Adj. R^2	0.000	0.017	-0.001	0.050	-0.001	0.045	0.003	0.036
Control Mean	3.253	3.253	3.818	3.818	3.607	3.607	3.358	3.358
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table presents regression estimates of the treatment effect of receiving truthful information about six statistical indicators about the housing market on a set of three questions related to Foreign Investment policies. Each row reports results from a separate regression related to these questions with and without controls. Controls: survey method, regions (NUTS II), gender, age and age^2, Higher education, foreigner, renter and right-leaning. Outcomes are measured from 1 (Totally disagrees) to 5 (Totally agrees) and the questions considered in this table are: Q6 "The State must introduce restrictions on local accommodation, even if these harm the country's economy."; Q7 "The State must put an end to Golden Visas, even if it harms the country's economy"; Q8 "The State must end tax benefits for non-habitual residents and digital nomads, even if this harms the country's economy"; Q9 "The State must end tax benefits for real estate investment funds, even if this reduces the construction of houses". Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%.** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Table A5: Architectural Restrictions

Questions	Q10		Q11	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.097	-0.099	0.076	0.079
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.072)	(0.071)
Observations	1006	1006	993	993
Adj. R^2	0.000	0.039	0.000	0.022
Control Mean	2.842	2.842	3.608	3.608
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table presents regression estimates of the treatment effect of receiving truthful information about six statistical indicators about the housing market on a set of three questions related to Architectural Restrictions. Each row reports results from a separate regression related to these questions with and without controls. Controls: survey method, regions (NUTS II), gender, age and age^2, Higher education, foreigner, renter and right-leaning. Outcomes are measured from 1 (Totally disagrees) to 5 (Totally agrees) and the questions considered in this table are: Q10 "The State must allow the construction of more tall buildings in areas under urban pressure, even if this affects the architecture of cities" and Q11 "The State should impose a predefined percentage of affordable housing in new developments, even if this reduces housing construction". Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%.** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Table A6: Taxation

Questions	Q12		Q13		Q14		Q15		Q16	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Treatment	-0.108*	-0.110*	-0.102	-0.101	-0.072	-0.064	-0.076	-0.038	-0.022	-0.024
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Observations	1014	1014	1007	1007	1000	1000	1001	1001	992	992
Adj. R^2	0.002	0.023	0.001	0.004	0.000	0.001	-0.000	0.075	-0.001	0.008
Control Mean	3.904	3.904	3.682	3.682	3.596	3.596	2.990	2.990	2.862	2.862
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table presents regression estimates of the treatment effect of receiving truthful information about six statistical indicators about the housing market on a set of three questions related to Tax policies. Each row reports results from a separate regression related to these questions with and without controls. Controls: survey method, regions (NUTS II), gender, age and age^2, Higher education, foreigner, renter and right-leaning. Outcomes are measured from 1 (Totally disagrees) to 5 (Totally agrees) and the questions considered in this table are: Q12 "The State must lower taxes on urban regeneration, even if this increases the budget deficit."; Q13 "The State must lower construction taxes, even if this increases the budget deficit"; Q14 "The State must lower taxes on private leases, even if this increases the budget deficit"; Q15 "The State must raise taxes on houses that remain vacant, even if this affects private property rights"; Q16 "The State must provide tax benefits for families who live with more rooms than necessary to move to smaller houses, even if this increases the budget deficit". Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%.** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Table A.7: Index

Questions	Public Investment		Regulations		Foreign Investment		Architectural Restrictions		Taxation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Treatment	0.012	0.024	0.086	0.102	-0.074	-0.057	-0.015	-0.014	-0.081*	-0.074*
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Observations	1029	1029	1022	1022	1025	1025	1022	1022	1027	1027
Adj. R^2	-.001	0.033	0.001	0.045	0.001	0.062	-0.001	0.033	0.002	0.034
Control Mean	3.443	3.443	3.533	3.533	3.512	3.512	3.231	3.231	3.415	3.415
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table presents regression estimates of the treatment effect of receiving truthful information about six statistical indicators about the housing market on a set of indexes related to different policies. Each row reports results from a separate regression related to these questions with and without controls. Outcomes are measured from 1 (Totally disagrees) to 5 (Totally agrees). Each index was constructed as an average for the group of questions related to that policy. Controls: survey method, regions (NUTS II), gender, age and age^2, Higher education, foreigner, renter and right-leaning. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%.** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Table A.8: Interactions - Public Investment

Questions	Q1		Q2		Q3	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.122	0.126	0.010	0.040	-0.001	0.019
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.071)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.074)
Normalized Mean Difference	0.065	0.103	-0.099	-0.054	-0.0104	-0.079
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.076)	(0.073)
Treatment*Normalized Mean Difference	0.003	-0.031	0.015	-0.022	0.099	0.065
	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.110)	(0.103)	(0.113)	(0.109)
Observations	946	946	942	942	944	944
Adj. R^2	0.001	0.025	0.000	0.034	-0.001	0.018
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table presents regression estimates of the treatment effect of receiving truthful information about six statistical indicators about the housing market on a set of three questions related to Public Investment policies. The Normalized mean difference is computed through the average of all z-scores of each of the questions about the housing market. Each row reports results from a separate regression related to these questions with and without controls. Controls: survey method, regions (NUTS II), gender, age and age^2, Higher education, foreigner, renter and right-leaning. Outcomes are measured from 1 (Totally disagrees) to 5 (Totally agrees) and the questions considered in this table are: Q1 "The State must invest more in public housing, even if it leads to a tax increase in the present and/or future taxes"; Q2 "The State must invest more in public housing, even if this means reduction in public investment in other areas in the present and/or in the future" and Q3 "The State must invest more in public housing, even if it means reducing investment in public transport". Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%.** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Table A.9: Interactions - Regulations

Questions	Q4		Q5.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.061	0.099	0.111	0.129*
	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.077)
Normalized Mean Difference	-0.019	-0.002	0.052	0.043
	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Treatment*Normalized Mean Difference	0.159	0.138	0.018	0.017
	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.105)	(0.100)
Observations	929	929	944	944
Adj. R^2	0.000	0.040	0.000	0.042
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table presents regression estimates of the treatment effect of receiving truthful information about six statistical indicators about the housing market on a set of three questions related to Regulation policies. The Normalized mean difference is computed through the average of all z-scores of each of the questions about the housing market. Each row reports results from a separate regression related to these questions with and without controls. Controls: survey method, regions (NUTS II), gender, age and age^2, Higher education, foreigner, renter and right-leaning. Outcomes are measured from 1 (Totally disagrees) to 5 (Totally agrees) and the questions considered in this table are: Q4 "The State must increase the regulation of the private rental market, even if this reduces the number of available houses and deters owners from putting their houses up for rent" and Q5 "The State must introduce ceilings on the value of rents, even if this reduces the number of available houses". Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%.** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Table A.10: Interactions - Foreign Investment

Questions	Q6		Q7		Q8		Q9	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-0.000	0.015	-0.033	0.004	-0.033	-0.001	-0.122	-0.092
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.077)
Normalized Mean Difference	-0.015	0.004	-0.125	-0.071	-0.072	-0.033	-0.100	-0.050
	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.072)	(0.071)
Treatment*Normalized Mean Difference	0.051	0.030	0.153	0.130	0.198*	0.189*	0.129	0.106
	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.113)	(0.106)	(0.116)	(0.114)	(0.121)	(0.124)
Observations	938	938	922	922	919	919	917	917
Adj. R^2	-0.003	0.014	-0.000	0.052	0.000	0.052	0.001	0.040
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table presents regression estimates of the treatment effect of receiving truthful information about six statistical indicators about the housing market on a set of three questions related to Foreign Investment policies. The Normalized Difference computes the difference between the responses given by all respondents and the true value, normalized to its true value. Each row reports results from a separate regression related to these questions with and without controls. Controls: survey method, regions (NUTS II), gender, age and age^2, Higher education, foreigner, renter and right-leaning. Outcomes are measured from 1 (Totally disagrees) to 5 (Totally agrees) and the questions considered in this table are: Q6 "The State must introduce restrictions on local accommodation, even if these harm the country's economy."; Q7 "The State must put an end to Golden Visas, even if it harms the country's economy"; Q8 "The State must end tax benefits for non-habitual residents and digital nomads, even if this harms the country's economy"; Q9 "The State must end tax benefits for real estate investment funds, even if this reduces the construction of houses". Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%.** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Table A.11: Interactions - Architectural Restrictions

Questions	Q10		Q11	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.092	-0.091	0.103	0.115
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.074)	(0.073)
Normalized Mean Difference	0.044	0.044	0.016	0.032
	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.059)	(0.061)
Treatment*Normalized Mean Difference	-0.070	-0.103	-0.061	-0.084
	(0.122)	(0.120)	(0.092)	(0.093)
Observations	945	945	932	932
R-squared	-0.001	0.033	-0.001	0.024
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table presents regression estimates of the treatment effect of receiving truthful information about six statistical indicators about the housing market on a set of three questions related to Architectural Restrictions. The Normalized mean difference is computed through the average of all z-scores of each of the questions about the housing market. Each row reports results from a separate regression related to these questions with and without controls. Controls: survey method, regions (NUTS II), gender, age and age^2, Higher education, foreigner, renter and right-leaning. Outcomes are measured from 1 (Totally disagrees) to 5 (Totally agrees) and the questions considered in this table are: Q10 "The State must allow the construction of more tall buildings in areas under urban pressure, even if this affects the architecture of cities" and Q11 "The State should impose a predefined percentage of affordable housing in new developments, even if this reduces housing construction". Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%.** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.

Table A.12: Interactions - Taxation

Questions	Q12		Q13		Q14		Q15		Q16	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Treatment	-0.122*	-0.119*	-0.097	-0.091	-0.066	-0.052	-0.087	-0.041	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Normalized Mean Difference	-0.130**	-0.096	-0.143*	-0.124*	-0.141**	-0.131**	-0.107	-0.046	-0.045	-0.033
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Treatment*Normalized Mean Difference	0.217**	0.200**	0.149	0.127	0.025	0.016	0.138	0.070	0.033	0.015
	(0.094)	(0.091)	(0.114)	(0.110)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.133)	(0.135)
Observations	949	949	943	943	937	937	941	941	929	929
Adj. R^2	0.006	0.031	0.003	0.008	0.004	0.008	-0.001	0.073	-0.002	0.002
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table presents regression estimates of the treatment effect of receiving truthful information about six statistical indicators about the housing market on a set of three questions related to Tax policies. The Normalized mean difference is computed through the average of all z-scores of each of the questions about the housing market. Each row reports results from a separate regression related to these questions with and without controls. Controls: survey method, regions (NUTS II), gender, age and age^2, Higher education, foreigner, renter and right-leaning. Outcomes are measured from 1 (Totally disagrees) to 5 (Totally agrees) and the questions considered in this table are: Q12 "The State must lower taxes on urban regeneration, even if this increases the budget deficit."; Q13 "The State must lower construction taxes, even if this increases the budget deficit"; Q14 "The State must lower taxes on private leases, even if this increases the budget deficit"; Q15 "The State must raise taxes on houses that remain vacant, even if this affects private property rights"; Q16 "The State must provide tax benefits for families who live with more rooms than necessary to move to smaller houses, even if this increases the budget deficit". Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1%.** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.