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ABSTRACT

A Poisoned Gift? The Hireability Signals of an Income-Support Program for the Senior Unemployed*

Many OECD countries invest heavily in labour-market programs to prolong careers. Although active labour-market programs designed for this purpose have frequently been evaluated, less is known about the employment impact of more passive regimes that make labour-market participation later in life feasible. This study focuses on the latter by investigating the hiring opportunities of senior job candidates who partake in a system that ensures older labour-market participants a company supplement in addition to unemployment benefits when they are dismissed. Therefore, we conduct a state-of-the-art scenario experiment in which 360 genuine recruiters evaluate fictitious job candidates who have spent varying durations unemployed in regimes with and without the company supplement. Because they evaluate candidates with respect to both hireability and productivity perceptions, we can identify the mechanisms at play. Overall, we find no evidence of employer-side stigma hindering the re-employment of older unemployed in the program. On the contrary, the longer-term unemployed even benefit – in terms of hiring chances – from partaking in this regime because it seemingly mitigates the regular stigmatisation of long-term unemployment, especially for men. More concretely, recruiters judge the long-term unemployed more mildly, especially with respect to perceived flexibility, when they receive the company supplement and still apply.

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1 Introduction

To address ageing populations and their associated costs, many countries exhort their citizens to continue working at older ages (Taylor, 2002). Therefore, following the advice of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2018), they invest in active and facilitating labour-market programs targeted at older members of the labour force. Active programs refer to the labour-market integration of the unemployed via supply- or demand-side measures, such as training programs and hiring subsidies (Auer et al., 2005; Martin & Grubb, 2001). Meanwhile, facilitating programs aim to make working later in life feasible by, for example, reducing working hours (Phillipson et al., 2016) or emphasising coaching roles (Böttcher et al., 2018) at the end of an individual's career. Some facilitating programs are more passive as they aim to retain seniors in the labour market by supporting them financially when they become unemployed and confront lower hiring chances (Lippens et al., 2023; OECD, 2020).

Because tremendous amounts of public funds are invested in these programs (Martin & Grubb, 2001; OECD, 2023), research into their effectiveness is essential to justify and maintain their existence. On the one hand, the effectiveness of active labour-market programs, in terms of re-employment of the senior unemployed, has frequently been evaluated (Cooke, 2006; Dar & Tzannatos, 1999; Orfao & Malo, 2021; Vodopivec et al., 2019; Zhang, 2003), On the other hand, however, little is known about the effect of facilitating programs, despite the possibility that such measures could also affect the objective to expand working lives.

Therefore, this study focuses on the re-employment of senior candidates who participate in such facilitating program. More concretely, the program central to this study is the Belgian unemployment regime with company supplement. This regime supports dismissed seniors with an income supplement at the ex-employer's expense in addition to their regular government-funded unemployment benefits (Federale Overheidsdienst, n.d.).[1] To obtain this company supplement, individuals need to register at a public employment service and accept suitable jobs suggested by this public service. According to data

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[1] The specific conditions for participation in the unemployment regime with company supplement depend on contextual factors (Federale Overheidsdienst, n.d.). However, in general, it is stated that this regime is open to dismissed workers who are at least 62 years old and have a career of at least 40 years. However, the age limit is often lowered to 60, for example when a company is in difficulty or undergoing restructuring and for jobs involving night or shift work.

from the Flemish public employment service, this facilitating program seemingly hinders the objective of expanding work life, as only 0.62% of the seniors unemployed who were in this regime in February 2022 found a new job by February 2023.

However, it is unclear whether the low re-employment rate among the unemployed in this regime is caused by the senior unemployed making little effort to find a new job (i.e. a supply-side problem) or by employers being unwilling to hire them (i.e. a demand-side problem). Concerning the supply side, it has been argued that, broadly speaking, generous unemployment benefits discourage the unemployed from returning to work because they can maintain their existing standard of living (Atkinson & Micklewright, 1991; Jenkins & Garcia-Serrano, 2004; Reissert & Schmid, 2016). In contrast, less research has been conducted concerning demand-side effects. Nevertheless, unfavourable treatment in recruitment decisions represents a plausible explanation for the low re-employment rates due to the possibility that recruiters use the unemployment regime as a negative signal for the candidate's productivity (Arrow, 1973; Goffman, 1963; Spence, 1973). That is, similar to participation in active labour-market programs (Falk et al., 2005; Fossati et al., 2021; Liechti et al., 2017; Martin & Grubb, 2001; Van Belle et al., 2019), partaking in this unemployment regime could produce negative motivation and trainability signal effects that induce the unfavourable treatment of such candidates.

To investigate the effect of participation in the Belgian unemployment regime with an additional company supplement on re-employment opportunities, we conduct a scenario experiment involving 360 genuine recruiters. In this experiment, recruiters have to evaluate fictitious candidates who are unemployed at the time of application but differ in terms of their participation in the unemployment regime with company supplement. Importantly, to reveal possible underlying mechanisms, our participants evaluate the fictitious candidates with respect to not only hireability but also 18 productivity-related perceptions that are theoretically associated with the regime. In addition to the critical manipulation of partaking in the regime, we vary other candidate characteristics to investigate heterogeneous treatment effects.

This design enables us to make three crucial contributions to the limited literature on the effectiveness of facilitating programs at prolonging working lives. First, we are pioneers in the examination of demand-side problems, such as the possible unfavourable treatment of senior candidates unemployed in a regime with company supplement compared to candidates of a similar age and

unemployment duration who do not partake in this regime. Second, we exceed this examination by exploring various contextual factors, with a particular focus on the moderating effects of the candidate's unemployment duration, gender and referral status. Unemployment duration and gender are especially relevant because the stigmas around unemployment usually occur over time (Atkinson et al., 1996; Bonoli, 2014; Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2012; Van Belle et al., 2018) and mainly towards male candidates (Baert et al., 2016; Luijkx & Wolbers, 2009; Mooi-Reci & Ganzeboom, 2015). However, long-term unemployment stigmas are potentially mitigated when candidates are unemployed in the regime with company supplement. This is because long periods of unemployment seem more reasonable in this regime due to the comfortable income not forcing these unemployed to search for a new job (Atkinson & Micklewright, 1991; Jenkins & Garcia-Serrano, 2004). This diminishes the stigma effect on men, for whom long-term unemployment is especially stigmatising. In addition, the mitigating potency of participation in such a regime could temper the negative signalling effect of referrals by public employment agencies (Fay, 1997; Van Belle et al., 2019). Third and final, we go beyond measuring heterogeneity by offering a deeper understanding based on the signals transmitted by participation in this unemployment regime. Hence, by scrutinising the signals associated with partaking in the facilitating program of interest, we contribute to the literature on signalling effects, which currently focuses on active labour-market programs.

2   Theoretical framework

We begin this study with a description of the theoretically expected effects of participation in the unemployment regime with company supplement on the candidate's hiring probability. According to the theory of statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972), the (unintentional) signalling theory (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1973), and the social stigma theory (Eriksson & Rooth, 2014; Goffman, 1963; Vishwanath, 1989), the hiring opportunities of senior candidates unemployed in such a regime could be determined by the signals or stigma that recruiters derive from the regime. More concretely, these theories argue that when recruiters are confronted with asymmetrical information, they use the limited information available to them (e.g. the unemployment regime) as a signal for the candidate's productivity that enables them to select or eliminate these candidates.

In general, we argue that the unemployment regime with company supplement may produce two contradictory effects on the hiring opportunities of senior unemployed job candidates. On the one hand, this regime risks deepening prejudices related to (long-term) unemployment and older age (Liechti et al., 2017; Taylor, 2002).[2] First, participating in the regime is expected to emphasise the signal of higher reservation wages that recruiters derive from older ages (De Coen et al., 2015; Van Borm et al., 2021). In other words, participation in this unemployment regime might signal that these candidates are less motivated to obtain effective employment in a new job because they can maintain their standard of living during unemployment using the company supplement that they receive in addition to their regular unemployment benefits (Atkinson & Micklewright, 1991; Jenkins & Garcia-Serrano, 2004). Second, it could trigger additional negative signals, aligning with prior research on participation in active labour-market programs (Baert, 2016; Fossati et al., 2021; Liechti et al., 2017; Van Belle et al., 2019), receiving unemployment benefits (Suomi et al., 2022), and being unemployed in general (Atkinson et al., 1996; Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2012; Oberholzer-Gee, 2008; Van Belle et al., 2018).[3] That is, recruiters could presume that these candidates are only applying to meet the demands associated with receipt of the company supplement. Accordingly, we hypothesise that participation in the unemployment regime with company supplement negatively affects the employment opportunities of the senior unemployed (H1).

On the other hand, partaking in this unemployment regime could increase the probability that these candidates will be hired. More concretely, a candidate still applying for jobs despite the generous financial support could signal high levels of motivation. Therefore, we establish an alternative hypothesis suggesting that participation in the unemployment regime with company supplement positively affects the employment opportunities of the senior unemployed (H1bis).

In addition, we suspect that the effects of partaking in this regime vary based on three other candidate characteristics: unemployment duration, gender and referral through the public employment

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[2] An older age emits many negative signals, including greater capital reserves, lower trainability and flexibility, and fewer physical and technological skills (McGregor & Gray, 2002; Richardson et al., 2012; Taylor & Walker, 1998; Van Borm et al., 2021).

[3] More specifically, participation in active labour-market programs signals extensive hiring administration and lower candidate motivation and trainability (Baert, 2016; Fossati et al., 2021; Liechti et al., 2017; Van Belle et al., 2019), receiving unemployment benefits signals lower levels of warmth, consciousness and suitability (Suomi et al., 2022), and being unemployed signals lower candidate motivation, lower levels of satisfaction experienced by previous employers, and more rejections by potential employers (Atkinson et al., 1996; Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2012; Oberholzer-Gee, 2008; Van Belle et al., 2018).

service. First, regarding unemployment duration, multiple correspondence experiments have reported lower callback probabilities for candidates who are unemployed for a longer period (Baert & Verhaest, 2019; Eriksson & Rooth, 2014; Ghayad, 2014; Kroft et al., 2013; Oberholzer-Gee, 2008). This negative effect could be explained by the signals of lower motivation (Atkinson et al., 1996; Bonoli, 2014; Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2012; Luijkx & Wolbers, 2009; Van Belle et al., 2018), lower satisfaction experienced by previous employers, which relates to recruiters' rational herding behaviour (Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2012; Oberholzer-Gee, 2008; Van Belle et al., 2018), greater skill loss (Acemoglu, 1995; Atkinson et al., 1996; Oberholzer-Gee, 2008), and lower capabilities (Gangl, 2004; Karren & Sherman, 2012; Vishwanath, 1989). This demonstrates that unemployment becomes especially stigmatising when it lasts longer. However, we expect that long-term unemployment is less stigmatising for candidates participating in the unemployment regime with company supplement. This is because, compared to senior unemployed candidates who do not partake in this regime, longer periods of unemployment appear to be more reasonable for candidates receiving the supplement, who have no urge to search for work due to their comfortable income enabling them to maintain their standard of living (Atkinson & Micklewright, 1991; Jenkins & Garcia-Serrano, 2004). Stated otherwise, the expected effect of participation in this unemployment regime is likely to be tempered by longer unemployment spells, because the signal effects of unemployment without participation in such a program become stronger. Accordingly, we hypothesise that partaking in the unemployment regime with company supplement is less unfavourable for long-term senior unemployed candidates compared to short-term senior unemployed candidates (H2A).

Second, with respect to gender, prior studies have shown that the stigmatisation of the long-term unemployed is penalised more severely for men than women (Baert et al., 2016; Luijkx & Wolbers, 2009; Mooi-Reci & Ganzeboom, 2015). This could be explained by the social norm to work, which is more pressing on men than women in most countries (Gallie & Russell, 1998; Stam et al., 2016; Van der Meer, 2014). Consequently, (long-term) unemployment is more acceptable for women and more stigmatising for men. If (consistent with H2A) employers are more lenient towards (long-term) unemployment when one participates in the regime with company supplement, this should especially benefit men. Therefore, we theorise that participation in the unemployment regime with company supplement is less unfavourable for male senior unemployed candidates compared to female senior unemployed candidates (H2B).

Third and final, concerning the interaction between partaking in the unemployment regime with company supplement and being referred by public employment services, we again argue that the former mitigates the signals transmitted by the latter. However, although some studies demonstrate the negative signalling effects of job referrals, others provide evidence of positive signalling effects, yielding contradictory hypotheses. On the one hand, a negative signalling effect might be caused by perceptions of lower motivation (Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2012; Ingold & Stuart, 2015; Van Belle et al., 2019), lower trainability (Thurow, 1975), lower satisfaction experienced by previous employers, which relates to recruiters' rational herding behaviour (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992), and lower intellectual and social abilities (Bellis et al., 2011; Ingold & Stuart, 2015). If this negative signal prevails, participation in the unemployment regime with company supplement – given its mitigating effect – is expected to be less unfavourable for referred candidates than candidates who apply by themselves (H2C). On the other hand, a potential positive effect of referrals is explained via positive signals related to higher levels of perceived suitability (Battisti et al., 2019; Bellis et al., 2011) and reliability (Battisti et al., 2019) due to the matching work of the public employment agency. Therefore, we establish an alternative hypothesis stating that participation in the unemployment regime with company supplement is more unfavourable for referred senior unemployed candidates (H2Cbis).

3   Experiment

To test the hypotheses presented in the previous section, we conduct a vignette experiment, a method frequently used to study hiring decisions (Baert, 2018; Derous et al., 2012; Di Stasio, 2014; Kübler et al., 2018; Sterkens et al., 2022; Van Borm et al., 2021). A vignette experiment involves the evaluation of fictitious candidate profiles (i.e. vignettes) with specific characteristics (i.e. vignette factors, e.g. gender) varying across a predetermined number of categories (i.e. vignette levels, e.g. male and female) (Auspurg & Hinz, 2014; Rossi & Nock, 1982).

This method is favoured over a correspondence experiment because the latter is less suitable for explaining recruiter motivations for hiring behaviour (Neumark, 2018), one of the present study's purposes. Moreover, compared to traditional surveys, vignette experiments diminish socially desirable answering and increase ecological validity because the experiment's multidimensionality hides the main research

aim (i.e. participation in a facilitating program) and forces recruiters to make trade-offs between dimensions that resemble real-life hiring decisions (Auspurg et al., 2014).

Given our related research aim, our experiment is inspired by the work of Van Borm and colleagues (2021) investigating the explaining signals of age discrimination. By extending their research design as described in the following sections, we have created a more relevant and suitable vignette experiment to test the signals that could explain the unemployment opportunities for senior candidates in this regime.

3.1   Vignette design

As a basis for our vignette design, we retained the five candidate characteristics used by Van Borm and colleagues (2021): age, gender, commuting distance, relevant work experience and extra-curricular activities. However, we adjusted and limited the ages in our application to 10 levels (i.e. 33, 38, 44, 49, 55, 60, 61, 62, 63 and 64 years) for the following reasons. As discussed in Section 1, in most cases, the unemployed individual must have reached the age of 60 years to participate in the regime (Federale Overheidsdienst, n.d.). The upper bound of 64 years was chosen to respect the statutory retirement age (i.e. 65 years at the time of the experiment). Therefore, our age levels produced five ages suitable for unemployment in the regime with company supplement. Then, five younger ages were adopted as control conditions by subtracting five or six years alternating. This resulted in a lower bound of 33 years. Finally, by incorporating a limited number of age levels instead of the continuous variable – as used by Van Borm and colleagues (2021) – we created a more efficient design and reduced level effects (Auspurg & Hinz, 2014).

The levels of the other four characteristics were integrated as follows: gender (male or female), commuting distance (0–5 km, 5–10 km, 10–50 km, or more than 50 km), relevant work experience (none, about 2 years, about 5 years, or about 10 years), and extra-curricular activities (none, volunteer work, practising sports, or engaging in cultural activities). By using these five characteristics typically revealed on resumes (Carlsson, Reshid, & Rooth, 2018; Lahey, 2008; Nuijten, Poell, & Alfes, 2017; Olian, Schwab, & Haberfeld, 1988), we increase ecological validity by mimicking real-life hiring decisions to the extent possible. Moreover, adopting gender as a vignette factor enables H2B to be tested.

Our experiment's central contribution is the integration of three candidate characteristics related to the unemployment regime with company supplement. First, to test H1, we incorporated the candidate's

unemployment status: unemployed (without specification) or unemployed in the regime with company supplement. Second, to examine H2A, we added candidate unemployment duration, defined in terms of one of five levels: one month or less, more than one month but less than six months, more than six months but less than one year, more than one year but less than two years, or more than two years. Third, to check H2C, we integrated the candidate's application method: direct application or referral from the public employment service of Flanders. Table 1 summarises the candidate characteristics and the accompanying levels used in our vignette design.

<p align="center">< Table 1 about here ></p>

Combining all vignette levels for these eight factors made 25,600 unique vignettes possible (i.e. 2x10x4x4x2x5x4x2). However, because this would require an unrealistically large participant sample, a sample of vignettes was drawn using a D-efficient design to select the vignettes with the most statistical power. First, we ran Auspurg and Hinz's (2014) algorithm and Kuhfeld's (2010) free macro %Mktex on the candidate characteristics discussed, ignoring age and unemployment status. This produced 250 unique vignettes with a high D-efficiency of 96.74, which exceeds the minimal level of 90.00 required to achieve an efficient experimental design (Auspurg & Hinz, 2014). Second, we randomly added candidate age and unemployment status but omitted implausible and illogical combinations (i.e. the unemployment regime with company supplement for candidates younger than 60) and unequal age distributions to increase the ecological validity. Third, we blocked the 250 vignettes into 50 decks and randomly assigned them to the participating recruiters to obtain greater design efficiency and internal validity (Auspurg & Hinz, 2014). This means that each recruiter had to evaluate five candidate profiles (i.e. vignettes). According to Auspurg & Hinz (2014) and in line with Van Borm and colleagues (2021), this is appropriate given the number of evaluation criteria (i.e. 20 statements; see Subsection 3.2). Finally, we randomised the sequence of the presentation of the five different vignettes within each deck to avoid order effects. The low correlations between candidate dimensions confirmed the success of this experimental setup.[4]

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[4] For example, the highest correlation (−0.074) was observed between candidate age and unemployment duration. The correlation between candidate age and unemployment status was not considered because the unemployment regime with company supplement only applies from the age of 60 (as discussed in Subsection 3.1).

3.2 Data collection

Between February and March 2022, we invited 6,000 professional recruiters who are active in Flanders, the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, to participate in our online vignette experiment. Their e-mail addresses were found in vacancy advertisements published in the online databank of the public employment service of Flanders, Belgium's largest job site (Delbeke, 2019). This ensured that participants had experience with selection decisions, increasing population validity. Moreover, to enhance ecological validity, we opted for Belgian recruiters because the unemployment regime with company supplement is bounded by specific national legislation. By the beginning of April 2022, 360 recruiters had accurately completed the entire survey, resulting in 1,800 observations (each recruiter evaluated five fictitious candidates).[5] Recruiters were only partially informed about the purpose of the experiment – we did not mention the unemployment regime and only referred to a survey on hiring decisions in which fictitious decisions were to be made.

In the first part of the survey, recruiters were asked to assist in a selection decision for a vacancy at a fictitious company instead of their own company to increase internal validity. Each recruiter was shown a vacancy for one of eight specific jobs: (i) dental technician, (ii) door-to-door sales worker, (iii) packer, (iv) computer numerical control (CNC) machine operator, (v) lab technician (cytogenetic techniques), (vi) insurance sales agent, (vii) physiotherapist or (viii) database administrator. These jobs were selected by Van Borm and colleagues (2021) to capture variations in four job characteristics: overall skills, customer contact, physical effort and technological knowledge (needed to perform the job well). The jobs and their corresponding descriptions were retrieved using the Occupation Information Network (O∗NET) and appear in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Because we scraped recruiter e-mail addresses from eligible vacancies related to one of those jobs, we were able to assign one relevant fictitious vacancy to each recruiter, increasing ecological validity. To ensure internal validity, we did this in such a way that the jobs were presented with equal probability and without correlation with the vignette decks.

To fill the presented vacancy, recruiters were informed that a colleague had already made a first selection of five suitable candidates based on their education, relevant work experience and availability.

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[5] The accuracy was checked via an attention check that asked recruiters to select the option 'completely agree' in one of the Likert scales. The observations of the 22 recruiters who selected another option were eliminated.

Concerning the latter, we mentioned that this was an urgent vacancy for which candidates would ideally be available immediately, justifying the selection of five unemployed candidates and increasing ecological validity. Their colleague also had a short telephone interview with these candidates and saved some notes in the HR software package.[6] These notes were presented to the recruiters in the form of separate tables for each candidate showing their distinctive characteristics. An explanation of two of these characteristics was provided in these instructions. We clarified unemployment status by using the following description: 'This indicates whether the candidate is unemployed in the regime with company supplement in which the candidate receives a supplementary company allowance from the previous employer in addition to the regular unemployment benefits.' In addition, we explained that the application method refers to one of two possibilities: a direct application made by the candidate themselves or an application via a referral from the public employment service.

Next, recruiters were asked to evaluate each candidate in response to twenty statements divided into five groups (as presented in Table A.2 in the Appendix) on 11-point Likert scales ranging from 0 ('completely disagree') to 10 ('completely agree'). The first group comprises two statements about the probability of interviewing the candidate (i.e. the proximal hiring outcome) and the probability of hiring the candidate (i.e. the distal hiring outcome) (Sterkens et al., 2021; Van Belle et al., 2018). The latter four groups of statements measure recruiters' perceptions of the candidates.

More concretely, the second group includes fifteen statements related to Arrow's statistical discrimination theory (1973). Twelve of these statements measure age-related perceptions regarding senior candidates' productivity and were reproduced from the work of Van Borm and colleagues (2021). We incorporated these perceptions to check whether they differ between senior candidates who participate in the unemployment regime with company supplement and senior candidates who do not. This approach was adopted because, as discussed in Section 2, prior research shows that labour-market programs targeted at seniors could enforce age prejudices. More specifically, we asked the recruiters about their perceptions of each candidate's (i) mental abilities, (ii) social abilities, (iii) physical abilities, (iv)

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[6] Similar to the study by Sterkens and colleagues on burn-out (2021), this description could improve the ecological validity as information regarding the unemployment status is usually not depicted on the candidate's resumé.

technological knowledge and skills, (v) flexibility, (vi) creativity, (vii) experience, (viii) motivation, (ix) reliability, (x) accuracy, (xi) trainability and (xii) reasonability of wage expectations.

Third, we queried two perceptions theoretically related to unemployment that are not captured by the second group: the satisfaction experienced by a candidate's previous employers and the number of rejections received from potential employers. As Section 2 discussed, these perceptions are associated with rational herding, meaning recruiters rely on their perception of dismissal and hiring decisions of other employers. Because unemployment regimes are only available to dismissed employees, recruiters may perceive that previous employers were not satisfied with (the productivity of) the candidate. Meanwhile, recruiters may assume that productive candidates would have already been hired by other potential employers. These negative perceptions based on rational herding behaviour may lower the probability of a potential employer hiring a candidate.

The fourth group relates to participation in labour-market programs and concerns the (administrative) ease of hiring the candidate. This is because recruiters may fear the so-called 'red tape' (as argued in Section 2) representing the excessive regulations and formalities potentially associated with hiring candidates who are unemployed in the regime with company supplement.

The fifth and final group features three statements related to the theory of taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957) that have been used in similar studies (Baert & De Pauw, 2014; Sterkens et al., 2021; Van Borm et al., 2021) to measure how recruiters perceive employer, colleague and customer attitudes towards collaborations with the candidate.

In the survey's second part, recruiters completed a post-experimental questionnaire. This provided recruiter-side information for robustness as well as secondary moderation analyses. The post-experimental survey included questions about each recruiter's (i) tendency to answer in a socially desirable way, (ii) personal characteristics, (iii) job characteristics and (iv) organisational characteristics. First, considering the robustness analyses, we captured recruiter tendencies towards socially desirable answering in a manner more expansive and nuanced than the outdated Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982) used by Van Bom and colleagues (2021). More specifically, we implemented the twenty items of the Social Desirability Scale developed by Steenkamp and colleagues (2010), which consists of two subscales, one measuring egoistic response tendencies ($\alpha = 0.599$) and one

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measuring moralistic response tendencies (α = 0.657).[7] Second, four personal recruiter characteristics were observed, keeping recruiters unidentifiable: (i) gender (man, woman or other), (ii) age (open question), (iii) nationality (Belgian, non-Belgian but EU-27 or non-EU-27) and (iv) highest level of educational attainment (higher education: doctorate; higher education: master; higher education: academic bachelor; higher education: professional bachelor; secondary education: general; secondary education: technical; secondary education: vocational; or primary education). Third, three characteristics about each recruiter's current job were requested: (i) how often they were involved in evaluating candidates in their current role (daily, weekly, biweekly, monthly, once every six months, once every year, or less frequently), (ii) how long they had been involved in evaluating job candidates (less than one year, 1–5 years, or more than 5 years), and (iii) their role (manager, specialist in personnel and career development, employment services agent, management assistant, general administrative assistant or other, with participants able to type a response to this last option). Fourth and final, we observed one characteristic related to the organisation in which the recruiter was active at the time of the experiment, namely, the percentage of the workforce aged 50 or older (0%, 1–9%, 10–19%, 20–29%, 30–39% or 40% or more). These latter three groups of characteristics were recorded to perform secondary moderation analyses and to examine the population validity with respect to the average Belgian recruiter.

3.3   Data description

This subsection briefly discusses summary statistics representing the collected experimental data. In Table A.3 in the Appendix, an overview of these statistics is given for the full sample as well as for the two subsamples distinguished by the main treatment (i.e. the unemployment regime).

As the first column makes apparent, the majority our total sample of 360 recruiters were women (68.9%) and had completed tertiary education (80.6%). Additionally, there were more younger recruiters than older recruiters: 41.4% were between 21 and 35 years old, 38.3% were between 36 and 50 years old, and 20.3% were between 51 and 75 years old. Next, recruiters were rather experienced with selection

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[7] The rather modest Cronbach's alphas align with the variations reported by Steenkamp and colleagues (2010), namely, between 0.49 and 0.76 for the egoistic response tendency scale and between 0.67 and 0.77 for the moralistic response tendency scale. Nevertheless, Grohmann and Bodur (2015) and McKibben and Silvia (2015) disclosed lower reliabilities for the latter scale, recording 0.63 and 0.62 respectively.

decisions: most were involved in evaluating job candidates at least once every six months (59.2%) and for more than five years (55.3%). Furthermore, most recruiters described their role as manager (43.3%). This was followed by HR-related roles other than those mentioned (22.2%), HR and career development specialist roles (14.2%), employment services agent roles (11.1%), management assistant roles (5.0%) and general administrative assistant roles (4.2%). Finally, 53.1% of recruiters were employed by an organisation in which at least 20% of the workforce was aged 50 or older.

As the previous subsection indicated, the population validity of our results can be demonstrated by comparing the aforementioned characteristics of our sample with the sample of Belgian recruiters from the European Social Survey.[8] Overall, our sample is fairly representative of the population of professional Belgian recruiters, although, our recruiters were even more frequently women (68.9% versus 62.1%), more highly educated (80.6% versus 62.1%) and younger (40 years old versus 49 years old on average).

Finally, the presented t-test and chi-squared tests in the final column of Table A.3 indicate that the randomisation of the candidate's unemployment status between the different participating recruiters was quite successful. Candidates unemployed in the regime with company supplement were evaluated by recruiters with similar characteristics as the recruiters who evaluated unemployed candidates who do not participate in this regime. However, the former candidates were evaluated by more recruiters aged between 21 and 35 years, more employment services agents, and fewer managers than the latter candidates. Therefore, we have controlled for these recruiter characteristics in our analyses.

4   Results

To investigate whether (Subsection 3.1), when (Subsection 3.2) and why (Subsection 3.3) the unemployment regime with company supplement affects the interview and hiring probability of the senior unemployed, we conducted multiple ordered logistic regressions that clustered standard errors at the recruiter level. This regression framework was chosen given our categorical dependent variables (i.e. hiring decisions and productivity perceptions) ranging from 0 to 10 and not being normally distributed. Although all jobs, and, candidate and recruiter characteristics discussed in Section 3 have been incorporated as

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[8] We retrieved Belgian data from the 2018 wave for the following ISCO-08 codes: 1212 (i.e. human resource managers), 2423 (i.e. personnel and careers professionals), 3333 (i.e. employment agents and contractors), and 4416 (i.e. personnel clerks).

independent variables in the regressions, the subsections below only discuss summarised tables presenting the main coefficients (enabling our hypotheses to be tested). The full tables which also depict the results for the control variables can be found in the Online Appendix.

4.1   Effect of the unemployment regime with company supplement on selection decisions

We begin our analyses by investigating whether unemployment in the regime with company supplement has a negative (H1) or positive (H1bis) impact on the interview and hiring probability of senior unemployed candidates, keeping other candidate characteristics (e.g. age and unemployment duration) constant. The summarised results of this regression framework without interaction variables appear in Table 2, with the full estimation results of this regression framework presented in Table O.A.1 of the Online Appendix.

< Table 2 about here >

First, as columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 demonstrate, we find that candidates who participate in the regime with company supplement are more likely to be invited for an interview and hired. For instance, the odds of being definitely invited or hired (i.e. a score of 10) sum to 0.120 (p = 0.033) and 0.030 (p = 0.012) respectively, with these interview (hiring) odds limited to 0.095 (0.022) for candidates with a similar unemployment duration who do not partake in this regime. Hence, these significant positive effects of participation in the unemployment regime with company supplement support our alternative hypothesis H1bis.

Next, we perform robustness analyses on socially desirable responding, excluding the 5% recruiters with the highest scores for egoistic and moralistic response tendencies, as discussed in Subsection 3.2.[9] The results presented in columns (3) to (6) of Table 2 indicate that the aforementioned conclusions are robust, even though the significance of the difference in interview probability decreased.[10] Nevertheless,

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[9] Concretely, the 20 recruiters who scored above 4.19 for egoistic response tendencies and the 17 recruiters who scored above 4.30 for moralistic response tendencies were eliminated from the two subsamples. Given the distribution of results, it was impossible to create exactly even-sized subsamples.

[10] Although the differences in hiring probability remain significant at the 5% level upon excluding recruiters with high tendencies towards egoistic (β = 0.277, p = 0.029) and moralistic (β = 0.269, p = 0.031) responses, the difference in interview probability becomes only marginally significant in the former (β = 0.236, p = 0.057) and latter (β = 0.228, p = 0.063) case.

we suspect that this decrease is not due to social desirability but rather to insufficient power, with similar results produced using subsamples that eliminate a different 5% of the recruiters (e.g. the 5% oldest or youngest recruiters).

Finally, our results concerning the other vignette factors align with prior research that identified negative effects of older ages, longer unemployment spells, and referrals by public employment services. More concretely, analogous to other studies on age discrimination (Lippens et al., 2023; Van Borm et al., 2021), we find lower interview and hiring probabilities for candidates aged 55 and older compared to 33-year-old candidates. Additionally, our results demonstrate the negative effects of unemployment spells of at least 1 month compared to shorter unemployment periods, again confirming previous research (Eriksson & Rooth, 2014; Oberholzer-Gee, 2008; Van Belle et al., 2018). Furthermore, in line with multiple studies on referrals (Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2012; Ingold & Stuart, 2015; Van Belle et al., 2019), we detect lower interview and hiring probabilities for candidates who are referred by public employment services. In addition, interview and hiring probabilities decrease for candidates whose commuting distance exceeds 50 km (as opposed to 0–5 km) and increase for candidates with experience ranging from two to ten years (as opposed to no experience). In contrast, we find no significant differences associated with candidate gender or extra-curricular activities. Similarly, regarding recruiter characteristics, no significant differences were identified (as shown by Table O.A.1 in the Online Appendix).

4.2   Heterogeneity in the relationship between the unemployment regime and selection decisions

Next, we examine when unemployment in the regime with company supplement positively impacts a candidate's interview and hiring chances. More specifically, we investigate whether the unemployment regime with company supplement is more favourable – or, in terms of our original hypotheses, less unfavourable – for long-term unemployed (H2A), male (H2B), and referred (H2C) candidates. Regarding hypothesis H2A, we focus our analyses on very long-term unemployment – defined as beginning at two years of unemployment – because the effects are expected to be more pronounced for longer unemployment periods (Section 2). This two-year cut-off aligns with previous research investigating the impact of long-term unemployment (Bejaković & Mrnjavac, 2018; Dockery & Webster, 2002; Rose et al., 2012) and with the Flemish government's delimitation regarding hiring subsidies for the long-term

unemployed (Vlaanderen, n.d.).

To test these three hypotheses, we adapted the aforementioned regression framework by including interaction terms for the relationships between the unemployment regime and these three candidate characteristics. After including these interactions, the remaining coefficient of the unemployment regime should be interpreted as the effect of the unemployment regime with company supplement for a reference candidate (i.e. a female candidate who has been unemployed for under two years and who applied directly without referral).

< Table 3 about here >

As columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 show, we observe statistically significant differences in the unemployment duration and gender of unemployed candidates participating in the regime with company supplement but not their referral status. Regarding unemployment duration, our hypothesis H2A is confirmed because candidates who have been unemployed for least two years in the regime with company supplement are more likely to be interviewed (β = 0.666, p = 0.015) or hired (β = 0.704, p = 0.006) than candidates who have been unemployed in that regime for a shorter period. Regarding the gender of candidates unemployed in the regime with company supplement, similar positive interaction effects are observed, supporting hypothesis H2B. Specifically, our findings reveal that men unemployed in the regime with company supplement are more likely to be interviewed (β = 0.432, p = 0.041) or hired (β = 0.469, p = 0.020) than women unemployed in the same regime. In contrast, there are no significant differences between candidates unemployed in the regime with company supplement who applied directly and those who were referred. Therefore, we find no evidence for either hypothesis H2C or H2Cbis.

By means of three robustness analyses, we are able to support these findings. First – and aligning with the robustness checks in Subsection 4.1 – we conduct robustness checks that exclude the 5% of recruiters with the highest scores for egoistic and moralistic response tendencies. As models (3) to (6) of Table 3 demonstrate, similar results are found. Second, we perform another robustness analysis that adopts additional interactions between unemployment in the regime with company supplement and all other candidate, job and recruiter characteristics. This is because, the latter variables might potentially (incidentally) correlate with the unemployment duration, gender and referral status of the candidate. The results presented in models (7) and (8) of Table O.A.2 suggest the same conclusions. Finally, we perform a

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robustness check that operationalises long-term unemployment as at least one year of unemployment, in line with the OECD (2022) and the Belgian government's database (Statbel, 2022). This represents an alternative to our benchmark definition of long-term unemployment as at least two years of unemployment. Again, conclusions based on models (9) and (10) of Table O.A.2 in the Online Appendix are similar to those based on our benchmark analysis. Nevertheless, some significance levels are somewhat lower in these three robustness analyses, probably due to insufficient power (as Subsection 4.1 states).[11]

4.3   Signals of the unemployment regime with company supplement

Finally, we explore why unemployment in the regime with company supplement might have this positive impact on candidate interview and hiring probabilities, especially for males and the long-term unemployed. Therefore, we adjusted the previous regression frameworks by replacing the dependent variables (i.e. the interview and hiring scale) with the 18 candidate perceptions discussed in Subsection 3.2.[12] Although these perceptions could theoretically be attributed to clusters – such as productivity and collaboration (Arrow, 1973; Becker, 1957) – an exploratory factor analysis did not reveal any meaningful distinctive clusters, making an item-level analysis relevant. The summarised results excluding and including interactions with the unemployment regime appear in Tables 4 and 5, and the full estimation results appear in Tables O.A.3 and O.A.4 of the Online Appendix.

< Table 4 about here >

< Table 5 about here >

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[11] More concretely, with respect to interview probability, the interaction between the unemployment regime and male candidates becomes less significant in the first (β_{ERT} = 0.427, p_{ERT} = 0.050; β_{MRT} = 0.413, p_{MRT} = 0.057) and second (β = 0.209, p = 0.074) robustness analyses. Regarding hiring probability, the significance of the interaction between the unemployment regime and lengthy long-term unemployment reduces in the third robustness check (β = 0.339, p = 0.122) .

[12] No mediation analysis was conducted because our experimental data is limited to the causal interpretation of the relationship between (i) the unemployment regime and the interview or hiring probability and (ii) the unemployment regime and the perceptions. Thus, although we provide evidence for multiple signals of (the interactions with) the unemployment regime with company supplement that could possibly explain the positive effects on interview probability, not all of these signals necessarily drive the favourable treatment of candidates who are unemployed in this regime because recruiters might not consider these signals when making selection decisions.

In general, the overall positive effect of the unemployment regime with company supplement (confirming H1bis) can be explained in terms of recruiters' positive perceptions towards collaboration between these candidates and their future colleagues. That is, we find marginal evidence that the odds of a positive evaluation on this collaboration scale are higher for candidates unemployed in the regime with company supplement ($\beta = 0.241$, $p = 0.076$) than unemployed candidates who do not partake in this regime.

Next, the more favourable effect for long-term unemployment in this regime (confirming H2A) can be explained by the more positive perceptions regarding these candidates' flexibility ($\beta = 0.829$, $p = 0.002$), the satisfaction experienced by previous employers ($\beta = 1.208$, $p < 0.001$), the limited levels of rejection by potential employers ($\beta = 0.487$, $p = 0.048$), and the administrative ease of hiring ($\beta = 0.665$, $p = 0.014$) compared to seniors who are unemployed for a similar period but do not participate in this regime. This implies that the stigmatisation of long-term unemployment (discussed in Section 2) is mitigated by participation in the unemployment regime with company supplement.

Furthermore, the more favourable effect for men in the unemployment regime with company supplement (confirming H2B) can be explained by recruiters' more positive perception regarding the smaller number of previous rejections of unemployed candidates in this regime by other potential employers. This is because male candidates who are unemployed in this regime have higher odds ($\beta = 0.497$, $p = 0.015$) on this scale than female candidates unemployed for a similar period in the same regime. This means that, at least for men, this unemployment regime more strongly signals that the candidate has not been frequently rejected by other potential employers. As Section 2 discusses, this finding is consistent with the mitigating effect of the unemployment regime with company supplement on the long-term unemployment stigma because the latter appears mainly among men.

5   Conclusion

Although numerous OECD countries invest vast amounts of public funds in active and facilitating labour-market programs to prolong work lives, research on their effectiveness is limited to the former programs. Therefore, this study has more closely examined the employment impact of the latter programs, which enable labour-market participation later in life. More concretely, we have focused on possible demand-

side problems for job candidates who participate in a program that supports senior dismissed with a company supplement at the ex-employer's expense in addition to regular government-funded unemployment benefits. In particular, we have examined the signals that recruiters derive from this participation to explain possible unfavourable treatment. To do this, we established a state-of-the-art scenario experiment in which genuine recruiters evaluate fictitious job candidates unemployed for differing lengths of time in either a regime with or without company supplement. Specifically, each recruiter rated five candidates for one of eight job vacancies based on their likelihood of being interviewed and hired and based on 18 theoretically relevant candidate perceptions.

In general, our research indicates that the low re-employment of seniors unemployed in a regime with company supplement is not caused by employers treating them unfavourably. More concretely, we find evidence that the seniors in this regime are at least as likely to be hired as seniors who do not participate in this regime, keeping factors as age and unemployment duration constant. Moreover, the longer-term unemployed even benefit in terms of hiring chances from partaking in this regime because this seems to temper the regular stigmatisation of long-term unemployment, particularly for male candidates. This is because long-term unemployed individuals are judged more leniently when they apply despite receiving a company supplement. Specifically, unemployed seniors who apply despite their company supplement are perceived as being less rejected by other employers, more flexible, easier to hire and more satisfying to previous employers.

In addition to their academic relevance, our results have important policy implications. Concretely, we have demonstrated that the low re-employment rates of senior candidates unemployed in the regime with company supplement cannot be explained by employers' unfavourable treatment in selection decisions. Therefore, problems seem to be situated rather along the supply side. Hence, policy adaptions should focus on the latter to increase the employment rate among the senior unemployed in this regime and effectively expand working lives. To guide these adaptions, we highly recommend the investigation of possible thresholds related to this regime on the supply side. For example, it is often argued that unemployed candidates in this regime are less motivated to apply for jobs due to the generous benefits and due to the public employment service not offering enough suitable jobs (Vlaams Parlement, 2019; Vlaams Parlement, 2021).

We conclude this article by acknowledging two of its limitations. First, our experimental setup

implies that we are only able to claim causality about the effects of the unemployment regime on the candidate productivity perceptions and on the hiring decisions, but not of the productivity perceptions on the hiring decisions, as the former were not experimentally manipulated (Gerber & Green, 2012). Therefore, we did not conduct a mediation analysis. Second, the online experimental setting meant that recruiters were aware of our observations, potentially causing measurement biases. Acknowledging this risk, we took multiple measures to mitigate the impact of these effects. For example, recruiters were forced to make trade-offs to mimic real-life hiring decisions, we invented a novel cover story about a previous telephone interview to explain the disclosure of the candidate's unemployment status, an attention check was integrated to eliminate inaccurate recruiters, and a social desirability scale was implemented to check the robustness of the results among less biased recruiters. Finally, previous research has found strong correlations between vignette experiments and actual behaviour (Hainmueller, Hangartner & Yamamoto, 2015). Nevertheless, we encourage researchers to explore the employment opportunities of candidates unemployed in similar labour-market programs in other countries for other jobs using different but complementary research methods. These findings will provide a further perspective on the effectiveness of such programs and illuminate possible contextual differences.

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Tables

Table 1. Vignette factors and corresponding levels used in the experiment

Vignette factors	Vignette levels
Gender	{Male, Female}
Age	{33, 38, 44, 49, 55, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64}
Commuting distance	{0–5 km, 5–10 km, 10–50 km, More than 50 km}
Relevant work experience	{None, About 2 years, About 5 years, About 10 years}
Unemployment status	{Unemployed, Unemployed in the regime with companysupplement}
Unemployment duration	{One month or less, More than one month but less than six months, More than six months but less than one year, More than one year but less than two years, More than two years}
Extra-curricular activities	{None, Volunteering, Sport activities, Cultural activities}
Application method	{Directly, Referral through the public employment service of Flanders}

Notes. The factorial product of the vignette levels (i.e. 2x10x4x4x2x5x4x2) resulted in 25,600 possible combinations. Fifty sets of five vignettes were drawn from this vignette universe using a D-efficient design (D-efficiency: 96.74; Auspurg & Hinz, 2014) and distributed at random to the recruiters, as Subsection 3.1 describes.

Table 2. Regression results with the interview and hiring probability as the outcome variables

	Full sample [N = 1,800]		Subsample: 95% recruiters with the lowest ERT [N = 1,780]		Subsample: 95% recruiters with the lowest MRT [N = 1,783]	
	Interview probability (1)	Hiring probability (2)	Interview probability (3)	Hiring probability (4)	Interview probability (5)	Hiring probability (6)
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	0.256* (0.120)	0.306* (0.122)	0.236† (0.124)	0.277* (0.126)	0.228† (0.123)	0.269* (0.125)
Age (ref. = 33 years)						
38 years	−0.039 (0.176)	−0.091 (0.179)	−0.019 (0.181)	−0.032 (0.185)	−0.004 (0.186)	−0.031 (0.190)
44 years	−0.267† (0.162)	−0.186 (0.183)	−0.290† (0.170)	−0.199 (0.191)	−0.320† (0.170)	−0.257 (0.192)
49 years	−0.138 (0.221)	−0.314 (0.234)	−0.100 (0.231)	−0.230 (0.237)	−0.222 (0.226)	−0.370 (0.237)
55 years	−0.571** (0.197)	−0.512* (0.199)	−0.585** (0.203)	−0.487* (0.205)	−0.603** (0.205)	−0.508* (0.206)
60 years	−0.966*** (0.231)	−0.992*** (0.235)	−0.900*** (0.235)	−0.917*** (0.239)	−1.011*** (0.236)	−0.974*** (0.240)
61 years	−1.206*** (0.237)	−1.152*** (0.233)	−1.224*** (0.249)	−1.182*** (0.241)	−1.249*** (0.243)	−1.179*** (0.241)
62 years	−1.250*** (0.202)	−1.437*** (0.217)	−1.178*** (0.212)	−1.350*** (0.222)	−1.233*** (0.208)	−1.404*** (0.222)
63 years	−1.429*** (0.198)	−1.509*** (0.219)	−1.408*** (0.203)	−1.454*** (0.223)	−1.390*** (0.205)	−1.433*** (0.226)
64 years	−1.250*** (0.200)	−1.506*** (0.198)	−1.231*** (0.203)	−1.480*** (0.202)	−1.263*** (0.206)	−1.494*** (0.200)
Male	0.018 (0.074)	−0.025 (0.080)	0.027 (0.074)	−0.017 (0.080)	0.024 (0.076)	−0.010 (0.081)
Commuting distance (ref. = 0–5km)						
5–10 km	0.182† (0.103)	0.060 (0.106)	0.180† (0.107)	0.046 (0.109)	0.201† (0.107)	0.077 (0.110)
10–50 km	0.035 (0.097)	−0.039 (0.102)	0.039 (0.100)	−0.046 (0.105)	0.065 (0.100)	0.001 (0.105)
More than 50 km	−0.854*** (0.120)	−1.028*** (0.125)	−0.848*** (0.123)	−1.032*** (0.128)	−0.828*** (0.123)	−1.011*** (0.127)
Relevant work experience (ref. = None)						
About 2 years	1.366*** (0.116)	1.408*** (0.123)	1.338*** (0.120)	1.392*** (0.126)	1.348*** (0.120)	1.388*** (0.127)
About 5 years	1.751*** (0.127)	1.897*** (0.132)	1.720*** (0.131)	1.877*** (0.137)	1.734*** (0.131)	1.904*** (0.137)
About 10 years	2.141*** (0.132)	2.317*** (0.130)	2.118*** (0.135)	2.335*** (0.135)	2.124*** (0.135)	2.302*** (0.135)
Unemployment period (ref. = 1 month at most)						
1–6 months	−0.224* (0.109)	−0.243* (0.118)	−0.233* (0.112)	−0.265* (0.120)	−0.185 (0.112)	−0.215† (0.121)
6–12 months	−0.545*** (0.112)	−0.699*** (0.111)	−0.536*** (0.114)	−0.691*** (0.115)	−0.522*** (0.115)	−0.691*** (0.113)

12–24 months	−0.691*** (0.111)	−0.828*** (0.117)	−0.692*** (0.114)	−0.835*** (0.120)	−0.656*** (0.113)	−0.773*** (0.118)
More than 24 months	−0.874*** (0.115)	−1.139*** (0.124)	−0.858*** (0.119)	−1.165*** (0.128)	−0.854*** (0.119)	−1.089*** (0.128)
Extra-curricular activities (ref. = None)						
Cultural activities	0.103 (0.098)	−0.046 (0.106)	0.128 (0.101)	−0.040 (0.107)	0.116 (0.101)	−0.030 (0.108)
Sport activities	0.138 (0.101)	0.081 (0.114)	0.189[†] (0.103)	0.130 (0.114)	0.149 (0.103)	0.088 (0.117)
Voluntary work	0.162 (0.103)	0.077 (0.108)	0.186[†] (0.105)	0.087 (0.109)	0.146 (0.106)	0.040 (0.111)
Referral through PES	−0.328*** (0.078)	−0.358*** (0.078)	−0.322*** (0.080)	−0.344*** (0.080)	−0.359*** (0.080)	−0.379*** (0.079)

B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS

Job fixed effects included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS

Recruiter characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. Abbreviations used: ref. (reference category), URCS (Unemployed in the Regime with Company Supplement), ERT (Egoistic Response Tendencies), MRT (Moralistic Response Tendencies), and PES (Public Employment Service). The subsamples were created by excluding the 20 recruiters who scored above 4.19 for egoistic response tendencies and the 17 recruiters who scored above 4.30 for moralistic response tendencies. The lists of included jobs and recruiter characteristics are described in Subsection 3.2 and presented in the Online Appendix Table 1. The outcome variables range from 0 (i.e. definitely no interview or hire) to 10 (i.e. definitely an interview or hire). The presented statistics are coefficient estimates and their standard errors appear in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for the clustering of the observations at the recruiter level. Significances are indicated as *** when $p < .001$, ** when $p < .01$, * when $p < .05$, and † when $p < .10$.

Table 3. Regression results with the interview and hiring probability as the outcome variables (two-way interactions included)

	Full sample [N = 1,800]		Subsample: 95% recruiters with the lowest ERT [N = 1,780]		Subsample: 95% recruiters with the lowest MRT [N = 1,783]	
	Interview probability (1)	Hiring probability (2)	Interview probability (3)	Hiring probability (4)	Interview probability (5)	Hiring probability (6)
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	−0.079 (0.210)	−0.069 (0.215)	−0.093 (0.212)	−0.079 (0.221)	−0.111 (0.216)	−0.124 (0.221)
Interactions						
URCSxMale	0.432* (0.211)	0.496* (0.213)	0.427† (0.218)	0.453* (0.218)	0.413† (0.217)	0.466* (0.217)
URCSxLong-term unemployment [a]	0.666* (0.275)	0.704** (0.256)	0.731* (0.291)	0.720** (0.269)	0.792** (0.279)	0.766** (0.262)
URCSxReferral	0.004 (0.193)	0.012 (0.192)	−0.010 (0.201)	0.024 (0.202)	−0.015 (0.197)	0.051 (0.197)
Other candidate characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS						
Job fixed effects included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS						
Recruiter characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. Abbreviations used: URCS (Unemployed in the Regime with Company Supplement), ERT (Egoistic Response Tendencies), and MRT (Moralistic Response Tendencies). The subsamples were created by excluding the 20 recruiters who scored above 4.19 for egoistic response tendencies and the 17 recruiters who scored above 4.30 for moralistic response tendencies. The list of included candidate characteristics is discussed in Subsection 3.1 and presented in Table 2. The lists of included jobs and recruiter characteristics are described in Subsection 3.2 and presented in Table 2 of the Online Appendix. The outcome variables range from 0 (i.e. definitely no interview or hire) to 10 (i.e. definitely an interview or hire). The presented statistics are coefficient estimates and their standard errors appear in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for the clustering of the observations at the recruiter level. Significances are indicated as *** when p < .001, ** when p < .01, * when p < .05, and † when p < .10.
[a] Long-term unemployment refers to a recent unemployment period of at least 2 years.

Table 4. Regression results with the perceptions as the outcome variables

	Intelligence	Social skills	Physical skills	Technological skills	Flexibility	Creativity
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	0.028 (0.131)	0.171 (0.135)	−0.020 (0.134)	−0.001 (0.136)	0.034 (0.130)	0.057 (0.135)
Other candidate characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS						
Job fixed effects included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS						
Recruiter characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Experience	Motivation	Reliability	Preciseness	Trainability	Reasonable salary expectations
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	0.020 (0.124)	−0.069 (0.116)	0.137 (0.131)	0.191 (0.137)	0.153 (0.133)	−0.096 (0.138)
Other candidate characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS						
Job fixed effects included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS						
Recruiter characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Satisfaction of previous employers	Rejection by potential employers	Administrative ease of hiring	Collaboration with employer	Collaboration with colleagues	Collaboration with clients
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	0.194 (0.134)	0.094 (0.121)	−0.224 (0.143)	0.213 (0.138)	0.241† (0.136)	0.193 (0.143)
Other candidate characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS						
Job fixed effects included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS						

Recruiter characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. Abbreviation used: URCS (Unemployed in the Regime with Company Supplement). The list of included candidate characteristics is discussed in Subsection 3.1 and presented in Table 2. The lists of included jobs and recruiter characteristics are described in Subsection 3.2 and presented in Table 3 of the Online Appendix. The outcome variables range from 0 (i.e. definitely no interview or hire) to 10 (i.e. definitely an interview or hire). The presented statistics are coefficient estimates and their standard errors appear in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for the clustering of the observations at the recruiter level. Significances are indicated as *** when p < .001, ** when p < .01, * when p < .05, and † when p < .10.

Table 5. Regression results with the perceptions as the outcome variables (two-way interactions included)

	Intelligence	Social skills	Physical skills	Technological skills	Flexibility	Creativity
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	0.178 (0.211)	0.323 (0.215)	−0.056 (0.235)	−0.326 (0.216)	−0.292 (0.224)	−0.327 (0.235)
Interactions						
URCSxMale	−0.206 (0.207)	−0.037 (0.216)	0.111 (0.215)	0.209 (0.186)	0.302 (0.210)	0.322 (0.224)
URCSxLong-term unemployment [a]	0.195 (0.271)	0.329 (0.271)	0.067 (0.266)	0.392 (0.243)	0.829** (0.267)	0.412 (0.288)
URCSxReferral	−0.161 (0.191)	−0.383* (0.181)	−0.064 (0.185)	0.297 (0.196)	0.067 (0.198)	0.306 (0.200)
Other candidate characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS						
Job fixed effects included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS						
Recruiter characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

	Experience	Motivation	Reliability	Preciseness	Trainability	Reasonable salary expectations
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	−0.252 (0.196)	−0.360+ (0.213)	0.094 (0.206)	0.169 (0.228)	−0.180 (0.228)	0.030 (0.227)
Interactions						
URCSxMale	0.166 (0.186)	0.235 (0.218)	0.049 (0.226)	−0.073 (0.220)	0.346 (0.220)	−0.105 (0.230)
URCSxLong-term unemployment [a]	0.328 (0.256)	0.165 (0.277)	0.371 (0.304)	0.341 (0.306)	0.174 (0.267)	0.098 (0.262)
URCSxReferral	0.261 (0.192)	0.295 (0.197)	−0.080 (0.188)	0.010 (0.208)	0.254 (0.191)	−0.186 (0.199)
Other candidate characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS						
Job fixed effects included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS						
Recruiter characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

	Satisfaction of previous employers	Rejection by potential employers	Administrative ease of hiring	Collaboration with employer	Collaboration with colleagues	Collaboration with clients

A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS

Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	0.149 (0.227)	−0.374† (0.209)	−0.155 (0.220)	−0.020 (0.240)	−0.014 (0.243)	0.061 (0.236)
Interactions						
URCSxMale	−0.030 (0.223)	0.497* (0.204)	0.078 (0.210)	0.307 (0.232)	0.274 (0.227)	0.216 (0.224)
URCSxLong-term unemployment [a]	1.208*** (0.287)	0.487* (0.246)	0.665* (0.271)	0.297 (0.294)	0.395 (0.286)	0.276 (0.286)
URCSxReferral	−0.274 (0.206)	0.244 (0.169)	−0.452* (0.180)	0.059 (0.199)	0.097 (0.194)	−0.046 (0.196)
Other candidate characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS

Job fixed effects included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS

Recruiter characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. Abbreviation used: URCS (Unemployed in the Regime with Company Supplement). The list of included candidate characteristics is discussed in Subsection 3.1 and presented in Table 2. The lists of included jobs and recruiter characteristics are described in Subsection 3.2 and presented in Table 4 of the Online Appendix. The outcome variables range from 0 (i.e. definitely no interview or hire) to 10 (i.e. definitely an interview or hire). The presented statistics are coefficient estimates and their standard errors appear in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for the clustering of the observations at the recruiter level. Significances are indicated as *** when $p < .001$, ** when $p < .01$, * when $p < .05$, and † when $p < .10$.

[a] Long-term unemployment refers to a recent unemployment period of at least 2 years.

Appendix

Table A.1. Function descriptions of the jobs used in the experiment

Jobs	Job characteristics				Function descriptions
	Overall skills	Customer contact	Physical effort	Technological knowledge	
Dental technician	Low	Low	Low	Low	'This employee will be responsible for the construction or repair of partial or full dentures and other dental constructions.'
Door-to-door sales worker	Low	High	Low	Low	'This employee will be responsible for selling goods or services door-to-door or on the street.'
Packer	Low	Low	High	Low	'This employee will be responsible for packaging a wide variety of products and materials (in an industrial environment).'
CNC machine operator	Low	Low	Low	High	'This employee will be responsible for setting up machines that mill, shape and/or engrave plastic or metal work pieces.'
Lab technician (cytogenetic techniques)	High	Low	Low	Low	'This employee will be responsible for analysing chromosomes (in biological material such as amniotic fluid, bone marrow, and blood) in view of studying, diagnosing, or treating genetic diseases.'
Insurance sales agent	High	High	Low	Low	'This employee will be responsible for selling insurance, including life, property, accident, and health insurance.'
Physiotherapist	High	Low	High	Low	'This employee will be responsible for physically (physiotherapeutically) guiding individuals with exceptional physical needs due to gross motor development disorders or other disorders.'
Database administrator	High	Low	Low	High	'This employee will be responsible for the implementation, testing, management, security, and reworking of computer databases using data management systems.'

Notes. Jobs and function descriptions were provided by O∗NET, as described in Subsection 3.2.

Table A.2. Outcomes and perceptions including corresponding statements used in the experiment

Outcomes and perceptions	Statements
A. Outcomes	
Interview probability	'I advise to invite this candidate for a job interview for the described position.'
Hiring probability	'I advise to hire this candidate for the described position.'
B. Perceptions related to statistical based discrimination	
Perceived intellectual abilities	'I think this candidate has sufficient intellectual capacity to perform this job well.'
Perceived social abilities	'I think this candidate has sufficient social capacity to perform this job well.'
Perceived physical abilities	'I think this candidate has sufficient physical capacity to perform this job well.'
Perceived technological knowledge and skills	'I think this candidate has sufficient technological knowledge and skills to perform this job well.'
Perceived flexibility	'I think this candidate is sufficiently flexible to perform this job well.'
Perceived creativity	'I think this candidate is sufficiently creative to perform this job well.'
Perceived experience	'I think this candidate has sufficient experience to perform this job well.'
Perceived motivation	'I think this candidate is sufficiently motivated to perform this job well.'
Perceived reliability	'I think this candidate is sufficiently reliable to perform this job well.'
Perceived accuracy	'I think this candidate is sufficiently accurate to perform this job well.'
Perceived trainability	'I think this candidate is sufficiently trainable to perform this job well.'
Perceived reasonability with respect to wage expectations	'I think this candidate would have reasonable wage expectations.'
Perceived satisfaction of previous employers	'I think previous employers this candidate worked for were satisfied with his/her productivity.'
Perceived frequency of rejection	'I think this candidate has not been rejected many times by potential employers.
Perceived (administrative) ease of hiring	'I think hiring this candidate is (administratively) easy.'
C. Perceptions related to taste based discrimination	
Attitude towards collaboration of employer	'I think I would enjoy collaborating with this candidate.'
Attitude towards collaboration of other employees	'I think other employees would enjoy collaborating with this candidate.'
Attitude towards collaboration of customers	'I think customers would enjoy collaborating with this candidate.'

Notes. This table demonstrates the potential perceptions and the evaluation outcomes, as well as their corresponding statements as presented in the online experiment. The recruiters evaluated each statement on a 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (i.e. 'completely disagree') to 10 (i.e. 'completely agree').

Table A.3. Description of recruiter characteristics by candidate's unemployment status

	Mean			Difference
	Full sample [N = 1,800]	Subsample: Unemployed [N = 1,285]	Subsample: Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS) [N = 515]	(2) – (3)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male	0.311	0.314	0.303	0.011 (0.475)
Age				
Between 21 and 35 years	0.414	0.399	0.450	−0.051* (−1.997)
Between 36 and 50 years	0.383	0.390	0.367	0.023 (0.903)
Between 51 and 75 years	0.203	0.211	0.183	0.028 (1.353)
Tertiary education	0.806	0.806	0.804	0.002 (0.113)
At least weekly involved in selection decisions	0.592	0.583	0.614	−0.031 (−1.198)
Duration of experience				
More than 5 years	0.553	0.099	0.084	0.015 (1.005)
1 to 5 years	0.353	0.339	0.386	−0.047† (−1.891)
Less than 1 year	0.094	0.562	0.530	0.032 (1.225)
Job				
General administrative assistant	0.042	0.047	0.029	0.018 (1.686)
Employment agency employee	0.111	0.100	0.138	−0.037* (−2.289)
HR and career development specialist	0.142	0.135	0.159	−0.025 (−1.352)
Management assistant	0.050	0.053	0.043	0.010 (0.897)
Manager	0.433	0.448	0.396	0.052* (2.018)
Other	0.222	0.217	0.235	−0.018 (−1.352)
At least 20% of the employees in the organisation is older than 50	0.531	0.530	0.532	−0.002 (−0.80)

Notes. Abbreviation used: URCS (Unemployed in the Regime with Company Supplement). T-tests are performed to test whether the presented differences are significantly different from 0. T-statistics are presented in brackets. Significances are indicated as *** when p < .001; ** when p < .01; * when p < .05; and † when p < .10.

Online Appendix

Table O.A.1. Full ordered regression results with the interview and hiring probability as the outcome variables

	Full sample [N = 1,800]		Subsample: 95% recruiters with the lowest ERT [N = 1,780]		Subsample: 95% recruiters with the lowest MRT [N = 1,783]	
	Interview probability (1)	Hiring probability (2)	Interview probability (3)	Hiring probability (4)	Interview probability (5)	Hiring probability (6)
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	0.256* (0.120)	0.306* (0.122)	0.236[†] (0.124)	0.277* (0.126)	0.228[†] (0.123)	0.269* (0.125)
Age (ref. = 33 years)						
38 years	−0.039 (0.176)	−0.091 (0.179)	−0.019 (0.181)	−0.032 (0.185)	−0.004 (0.186)	−0.031 (0.190)
44 years	−0.267[†] (0.162)	−0.186 (0.183)	−0.290[†] (0.170)	−0.199 (0.191)	−0.320[†] (0.170)	−0.257 (0.192)
49 years	−0.138 (0.221)	−0.314 (0.234)	−0.100 (0.231)	−0.230 (0.237)	−0.222 (0.226)	−0.370 (0.237)
55 years	−0.571** (0.197)	−0.512* (0.199)	−0.585** (0.203)	−0.487* (0.205)	−0.603** (0.205)	−0.508* (0.206)
60 years	−0.966*** (0.231)	−0.992*** (0.235)	−0.900*** (0.235)	−0.917*** (0.239)	−1.011*** (0.236)	−0.974*** (0.240)
61 years	−1.206*** (0.237)	−1.152*** (0.233)	−1.224*** (0.249)	−1.182*** (0.241)	−1.249*** (0.243)	−1.179*** (0.241)
62 years	−1.250*** (0.202)	−1.437*** (0.217)	−1.178*** (0.212)	−1.350*** (0.222)	−1.233*** (0.208)	−1.404*** (0.222)
63 years	−1.429*** (0.198)	−1.509*** (0.219)	−1.408*** (0.203)	−1.454*** (0.223)	−1.390*** (0.205)	−1.433*** (0.226)
64 years	−1.250*** (0.200)	−1.506*** (0.198)	−1.231*** (0.203)	−1.480*** (0.202)	−1.263*** (0.206)	−1.494*** (0.200)
Male	0.018 (0.074)	−0.025 (0.080)	0.027 (0.074)	−0.017 (0.080)	0.024 (0.076)	−0.010 (0.081)
Commuting distance (ref. = 0–5km)						
5–10 km	0.182[†] (0.103)	0.060 (0.106)	0.180[†] (0.107)	0.046 (0.109)	0.201[†] (0.107)	0.077 (0.110)
10–50 km	0.035 (0.097)	−0.039 (0.102)	0.039 (0.100)	−0.046 (0.105)	0.065 (0.100)	0.001 (0.105)
More than 50 km	−0.854*** (0.120)	−1.028*** (0.125)	−0.848*** (0.123)	−1.032*** (0.128)	−0.828*** (0.123)	−1.011*** (0.127)
Relevant work experience (ref. = None)						
About 2 years	1.366*** (0.116)	1.408*** (0.123)	1.338*** (0.120)	1.392*** (0.126)	1.348*** (0.120)	1.388*** (0.127)
About 5 years	1.751*** (0.127)	1.897*** (0.132)	1.720*** (0.131)	1.877*** (0.137)	1.734*** (0.131)	1.904*** (0.137)
About 10 years	2.141*** (0.132)	2.317*** (0.130)	2.118*** (0.135)	2.335*** (0.135)	2.124*** (0.135)	2.302*** (0.135)

Unemployment period (ref. = 1 month at most)						
1–6 months	−0.224* (0.109)	−0.243* (0.118)	−0.233* (0.112)	−0.265* (0.120)	−0.185 (0.112)	−0.215† (0.121)
6–12 months	−0.545*** (0.112)	−0.699*** (0.111)	−0.536*** (0.114)	−0.691*** (0.115)	−0.522*** (0.115)	−0.691*** (0.113)
12–24 months	−0.691*** (0.111)	−0.828*** (0.117)	−0.692*** (0.114)	−0.835*** (0.120)	−0.656*** (0.113)	−0.773*** (0.118)
More than 24 months	−0.874*** (0.115)	−1.139*** (0.124)	−0.858*** (0.119)	−1.165*** (0.128)	−0.854*** (0.119)	−1.089*** (0.128)
Extra-curricular activities (ref. = None)						
Cultural activities	0.103 (0.098)	−0.046 (0.106)	0.128 (0.101)	−0.040 (0.107)	0.116 (0.101)	−0.030 (0.108)
Sport activities	0.138 (0.101)	0.081 (0.114)	0.189† (0.103)	0.130 (0.114)	0.149 (0.103)	0.088 (0.117)
Voluntary work	0.162 (0.103)	0.077 (0.108)	0.186† (0.105)	0.087 (0.109)	0.146 (0.106)	0.040 (0.111)
Referral through PES	−0.328*** (0.078)	−0.358*** (0.078)	−0.322*** (0.080)	−0.344*** (0.080)	−0.359*** (0.080)	−0.379*** (0.079)
B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS						
Job (ref. = Dental technician)						
Door-to-door salesman	0.399 (0.278)	0.404 (0.268)	0.454 (0.292)	0.467 (0.285)	0.293 (0.272)	0.316 (0.263)
Packer	−0.183 (0.347)	−0.361 (0.334)	−0.241 (0.347)	−0.409 (0.338)	−0.214 (0.361)	−0.309 (0.344)
Plate machine tool setter	0.164 (0.248)	0.082 (0.258)	0.200 (0.255)	0.166 (0.266)	0.182 (0.252)	0.117 (0.263)
Laboratory technician	−0.119 (0.242)	−0.254 (0.238)	−0.085 (0.248)	−0.213 (0.248)	−0.129 (0.245)	−0.211 (0.241)
Insurance agent	−0.262 (0.236)	−0.499* (0.226)	−0.235 (0.245)	−0.517* (0.237)	−0.276 (0.238)	−0.488* (0.237)
Physiotherapist	0.038 (0.284)	−0.373 (0.233)	0.063 (0.293)	−0.347 (0.239)	0.000 (0.295)	−0.374 (0.242)
Database administrator	−0.286 (0.292)	−0.532* (0.230)	−0.256 (0.295)	−0.495* (0.236)	−0.292 (0.293)	−0.502* (0.229)
C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS						
Male	−0.093 (0.158)	−0.215 (0.142)	−0.115 (0.167)	−0.192 (0.150)	−0.128 (0.157)	−0.198 (0.146)
Age (ref. = 21–35 years)						
36–50 years	0.055 (0.174)	−0.047 (0.162)	−0.006 (0.178)	−0.105 (0.169)	0.037 (0.177)	−0.063 (0.164)
51–75 years	−0.154 (0.217)	−0.161 (0.183)	−0.167 (0.235)	−0.203 (0.196)	−0.109 (0.226)	−0.170 (0.193)
Tertiary education	−0.178 (0.196)	−0.246 (0.194)	−0.244 (0.211)	−0.296 (0.202)	−0.087 (0.202)	−0.151 (0.202)
At least weekly involved in selection decisions	0.002 (0.163)	−0.090 (0.149)	−0.032 (0.178)	−0.122 (0.161)	0.093 (0.167)	−0.073 (0.153)
Period of experience (ref. = Less than 1 year)						
1 to 5 years	0.159 (0.235)	0.305 (0.232)	0.197 (0.236)	0.327 (0.235)	0.078 (0.257)	0.226 (0.250)
More than 5 years	0.325 (0.240)	0.446† (0.242)	0.394 (0.243)	0.486† (0.248)	0.201 (0.260)	0.347 (0.258)
Job (ref. = Others)						
General administrative assistant	−0.105 (0.309)	0.086 (0.309)	−0.116 (0.338)	0.010 (0.325)	−0.015 (0.323)	0.017 (0.312)

Employment agency employee	0.497 (0.319)	0.630† (0.323)	0.504 (0.322)	0.668* (0.328)	0.453 (0.331)	0.581† (0.331)
HR and career development specialist	−0.006 (0.211)	0.044 (0.199)	0.020 (0.216)	0.124 (0.201)	0.035 (0.217)	0.050 (0.207)
Management assistant	−0.081 (0.318)	0.195 (0.273)	−0.092 (0.338)	0.185 (0.290)	−0.135 (0.331)	0.142 (0.305)
Manager	−0.207 (0.186)	−0.156 (0.160)	−0.230 (0.196)	−0.160 (0.169)	−0.168 (0.188)	−0.134 (0.166)
At least 20% of the employees in the organisation is older than 50	0.085 (0.150)	−0.001 (0.137)	0.033 (0.153)	−0.048 (0.140)	0.043 (0.157)	−0.011 (0.142)

D. CUT-POINTS OUTCOME VARIABLE

Cut-point 1	−3.383 (0.378)	−3.794 (0.382)	−3.394 (0.392)	−3.798 (0.401)	−3.333 (0.390)	−3.711 (0.391)
Cut-point 2	−2.646 (0.362)	−2.872 (0.368)	−2.710 (0.373)	−2.911 (0.385)	−2.618 (0.376)	−2.788 (0.377)
Cut-point 3	−1.983 (0.358)	−2.174 (0.368)	−2.036 (0.369)	−2.200 (0.385)	−1.970 (0.372)	−2.108 (0.376)
Cut-point 4	−1.548 (0.357)	−1.617 (0.363)	−1.581 (0.368)	−1.642 (0.381)	−1.538 (0.371)	−1.568 (0.372)
Cut-point 5	−1.237 (0.356)	−1.156 (0.360)	−1.280 (0.368)	−1.169 (0.377)	−1.223 (0.369)	−1.097 (0.369)
Cut-point 6	−0.789 (0.359)	−0.073 (0.367)	−0.819 (0.370)	−0.066 (0.386)	−0.794 (0.373)	−0.028 (0.377)
Cut-point 7	−0.205 (0.360)	0.630 (0.368)	−0.250 (0.372)	0.638 (0.385)	−0.214 (0.375)	0.672 (0.378)
Cut-point 8	0.549 (0.364)	1.623 (0.374)	0.496 (0.376)	1.661 (0.391)	0.544 (0.379)	1.678 (0.385)
Cut-point 9	1.546 (0.367)	2.738 (0.378)	1.506 (0.380)	2.790 (0.396)	1.566 (0.381)	2.831 (0.391)
Cut-point 10	2.253 (0.380)	3.782 (0.405)	2.187 (0.393)	3.813 (0.424)	2.286 (0.394)	3.924 (0.427)

Notes. Abbreviations used: ref. (reference category), URCS (Unemployed in the Regime with Company Supplement), ERT (Egoistic Response Tendencies), MRT (Moralistic Response Tendencies), PES (Public Employment Service), and HR (Human Resources). The subsamples were created by excluding the 20 recruiters who scored above 4.19 for egoistic response tendencies and the 17 recruiters who scored above 4.30 for moralistic response tendencies respectively. The outcome variables range from 0 (i.e. definitely no interview or hire) to 10 (i.e. definitely an interview or hire). The presented statistics are coefficient estimates and their standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the recruiter level. Significances are indicated as *** when $p < .001$; ** when $p < .01$; * when $p < .05$; and † when $p < .10$.

Table O.A.2. Full ordered regression results with the interview and hiring probability as the outcome variables, two-way interactions included

	Full sample [N = 1,800]		Subsample: 95% recruiters with the lowest ERT [N = 1,780]		Subsample: 95% recruiters with the lowest MRT [N = 1,783]	
	Interview probability (1)	Hiring probability (2)	Interview probability (3)	Hiring probability (4)	Interview probability (5)	Hiring probability (6)
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	−0.079 (0.210)	−0.069 (0.215)	−0.093 (0.212)	−0.079 (0.221)	−0.111 (0.216)	−0.124 (0.221)
Age (ref. = 33 years)						
38 years	−0.079 (0.176)	−0.134 (0.181)	−0.064 (0.182)	−0.078 (0.187)	−0.050 (0.186)	−0.079 (0.192)
44 years	−0.286† (0.162)	−0.211 (0.186)	−0.309† (0.170)	−0.223 (0.193)	−0.337* (0.171)	−0.282 (0.195)
49 years	−0.158 (0.225)	−0.343 (0.239)	−0.120 (0.235)	−0.257 (0.242)	−0.244 (0.229)	−0.400† (0.242)
55 years	−0.605** (0.198)	−0.548** (0.202)	−0.625** (0.203)	−0.528* (0.208)	−0.648** (0.205)	−0.553** (0.209)
60 years	−1.017*** (0.228)	−1.046*** (0.233)	−0.958*** (0.232)	−0.976*** (0.237)	−1.066*** (0.233)	−1.028*** (0.238)
61 years	−1.309*** (0.243)	−1.268*** (0.241)	−1.332*** (0.254)	−1.292*** (0.248)	−1.356*** (0.248)	−1.289*** (0.248)
62 years	−1.266*** (0.202)	−1.459*** (0.218)	−1.194*** (0.211)	−1.368*** (0.222)	−1.247*** (0.207)	−1.421*** (0.223)
63 years	−1.423*** (0.194)	−1.503*** (0.215)	−1.409*** (0.200)	−1.458*** (0.219)	−1.389*** (0.202)	−1.435*** (0.222)
64 years	−1.297*** (0.202)	−1.560*** (0.205)	−1.280*** (0.206)	−1.536*** (0.210)	−1.311*** (0.209)	−1.553*** (0.207)
Male	−0.112 (0.095)	−0.173† (0.101)	−0.106 (0.097)	−0.154 (0.102)	−0.106 (0.099)	−0.150 (0.105)
Commuting distance (ref. = 0–5km)						
5–10 km	0.177† (0.104)	0.057 (0.106)	0.175 (0.108)	0.046 (0.110)	0.191† (0.108)	0.075 (0.110)
10–50 km	0.048 (0.097)	−0.026 (0.102)	0.054 (0.100)	−0.032 (0.104)	0.079 (0.100)	0.015 (0.104)
More than 50 km	−0.861*** (0.122)	−1.038*** (0.126)	−0.855*** (0.125)	−1.041*** (0.130)	−0.838*** (0.124)	−1.023*** (0.128)
Relevant work experience (ref. = None)						
About 2 years	1.357*** (0.117)	1.393*** (0.125)	1.335*** (0.122)	1.386*** (0.129)	1.348*** (0.121)	1.382*** (0.130)
About 5 years	1.754*** (0.129)	1.895*** (0.134)	1.732*** (0.133)	1.884*** (0.139)	1.745*** (0.133)	1.908*** (0.138)
About 10 years	2.165*** (0.132)	2.339*** (0.131)	2.151*** (0.136)	2.362*** (0.136)	2.160*** (0.135)	2.330*** (0.136)
Unemployment period (ref. = 1 month at most)						
1–6 months	−0.218* (0.110)	−0.241* (0.118)	−0.223* (0.113)	−0.259* (0.121)	−0.172 (0.113)	−0.206† (0.121)
6–12 months	−0.515*** (0.112)	−0.665*** (0.112)	−0.509*** (0.115)	−0.664*** (0.117)	−0.489*** (0.116)	−0.658*** (0.114)

12–24 months	−0.704*** (0.112)	−0.843*** (0.118)	−0.707*** (0.115)	−0.852*** (0.121)	−0.670*** (0.114)	−0.789*** (0.119)
More than 24 months	−1.051*** (0.135)	−1.333*** (0.146)	−1.051*** (0.140)	−1.360*** (0.150)	−1.068*** (0.142)	−1.305*** (0.151)
Extra-curricular activities (ref. = None)						
Cultural activities	0.119 (0.101)	−0.024 (0.107)	0.146 (0.104)	−0.014 (0.107)	0.132 (0.105)	−0.003 (0.109)
Sport activities	0.183† (0.102)	0.133 (0.116)	0.236* (0.103)	0.181 (0.116)	0.195† (0.104)	0.140 (0.119)
Voluntary work	0.200† (0.103)	0.124 (0.109)	0.228* (0.104)	0.135 (0.111)	0.186† (0.106)	0.088 (0.112)
Referral through PES	−0.342*** (0.093)	−0.373*** (0.096)	−0.333*** (0.095)	−0.362*** (0.098)	−0.371*** (0.096)	−0.405*** (0.098)
Interactions						
URCSxMale	0.432* (0.211)	0.496* (0.213)	0.427† (0.218)	0.453* (0.218)	0.413† (0.217)	0.466* (0.217)
URCSxLong-term unemployment[a]	0.666* (0.275)	0.704** (0.256)	0.731* (0.291)	0.720** (0.269)	0.792** (0.279)	0.766** (0.262)
URCSxReferral	0.004 (0.193)	0.012 (0.192)	−0.010 (0.201)	0.024 (0.202)	−0.015 (0.197)	0.051 (0.197)

B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS

Job (ref. = Dental technician)						
Door-to-door salesman	0.382 (0.277)	0.391 (0.269)	0.440 (0.290)	0.457 (0.284)	0.276 (0.271)	0.303 (0.262)
Packer	−0.202 (0.346)	−0.377 (0.333)	−0.260 (0.347)	−0.424 (0.339)	−0.232 (0.360)	−0.325 (0.343)
Plate machine tool setter	0.142 (0.247)	0.060 (0.255)	0.172 (0.253)	0.143 (0.262)	0.162 (0.250)	0.099 (0.259)
Laboratory technician	−0.114 (0.243)	−0.250 (0.240)	−0.080 (0.248)	−0.210 (0.249)	−0.119 (0.246)	−0.202 (0.242)
Insurance agent	−0.270 (0.236)	−0.511* (0.227)	−0.248 (0.242)	−0.529* (0.237)	−0.285 (0.237)	−0.497* (0.237)
Physiotherapist	0.004 (0.285)	−0.409† (0.235)	0.026 (0.294)	−0.381 (0.239)	−0.030 (0.295)	−0.404† (0.243)
Database administrator	−0.293 (0.291)	−0.541* (0.229)	−0.265 (0.293)	−0.505* (0.234)	−0.298 (0.292)	−0.507* (0.227)

C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS

Male	−0.097 (0.158)	−0.217 (0.141)	−0.116 (0.166)	−0.191 (0.148)	−0.133 (0.156)	−0.201 (0.145)
Age (ref. = 21–35 years)						
36–50 years	0.050 (0.173)	−0.047 (0.161)	−0.014 (0.176)	−0.106 (0.168)	0.032 (0.176)	−0.062 (0.163)
51–75 years	−0.149 (0.217)	−0.159 (0.184)	−0.161 (0.235)	−0.200 (0.196)	−0.102 (0.227)	−0.166 (0.194)
Tertiary education	−0.181 (0.194)	−0.255 (0.192)	−0.250 (0.209)	−0.311 (0.201)	−0.093 (0.200)	−0.162 (0.199)
At least weekly involved in selection decisions	−0.016 (0.162)	−0.107 (0.149)	−0.050 (0.177)	−0.139 (0.160)	0.078 (0.166)	−0.087 (0.152)
Period of experience (ref. = Less than 1 year)						
1 to 5 years	0.142 (0.235)	0.289 (0.232)	0.179 (0.236)	0.312 (0.235)	0.066 (0.258)	0.217 (0.250)
More than 5 years	0.323 (0.240)	0.447† (0.242)	0.396 (0.243)	0.491* (0.248)	0.205 (0.261)	0.354 (0.259)
Job (ref. = Others)						

General administrative assistant	−0.118 (0.320)	0.077 (0.313)	−0.121 (0.348)	0.009 (0.331)	−0.018 (0.334)	0.019 (0.318)
Employment agency employee	0.528 (0.320)	0.659* (0.323)	0.537⁺ (0.324)	0.696* (0.329)	0.484 (0.332)	0.609⁺ (0.331)
HR and career development specialist	0.002 (0.208)	0.052 (0.198)	0.025 (0.213)	0.130 (0.201)	0.042 (0.214)	0.057 (0.206)
Management assistant	−0.066 (0.323)	0.218 (0.275)	−0.069 (0.343)	0.213 (0.292)	−0.126 (0.336)	0.163 (0.306)
Manager	−0.211 (0.185)	−0.161 (0.160)	−0.231 (0.195)	−0.162 (0.168)	−0.169 (0.187)	−0.137 (0.166)
At least 20% of the employees in the organisation is older than 50	0.107 (0.150)	0.024 (0.137)	0.059 (0.153)	−0.022 (0.141)	0.067 (0.157)	0.015 (0.142)

D. CUT-POINTS OUTCOME VARIABLE

Cut-point 1	−3.520 (0.385)	−3.944 (0.393)	−3.528 (0.396)	−3.936 (0.409)	−3.465 (0.396)	−3.852 (0.400)
Cut-point 2	−2.782 (0.368)	−3.020 (0.378)	−2.843 (0.376)	−3.048 (0.392)	−2.750 (0.381)	−2.928 (0.385)
Cut-point 3	−2.117 (0.364)	−2.322 (0.378)	−2.167 (0.372)	−2.336 (0.392)	−2.099 (0.376)	−2.247 (0.384)
Cut-point 4	−1.681 (0.362)	−1.764 (0.373)	−1.710 (0.371)	−1.778 (0.388)	−1.665 (0.375)	−1.705 (0.380)
Cut-point 5	−1.368 (0.361)	−1.300 (0.370)	−1.407 (0.371)	−1.302 (0.384)	−1.348 (0.374)	−1.231 (0.377)
Cut-point 6	−0.917 (0.364)	−0.210 (0.377)	−0.944 (0.373)	−0.192 (0.393)	−0.915 (0.377)	−0.153 (0.385)
Cut-point 7	−0.330 (0.366)	0.499 (0.378)	−0.370 (0.375)	0.518 (0.393)	−0.330 (0.379)	0.553 (0.386)
Cut-point 8	0.429 (0.369)	1.499 (0.383)	0.381 (0.379)	1.547 (0.399)	0.434 (0.383)	1.565 (0.392)
Cut-point 9	1.433 (0.371)	2.620 (0.387)	1.398 (0.383)	2.683 (0.403)	1.463 (0.385)	2.725 (0.398)
Cut-point 10	2.142 (0.384)	3.667 (0.411)	2.081 (0.397)	3.710 (0.428)	2.186 (0.397)	3.820 (0.432)

Table O.A.2. Full ordered regression results with the interview and hiring probability as the outcome variables, two-way interactions included (continued)

	Full sample: all interactions with URCS [N = 1,800]		Full sample: long-term unemployed = at least 1 year [N = 1,800]	
	Interview probability (7)	Hiring probability (8)	Interview probability (9)	Hiring probability (10)
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS				
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	0.349 (0.631)	–0.201 (0.684)	–0.157 (0.217)	–0.083 (0.225)
Age (ref. = 33 years)				
38 years	–0.123 (0.181)	–0.178 (0.186)	–0.081 (0.176)	–0.125 (0.182)
44 years	–0.342* (0.169)	–0.267 (0.190)	–0.293[†] (0.161)	–0.219 (0.185)
49 years	–0.195 (0.231)	–0.372 (0.243)	–0.171 (0.225)	–0.344 (0.240)
55 years	–0.631** (0.203)	–0.571** (0.207)	–0.610** (0.196)	–0.537** (0.201)
60 years	–1.276*** (0.292)	–1.202*** (0.300)	–1.029*** (0.228)	–1.036*** (0.234)
61 years	–1.326*** (0.307)	–1.294*** (0.298)	–1.306*** (0.242)	–1.240*** (0.240)
62 years	–1.212*** (0.245)	–1.502*** (0.262)	–1.286*** (0.203)	–1.460*** (0.221)
63 years	–1.363*** (0.238)	–1.425*** (0.256)	–1.433*** (0.194)	–1.508*** (0.217)
64 years	–1.492*** (0.230)	–1.719*** (0.237)	–1.282*** (0.202)	–1.547*** (0.206)
Male	–0.121 (0.096)	–0.179[†] (0.103)	–0.117 (0.095)	–0.175[†] (0.102)
Commuting distance (ref. = 0–5km)				
5–10 km	0.142 (0.125)	0.030 (0.131)	0.199[†] (0.102)	0.083 (0.105)
10–50 km	0.124 (0.131)	0.045 (0.128)	0.032 (0.098)	–0.037 (0.103)
More than 50 km	–0.980*** (0.149)	–1.172*** (0.152)	–0.864*** (0.121)	–1.031*** (0.126)
Relevant work experience (ref. = None)				
About 2 years	1.477*** (0.146)	1.538*** (0.159)	1.329*** (0.117)	1.367*** (0.125)
About 5 years	1.807*** (0.150)	2.007*** (0.165)	1.734*** (0.130)	1.867*** (0.135)
About 10 years	2.183*** (0.157)	2.410*** (0.167)	2.134*** (0.132)	2.296*** (0.130)
Unemployment period (ref. = 1 month at most)				
1–6 months	–0.259* (0.123)	–0.284* (0.126)	–0.204[†] (0.110)	–0.239* (0.119)
6–12 months	–0.599*** (0.124)	–0.716*** (0.120)	–0.511*** (0.112)	–0.668*** (0.112)
12–24 months	–0.764*** (0.121)	–0.873*** (0.126)	–0.832*** (0.125)	–0.931*** (0.134)

More than 24 months	–1.110*** (0.141)	–1.384*** (0.151)	–1.010*** (0.125)	–1.234*** (0.138)
Extra-curricular activities (ref. = None)				
Cultural activities	0.215 (0.134)	0.041 (0.144)	0.112 (0.100)	–0.029 (0.107)
Sport activities	0.220+ (0.129)	0.138 (0.142)	0.200+ (0.102)	0.140 (0.116)
Voluntary work	0.173 (0.134)	0.129 (0.138)	0.180+ (0.103)	0.106 (0.109)
Referral through PES	–0.356*** (0.095)	–0.392*** (0.097)	–0.338*** (0.093)	–0.366*** (0.096)
Interactions				
URCSx61 years	–0.220 (0.449)	–0.111 (0.432)		
URCSx62 years	–0.129 (0.432)	0.149 (0.418)		
URCSx63 years	–0.356 (0.382)	–0.304 (0.382)		
URCSx64 years	0.295 (0.424)	0.213 (0.402)		
URCSxMale	0.374+ (0.209)	0.502* (0.212)	0.435* (0.212)	0.503* (0.215)
URCSx5-10 km	–0.068 (0.294)	–0.116 (0.304)		
URCSx10-50 km	–0.252 (0.288)	–0.270 (0.271)		
URCSxMore than 50 km	0.252 (0.294)	0.299 (0.291)		
URCSxAbout 2 years experience	–0.403 (0.295)	–0.476+ (0.285)		
URCSxAbout 5 years experience	–0.287 (0.343)	–0.464 (0.307)		
URCSxAbout 10 years experience	0.052 (0.260)	–0.090 (0.256)		
URCSxLong-term unemployment[a]	0.689* (0.280)	0.674* (0.263)	0.520* (0.225)	0.339 (0.219)
URCSxCultural activities	–0.395 (0.329)	–0.259 (0.313)		
URCSxSport activities	–0.286 (0.331)	–0.144 (0.331)		
URCSxVoluntary work	0.097 (0.310)	0.017 (0.292)		
URCSxReferral	–0.128 (0.214)	–0.066 (0.207)	0.020 (0.195)	0.031 (0.195)
B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS				
Job (ref. = Dental technician)				
Door-to-door salesman	0.237 (0.299)	0.221 (0.288)	0.385 (0.277)	0.392 (0.268)
Packer	–0.345 (0.387)	–0.461 (0.399)	–0.204 (0.346)	–0.370 (0.332)
Plate machine tool setter	0.097 (0.274)	0.022 (0.270)	0.144 (0.249)	0.070 (0.257)
Laboratory technician	–0.211 (0.272)	–0.330 (0.268)	–0.143 (0.245)	–0.271 (0.241)
Insurance agent	–0.275 (0.247)	–0.507* (0.242)	–0.271 (0.237)	–0.504* (0.227)
Physiotherapist	–0.091 (0.307)	–0.408 (0.273)	0.001 (0.288)	–0.407+ (0.236)

Database administrator	−0.407 (0.290)	−0.581* (0.240)	−0.304 (0.292)	−0.542* (0.229)
Interactions				
URCSxDoor-to-door salesman	0.426 (0.418)	0.510 (0.389)		
URCSxPacker	0.533 (0.515)	0.322 (0.569)		
URCSxPlate machine tool setter	0.180 (0.351)	0.122 (0.410)		
URCSxLaboratory technician	0.239 (0.372)	0.232 (0.394)		
URCSxInsurance agent	0.027 (0.357)	0.055 (0.382)		
URCSxPhysiotherapist	0.369 (0.386)	0.043 (0.376)		
URCSxPDatabase administrator	0.497 (0.393)	0.134 (0.367)		
C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS				
Male	−0.055 (0.165)	−0.130 (0.154)	−0.094 (0.158)	−0.216 (0.141)
Age (ref. = 21–35 years)				
36–50 years	0.099 (0.182)	0.013 (0.170)	0.059 (0.173)	−0.045 (0.162)
51–75 years	−0.146 (0.232)	−0.235 (0.207)	−0.148 (0.217)	−0.162 (0.184)
Tertiary education	−0.224 (0.218)	−0.308 (0.214)	−0.179 (0.194)	−0.246 (0.191)
At least weekly involved in selection decisions	0.119 (0.171)	−0.003 (0.163)	−0.009 (0.163)	−0.100 (0.149)
Period of experience (ref. = Less than 1 year)				
1 to 5 years	0.114 (0.261)	0.131 (0.250)	0.153 (0.236)	0.298 (0.233)
More than 5 years	0.286 (0.279)	0.294 (0.273)	0.335 (0.241)	0.455[†] (0.242)
Job (ref. = Others)				
General administrative assistant	0.144 (0.299)	0.296 (0.310)	−0.104 (0.318)	0.092 (0.314)
Employment agency employee	0.437 (0.369)	0.540 (0.362)	0.506 (0.319)	0.634[†] (0.323)
HR and career development specialist	−0.074 (0.225)	−0.042 (0.209)	−0.001 (0.209)	0.047 (0.198)
Management assistant	−0.026 (0.318)	0.233 (0.271)	−0.070 (0.321)	0.212 (0.273)
Manager	−0.279 (0.205)	−0.200 (0.179)	−0.212 (0.185)	−0.161 (0.161)
At least 20% of the employees in the organisation is older than 50	0.167 (0.154)	0.114 (0.144)	0.103 (0.149)	0.015 (0.137)
Interactions				
URCSxMale	−0.153 (0.230)	−0.304 (0.228)		
URCSx36-50 years	−0.155 (0.264)	−0.171 (0.264)		
URCSx51-75 years	−0.077 (0.324)	0.254 (0.317)		
URCSxTertuary edycatuib	0.121 (0.281)	0.178 (0.284)		

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URCSxAt least weekly	−0.509* (0.224)	−0.373 (0.231)		
URCSx1 to 5 years	0.043 (0.420)	0.613 (0.450)		
URCSxMore than 5 years	0.184 (0.424)	0.689 (0.462)		
URCSxGeneral administrative assistant	−1.369* (0.597)	−1.060[†] (0.578)		
URCSxEmployment agency employee	0.368 (0.438)	0.416 (0.445)		
URCSxHR and career development specialist	0.277 (0.269)	0.317 (0.275)		
URCSxManagement assistant	−0.149 (0.690)	−0.008 (0.609)		
URCSxManager	0.258 (0.256)	0.165 (0.242)		
URCSxAt least 20% of the employees in the organization is older than 50	−0.253 (0.218)	−0.342 (0.208)		

D. CUT-POINTS OUTCOME VARIABLE

Cut-point 1	−3.622 (0.431)	−4.094 (0.440)	−3.554 (0.386)	−3.946 (0.395)
Cut-point 2	−2.882 (0.412)	−3.165 (0.422)	−2.816 (0.369)	−3.022 (0.379)
Cut-point 3	−2.215 (0.409)	−2.460 (0.422)	−2.151 (0.365)	−2.323 (0.379)
Cut-point 4	−1.774 (0.409)	−1.894 (0.419)	−1.714 (0.364)	−1.765 (0.374)
Cut-point 5	−1.458 (0.407)	−1.425 (0.416)	−1.401 (0.363)	−1.301 (0.371)
Cut-point 6	−1.002 (0.409)	−0.322 (0.422)	−0.950 (0.366)	−0.214 (0.378)
Cut-point 7	−0.409 (0.412)	0.394 (0.423)	−0.363 (0.367)	0.491 (0.379)
Cut-point 8	0.358 (0.415)	1.407 (0.426)	0.395 (0.370)	1.487 (0.384)
Cut-point 9	1.377 (0.419)	2.537 (0.435)	1.397 (0.373)	2.605 (0.388)
Cut-point 10	2.093 (0.430)	3.587 (0.463)	2.107 (0.385)	3.652 (0.411)

Notes. Abbreviations used: ref. (reference category), URCS (Unemployed in the Regime with Company Supplement), ERT (Egoistic Response Tendencies), MRT (Moralistic Response Tendencies), PES (Public Employment Service), and HR (Human Resources). The subsamples were created by excluding the 20 recruiters who scored above 4.19 for egoistic response tendencies and the 17 recruiters who scored above 4.30 for moralistic response tendencies respectively. The outcome variables range from 0 (i.e. definitely no interview or hire) to 10 (i.e. definitely an interview or hire). The presented statistics are coefficient estimates and their standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the recruiter level. Significances are indicated as *** when p < .001; ** when p < .01; * when p < .05; and † when p < .10.

[a] In general, long-term unemployment refers to an unemployment period of at least 2 years in our analyses. However, in this table, we integrated robustness checks with a lower cut-off for long-term unemployment. That is, in models (9) and (10), long-term unemployment is defined as an unemployment period of at least 1 year.

Table O.A.3. Full ordered regression results with the perceptions as the outcome variables

	Intelligence	Social skills	Physical skills	Technological skills	Flexibility	Creativity
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	0.028 (0.131)	0.171 (0.135)	−0.020 (0.134)	−0.001 (0.136)	0.034 (0.130)	0.057 (0.135)
Age (ref. = 33 years)						
38 years	−0.091 (0.184)	0.193 (0.187)	0.305† (0.175)	−0.044 (0.166)	0.099 (0.198)	0.189 (0.209)
44 years	−0.095 (0.184)	0.143 (0.189)	0.061 (0.173)	−0.144 (0.189)	0.037 (0.206)	0.122 (0.206)
49 years	0.160 (0.230)	0.112 (0.224)	0.081 (0.219)	−0.084 (0.219)	−0.079 (0.229)	−0.082 (0.241)
55 years	−0.209 (0.234)	0.374 (0.229)	0.043 (0.222)	−0.394† (0.230)	0.179 (0.232)	0.205 (0.243)
60 years	0.078 (0.220)	0.181 (0.243)	−0.811** (0.271)	−0.619* (0.251)	0.050 (0.235)	−0.037 (0.263)
61 years	−0.569* (0.240)	−0.207 (0.250)	−0.691** (0.234)	−0.737** (0.240)	−0.268 (0.246)	−0.268 (0.255)
62 years	−0.412† (0.225)	−0.236 (0.221)	−1.010*** (0.219)	−0.767** (0.224)	−0.538* (0.230)	−0.343 (0.239)
63 years	−0.304 (0.205)	0.045 (0.205)	−0.904*** (0.222)	−0.821*** (0.214)	−0.312 (0.229)	−0.139 (0.223)
64 years	−0.431* (0.202)	−0.058 (0.197)	−1.046*** (0.218)	−0.806*** (0.203)	−0.332 (0.212)	−0.257 (0.227)
Male	−0.099 (0.073)	−0.204** (0.072)	0.055 (0.076)	0.047 (0.079)	0.018 (0.078)	−0.280** (0.082)
Commuting distance (ref. = 0–5km)						
5–10 km	0.077 (0.108)	0.050 (0.108)	−0.103 (0.105)	−0.057 (0.107)	−0.124 (0.109)	−0.082 (0.117)
10–50 km	0.099 (0.102)	−0.023 (0.100)	−0.032 (0.103)	0.008 (0.115)	−0.230* (0.108)	−0.123 (0.107)
More than 50 km	−0.096 (0.101)	−0.150 (0.104)	−0.076 (0.101)	−0.157 (0.108)	−0.654*** (0.130)	−0.144 (0.107)
Relevant work experience (ref. = None)						
About 2 years	1.549*** (0.133)	0.779*** (0.115)	0.417*** (0.110)	1.739*** (0.137)	0.394** (0.115)	0.771*** (0.120)
About 5 years	2.117*** (0.143)	1.053*** (0.114)	0.637*** (0.108)	2.368*** (0.150)	0.519*** (0.131)	0.821*** (0.130)
About 10 years	2.633*** (0.156)	1.235*** (0.118)	0.752*** (0.100)	2.846*** (0.161)	0.573*** (0.121)	1.046*** (0.123)
Unemployment period (ref. = 1 month at most)						
1–6 months	−0.252* (0.108)	−0.059 (0.099)	−0.002 (0.103)	−0.027 (0.122)	0.058 (0.114)	0.059 (0.113)
6–12 months	−0.317** (0.107)	−0.163 (0.103)	−0.039 (0.107)	−0.165 (0.116)	−0.175 (0.117)	−0.167 (0.121)
12–24 months	−0.372** (0.112)	−0.205* (0.103)	0.016 (0.102)	−0.278* (0.119)	−0.191† (0.115)	−0.229† (0.119)
More than 24 months	−0.604*** (0.115)	−0.526*** (0.109)	−0.325** (0.104)	−0.555*** (0.127)	−0.524*** (0.130)	−0.451*** (0.117)
Extra-curricular activities (ref. = None)						

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Cultural activities	0.126 (0.102)	0.566*** (0.106)	−0.070 (0.101)	−0.102 (0.106)	−0.038 (0.112)	0.395** (0.126)
Sport activities	0.233* (0.105)	0.636*** (0.113)	0.676*** (0.108)	−0.026 (0.118)	0.136 (0.110)	0.371** (0.111)
Voluntary work	0.051 (0.104)	0.847*** (0.115)	0.170† (0.101)	−0.087 (0.099)	0.206† (0.113)	0.424*** (0.111)
Referral through PES	−0.197** (0.070)	−0.230** (0.072)	−0.035 (0.069)	−0.124† (0.073)	−0.269** (0.082)	−0.258** (0.081)

B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS

Job (ref. = Dental technician)						
Door-to-door salesman	−0.010 (0.361)	0.390 (0.361)	0.025 (0.338)	−0.663† (0.344)	0.210 (0.287)	0.161 (0.365)
Packer	−0.546 (0.395)	−0.344 (0.381)	−0.994* (0.406)	−0.991** (0.313)	−0.639* (0.301)	−0.784* (0.366)
Plate machine tool setter	−0.216 (0.313)	0.137 (0.322)	−0.318 (0.298)	−0.174 (0.259)	0.128 (0.259)	−0.106 (0.336)
Laboratory technician	−0.095 (0.295)	−0.123 (0.306)	−0.180 (0.287)	−0.465† (0.258)	−0.014 (0.238)	−0.145 (0.327)
Insurance agent	−0.431 (0.304)	−0.052 (0.297)	0.096 (0.317)	−0.949*** (0.258)	−0.008 (0.238)	−0.204 (0.299)
Physiotherapist	0.201 (0.299)	0.236 (0.293)	−0.189 (0.258)	−0.755** (0.251)	−0.059 (0.230)	−0.119 (0.307)
Database administrator	−0.649* (0.311)	−0.252 (0.342)	−0.190 (0.308)	−0.691** (0.255)	−0.064 (0.254)	−0.412 (0.326)

C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS

Male	0.156 (0.157)	0.319† (0.164)	0.196 (0.171)	0.128 (0.138)	0.143 (0.140)	0.062 (0.164)
Age (ref. = 21–35 years)						
36–50 years	0.024 (0.183)	−0.228 (0.192)	−0.009 (0.193)	0.076 (0.174)	0.077 (0.168)	−0.046 (0.197)
51–75 years	−0.482* (0.226)	−0.612** (0.234)	−0.369 (0.237)	−0.253 (0.187)	−0.258 (0.195)	−0.249 (0.229)
Tertiary education	−0.179 (0.215)	−0.071 (0.234)	−0.136 (0.240)	−0.285 (0.215)	−0.230 (0.197)	−0.213 (0.226)
At least weekly involved in selection decisions	0.114 (0.171)	−0.113 (0.178)	0.023 (0.173)	0.070 (0.151)	0.116 (0.149)	−0.134 (0.177)
Period of experience (ref. = Less than 1 year)						
1 to 5 years	0.138 (0.262)	−0.086 (0.284)	0.300 (0.282)	0.318 (0.242)	0.144 (0.224)	0.236 (0.290)
More than 5 years	0.351 (0.275)	0.148 (0.291)	0.462 (0.291)	0.515* (0.240)	0.117 (0.229)	0.267 (0.292)
Job (ref. = Others)						
General administrative assistant	0.470 (0.327)	0.459 (0.408)	0.069 (0.386)	0.503 (0.331)	0.167 (0.305)	0.522 (0.385)
Employment agency employee	0.556† (0.328)	0.688* (0.331)	0.903* (0.366)	0.229 (0.304)	0.770** (0.285)	1.080** (0.338)
HR and career development specialist	−0.298 (0.233)	−0.402 (0.270)	−0.408 (0.255)	−0.080 (0.211)	−0.122 (0.204)	−0.231 (0.250)
Management assistant	0.550† (0.306)	1.047** (0.302)	0.457 (0.370)	0.447 (0.292)	0.858** (0.307)	1.022** (0.302)
Manager	−0.174 (0.195)	−0.034 (0.218)	−0.088 (0.192)	−0.144 (0.170)	−0.119 (0.166)	−0.226 (0.205)
At least 20% of the employees in the organisation is older than 50	0.223 (0.147)	0.300† (0.158)	0.384* (0.169)	0.177 (0.140)	0.144 (0.137)	0.321* (0.160)

D. CUT-POINTS OUTCOME VARIABLE

Cut-point 1	−3.819 (0.567)	−4.033 (0.651)	−4.946 (0.668)	−3.581 (0.500)	−4.528 (0.545)	−4.602 (0.678)
Cut-point 2	−3.467 (0.511)	−3.971 (0.638)	−4.286 (0.548)	−3.056 (0.468)	−3.816 (0.479)	−4.108 (0.582)
Cut-point 3	−2.881 (0.471)	−3.537 (0.551)	−3.322 (0.479)	−2.431 (0.443)	−3.310 (0.444)	−3.564 (0.524)
Cut-point 4	−2.479 (0.468)	−3.090 (0.510)	−2.665 (0.463)	−1.861 (0.427)	−2.573 (0.415)	−2.947 (0.495)
Cut-point 5	−1.983 (0.466)	−2.578 (0.508)	−1.928 (0.444)	−1.350 (0.433)	−2.050 (0.412)	−2.314 (0.503)
Cut-point 6	0.437 (0.448)	0.553 (0.457)	0.311 (0.443)	0.529 (0.425)	0.089 (0.413)	0.801 (0.482)
Cut-point 7	1.105 (0.448)	1.195 (0.456)	0.848 (0.440)	1.206 (0.427)	0.743 (0.414)	1.421 (0.480)
Cut-point 8	2.084 (0.451)	2.137 (0.460)	1.705 (0.442)	2.185 (0.426)	1.622 (0.417)	2.288 (0.481)
Cut-point 9	3.538 (0.465)	3.523 (0.487)	2.940 (0.450)	3.582 (0.427)	2.896 (0.432)	3.542 (0.505)
Cut-point 10	4.747 (0.487)	4.752 (0.514)	4.052 (0.476)	4.709 (0.466)	4.147 (0.502)	4.621 (0.555)

Table O.A.3. Full ordered regression results with the perceptions as the outcome variables (continued)

	Experience	Motivation	Reliability	Preciseness	Trainability	Reasonable salary expectations
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	0.020 (0.124)	−0.069 (0.116)	0.137 (0.131)	0.191 (0.137)	0.153 (0.133)	−0.096 (0.138)
Age (ref. = 33 years)						
38 years	0.089 (0.184)	0.369† (0.200)	0.248 (0.212)	0.117 (0.196)	0.231 (0.178)	0.185 (0.166)
44 years	−0.178 (0.178)	0.567** (0.198)	0.338 (0.219)	0.220 (0.204)	−0.144 (0.183)	0.363* (0.181)
49 years	0.058 (0.205)	0.366 (0.232)	0.260 (0.236)	0.139 (0.227)	−0.342 (0.214)	0.162 (0.200)
55 years	−0.314 (0.203)	0.387† (0.224)	0.442† (0.245)	0.202 (0.244)	−0.520* (0.231)	0.074 (0.212)
60 years	−0.256 (0.238)	0.377 (0.241)	0.369 (0.254)	0.038 (0.266)	−1.141*** (0.259)	−0.113 (0.237)
61 years	−0.487* (0.210)	0.283 (0.233)	0.079 (0.280)	−0.268 (0.270)	−1.328*** (0.244)	−0.159 (0.242)
62 years	−0.262 (0.211)	0.270 (0.218)	0.179 (0.236)	−0.091 (0.236)	−1.319*** (0.236)	−0.288 (0.204)
63 years	−0.497* (0.195)	0.265 (0.206)	0.368 (0.237)	−0.015 (0.219)	−1.531*** (0.236)	−0.282 (0.219)
64 years	−0.384† (0.204)	0.176 (0.196)	0.261 (0.218)	−0.149 (0.213)	−1.649*** (0.220)	−0.341 (0.213)
Male	−0.009 (0.076)	−0.051 (0.081)	−0.091 (0.075)	−0.186* (0.076)	−0.017 (0.078)	−0.133† (0.070)
Commuting distance (ref. = 0–5km)						
5–10 km	0.118 (0.117)	−0.062 (0.113)	0.044 (0.105)	−0.006 (0.113)	−0.076 (0.110)	0.103 (0.101)
10–50 km	0.084 (0.109)	−0.054 (0.109)	0.109 (0.100)	−0.021 (0.105)	−0.006 (0.107)	0.117 (0.109)
More than 50 km	−0.010 (0.114)	−0.168 (0.115)	−0.105 (0.112)	−0.054 (0.113)	−0.106 (0.108)	0.048 (0.098)
Relevant work experience (ref. = None)						
About 2 years	2.746*** (0.157)	0.653*** (0.112)	0.645*** (0.118)	0.970*** (0.128)	0.824*** (0.114)	0.265** (0.099)
About 5 years	4.155*** (0.194)	1.020*** (0.129)	1.089*** (0.122)	1.408*** (0.129)	1.125*** (0.127)	0.414*** (0.114)
About 10 years	5.264*** (0.214)	1.066*** (0.115)	1.156*** (0.122)	1.658*** (0.137)	1.372*** (0.120)	0.095 (0.115)
Unemployment period (ref. = 1 month at most)						
1–6 months	0.033 (0.126)	0.019 (0.113)	−0.079 (0.098)	−0.107 (0.109)	0.028 (0.111)	−0.058 (0.107)
6–12 months	−0.073 (0.121)	−0.281* (0.112)	−0.306** (0.105)	−0.271* (0.114)	−0.139 (0.115)	0.060 (0.114)
12–24 months	−0.238* (0.117)	−0.403*** (0.115)	−0.439*** (0.102)	−0.187† (0.107)	−0.236* (0.119)	0.066 (0.108)
More than 24 months	−0.314* (0.123)	−0.876*** (0.129)	−0.776*** (0.118)	−0.603*** (0.116)	−0.584*** (0.117)	−0.041 (0.112)

Extra-curricular activities (ref. = None)						
Cultural activities	−0.064 (0.103)	−0.010 (0.117)	0.081 (0.108)	0.072 (0.102)	−0.036 (0.107)	−0.018 (0.098)
Sport activities	0.001 (0.117)	0.109 (0.112)	0.100 (0.111)	0.125 (0.105)	0.140 (0.103)	0.116 (0.104)
Voluntary work	0.110 (0.108)	0.161 (0.115)	0.127 (0.101)	0.152 (0.102)	0.166† (0.097)	0.085 (0.097)
Referral through PES	−0.155* (0.078)	−0.947*** (0.099)	−0.363*** (0.080)	−0.296*** (0.079)	−0.200** (0.071)	−0.087 (0.069)

B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS

Job (ref. = Dental technician)						
Door-to-door salesman	0.705* (0.277)	0.495† (0.287)	0.433 (0.372)	0.296 (0.367)	0.150 (0.346)	0.213 (0.314)
Packer	0.345 (0.344)	−0.252 (0.289)	−0.164 (0.371)	−0.185 (0.379)	−0.270 (0.331)	−0.187 (0.326)
Plate machine tool setter	0.186 (0.224)	0.435† (0.239)	0.379 (0.292)	0.423 (0.299)	0.308 (0.274)	0.325 (0.273)
Laboratory technician	−0.156 (0.235)	0.219 (0.249)	0.129 (0.294)	−0.006 (0.311)	−0.231 (0.294)	0.049 (0.300)
Insurance agent	0.026 (0.214)	0.183 (0.236)	0.188 (0.291)	−0.076 (0.327)	−0.144 (0.284)	−0.001 (0.275)
Physiotherapist	−0.243 (0.226)	0.220 (0.229)	−0.028 (0.279)	−0.389 (0.293)	−0.076 (0.259)	0.092 (0.268)
Database administrator	−0.282 (0.224)	0.380 (0.266)	0.216 (0.339)	−0.144 (0.336)	−0.355 (0.276)	−0.155 (0.287)

C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS

Male	−0.004 (0.128)	0.034 (0.145)	0.199 (0.177)	0.262 (0.166)	0.056 (0.153)	0.240 (0.161)
Age (ref. = 21–35 years)						
36–50 years	−0.046 (0.151)	−0.216 (0.164)	−0.159 (0.201)	−0.251 (0.205)	0.027 (0.174)	−0.071 (0.172)
51–75 years	−0.480** (0.170)	−0.278 (0.184)	−0.365 (0.238)	−0.416† (0.238)	−0.026 (0.199)	−0.102 (0.202)
Tertiary education	−0.181 (0.183)	−0.321 (0.204)	−0.378 (0.249)	−0.375 (0.248)	−0.209 (0.230)	0.039 (0.226)
At least weekly involved in selection decisions	−0.059 (0.136)	−0.042 (0.155)	−0.128 (0.186)	−0.105 (0.187)	0.062 (0.166)	−0.047 (0.169)
Period of experience (ref. = Less than 1 year)						
1 to 5 years	0.075 (0.209)	0.319 (0.255)	0.321 (0.312)	0.287 (0.306)	0.254 (0.282)	−0.048 (0.315)
More than 5 years	0.386† (0.215)	0.427† (0.256)	0.451 (0.319)	0.480 (0.311)	0.367 (0.280)	0.207 (0.327)
Job (ref. = Others)						
General administrative assistant	0.136 (0.320)	0.175 (0.329)	0.453 (0.381)	0.631† (0.350)	0.322 (0.268)	0.085 (0.255)
Employment agency employee	0.341 (0.255)	1.164*** (0.280)	0.815* (0.359)	0.835* (0.366)	0.632† (0.351)	0.488 (0.306)
HR and career development specialist	−0.262 (0.186)	−0.044 (0.190)	−0.363 (0.255)	−0.436† (0.259)	−0.216 (0.215)	−0.136 (0.253)
Management assistant	0.114 (0.245)	0.628* (0.277)	0.890** (0.327)	0.882** (0.330)	0.754* (0.300)	0.726† (0.379)
Manager	−0.218 (0.156)	−0.040 (0.166)	−0.146 (0.210)	−0.085 (0.215)	−0.146 (0.189)	−0.009 (0.184)

At least 20% of the employees in the organisation is older than 50	0.171 (0.122)	0.075 (0.132)	0.204 (0.164)	0.107 (0.163)	0.083 (0.149)	0.146 (0.147)

D. CUT-POINTS OUTCOME VARIABLE

Cut-point 1	−1.604 (0.358)	−3.944 (0.486)	−4.208 (0.634)	−4.391 (0.646)	−4.837 (0.579)	−4.129 (0.569)
Cut-point 2	−0.930 (0.344)	−3.258 (0.428)	−3.674 (0.544)	−3.781 (0.564)	−3.990 (0.488)	−3.621 (0.513)
Cut-point 3	−0.174 (0.335)	−2.630 (0.398)	−3.034 (0.490)	−3.274 (0.525)	−3.141 (0.456)	−2.757 (0.448)
Cut-point 4	0.342 (0.336)	−1.961 (0.380)	−2.605 (0.469)	−2.963 (0.516)	−2.489 (0.445)	−2.031 (0.423)
Cut-point 5	0.829 (0.339)	−1.405 (0.380)	−2.113 (0.470)	−2.388 (0.521)	−1.762 (0.446)	−1.232 (0.418)
Cut-point 6	1.792 (0.340)	0.413 (0.376)	0.845 (0.460)	0.881 (0.491)	0.359 (0.448)	0.524 (0.420)
Cut-point 7	2.726 (0.349)	1.052 (0.372)	1.406 (0.460)	1.430 (0.491)	1.017 (0.448)	1.263 (0.425)
Cut-point 8	3.726 (0.358)	1.853 (0.373)	2.209 (0.460)	2.212 (0.488)	1.921 (0.454)	2.198 (0.438)
Cut-point 9	5.099 (0.374)	3.027 (0.381)	3.501 (0.476)	3.487 (0.504)	3.129 (0.458)	3.500 (0.470)
Cut-point 10	6.309 (0.393)	4.213 (0.411)	4.735 (0.511)	4.624 (0.550)	4.234 (0.501)	4.259 (0.509)

Table O.A.3. Full ordered regression results with the perceptions as the outcome variables (continued)

	Satisfaction of previous employers	Rejection by potential employers	Administrative ease of hiring	Collaboration with employer	Collaboration with colleagues	Collaboration with clients
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	0.194 (0.134)	0.094 (0.121)	−0.224 (0.143)	0.213 (0.138)	0.241† (0.136)	0.193 (0.143)
Age (ref. = 33 years)						
38 years	0.252 (0.211)	0.331† (0.185)	0.154 (0.166)	0.165 (0.217)	0.257 (0.208)	0.038 (0.206)
44 years	0.127 (0.221)	0.094 (0.179)	−0.258 (0.183)	0.082 (0.197)	0.092 (0.195)	0.172 (0.192)
49 years	0.113 (0.238)	−0.048 (0.236)	0.160 (0.212)	−0.081 (0.259)	0.015 (0.251)	−0.201 (0.237)
55 years	0.173 (0.244)	0.124 (0.206)	−0.303 (0.199)	0.405† (0.242)	0.342 (0.241)	0.413† (0.229)
60 years	0.120 (0.282)	−0.368 (0.236)	−0.135 (0.255)	−0.202 (0.282)	−0.108 (0.260)	0.145 (0.250)
61 years	−0.074 (0.265)	−0.463* (0.217)	−0.800** (0.238)	−0.541* (0.269)	−0.581* (0.263)	−0.474† (0.253)
62 years	−0.087 (0.262)	−0.559* (0.221)	−0.246 (0.226)	−0.320 (0.268)	−0.457† (0.268)	−0.374 (0.265)
63 years	0.032 (0.240)	−0.864*** (0.226)	−0.605** (0.206)	−0.112 (0.242)	−0.088 (0.247)	−0.192 (0.235)
64 years	0.060 (0.222)	−0.572** (0.219)	−0.614** (0.212)	−0.283 (0.222)	−0.302 (0.225)	−0.223 (0.218)
Male	−0.105 (0.078)	−0.143† (0.079)	−0.079 (0.062)	−0.232** (0.074)	−0.131† (0.074)	−0.159* (0.070)
Commuting distance (ref. = 0–5km)						
5–10 km	0.014 (0.120)	0.241* (0.106)	0.125 (0.094)	0.041 (0.113)	0.034 (0.117)	−0.027 (0.111)
10–50 km	−0.069 (0.110)	−0.005 (0.110)	0.056 (0.095)	0.022 (0.107)	0.029 (0.105)	−0.079 (0.104)
More than 50 km	−0.126 (0.116)	0.097 (0.104)	−0.005 (0.095)	−0.099 (0.115)	−0.020 (0.112)	−0.145 (0.113)
Relevant work experience (ref. = None)						
About 2 years	0.477*** (0.125)	0.334** (0.100)	0.243* (0.094)	0.528*** (0.102)	0.556*** (0.109)	0.433*** (0.110)
About 5 years	0.933*** (0.135)	0.606*** (0.116)	0.347** (0.103)	0.686*** (0.118)	0.751*** (0.124)	0.696*** (0.122)
About 10 years	1.297*** (0.129)	0.732*** (0.109)	0.297** (0.099)	0.842*** (0.109)	0.872*** (0.112)	0.877*** (0.115)
Unemployment period (ref. = 1 month at most)						
1–6 months	−0.131 (0.119)	−0.291* (0.128)	−0.127 (0.098)	−0.066 (0.103)	0.031 (0.105)	−0.107 (0.111)
6–12 months	−0.334** (0.124)	−0.704*** (0.128)	−0.084 (0.093)	−0.245* (0.109)	−0.186† (0.108)	−0.218* (0.107)
12–24 months	−0.453*** (0.120)	−1.003*** (0.128)	−0.237** (0.088)	−0.218* (0.107)	−0.180† (0.099)	−0.183† (0.096)
More than 24 months	−1.059*** (0.135)	−1.422*** (0.126)	−0.285** (0.091)	−0.474*** (0.108)	−0.360** (0.107)	−0.551*** (0.105)

Extra-curricular activities (ref. = None)						
Cultural activities	−0.062 (0.123)	−0.046 (0.118)	0.063 (0.093)	−0.098 (0.112)	−0.013 (0.107)	0.064 (0.111)
Sport activities	0.137 (0.119)	−0.143 (0.112)	0.189* (0.096)	0.140 (0.104)	0.108 (0.104)	0.132 (0.106)
Voluntary work	0.154 (0.115)	−0.036 (0.118)	0.146† (0.088)	0.138 (0.101)	0.191† (0.100)	0.255* (0.104)
Referral through PES	−0.253** (0.084)	−0.061 (0.071)	−0.034 (0.066)	−0.297*** (0.077)	−0.232** (0.080)	−0.264** (0.078)

B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS

Job (ref. = Dental technician)						
Door-to-door salesman	−0.053 (0.309)	−0.008 (0.260)	0.110 (0.369)	0.512 (0.418)	0.462 (0.404)	0.934* (0.408)
Packer	−0.372 (0.384)	−0.210 (0.343)	−0.312 (0.376)	−0.372 (0.464)	−0.311 (0.452)	−0.434 (0.444)
Plate machine tool setter	0.001 (0.316)	0.008 (0.295)	−0.298 (0.325)	0.017 (0.367)	0.092 (0.365)	0.020 (0.378)
Laboratory technician	−0.023 (0.309)	−0.217 (0.265)	−0.251 (0.300)	0.092 (0.341)	0.177 (0.342)	0.055 (0.356)
Insurance agent	−0.275 (0.289)	−0.213 (0.271)	−0.443 (0.286)	0.042 (0.352)	0.100 (0.353)	0.219 (0.354)
Physiotherapist	−0.428 (0.306)	0.150 (0.228)	−0.209 (0.302)	−0.024 (0.353)	0.051 (0.341)	0.286 (0.348)
Database administrator	−0.116 (0.329)	−0.201 (0.246)	−0.317 (0.340)	−0.057 (0.365)	−0.038 (0.356)	−0.008 (0.366)

C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS

Male	0.192 (0.175)	0.140 (0.143)	0.437* (0.183)	0.347† (0.206)	0.371† (0.194)	0.391* (0.195)
Age (ref. = 21–35 years)						
36–50 years	−0.201 (0.205)	0.305† (0.173)	0.122 (0.208)	−0.260 (0.226)	−0.280 (0.221)	−0.485* (0.217)
51–75 years	−0.369 (0.230)	0.340† (0.193)	−0.097 (0.268)	−0.550* (0.264)	−0.544* (0.253)	−0.777** (0.254)
Tertiary education	−0.160 (0.224)	0.021 (0.200)	0.325 (0.233)	−0.215 (0.278)	−0.293 (0.260)	−0.074 (0.271)
At least weekly involved in selection decisions	0.019 (0.182)	0.023 (0.152)	0.138 (0.187)	−0.227 (0.209)	−0.147 (0.202)	−0.421* (0.206)
Period of experience (ref. = Less than 1 year)						
1 to 5 years	−0.301 (0.298)	−0.196 (0.257)	0.286 (0.312)	−0.138 (0.328)	0.060 (0.323)	0.083 (0.328)
More than 5 years	−0.306 (0.310)	−0.154 (0.265)	0.975** (0.328)	0.281 (0.329)	0.399 (0.322)	0.622† (0.334)
Job (ref. = Others)						
General administrative assistant	0.213 (0.354)	0.873** (0.313)	0.041 (0.393)	0.491 (0.418)	0.610 (0.421)	0.478 (0.424)
Employment agency employee	0.536 (0.353)	0.498† (0.299)	0.199 (0.333)	0.999* (0.399)	0.876* (0.384)	0.791* (0.395)
HR and career development specialist	0.018 (0.254)	0.167 (0.224)	−0.063 (0.302)	−0.090 (0.269)	−0.089 (0.269)	−0.122 (0.270)
Management assistant	1.375*** (0.336)	0.944** (0.361)	0.557 (0.436)	0.747† (0.411)	0.712† (0.390)	0.798* (0.361)
Manager	−0.016 (0.204)	0.065 (0.161)	−0.135 (0.227)	−0.115 (0.237)	−0.057 (0.224)	−0.247 (0.230)

At least 20% of the employees in the organisation is older than 50	−0.023 (0.161)	0.010 (0.140)	−0.062 (0.177)	−0.035 (0.182)	0.026 (0.178)	0.104 (0.180)

D. CUT-POINTS OUTCOME VARIABLE

Cut-point 1	−4.868 (0.621)	−3.703 (0.426)	−4.163 (0.662)	−5.014 (0.706)	−4.541 (0.693)	−4.437 (0.648)
Cut-point 2	−4.572 (0.584)	−2.813 (0.411)	−3.586 (0.552)	−4.401 (0.625)	−3.927 (0.597)	−4.097 (0.591)
Cut-point 3	−3.953 (0.526)	−2.079 (0.411)	−2.801 (0.496)	−3.949 (0.578)	−3.314 (0.536)	−3.554 (0.544)
Cut-point 4	−3.359 (0.501)	−1.475 (0.403)	−2.007 (0.471)	−3.305 (0.545)	−2.811 (0.521)	−3.099 (0.525)
Cut-point 5	−2.693 (0.503)	−1.021 (0.408)	−1.409 (0.465)	−2.785 (0.546)	−2.237 (0.517)	−2.541 (0.514)
Cut-point 6	0.586 (0.490)	1.062 (0.414)	0.300 (0.466)	0.671 (0.525)	1.073 (0.504)	0.892 (0.496)
Cut-point 7	1.106 (0.493)	1.664 (0.417)	0.890 (0.468)	1.121 (0.524)	1.548 (0.504)	1.445 (0.498)
Cut-point 8	1.986 (0.495)	2.348 (0.421)	1.699 (0.472)	1.871 (0.533)	2.275 (0.512)	2.143 (0.504)
Cut-point 9	3.313 (0.548)	3.628 (0.470)	2.786 (0.483)	2.845 (0.557)	3.315 (0.535)	3.135 (0.525)
Cut-point 10	4.646 (0.609)	4.799 (0.566)	3.806 (0.535)	4.156 (0.613)	4.779 (0.604)	4.508 (0.584)

Notes. Abbreviations used: ref. (reference category), URCS (Unemployed in the Regime with Company Supplement), PES (Public Employment Service), and HR (Human Resources). The outcome variables range from 0 (i.e. definitely no interview or hire) to 10 (i.e. definitely an interview or hire). The presented statistics are coefficient estimates and their standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the recruiter level. Significances are indicated as *** when $p < .001$; ** when $p < .01$; * when $p < .05$; and † when $p < .10$.

Table O.A.4. Full ordered regression results with the perceptions as the outcome variables, two-way interactions included

	Intelligence	Social skills	Physical skills	Technological skills	Flexibility	Creativity
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	0.178 (0.211)	0.323 (0.215)	−0.056 (0.235)	−0.326 (0.216)	−0.292 (0.224)	−0.327 (0.235)
Age (ref. = 33 years)						
38 years	−0.086 (0.186)	0.210 (0.187)	0.305† (0.176)	−0.085 (0.167)	0.050 (0.199)	0.149 (0.210)
44 years	−0.079 (0.187)	0.157 (0.190)	0.057 (0.174)	−0.161 (0.191)	0.026 (0.207)	0.104 (0.205)
49 years	0.169 (0.233)	0.130 (0.227)	0.080 (0.222)	−0.117 (0.222)	−0.116 (0.232)	−0.117 (0.241)
55 years	−0.214 (0.236)	0.374 (0.230)	0.043 (0.223)	−0.426† (0.232)	0.137 (0.233)	0.180 (0.245)
60 years	0.075 (0.219)	0.181 (0.242)	−0.813** (0.270)	−0.640* (0.249)	0.006 (0.235)	−0.059 (0.264)
61 years	−0.570* (0.245)	−0.243 (0.253)	−0.707** (0.236)	−0.757** (0.242)	−0.347 (0.250)	−0.293 (0.257)
62 years	−0.418† (0.226)	−0.234 (0.220)	−1.007*** (0.219)	−0.781*** (0.224)	−0.565* (0.230)	−0.352 (0.239)
63 years	−0.302 (0.208)	0.068 (0.204)	−0.896*** (0.221)	−0.849*** (0.216)	−0.324 (0.230)	−0.160 (0.223)
64 years	−0.401† (0.206)	−0.004 (0.200)	−1.046*** (0.221)	−0.870*** (0.209)	−0.382† (0.215)	−0.327 (0.230)
Male	−0.048 (0.093)	−0.210* (0.091)	0.023 (0.094)	−0.010 (0.100)	−0.075 (0.098)	−0.367*** (0.103)
Commuting distance (ref. = 0–5km)						
5–10 km	0.061 (0.108)	0.033 (0.108)	−0.102 (0.105)	−0.051 (0.107)	−0.136 (0.110)	−0.078 (0.118)
10–50 km	0.092 (0.102)	−0.023 (0.101)	−0.029 (0.102)	0.019 (0.115)	−0.221* (0.107)	−0.117 (0.107)
More than 50 km	−0.104 (0.102)	−0.156 (0.104)	−0.076 (0.102)	−0.154 (0.108)	−0.662*** (0.130)	−0.143 (0.107)
Relevant work experience (ref. = None)						
About 2 years	1.562*** (0.133)	0.779*** (0.114)	0.412*** (0.110)	1.744*** (0.138)	0.398** (0.117)	0.767*** (0.122)
About 5 years	2.137*** (0.143)	1.065*** (0.114)	0.632*** (0.109)	2.379*** (0.152)	0.536*** (0.133)	0.818*** (0.132)
About 10 years	2.659*** (0.154)	1.273*** (0.118)	0.751*** (0.100)	2.846*** (0.163)	0.601*** (0.120)	1.037*** (0.126)
Unemployment period (ref. = 1 month at most)						
1–6 months	−0.239* (0.109)	−0.054 (0.100)	−0.006 (0.104)	−0.015 (0.124)	0.080 (0.116)	0.063 (0.115)
6–12 months	−0.321** (0.107)	−0.156 (0.102)	−0.034 (0.108)	−0.148 (0.116)	−0.143 (0.116)	−0.149 (0.121)
12–24 months	−0.362** (0.112)	−0.200† (0.104)	0.014 (0.101)	−0.279* (0.119)	−0.193† (0.116)	−0.237* (0.119)
More than 24 months	−0.644*** (0.135)	−0.588*** (0.129)	−0.341** (0.120)	−0.671*** (0.147)	−0.738*** (0.150)	−0.571*** (0.140)

Extra-curricular activities (ref. = None)						
Cultural activities	0.106 (0.104)	0.547*** (0.108)	−0.067 (0.100)	−0.081 (0.108)	−0.024 (0.112)	0.428** (0.128)
Sport activities	0.216* (0.106)	0.629*** (0.114)	0.683*** (0.108)	0.003 (0.117)	0.172 (0.109)	0.415*** (0.112)
Voluntary work	0.038 (0.106)	0.850*** (0.117)	0.179[†] (0.101)	−0.071 (0.101)	0.235* (0.112)	0.448*** (0.112)
Referral through PES	−0.162[†] (0.088)	−0.137 (0.086)	−0.018 (0.085)	−0.212* (0.093)	−0.302** (0.097)	−0.344*** (0.098)
Interactions						
URCSxMale	−0.206 (0.207)	−0.037 (0.216)	0.111 (0.215)	0.209 (0.186)	0.302 (0.210)	0.322 (0.224)
URCSxLong-term unemployment[a]	0.195 (0.271)	0.329 (0.271)	0.067 (0.266)	0.392 (0.243)	0.829** (0.267)	0.412 (0.288)
URCSxReferral	−0.161 (0.191)	−0.383* (0.181)	−0.064 (0.185)	0.297 (0.196)	0.067 (0.198)	0.306 (0.200)
B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS						
Job (ref. = Dental technician)						
Door-to-door salesman	−0.006 (0.361)	0.397 (0.363)	0.021 (0.339)	−0.670[†] (0.345)	0.207 (0.285)	0.148 (0.365)
Packer	−0.548 (0.394)	−0.349 (0.380)	−1.000* (0.406)	−0.989** (0.314)	−0.640* (0.300)	−0.780* (0.367)
Plate machine tool setter	−0.220 (0.315)	0.132 (0.323)	−0.320 (0.298)	−0.175 (0.259)	0.129 (0.260)	−0.108 (0.338)
Laboratory technician	−0.094 (0.296)	−0.127 (0.306)	−0.181 (0.288)	−0.451[†] (0.257)	0.005 (0.237)	−0.130 (0.329)
Insurance agent	−0.434 (0.305)	−0.056 (0.299)	0.095 (0.318)	−0.951*** (0.258)	−0.016 (0.239)	−0.203 (0.301)
Physiotherapist	0.208 (0.299)	0.238 (0.295)	−0.194 (0.259)	−0.760** (0.252)	−0.071 (0.230)	−0.128 (0.309)
Database administrator	−0.654* (0.311)	−0.262 (0.341)	−0.193 (0.308)	−0.685** (0.255)	−0.061 (0.253)	−0.407 (0.327)
C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS						
Male	0.157 (0.157)	0.319[†] (0.164)	0.196 (0.171)	0.134 (0.139)	0.150 (0.140)	0.064 (0.165)
Age (ref. = 21–35 years)						
36–50 years	0.028 (0.183)	−0.227 (0.192)	−0.009 (0.193)	0.068 (0.173)	0.071 (0.167)	−0.055 (0.197)
51–75 years	−0.476* (0.226)	−0.612** (0.234)	−0.370 (0.238)	−0.253 (0.187)	−0.262 (0.196)	−0.253 (0.230)
Tertiary education			−0.136 (0.241)	−0.284 (0.214)	−0.246 (0.197)	−0.217 (0.227)
At least weekly involved in selection decisions	−0.188 (0.215)	−0.081 (0.233)	0.022 (0.173)	0.056 (0.150)	0.100 (0.150)	−0.147 (0.176)
Period of experience (ref. = Less than 1 year)						
1 to 5 years	0.144 (0.262)	−0.085 (0.284)	0.299 (0.282)	0.314 (0.241)	0.129 (0.224)	0.223 (0.294)
More than 5 years	0.352 (0.275)	0.150 (0.291)	0.464 (0.291)	0.518* (0.238)	0.119 (0.229)	0.268 (0.295)
Job (ref. = Others)						
General administrative assistant	0.462 (0.328)	0.450 (0.409)	0.066 (0.388)	0.495 (0.333)	0.144 (0.304)	0.515 (0.386)

Employment agency employee	0.557† (0.328)	0.693* (0.330)	0.907* (0.367)	0.241 (0.305)	0.784** (0.286)	1.090** (0.341)
HR and career development specialist	−0.302 (0.232)	−0.404 (0.269)	−0.406 (0.254)	−0.075 (0.210)	−0.123 (0.206)	−0.230 (0.252)
Management assistant	0.550† (0.307)	1.057*** (0.300)	0.461 (0.371)	0.471 (0.295)	0.889** (0.309)	1.044** (0.304)
Manager	−0.176 (0.195)	−0.035 (0.218)	−0.088 (0.192)	−0.147 (0.169)	−0.126 (0.167)	−0.231 (0.207)
At least 20% of the employees in the organisation is older than 50	0.226 (0.147)	0.305† (0.158)	0.385* (0.169)	0.183 (0.140)	0.158 (0.137)	0.328* (0.161)

D. CUT-POINTS OUTCOME VARIABLE

Cut-point 1	−3.781 (0.567)	−3.997 (0.655)	−4.957 (0.672)	−3.679 (0.503)	−4.660 (0.553)	−4.728 (0.688)
Cut-point 2	−3.429 (0.511)	−3.936 (0.642)	−4.297 (0.551)	−3.153 (0.472)	−3.948 (0.486)	−4.233 (0.591)
Cut-point 3	−2.844 (0.471)	−3.501 (0.556)	−3.334 (0.482)	−2.528 (0.446)	−3.441 (0.452)	−3.689 (0.530)
Cut-point 4	−2.442 (0.469)	−3.054 (0.515)	−2.677 (0.466)	−1.959 (0.431)	−2.704 (0.423)	−3.071 (0.501)
Cut-point 5	−1.945 (0.467)	−2.542 (0.513)	−1.939 (0.447)	−1.448 (0.436)	−2.181 (0.420)	−2.437 (0.511)
Cut-point 6	0.475 (0.450)	0.594 (0.463)	0.299 (0.447)	0.435 (0.428)	−0.030 (0.421)	0.681 (0.491)
Cut-point 7	1.144 (0.449)	1.237 (0.461)	0.836 (0.445)	1.114 (0.429)	0.627 (0.421)	1.304 (0.488)
Cut-point 8	2.124 (0.451)	2.180 (0.465)	1.694 (0.446)	2.095 (0.428)	1.511 (0.423)	2.173 (0.488)
Cut-point 9	3.578 (0.465)	3.568 (0.490)	2.929 (0.454)	3.494 (0.429)	2.790 (0.437)	3.429 (0.510)
Cut-point 10	4.788 (0.486)	4.798 (0.518)	4.040 (0.479)	4.623 (0.467)	4.043 (0.502)	4.508 (0.558)

Table O.A.4. Full ordered regression results with the perceptions as the outcome variables, two-way interactions included (continued)

	Experience	Motivation	Reliability	Preciseness	Trainability	Reasonable salary expectations
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	−0.252 (0.196)	−0.360† (0.213)	0.094 (0.206)	0.169 (0.228)	−0.180 (0.228)	0.030 (0.227)
Age (ref. = 33 years)						
38 years	0.049 (0.186)	0.338† (0.201)	0.238 (0.212)	0.105 (0.196)	0.202 (0.179)	0.195 (0.167)
44 years	−0.194 (0.180)	0.549** (0.200)	0.338 (0.220)	0.228 (0.204)	−0.165 (0.185)	0.373* (0.181)
49 years	0.026 (0.209)	0.342 (0.233)	0.252 (0.238)	0.130 (0.230)	−0.369† (0.218)	0.171 (0.202)
55 years	−0.342† (0.205)	0.374† (0.225)	0.427† (0.247)	0.186 (0.246)	−0.534* (0.234)	0.073 (0.212)
60 years	−0.279 (0.237)	0.362 (0.242)	0.355 (0.254)	0.027 (0.266)	−1.159*** (0.261)	−0.110 (0.237)
61 years	−0.508* (0.213)	0.272 (0.236)	0.047 (0.286)	−0.276 (0.273)	−1.351*** (0.249)	−0.170 (0.248)
62 years	−0.277 (0.211)	0.267 (0.218)	0.171 (0.237)	−0.103 (0.237)	−1.319*** (0.236)	−0.287 (0.205)
63 years	−0.523** (0.197)	0.243 (0.207)	0.368 (0.238)	−0.027 (0.221)	−1.542*** (0.236)	−0.277 (0.218)
64 years	−0.437* (0.207)	0.121 (0.199)	0.260 (0.220)	−0.150 (0.217)	−1.709*** (0.227)	−0.311 (0.218)
Male	−0.056 (0.096)	−0.112 (0.102)	−0.114 (0.102)	−0.171† (0.098)	−0.106 (0.096)	−0.110 (0.094)
Commuting distance (ref. = 0–5km)						
5–10 km	0.126 (0.118)	−0.047 (0.114)	0.035 (0.106)	−0.017 (0.113)	−0.065 (0.110)	0.091 (0.102)
10–50 km	0.095 (0.110)	−0.045 (0.109)	0.112 (0.100)	−0.023 (0.105)	0.002 (0.106)	0.115 (0.108)
More than 50 km	−0.006 (0.115)	−0.161 (0.116)	−0.109 (0.113)	−0.057 (0.114)	−0.102 (0.109)	0.043 (0.099)
Relevant work experience (ref. = None)						
About 2 years	2.751*** (0.158)	0.647*** (0.114)	0.648*** (0.121)	0.978*** (0.129)	0.817*** (0.114)	0.267** (0.099)
About 5 years	4.162*** (0.194)	1.014*** (0.131)	1.100*** (0.125)	1.425*** (0.131)	1.113*** (0.128)	0.423*** (0.115)
About 10 years	5.266*** (0.216)	1.048*** (0.116)	1.175*** (0.124)	1.676*** (0.138)	1.354*** (0.121)	0.111 (0.117)
Unemployment period (ref. = 1 month at most)						
1–6 months	0.048 (0.127)	0.020 (0.113)	−0.070 (0.099)	−0.092 (0.110)	0.022 (0.112)	−0.054 (0.108)
6–12 months	−0.059 (0.121)	−0.272* (0.112)	−0.297** (0.105)	−0.268* (0.114)	−0.123 (0.115)	0.057 (0.115)
12–24 months	−0.240* (0.117)	−0.411*** (0.115)	−0.438*** (0.104)	−0.182† (0.107)	−0.245* (0.119)	0.070 (0.108)
More than 24 months	−0.411** (0.140)	−0.937*** (0.148)	−0.866*** (0.140)	−0.683*** (0.137)	−0.644*** (0.138)	−0.056 (0.128)

Extra-curricular activities (ref. = None)						
Cultural activities	−0.047 (0.106)	0.020 (0.121)	0.080 (0.110)	0.066 (0.102)	−0.007 (0.107)	−0.031 (0.098)
Sport activities	0.023 (0.119)	0.140 (0.114)	0.108 (0.112)	0.124 (0.105)	0.174[+] (0.105)	0.106 (0.105)
Voluntary work	0.120 (0.109)	0.178 (0.116)	0.135 (0.101)	0.149 (0.102)	0.192[+] (0.100)	0.080 (0.099)
Referral through PES	−0.234* (0.095)	−1.028*** (0.110)	−0.351*** (0.094)	−0.311** (0.096)	−0.264** (0.089)	−0.043 (0.078)
Interactions						
URCSxMale	0.166 (0.186)	0.235 (0.218)	0.049 (0.226)	−0.073 (0.220)	0.346 (0.220)	−0.105 (0.230)
URCSxLong-term unemployment[a]	0.328 (0.256)	0.165 (0.277)	0.371 (0.304)	0.341 (0.306)	0.174 (0.267)	0.098 (0.262)
URCSxReferral	0.261 (0.192)	0.295 (0.197)	−0.080 (0.188)	0.010 (0.208)	0.254 (0.191)	−0.186 (0.199)
B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS						
Job (ref. = Dental technician)						
Door-to-door salesman	0.695* (0.278)	0.487[+] (0.287)	0.434 (0.373)	0.295 (0.368)	0.139 (0.346)	0.215 (0.314)
Packer	0.346 (0.345)	−0.243 (0.289)	−0.161 (0.373)	−0.180 (0.379)	−0.268 (0.332)	−0.187 (0.326)
Plate machine tool setter	0.181 (0.224)	0.438[+] (0.240)	0.376 (0.294)	0.418 (0.300)	0.304 (0.274)	0.322 (0.274)
Laboratory technician	−0.143 (0.234)	0.231 (0.249)	0.137 (0.296)	0.001 (0.312)	−0.224 (0.294)	0.046 (0.301)
Insurance agent	0.027 (0.215)	0.185 (0.236)	0.186 (0.292)	−0.079 (0.329)	−0.145 (0.286)	−0.006 (0.276)
Physiotherapist	−0.252 (0.228)	0.215 (0.230)	−0.031 (0.281)	−0.385 (0.295)	−0.091 (0.259)	0.094 (0.268)
Database administrator	−0.274 (0.224)	0.390 (0.268)	0.212 (0.339)	−0.144 (0.337)	−0.351 (0.276)	−0.161 (0.288)
C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS						
Male	0.001 (0.128)	0.036 (0.146)	0.202 (0.177)	0.264 (0.166)	0.056 (0.153)	0.241 (0.162)
Age (ref. = 21–35 years)						
36–50 years	−0.051 (0.150)	−0.222 (0.163)	−0.162 (0.201)	−0.253 (0.205)	0.023 (0.174)	−0.067 (0.172)
51–75 years	−0.480** (0.170)	−0.282 (0.184)	−0.366 (0.239)	−0.416[+] (0.238)	−0.030 (0.199)	−0.101 (0.203)
Tertiary education	−0.182 (0.183)	−0.319 (0.204)	−0.387 (0.250)	−0.382 (0.248)	−0.203 (0.230)	0.035 (0.227)
At least weekly involved in selection decisions	−0.072 (0.136)	−0.055 (0.155)	−0.134 (0.187)	−0.109 (0.188)	0.050 (0.165)	−0.043 (0.170)
Period of experience (ref. = Less than 1 year)						
1 to 5 years	0.071 (0.210)	0.311 (0.255)	0.317 (0.315)	0.287 (0.307)	0.248 (0.282)	−0.047 (0.315)
More than 5 years	0.388[+] (0.215)	0.426[+] (0.256)	0.454 (0.321)	0.480 (0.311)	0.370 (0.280)	0.207 (0.327)
Job (ref. = Others)						
General administrative assistant	0.129 (0.325)	0.170 (0.328)	0.439 (0.379)	0.622[+] (0.348)	0.321 (0.270)	0.082 (0.254)
Employment agency employee	0.349 (0.257)	1.172*** (0.281)	0.818* (0.360)	0.840* (0.366)	0.642[+] (0.351)	0.486 (0.306)

HR and career development specialist	−0.259 (0.186)	−0.041 (0.191)	−0.365 (0.256)	−0.438† (0.259)	−0.211 (0.215)	−0.137 (0.252)
Management assistant	0.125 (0.247)	0.642* (0.278)	0.894** (0.329)	0.887** (0.331)	0.769* (0.300)	0.719† (0.381)
Manager	−0.221 (0.155)	−0.041 (0.167)	−0.151 (0.211)	−0.087 (0.215)	−0.145 (0.190)	−0.010 (0.184)
At least 20% of the employees in the organisation is older than 50	0.182 (0.123)	0.079 (0.132)	0.211 (0.164)	0.114 (0.163)	0.086 (0.149)	0.147 (0.147)

D. CUT-POINTS OUTCOME VARIABLE

Cut-point 1	−1.689 (0.359)	−4.030 (0.490)	−4.235 (0.647)	−4.404 (0.653)	−4.936 (0.586)	−4.100 (0.569)
Cut-point 2	−1.015 (0.346)	−3.344 (0.431)	−3.701 (0.557)	−3.794 (0.572)	−4.089 (0.495)	−3.592 (0.513)
Cut-point 3	−0.259 (0.336)	−2.716 (0.401)	−3.061 (0.501)	−3.288 (0.531)	−3.237 (0.462)	−2.728 (0.448)
Cut-point 4	0.257 (0.337)	−2.048 (0.384)	−2.632 (0.481)	−2.976 (0.523)	−2.585 (0.452)	−2.002 (0.424)
Cut-point 5	0.744 (0.339)	−1.493 (0.384)	−2.140 (0.482)	−2.403 (0.527)	−1.857 (0.453)	−1.202 (0.419)
Cut-point 6	1.707 (0.340)	0.326 (0.380)	0.819 (0.474)	0.864 (0.499)	0.267 (0.455)	0.556 (0.421)
Cut-point 7	2.643 (0.349)	0.967 (0.376)	1.380 (0.473)	1.414 (0.499)	0.925 (0.455)	1.294 (0.425)
Cut-point 8	3.644 (0.359)	1.769 (0.377)	2.184 (0.473)	2.198 (0.496)	1.832 (0.460)	2.229 (0.438)
Cut-point 9	5.021 (0.373)	2.946 (0.385)	3.478 (0.488)	3.475 (0.511)	3.041 (0.464)	3.532 (0.470)
Cut-point 10	6.233 (0.393)	4.134 (0.411)	4.713 (0.521)	4.612 (0.554)	4.147 (0.504)	4.290 (0.508)

Table O.A.4. Full ordered regression results with the perceptions as the outcome variables, two-way interactions included (continued)

	Satisfaction of previous employers	Rejection by potential employers	Administrative ease of hiring	Collaboration with employer	Collaboration with colleagues	Collaboration with clients
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS						
Unemployed in the regime with company supplement (URCS)	0.149 (0.227)	−0.374[†] (0.209)	−0.155 (0.220)	−0.020 (0.240)	−0.014 (0.243)	0.061 (0.236)
Age (ref. = 33 years)						
38 years	0.217 (0.213)	0.283 (0.189)	0.160 (0.169)	0.148 (0.219)	0.234 (0.210)	0.029 (0.207)
44 years	0.138 (0.222)	0.070 (0.182)	−0.238 (0.184)	0.069 (0.198)	0.082 (0.196)	0.164 (0.193)
49 years	0.093 (0.241)	−0.092 (0.241)	0.173 (0.216)	−0.098 (0.262)	−0.005 (0.253)	−0.210 (0.238)
55 years	0.110 (0.249)	0.095 (0.209)	−0.320 (0.202)	0.392 (0.244)	0.326 (0.243)	0.403[†] (0.231)
60 years	0.060 (0.282)	−0.407[†] (0.239)	−0.156 (0.254)	−0.221 (0.283)	−0.125 (0.260)	0.132 (0.249)
61 years	−0.160 (0.270)	−0.520* (0.223)	−0.867*** (0.238)	−0.579* (0.272)	−0.615* (0.266)	−0.509* (0.256)
62 years	−0.125 (0.264)	−0.569* (0.222)	−0.256 (0.230)	−0.320 (0.268)	−0.459[†] (0.269)	−0.377 (0.265)
63 years	0.024 (0.240)	−0.880*** (0.227)	−0.573** (0.209)	−0.110 (0.242)	−0.092 (0.248)	−0.185 (0.236)
64 years	0.066 (0.226)	−0.654** (0.223)	−0.563* (0.218)	−0.314 (0.227)	−0.334 (0.231)	−0.233 (0.221)
Male	−0.123 (0.104)	−0.286** (0.103)	−0.122 (0.081)	−0.320** (0.103)	−0.211* (0.099)	−0.224* (0.095)
Commuting distance (ref. = 0–5km)						
5–10 km	−0.032 (0.122)	0.250* (0.109)	0.092 (0.094)	0.043 (0.114)	0.032 (0.119)	−0.032 (0.113)
10–50 km	−0.067 (0.111)	0.014 (0.110)	0.059 (0.095)	0.029 (0.108)	0.034 (0.106)	−0.077 (0.104)
More than 50 km	−0.141 (0.119)	0.103 (0.106)	−0.019 (0.096)	−0.097 (0.117)	−0.020 (0.112)	−0.149 (0.115)
Relevant work experience (ref. = None)						
About 2 years	0.503*** (0.126)	0.325** (0.101)	0.247** (0.095)	0.517*** (0.103)	0.552*** (0.110)	0.424*** (0.110)
About 5 years	0.985*** (0.139)	0.592*** (0.120)	0.369*** (0.104)	0.678*** (0.121)	0.751*** (0.127)	0.691*** (0.124)
About 10 years	1.377*** (0.135)	0.719*** (0.111)	0.348*** (0.099)	0.839*** (0.110)	0.872*** (0.113)	0.880*** (0.115)
Unemployment period (ref. = 1 month at most)						
1–6 months	−0.093 (0.122)	−0.299* (0.129)	−0.119 (0.100)	−0.068 (0.104)	0.034 (0.106)	−0.107 (0.112)
6–12 months	−0.306* (0.123)	−0.680*** (0.127)	−0.062 (0.093)	−0.231* (0.109)	−0.171 (0.107)	−0.204[†] (0.106)
12–24 months	−0.442*** (0.122)	−1.020*** (0.129)	−0.235** (0.088)	−0.227* (0.108)	−0.185[†] (0.100)	−0.187[†] (0.096)
More than 24 months	−1.362*** (0.165)	−1.579*** (0.150)	−0.430*** (0.111)	−0.559*** (0.138)	−0.470** (0.136)	−0.622*** (0.133)

Extra-curricular activities (ref. = None)						
Cultural activities	−0.082 (0.124)	−0.008 (0.119)	0.038 (0.095)	−0.080 (0.112)	0.005 (0.107)	0.074 (0.112)
Sport activities	0.150 (0.119)	−0.090 (0.112)	0.193* (0.098)	0.172[+] (0.104)	0.139 (0.105)	0.154 (0.105)
Voluntary work	0.174 (0.115)	0.004 (0.119)	0.160[+] (0.089)	0.161 (0.102)	0.213* (0.101)	0.276** (0.105)
Referral through PES	−0.210[+] (0.108)	−0.134 (0.086)	0.065 (0.076)	−0.314** (0.098)	−0.263** (0.098)	−0.255** (0.095)
Interactions						
URCSxMale	−0.030 (0.223)	0.497* (0.204)	0.078 (0.210)	0.307 (0.232)	0.274 (0.227)	0.216 (0.224)
URCSxLong-term unemployment[a]	1.208*** (0.287)	0.487* (0.246)	0.665* (0.271)	0.297 (0.294)	0.395 (0.286)	0.276 (0.286)
URCSxReferral	−0.274 (0.206)	0.244 (0.169)	−0.452* (0.180)	0.059 (0.199)	0.097 (0.194)	−0.046 (0.196)
B. JOB CHARACTERISTICS						
Job (ref. = Dental technician)						
Door-to-door salesman	−0.043 (0.315)	−0.033 (0.262)	0.107 (0.368)	0.504 (0.419)	0.452 (0.406)	0.931* (0.409)
Packer	−0.369 (0.387)	−0.215 (0.342)	−0.320 (0.376)	−0.377 (0.464)	−0.310 (0.453)	−0.435 (0.446)
Plate machine tool setter	−0.020 (0.321)	−0.003 (0.298)	−0.315 (0.325)	0.014 (0.369)	0.087 (0.369)	0.017 (0.380)
Laboratory technician	−0.003 (0.311)	−0.205 (0.268)	−0.250 (0.301)	0.099 (0.343)	0.187 (0.345)	0.061 (0.358)
Insurance agent	−0.288 (0.293)	−0.215 (0.274)	−0.458 (0.287)	0.037 (0.354)	0.098 (0.355)	0.219 (0.356)
Physiotherapist	−0.433 (0.309)	0.127 (0.232)	−0.216 (0.303)	−0.036 (0.356)	0.043 (0.344)	0.280 (0.350)
Database administrator	−0.131 (0.330)	−0.206 (0.250)	−0.340 (0.336)	−0.060 (0.366)	−0.040 (0.358)	−0.012 (0.367)
C. RECRUITER CHARACTERISTICS						
Male	0.199 (0.175)	0.142 (0.144)	0.447* (0.185)	0.349[+] (0.206)	0.374[+] (0.194)	0.393* (0.195)
Age (ref. = 21–35 years)						
36–50 years	−0.198 (0.204)	0.291[+] (0.174)	0.122 (0.209)	−0.266 (0.226)	−0.286 (0.221)	−0.490* (0.218)
51–75 years	−0.361 (0.231)	0.338[+] (0.194)	−0.098 (0.268)	−0.555* (0.264)	−0.549* (0.253)	−0.781** (0.254)
Tertiary education	−0.196 (0.225)	0.022 (0.200)	0.312 (0.233)	−0.217 (0.277)	−0.301 (0.260)	−0.078 (0.272)
At least weekly involved in selection decisions	0.007 (0.184)	−0.001 (0.153)	0.136 (0.187)	−0.237 (0.208)	−0.159 (0.202)	−0.427* (0.206)
Period of experience (ref. = Less than 1 year)						
1 to 5 years	−0.313 (0.298)	−0.198 (0.258)	0.272 (0.313)	−0.151 (0.330)	0.052 (0.323)	0.075 (0.329)
More than 5 years	−0.314 (0.310)	−0.148 (0.266)	0.968** (0.330)	0.279 (0.330)	0.402 (0.323)	0.623[+] (0.335)
Job (ref. = Others)						
General administrative assistant	0.175 (0.348)	0.855** (0.314)	0.013 (0.392)	0.487 (0.416)	0.599 (0.419)	0.471 (0.423)
Employment agency employee	0.548 (0.352)	0.517[+] (0.298)	0.205 (0.335)	1.002* (0.399)	0.881* (0.384)	0.793* (0.395)

HR and career development specialist	0.011 (0.256)	0.174 (0.226)	−0.059 (0.301)	−0.089 (0.271)	−0.088 (0.271)	−0.120 (0.271)
Management assistant	1.390*** (0.340)	0.977** (0.364)	0.570 (0.436)	0.762[†] (0.411)	0.725[†] (0.389)	0.810* (0.363)
Manager	−0.032 (0.204)	0.060 (0.162)	−0.140 (0.227)	−0.117 (0.238)	−0.059 (0.225)	−0.249 (0.231)
At least 20% of the employees in the organisation is older than 50	−0.003 (0.160)	0.023 (0.141)	−0.047 (0.176)	−0.027 (0.182)	0.036 (0.179)	0.109 (0.180)

D. CUT-POINTS OUTCOME VARIABLE

Cut-point 1	−4.959 (0.629)	−3.867 (0.439)	−4.183 (0.670)	−5.095 (0.715)	−4.630 (0.701)	−4.486 (0.653)
Cut-point 2	−4.664 (0.592)	−2.974 (0.426)	−3.606 (0.559)	−4.482 (0.634)	−4.016 (0.606)	−4.146 (0.596)
Cut-point 3	−4.045 (0.534)	−2.239 (0.426)	−2.820 (0.503)	−4.030 (0.587)	−3.403 (0.545)	−3.603 (0.548)
Cut-point 4	−3.450 (0.508)	−1.634 (0.419)	−2.025 (0.478)	−3.387 (0.554)	−2.901 (0.531)	−3.147 (0.531)
Cut-point 5	−2.781 (0.511)	−1.179 (0.423)	−1.426 (0.472)	−2.867 (0.556)	−2.326 (0.526)	−2.590 (0.519)
Cut-point 6	0.526 (0.498)	0.914 (0.429)	0.291 (0.474)	0.592 (0.535)	0.989 (0.514)	0.845 (0.502)
Cut-point 7	1.050 (0.500)	1.518 (0.431)	0.884 (0.475)	1.044 (0.533)	1.464 (0.514)	1.398 (0.504)
Cut-point 8	1.935 (0.502)	2.205 (0.435)	1.697 (0.479)	1.794 (0.542)	2.193 (0.520)	2.097 (0.508)
Cut-point 9	3.268 (0.554)	3.487 (0.482)	2.788 (0.490)	2.770 (0.564)	3.234 (0.542)	3.089 (0.529)
Cut-point 10	4.603 (0.611)	4.660 (0.575)	3.807 (0.540)	4.081 (0.618)	4.698 (0.607)	4.463 (0.584)

Notes. Abbreviations used: ref. (reference category), URCS (Unemployed in the Regime with Company Supplement), PES (Public Employment Service), and HR (Human Resources). The outcome variables range from 0 (i.e. definitely no interview or hire) to 10 (i.e. definitely an interview or hire). The presented statistics are coefficient estimates and their standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the recruiter level. Significances are indicated as *** when p < .001; ** when p < .01; * when p < .05; and [†] when p < .10.

[a] Long-term unemployment refers to a recent unemployment period of at least 2 years.