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A Meta-Analysis**

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## ABSTRACT

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# What Drives Social Returns to Education? A Meta-Analysis\*

Education can generate important externalities that contribute towards economic growth and convergence. In this paper, we study such externalities and their drivers by conducting the first meta-analysis of the social returns to education literature. We analyse over 1,000 estimates from 32 journal articles published since 1993, covering 15 countries of different levels of development. Our results indicate that: 1) there is publication bias (but not citation bias) in the literature; 2) spillovers slow down with economic development; 3) tertiary schooling and schooling dispersion increase spillovers; and 4) spillovers are smaller under fixed-effects and IV estimators but larger when measured at the firm level.

**JEL Classification:** I26, I28, J24, J31, C36

**Keywords:** returns to education, education externalities

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# 1 Introduction

The social effects of education may go much beyond the individuals that are investing directly in their own human capital. A person's education, or schooling, may affect different outcomes of their colleagues at work, neighbours, and possibly even other people in the same region, industry or even country (Marshall 1890). To the extent that education shapes an individual's own thinking, actions, and outcomes - as clearly indicated by a large literature on the private returns of education -, one's learning at school can also influence different economic and non-economic variables regarding other individuals. Specific economic examples include higher productivity and earnings. Non-economic outcomes may include better informed political participation, increased tax revenues, lower required public expenditure, lower crime, and slower spread of diseases (perhaps also during pandemics), all of which can again also lead to higher productivity and earnings.

Given their significance and breadth, such spillovers from schooling can promote economic development and convergence. The latter will apply if education spillovers are higher when economic development is lower. Indeed, the examples above may suggest that the marginal social return to education is higher at lower levels of economic development. For instance, if crime or the spread of disease tends to be higher at lower levels of economic development and if education tends to reduce crime or the spread of disease, then the social effects of education may be greater when countries are at earlier stages in their development. Many of these social effects would be translated into pecuniary dimensions, including productivity and wages.

Moreover, education spillovers may follow from non-pecuniary external returns (technological spillovers or knowledge diffusion) or, alternatively, pecuniary external returns (market interactions and prices) (Moretti 2004, Cardoso et al. 2018). In the latter case, more schooling in the general workforce may incentivise firms to invest in their physical and organisational capital which may make even the less schooled more productive. However, note that schooling could theoretically also have negative external effects, namely in the context of signaling models. Overall, the considerable potential for schooling spillovers or externalities - and the underlying inefficiency from education provided exclusively by markets - has therefore motivated large public investments in education. For instance, according to the World Bank, over 15% of governments' total expenditure is devoted to education, corresponding to an average of 4% of GDP.

In this paper, we seek to better understand social returns to education and its drivers, including the role of economic development. Our contribution is to conduct what we believe is the first meta-analysis of the microeconomic literature that estimates these external effects of education.<sup>1</sup> According

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<sup>1</sup>For a meta-analysis of the related but different macroeconomic literature, on the relationship between education and

to our review, that we describe in more detail below, there are 32 journal articles in the literature that researches the magnitude of different types of education spillovers. These studies cover 15 countries (and four continents), of which five address the cases of emerging or developing economies (China, Indonesia, Kenya, South Africa, and Tunisia), representing in total 33.1% of the world population.

To be able to better compare the studies, we focus on the studies that estimate pecuniary outcomes at the microeconomic level. We then analyse the extent to which the literature suffers from publication and citation biases. The former concerns the more likely publication of particular results, namely those with positive effects. The second type of bias, which we borrow from the medical literature, concerns the extent to which particular results, namely positive effect, are more likely to be cited by other papers. Moreover, we also study the role of a number of contextual and methodological variables.

We find some evidence of publication bias (but not of citation bias). Our results are also supportive of the hypothesis above, namely that spillovers slow down with economic development. Moreover, we also find that tertiary schooling and schooling dispersion increase spillovers; spillovers are smaller under fixed-effects and IV estimators but larger when measured at the firm level. These results can be helpful in allowing researchers to better compare their findings with other studies that adopt different methodological approaches.

The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Our data are described in Section 2. The research design and results are presented in Section 3. This includes both the analysis of publication and citation biases as the analysis of the drivers of the social and external returns along multiple dimensions of each study. The final section concludes.

## **2 Data and variables**

### **2.1 Criteria for selecting studies**

Our selection of studies was based on a comprehensive Google Scholar search (see Sokolova & Sorensen (2021) for a recent meta-analysis using a similar approach). More specifically, we included the following keywords in our search: 'education externalities', 'human capital externalities', 'education spillovers', 'social returns to education' and 'external returns to education' (using the 'OR' operator). These keywords capture the different phrases that authors have used to refer to the concept of externalities in education. Our search was originally conducted in May 2020 and considered the first 30 pages of results delivered by Google Scholar (each page listing ten different papers).

Following the initial stage above, we then considered the studies that met the following subject and economic growth, see Benos & Zotou (2014). See also Glewwe et al. (2014).

methodological criteria. On the subject side, we considered only studies that focused on at least one of three key economic outcomes we are interested in here: productivity (of firms), wages, and rents (land). These have been identified before as three main avenues for education spillovers (Moretti 2004): more educated workers can drive upwards the productivity of the firms in which they are employed, which can then increase the wages of all employees (through some combination of rent/profit sharing and labour market competition); finally, increases in productivity and wages in locations where schooling spillovers are large can lead to increases in rental prices.

On the methodological side, our inclusion criteria were the following. First, we consider exclusively studies published in academic journals listed in ABS (2018). This widely used journal ranking list includes over 300 journals in economics alone; however, it also includes over 1,000 additional journals from other disciplines and subjects taught at business schools, including those which may also study the social effects of education from a quantitative perspective.<sup>2</sup> Second, we include exclusively those estimates that are reported in the main text of the paper (excluding estimates in appendices, many of which based on subsamples or different sets of control variables). We also required that the number of observations, the time period considered in the estimation (and other variables discussed below) are clearly reported.<sup>3</sup> Finally, we also conducted a complementary search based on EconLit, following the same criteria as above. This delivered 87 studies in a first instance. However, we added only one journal article, published in 2019, to our original selection as the remaining studies either did not meet our criteria described above or were already included in our sample following the Google Scholar analysis.

In summary, we collected a total of 1,021 estimates from 32 empirical studies on education spillovers. The full list of articles can be found in **Appendix A**. While the number of papers is relatively small compared to more mature literatures that have already been subject to meta-analysis, the number of estimates in our study is relatively large (e.g. larger than in Benos & Zotou (2014)). Moreover, our estimates cover as many as 15 countries (and four continents), namely China, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, Tunisia, UK, and US.<sup>4</sup> These 15 countries represent 33.1% of the world population and provide a good coverage of different levels of schooling and economic development.

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<sup>2</sup>These subjects include human resource management, industrial relations, international development, and operations research. Considering this broader list can make our study selection more inclusive, leading to a broader range of approaches and a larger number of studies and estimates. In any case, we also consider an alternative journal list, focused on economics, as we explain below.

<sup>3</sup>We also considered Acemoglu & Angrist (2000) and Rudd (2000), which were not published in journals but are widely cited in the literature. On the other hand, we excluded one very short study which reported only three estimates.

<sup>4</sup>This analysis also indicates that some the most important gaps in the geographical coverage of existing published studies in education externalities are in India and Latin America. Eastern Europe and East Asia (e.g. Japan, South Korea) have also not been considered in the literature. These gaps may affect the generalizability of our results and constitute areas where further research may be particularly welcome.

## 2.2 Explanatory variables

We characterise the studies in this literature and their estimates along nine dimensions. These dimensions lead to 29 variables that we then consider as potential predictors of the size of the spillover that we analyse, following our discussion above. These dimensions and their variables are as follows:

1. *Spillover measure*: We consider the cases of the *average years of schooling* and the *share of college-educated workers*. The former is more comprehensive while the latter is more focused on the individual profiles that may have greater potential to generate spillovers, given the more advanced type of their schooling. Of course, levels of schooling below college, such as secondary school completion, may also be relevant, particularly in less developed countries where average education levels are lower. Note that we do not consider studies that focus on spillovers from qualitative types of education, such as vocational education as opposed to academic schooling, or particular courses in higher education (e.g. engineering or humanities).

2. *Spillover scope*: These have been classified as *regional*, *industry*, or *firm levels*. These three dimensions correspond to the levels at which the potential spillovers (such as the average years of schooling and share of college-educated workers) may be generated and are measured in the empirical analyses. As discussed before, schooling externalities can arise and be measured within different dimensions, related to the location (region or country) of the individuals, the sector or industry in which they work, or within their firm (a specific combination of sector and location in most cases, namely in firms located in a single area). For instance, if the average years of schooling (or college-educated share) adopted in the study are calculated within a city/region, then we define the spillover scope of that study to be the regional level. Alternatively, if the measures are calculated within each firm (industry), by considering the relevant schooling measure of those workers, we then define the scope as the firm (industry) level. A common specification involves regressing the log of a worker's wage on a number of human capital (control) variables, plus a measure of the average schooling of the individuals in the same firm, region or industry.<sup>5</sup>

3. *Spillover outcome*: The effects of spillovers may arise in multiple variables. In this meta-analysis, we consider the cases of the productivity of firms, the wages of workers, and rental prices. As discussed above, spillovers are likely to arise in terms of productivity in a first instance, as co-workers (in the same firm, industry and or region) benefit from the skills of more educated individuals. This will increase the productivity of those co-workers and their firms. Such productivity increases will then lead to wage increases through some combination of market competition for more productive

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<sup>5</sup>For instance, Martins & Jin (2010) conducts the analysis at the firm level, constructing the key regressor as the average schooling of all, same-firm colleagues of each worker. The wages of the latter are then considered as the dependent variable.

workers and rent sharing from firms to their workers. Higher regional wages and profits driven by the spillovers can also translate into higher prices for those resources in limited and rigid supply, such as land and housing, driving increases in rents. These higher rents may lead to some convergence of real wages across locations that are endowed with workforces of different schooling (and spillover) levels.

4. *Spillover type*: The literature studies both the social returns to education and the external returns to education. The latter can be regarded as the *additional* returns, accrued from interactions with other schooled individuals, that can be added to the direct, private returns. When the direct and indirect components are taken together, they would correspond to social returns. In other words,  $SR = PR + ER$ , in which SR, PR and ER are, respectively, the social returns, the private returns and the external returns. If the model considered in the paper under analysis considers separately the individual's schooling (as an additional control variable) and then focuses on 'social' schooling, we regard the coefficient of the latter as a measure of the external return, over and above the private return. If there is no such control for individual's schooling (and their private returns), then the coefficient (regarding total schooling in a given region, for instance) is regarded as a social return, as it will capture both direct and indirect dimensions.

5. *Data set characteristics*: Studies draw on the main types of data sets used in (micro-)econometric analyses, namely single cross-sections, pooled cross-sections, and panel data. The case of panel data sets are based on repeated observations of individuals or firms over time. We also considered the time period examined in each study as well as the size of the sample (number of observations).

6. *Estimation method*: Several estimates are obtained from OLS. However, many studies seek to address the potential endogeneity of their schooling variable through fixed effects (drawing on the repeated availability of the same individuals over time), instrumental variables or other methods. In some studies, their estimates draw on more than one such method, namely when combining instrumental variables and fixed effects. These data points (estimates) are classified correspondingly - unlike in the previous dimensions, the multiple potential outcomes are not mutually exclusive in this dimension regarding the estimation method.

7. *Country income level*: As discussed in the Introduction, social returns to education may vary depending on the income level of the country under analysis. We examine this by classifying the country studied in each article in four income levels: high, upper-middle, lower-middle and low. Using the World Bank Atlas method, these correspond to GNI per capita in 2018 of \$12,376 or more, between \$3,996 and \$12,375, between \$1,026 and \$3,995, and \$1,025 or less, respectively.

8. *Schooling quantity and quality*: The underlying levels of schooling in each country may also influence its social returns. We consider both quantity and quality dimensions, measured in terms



of the percentage of university graduates and the average schooling years (quantity) of the country's workforce (Barro & Lee 2013) and the average PISA scores across its three dimensions (maths, science and reading results). We use the measurement for the same year as that of the data when the social return is estimated or the closest possible (the latter in the case of the PISA scores).

9. *Publication characteristics:* We are also interested in uncovering potential relationships between the publication characteristics of each article and the social returns documented there. We consider four different variables in this case, namely the year of publication, the number of (Google Scholar) citations, and the journal ranks. The latter is measured using (ABS 2018), a widely used journal ranking including over 300 journals in economics alone plus over 1,000 journals from related fields taught at business schools (some of which may also examine social returns to education). We consider five journal categories (from 'recognised world-wide as exemplars of excellence', the top level ('4\*', which we score as 5), to 'recognised, but more modest standard in their field', the bottom level, which we score as 1). For the benefit of further robustness, we also measure the journal rank using the article influence score from the Eigenfactor database ([link](#)).

### 2.3 Descriptive statistics

The descriptive statistics of the variables described above are presented in **Table 1**. These statistics are computed from the 1,021 individual estimates that we extracted from 32 empirical studies (journal articles), treating each estimate equally, and provide an interesting overview of the literature. First, we find that most estimates are computed at the regional level (86%), while the industry and firm levels represent only 5% and 9% of the total, respectively. In contrast, we find considerable balance in the measurement of the potential spillovers, as 58% of the estimates use average years of schooling and 42% use the share of college-educated workers.

Wages prove to be the key outcome of education spillovers (82% of the estimates), followed by (firm) productivity (15%), while rents play a residual role (only 2% of the cases). Most studies focus on the external returns to education as they consider specifications that control for individual schooling (64% of the observations). The remaining 36% do not control for individual schooling and are thus interpreted here as estimating social returns to education (including both direct and indirect effects).

We find considerable dispersion in data types across our sample of studies: 25% of the estimates come from single cross-sections, 49% from pooled cross-sections, and 26% from panel data. Similarly, 36% of the estimates use OLS only, 22% use fixed effects (involving repeated observations of the units upon which the externalities may arise, e.g. firms or regions), 26% use instrumental variables (listed in **Table B.3**), and the remaining 20% use different methods (GLS, Heckman's selection and multilevel

modelling). These statistics also indicate that in only 1% of the cases are there overlaps between the different methods, which correspond to the joint use of fixed effects and instrumental variables.

When considering the economic development of the countries studied, we find that the majority the estimates (76%) are high-income. 19% are upper-middle income and only 5% are lower-middle income (no country covered is in the low income category). These statistics highlight the geographical dispersion of the existing estimates, but also the relatively limited evidence available from lower-income, developing countries. As discussed above, the latter may be the ones where social returns to education are the highest, given their relatively lower average schooling levels and the potentially greater impact of schooling from a social perspective.

Across the countries and time periods considered, we find an average percentage of graduates of 14% and 10.1 years of schooling. Again, these relatively large means reflect the large percentage of estimates from developed countries and recent years, following significant expansions of the education systems of developing countries.

Interestingly, the average number of observations used in each estimate is very large, at 288,000 (even if this is driven mostly by one particular study which studies around eight million observations). Moreover, on average, the estimates concern data regarding the year of 1990, even if the full range of years is very wide, starting at 1950 and ending in 2010. In contrast, the year of (journal) publication of the articles is, on average, 2007, covering the period 1993 to 2020.

Finally, the journals where the estimates are published are typically well reputed, with an average ABS (2018) ranking of 3.19 (and median of 3), where 5 is the maximum (namely the 'top five' journals in economics) and 1 the minimum (typically journals of limited international scope). Using the article influence score measure, the mean is 2.47 (and median of 1.6). The (log) number of Google scholar citations is 4.63 (about 100 citations), with a maximum of 7.49 (nearly 1,800, Rauch (1993)).

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Methodology

To investigate the drivers of social returns, we perform a meta-analysis by estimating the following equation:

$$\hat{\beta}_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \sum_{k=1}^k \alpha_k X_{jk} + e_{ij}, \quad (1)$$

where  $\hat{\beta}_{ij}$  is the  $i^{th}$  estimate from the  $j^{th}$  study and  $X_{jk}$  are the meta-independent variables that follow from the study design as described above.

However, note that in our analysis the estimated effects are not necessarily directly comparable as they are diverse along different dimensions. For instance, we consider in this study both the social returns to education and the external effects of education, depending on the approach adopted in each paper. Some estimates concern years of schooling while others the share of university graduates. The dependent variables include productivity, wages and rents. In order to analyse all estimates from the multiple studies jointly, we transform the estimated effects into partial correlation coefficients (PCC). The PCCs, which measure the association of a dependent variable and the independent variable, are widely used in economic meta-analyses to standardise effect sizes.

The formula we use is:

$$PCC(\hat{\beta}_{ij}) = \frac{t_{ij}}{\sqrt{t_{ij}^2 + df_{ij}}}, \quad (2)$$

where  $t_{ij}$  is the t-statistic of the effect under study and  $df_{ij}$  are the degrees of freedom for the  $i^{th}$  estimation in the  $j^{th}$  paper. Note that several selected studies do not report the number of regressors used, which prevent us from considering the exact value of  $df$ . In these cases, we used an approximation of the number of regressors based on our best analysis of the information available.<sup>6</sup> Finally, the standard errors of the PCCs, SE, are calculated as:

$$SE(PCC_{ij}) = \sqrt{\frac{1 - PCC_{ij}^2}{df_{ij}}}$$

We present the resulting descriptive statistics of the t-statistics and PCCs in **Table 2**. We find that 62.8% of the estimates indicate a significantly positive effect (at the 5% level), 33.6% are insignificant, and 3.6% are significantly negative. The mean and median t-statistics for the full sample are 3.68 and 2.47, respectively, while the PCC values have a mean and median values of 0.04 and 0.02. The distributions of t-statistics and PCCs are presented in **Figures 1** and **B.1**.<sup>7</sup>

PCC values by study characteristics are presented in **Table B.1**, including information on the number of estimates and their range. This analysis indicates some relevant patterns including that: (1) PCCs are higher at the firm level (0.076); (2) PCCs tend to be lower under fixed-effects (0.016) and IV (0.034) estimators, compared to the OLS estimator (0.043); (3) PCCs are higher when measuring social returns (0.043) than when measuring exclusively spillovers (0.040); and (4) PCCs are (much)

<sup>6</sup>One challenge here concerns studies based on panel data sets with a large number of individuals and a small number of time periods, which may create a significant difference between N and df.

<sup>7</sup>See also **Figure B.2** which illustrates the range of estimates over the years in which they were published.

higher in low-income economies (0.063, compared to 0.037 in high-income economies). Later in the paper, we test the extent to which these patterns hold when considering the multiple dimensions simultaneously under the meta-regression below.

### 3.2 Publication bias

An important question in the context of meta-analyses is if particular types of estimates, namely those that are significant, are more likely to be published. Studies that find spillovers to schooling may be regarded as more interesting and relevant in contrast to those that do not uncover significant effects. If the former are more likely to be reported and published than the latter, such selection would contribute to a skewed understanding of education externalities and possibly incorrect decisions from a policy perspective.

We obtain a first indication of the extent of publication bias in this literature by using the funnel plot methodology. The funnel plot (Light & Pillemer 1984) is a scatter plot of the reported study effect (i.e. PCCs in our case) against measures of study precision (i.e. the inverse standard errors of PCCs). In the absence of publication bias, the shape of the scatter plot should resemble a symmetric inverted funnel because the sampling error is random.

**Figure 2** presents a funnel plot based on the data that we collected. We find that the plot is skewed, given that the right tail is much more prominent compared to the left tail. This suggests that a large share of negative estimates may be missing from the funnel plot, which would indicate publication bias in the form of selection for a positive sign. However, this method of publication bias detection is based on visual inspection only, which may lack objectivity and accuracy.

In order to provide a more rigorous analysis, next we perform a trim-and-fill analysis in order to estimate if studies are potentially missing from our meta data set. This trim and fill method (Duval & Tweedie 2000) involves dropping (trimming) the less precise estimates causing funnel plot asymmetry and introducing (filling) those studies potentially missing from the meta-analysis because of publication bias. The result of the trim and fill approach is presented in **Table 4**. We find that: (1) the mean spillover effect based on the 1,021 observed estimates is 0.005; (2) there are 334 estimates potentially missing and subsequently imputed; and (3) after including such estimates, we obtain a new estimate (based on the observed plus imputed 1,335 estimates) of the mean spillover effect of 0.004.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to funnel plot, we also make use of the meta-regression to further detect publication bias. We follow the FAT-PET-PEESE approach (Stanley & Doucouliagos 2012) to test whether the

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<sup>8</sup>**Figure B.3** reveals that a substantial portion of negative estimates is missing from the funnel plot, due to publication bias in the form of selection for a positive sign. As indicated before, if these missing estimates were included in the meta-analysis, the resulting funnel plot would be more symmetrical.

effect is genuine or influenced by publication bias. We start out by regressing the t-statistic of the  $k^{th}$  estimate on the inverse of the standard error ( $1/SE$ ) by considering the following equation:

$$t_k = \beta_0 + \beta_1(1/SE_k) + u_k. \quad (3)$$

We then test the null hypothesis that the intercept term  $\beta_0$  is equal to zero - this corresponds to the funnel-asymmetry test (FAT). If  $\beta_0$  is statistically significantly different from zero, then the distribution of the effect sizes is regarded as asymmetric. However, regardless of publication selection, we are also able to identify an empirical effect by testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient  $\beta_1$  is equal to zero in equation 3 - this corresponds to the precision-effect test (PET). If  $\beta_1$  is statistically significantly different from zero, this indicates the presence of a genuine effect.

Moreover, we can also estimate the magnitude of the empirical effect corrected for publication selection by estimating the following equation which has no intercept:

$$t_k = \beta_0 SE_k + \beta_1(1/SE_k) + u_k \quad (4)$$

We test the null hypothesis that the intercept term  $\beta_1$  is equal to zero in equation 4. If  $\beta_1$  is statistically significantly different from zero, this indicates that a non-zero effect does actually exist in the literature, and  $\beta_1$  can be regarded as its estimate. This corresponds to the precision-effect estimate with standard error (PEESE) test. To test the robustness of the  $\beta$  coefficients in equations 3 and 4 above, we use four estimators: OLS estimator, which does not assign any weight to each estimate; weighted least square (WLS) estimator, which uses either the inverse of the number of estimates reported in the study as a sampling weight or the inverse of the imputed quality level of the journal as an analytical weight; and a least square dummy variable (LSDV) estimator which controls for study-level fixed effects. All estimation procedures calculate standard errors at the study level.

The regression results based on the FAT-PET-PEESE test for publication bias are presented in **Table 3**. We find the following: First, in the FAT test, the null hypothesis that  $\beta_0 = 0$  of equation 3 is rejected, which indicates the presence of publication bias. Second, in the PET test, the null hypothesis that  $\beta_0 = 0$  of equation 3 is rejected as well, which implies that a true empirical effect does exist in the literature (even if there is a publication selection bias). Finally, in the PEESE test, the coefficient  $\beta_1$  in equation 4 is statistically significantly different from zero, which indicates the the magnitude of the empirical effect corrected for publication selection is significantly positive, ranging between 0.017 and 0.02. In conclusion, we find evidence of publication bias, although the FAT-PET-PEESE test also indicates that there is a genuinely positive spillover effect.

### 3.3 Citation bias

We are also interested in the novel concept of 'citation bias', which we define as the extent to which particular types of results tend to be cited more. Specifically, we want to know if significantly positive estimates tend to receive more citations than other types of results. This analysis is possible given our collection of citation counts from Google Scholar, as mentioned above.

We believe this approach is relevant as the screening or consideration of studies in the literature can in some cases be more relevant at the citation stage than in terms of publication. Indeed, given the large number of journals around the world, many studies are eventually published, even if only after several rejections from journals of possibly increasingly lower average standing. In this case, the extent to which a paper is cited may be a relevant dimension of bias in its impact on the literature.

We propose a simple method to shed light on the question above, regarding potentially higher citations for studies of particular characteristics, namely significantly positive spillovers. Specifically, we regress the log number of citations on the respective PCCs (its mean across estimates of each study) in the context of the following equation:

$$\log C_j = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 PCC_{ij} + \alpha_2 Z_j + u_{ij}, \quad (5)$$

where  $\log C_j$  is log citations of the  $j^{th}$  study, and  $Z_j$  includes two characteristics of the study that may directly affect its citations record, namely the publication age and the imputed journal quality. Studies published in journals of higher standing and which have been published for more years will typically have more citations - it therefore may be useful to control for these variables. These dimensions may or not be directly related to the magnitude of the PCC, depending on the relevance of publication bias, which our earlier findings show to be present in this literature. We argue that, if the coefficient  $\alpha_1$  is statically significant and positive, that would indicate that studies with larger spillovers are more likely to be cited. In other words, researchers would tend to pay more attention to significant, large results, and the literature could therefore be developing a biased view of social returns to education.

First, when we run a scatter plot of the log number of citations against the average PCC value per study (**Figure B.4**), we find a negative but negligible correlation between the two variables, a preliminary result which is not consistent with citation bias. We then present the OLS estimates of different versions of equation 5 in **Table 5**. Column 1 does not include any controls, column 2 controls only for journal rank (using the more comprehensive ABS (2018) measure), column 3 controls for both journal rank and years since publication. We find in all cases that the PCCs are not positively

correlated with the log number of citations. This result is consistent with our preliminary evidence of no citation bias in this literature. When considering all PCCs from the multiple estimates per study (and clustering standard errors accordingly), we again find similar results, indicating no positive relationship between more positive social returns and higher citation counts. Again, we find similar results when considering our alternative measure of journal quality (**Table B.2**).

### 3.4 Drivers of social returns

We now turn to the analysis of the potential determinants of the magnitude of the social returns to education. For the benefit of robustness, our meta-regression considers six estimators: OLS, not assigning any weight to each estimate; meta-regression fixed-effects estimator, which weights each estimate by the within-study variance; meta-regression random-effects estimator, which weights each estimate by the within-study variance plus the between-studies variance; and the weighted least square (WLS) estimator, which uses either the inverse of the number of estimates reported in the study as a sampling weight, or the inverse of the standard error of PCCs and the imputed quality level of the journal where the study was published as an analytical weight.<sup>9</sup>

Our main results, based on the estimation of equation 1, are presented in **Table 6**. These prove to be generally very robust across all the specifications. First, we find that, compared to the regional level (i.e. the benchmark category), spillovers are higher at the firm level, with an increase of between 0.026 and 0.065. According to our discussion above, this positive effect may arise because people engage much more directly and intensively within firms, including through face-to-face communication. This facilitates deeper interactions, through which the human capital obtained by each one from schooling can more easily spillover to their coworkers. In contrast, the industry approach appears to deliver similar results when compared to the regional level.

Second, we do not find systematic differences in the estimates of spillovers when using the share of college-educated workers (as opposed to the average years of schooling). This result may be driven from the fact that most variation in average years of schooling is driven by variation in college-educated shares, at least in more developed countries (the large share of our sample).

Third, as expected, social returns are stronger than spillovers (external effects), with an increase ranging between 0.006 and 0.068. Social returns include both the individual own effects of schooling and the spillovers or externalities that schooling generates. To the extent that spillovers are positive,

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<sup>9</sup>Note that we do not consider the variables that are generated after the study is completed (journal rank, year of publication, and number of citations) as potential explanatory variables of the PCC. OLS and WLS procedures calculate standard errors clustering at the study level. We also standardized the two continuous variables, the number of observations and time period considered, in order to make their coefficients more easily interpretable. See Martins & Yang (2009) for another illustration of this approach in the context of a different literature.

social returns should be greater than spillover estimates, as indeed we find in our analysis. It is interesting that the magnitude of the coefficient is generally similar or higher than that of the intercept of these estimates (around 0.02), which underlines the relevance of both private and external returns.

Fourth, compared to the benchmark OLS estimator, fixed-effects and IV estimators tend to generate weaker spillover partial correlation coefficients. This difference may be explained by upward biases potentially present in OLS analyses. For instance, more educated workers may tend to flow to regions, industries or firms that are more productive and that pay higher wages, regardless of the spillovers. Such positive correlation between co-workers schooling and wages would generate a positive bias in OLS analyses. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that IV estimators tend to lead to the lowest PCCs of the three methods, even if not in all specifications. We present additional evidence on this point by listing the different IVs used across studies - see Table B.3.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, one can argue that it is precisely the IV estimators that deliver causal estimates of education externalities, as they draw on explicitly exogenous variation in aggregate schooling, and therefore should receive greater attention in this literature.

Fifth, compared to high-income economies (the benchmark category), upper-middle and lower-middle income economies tend to exhibit larger spillover effects, ranging between 0.028 and 0.067. Moreover, the effect from point estimates is always stronger in the case of lower-middle income economies than upper-middle income economies. This finding may be driven by the association between income and schooling levels and the diminishing scope for spillovers as schooling levels increase, as discussed above. If a large share of the workforce has higher levels of schooling, the scope for low-educated workers to learn from their high-educated co-workers is weaker, leading to lower spillovers as we find in our analysis.

Sixth, studies with more observations lead to smaller effects. Moreover, spillover effects tend to diminish with time, although the coefficient is not always significant. The latter result may be consistent with the finding above regarding country income levels: as a country increases its level of development and its average education, the scope for spillovers may also be reduced. This may also be consistent with the fact that some models indicate a downward trend over time in PCCs.

Finally, we find a potentially surprising result in that spillovers on productivity tend to be lower than those on wages. Presumably spillovers would first arise in productivity and then part of them would be accrued to workers in the form of higher wages. While we leave a more definite explanation for

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<sup>10</sup>From an economic perspective, a valid IV should influence the aggregate schooling variable that is driving the spillovers without affecting directly the outcome of interest (e.g. an individual's earnings). The table indicates that popular IVs amongst the 18 studies listed include compulsory schooling (and child-labour) laws, lagged demographic structures, and the presence of universities in the same region. As always, the adequacy of these and any other IVs can be debated. Such will also depend on the context of the study, including the institutional and historical setting of the country examined.



this result for future research, we speculate that at least part of the answer may involve measurement error in productivity. Measurement error is likely to be more significant in productivity than in wages, given that wages are directly observable whereas productivity needs to be estimated, using a range of variables that are not always present in the available data sets.

We also replicated the analysis above separately for estimates based on spillovers and social returns. The results are presented in Tables B.4 and B.5, respectively, and are very similar to the main findings discussed in this section.

### 3.5 Education levels

In an extension of our main results, we also examine the role of schooling levels in education spillovers. As discussed before, we consider both quantity and quality measures and, with respect to the former, both tertiary schooling and overall schooling years. We test the hypotheses that tertiary schooling and or higher quality of schooling may generate stronger spillover effects.

Additionally, we consider the hypothesis that greater dispersion in the distribution of schooling may increase education spillovers. In the limit, if every worker has the same level of schooling, a higher level of schooling for the entire workforce may not generate spillovers in the sense that there are no schooling gaps that would facilitate learning for some workers from their more-educated colleagues.

Specifically, we re-estimate our main specification from equation 1, which is now extended to include the three new variables above: share of tertiary graduates, average schooling years, and average schooling quality (as measured from PISA tests). Note that, when controlling for (holding constant) average schooling, increases in the share of tertiary graduates must imply a relative increase in low-educated workers and a relative decrease in medium-educated workers and consequently an increase in the dispersion of schooling.<sup>11</sup>

Table 7 presents the results of this new specification. First, we find that the coefficients of the remaining variables than schooling levels remain unchanged from our main results, at least qualitatively when not also quantitatively. Second, the new results indicate that tertiary schooling has a statistically significant positive effect on education spillovers, while average schooling has a statistically significant negative effect. Finally, we do not find significant relationships between PISA scores and education spillovers.

As discussed above, we interpret the opposite signs of the coefficients of the two education quantity variables as supporting the relevance of dispersion in schooling as a driver of education spillovers. In

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<sup>11</sup>Note that, in the new specification, we drop a number of less developed countries as we have no information on schooling quality there. We thus also drop the economic development measures that we used before, given the significant multicollinearity between the two.

this respect, increases in tertiary education may be a particularly relevant source of such externalities. This result is in line with our finding from the previous subsection regarding the role of economic development in that it is associated with large increases in tertiary education.

Our finding about the lack of a statistically significant positive association between schooling quality and education spillovers is potentially related to the same mechanism regarding education dispersion described above. Higher levels of schooling quality - as measured by PISA - may be particularly relevant for workers with compulsory schooling (when the PISA measurement takes place). This may boost their labour market perspectives but also reduces the potential learning from more schooled colleagues, thus diminishing the resulting spillovers. Any statistical noise in the PISA scores regarding schooling quality will also attenuate the effects that can be measured in our approach.

## 4 Conclusions

Education can generate important externalities and motivate the considerable involvement of governments in this sector around the world. Such externalities may also be stronger at lower levels of education. In this paper, we study the drivers of education externalities by conducting the first meta-analysis of the social returns to education literature. We analyse over 1,000 estimates from 32 journal articles published between 1993 and 2020, covering 15 countries in total, of which five are emerging or developing economies.

In a nutshell, our results indicate that: 1) there is evidence of publication bias but not of citation bias; 2) spillovers fall with economic development; 3) spillovers tend to be smaller under fixed-effects and IV estimators but larger when measured at the firm level; and 4) tertiary schooling and schooling dispersion tends to increase spillovers.

Overall, we believe our results highlight the relevance of the literature on social returns to education and the importance of its findings for national and international policy as well. In particular, these findings support the continuing investment in schooling - including tertiary education - in developing countries as they highlight the stronger social role of education at lower levels of economic development. Education may promote world development both from an individual private perspective and through the higher social returns that it generates across poorer countries. From an academic perspective, our results allow researchers to better compare their findings with respect to the existing literature, in particular studies developed under different methodologies.

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


Figure 1: Distribution of t-statistics

Note: Each observation corresponds to a t-statistic from an estimate. The total number of observations is 1,021. The full list of journal articles is presented in Appendix A.




Figure 2: Funnel-Asymmetry Plot

Note: This figure plots the values of PPCs that we obtained against their inverse standard errors. The total number of observations is 1,021.

Table 1: Definitions and summary statistics of explanatory variables

Variable	Description	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<b>Spillover scope</b>					
Regional level#	=1, if spillovers considered at regional level	0.86			
Industry level	=1, if spillovers considered at industry level	0.05			
Firm level	=1, if spillovers considered at firm level	0.09			
<b>Spillover measure</b>					
Average years of schooling#	=1, if agg schooling measured by avg schooling years	0.58			
Share of college-educated workers	=1, if agg schooling measured by college-educated share	0.42			
<b>Spillover outcome</b>					
Wages#	=1, if estimate based on wages	0.82			
Rental prices	=1, if estimate based on rents	0.02			
Productivity (firms)	=1, if estimate based on productivity	0.15			
<b>Spillover type</b>					
Social returns to education	=1, if no control for individual schooling	0.36			
External returns to education#	=1, if control for individual schooling	0.64			
<b>Data set type</b>					
Cross-section	=1, if cross-section data	0.25			
Pooled cross-sections#	=1, if pooled cross-sections	0.49			
Panel data	=1, if panel data	0.26			
<b>Estimation method</b>					
OLS#	=1, if OLS	0.36			
FE	=1, if fixed effects	0.22			
IV	=1, if instrumental variables	0.26			
Other methods	=1, if different from above	0.20			
<b>Country type</b>					
High-income #	=1, if high-income country	0.76			
Upper-middle income	=1, if upper-middle-income country	0.19			
Lower-middle income	=1, if lower-middle-income country	0.05			
<b>Schooling quantity and quality</b>					
Tertiary education completed	% of tertiary education graduates	0.14	0.08	0.01	0.31
Avg. years of total schooling	Average years of total schooling	10.10	2.35	4.54	13.42

Continued on next page

**Table 1 – continued from previous page**

Variable	Description	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Avg. PISA score	Avg PISA maths, science and reading scores	493.47	26.60	373	528
<b>Other data characteristics</b>					
Sample size	No. of observations (in thousands)	288.60	799.62	0.05	8034.75
Time period considered	Avg year of time period considered	1990.75	10.42	1950	2010
Year of publication	Year of journal publication	2007.27	5.59	1993	2020
Journal rank	From 1 (min) to 5 (max) (ABS 2018)	3.19	1.09	1	5
Article influence score		2.47	2.36	0.3	8.5
Log citations	Log Google Scholar citations (May 2020)	4.63	1.79	0	7.49

Notes: When the grouped variables include all possible categories, the benchmark categories omitted in the subsequent analysis are indicated by #. Low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of \$1,025 or less in 2018; lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between \$1,026 and \$3,995; upper middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between \$3,996 and \$12,375; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of \$12,376 or more. The data on 'Tertiary education completed' and 'Avg. years of total schooling' is from Barro & Lee (2013). The number of observations of Avg. PISA score is 851. The number of observations of Article influence score is 750. The number of observations of Log citations is 1,008. Two studies are not ranked using (ABS 2018). The Median (ABS 2018) ranking score is 3. The Median Article influence score is 1.6. The data on 'Avg. PISA score' is from the OECD database (unavailable for South Africa and Kenya). Also, we excluded the PISA score for China, which is only available from 2009 (and refers to a specific region of the country), while the period in the two Chinese studies considered in the meta-analysis is 1995-1998. The total number of observations is 1,021.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for effect size variables

	t-statistics	PCCs
Mean	3.68	0.04
Median	2.47	0.02
Maximum	89.00	0.51
Minimum	-6.00	-0.22
Std.Dev.	5.53	0.08
5%	-1.13	-0.04
10%	-0.22	-0.00
90%	9.09	0.12
95%	12.16	0.21
Observations	1,017	1,017

Note: When calculating the PCC, we assume that the degrees of freedom are equal to the number of observations when the studies do not report degrees of freedom nor the number of regressors used.



Table 3: Testing for publication bias

<b>FAT-PET test:</b> $t = \beta_0 + \beta_1(1/SE) + u$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	(OLS)	(WLS)	(WLS)	(LSDV)
Intercept( $H_0:\beta_0=0$ )	2.645	2.933	2.674	2.920
	(0.424)***	(0.473)***	(0.474)***	(0.022)***
1/SE( $H_0:\beta_1=0$ )	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.017
	(0.005)**	(0.006)**	(0.005)**	(0.005)***
Observations	1015	1015	1015	1015
R-squared	0.186	0.179	0.169	0.414
<b>PEESE test:</b> $t = \beta_0SE + \beta_1(1/SE) + u$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	(OLS)	(WLS)	(WLS)	(LSDV)
SE	1.858	1.696	2.134	-0.396
	(0.573)***	(0.473)***	(0.766)***	(1.263)
1/SE( $H_0:\beta_1=0$ )	0.019	0.020	0.020	0.017
	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.007)***	(0.005)***
$N$	1015	1015	1015	1015
$R^2$	0.323	0.325	0.304	0.577

Note: OLS denotes ordinary least square, which does not assign any weight to each estimate. WLS denotes weighted least square, which uses either the inverse of the number of estimates reported in the study as a sampling weight (column 2), or the inverse of the quality level of the study as an analytical weight (column 3). LSDV denotes least square dummy variables, which controls for study-level fixed effects. All estimation procedures calculate standard errors at the study level. The significance levels are \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 4: Trim-and-fill analysis of publication bias

Estimates	No. of estimates	Effect size	[95% Conf.Interval]
Observed	1021	0.005	[0.005, 0.005]
Observed+imputed	1355	0.004	[0.004, 0.004]

Note: The analysis used PCCs as effect sizes based on common-effect model. 'Imputed' denotes potential estimates which are missed because of publication bias.

Table 5: Test for citation bias, OLS models

	(1)	(2)	(3)
PCCs	-4.170 (6.205)	-5.761 (5.599)	-9.329 (3.097) <sup>***</sup>
Journal rank		0.955 (0.235) <sup>***</sup>	0.548 (0.162) <sup>***</sup>
Publication age			0.228 (0.035) <sup>***</sup>
Constant	4.050 (0.527) <sup>***</sup>	1.505 (0.656) <sup>**</sup>	0.047 (0.608)
Observations	31	31	31
R-squared	0.013	0.319	0.778

Note: Dependent variable: Log number of (Google Scholar) citations as of 2020. Journal rank based on (ABS 2018), from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). Publication age measured in years difference between 2020 and year of publication of article. All estimation procedures cluster standard errors at the study level. The significance levels are \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 6: Meta-regression: drivers of education spillovers

Dependent variable: PCCs	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(OLS)	(FE)	(RE)	(WLS)	(WLS)	(WLS)
<i>Scope of spillovers(Regional level#)</i>						
Industry level	-0.023 (0.012)*	0.002 (0.001)***	-0.023 (0.008)***	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.025 (0.013)*
Firm level	0.037 (0.018)*	0.026 (0.000)***	0.029 (0.008)***	0.065 (0.025)**	0.038 (0.009)***	0.050 (0.022)**
<i>Measures of spillovers (Average years of schooling#)</i>						
Share of college-educated workers	0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.000)***	0.001 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.012 (0.015)
<i>Outcomes effect of Spillovers (Wages of workers#)</i>						
Rental prices of land	-0.086 (0.028)***	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.080 (0.013)***	-0.084 (0.028)***	-0.021 (0.012)*	-0.083 (0.029)***
Productivity of firm	-0.078 (0.022)***	-0.010 (0.001)***	-0.073 (0.010)***	-0.065 (0.024)***	-0.029 (0.011)**	-0.074 (0.023)***
<i>Types of education spillovers (External returns#)</i>						
Social returns	0.068 (0.020)***	0.006 (0.000)***	0.063 (0.007)***	0.057 (0.021)**	0.021 (0.009)**	0.063 (0.022)***
<i>Estimation methods (OLS#)</i>						
FE	-0.022 (0.010)**	-0.006 (0.000)***	-0.019 (0.007)***	-0.026 (0.011)**	-0.010 (0.003)***	-0.030 (0.011)***
IV	-0.039 (0.014)***	-0.005 (0.000)***	-0.029 (0.005)***	-0.040 (0.016)**	-0.009 (0.003)***	-0.045 (0.016)***
Other estimation	0.029 (0.015)*	-0.004 (0.000)***	0.028 (0.005)***	-0.005 (0.017)	0.002 (0.012)	0.026 (0.016)
<i>Types of dataset (Pooled cross-sections#)</i>						

Continued on next page

Table 6 – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(OLS)	(FE)	(RE)	(WLS)	(WLS)	(WLS)
Panel data	0.001 (0.011)	0.007 (0.000)***	0.005 (0.008)	0.004 (0.015)	0.012 (0.005)**	0.001 (0.012)
Cross-section data	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.000)***	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.009 (0.015)
<i>Types of country analysed (High-income economies#)</i>						
Lower-middle income economies	0.053 (0.020)**	0.030 (0.002)***	0.040 (0.010)***	0.067 (0.028)**	0.036 (0.008)***	0.063 (0.024)**
Upper-middle income economies	0.036 (0.013)***	0.028 (0.001)***	0.031 (0.006)***	0.034 (0.015)**	0.031 (0.012)**	0.041 (0.015)**
<i>Other data characteristic</i>						
Time period considered	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.000)***	-0.009 (0.002)***	-0.015 (0.008)*	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.013 (0.008)
Data size	-0.018 (0.005)***	-0.004 (0.000)***	-0.017 (0.002)***	-0.013 (0.003)***	-0.008 (0.002)***	-0.019 (0.005)***
Constant	0.025 (0.009)***	0.010 (0.000)***	0.024 (0.004)***	0.033 (0.011)***	0.013 (0.003)***	0.027 (0.010)**
Observations	1017	1017	1017	1017	1017	1017
R-squared	0.175		0.283	0.257	0.228	0.184

Note: When the grouped variables include all possible categories, the categories omitted in the subsequent analysis (the benchmark categories) are indicated by #. OLS denotes ordinary least square, which does not assign any weight to each estimate. FE denotes meta-regression fixed-effects, which weight each estimate by the within-study variance (column 2). RE denotes meta-regression random-effects, which weight the each estimate by the within-study variance plus the between-studies variance (column 3). WLS denotes weighted least square, which uses either the inverse of the number of estimates reported in the study as a sampling weight (column 4), or the inverse of the standard error of PCCs (column 5) and the quality level of the study as an analytical weight (column 6). (1), (4), (5) and (6) calculate standard errors clustering at the study level. We standardize the two continuous variables, i.e. the number of observations and time period considered, in order to make them more interpretable. The significance levels are \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 7: Effects of schooling quantity and quality on education spillovers in developed countries

Dependent variable: PCCs	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(OLS)	(FE)	(RE)	(WLS)	(WLS)	(WLS)
<i>Scope of spillovers(Regional level#)</i>						
Industry level	-0.046 (0.022)*	0.001 (0.001)	-0.036 (0.014)**	-0.037 (0.014)**	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.052 (0.025)**
Firm level	0.052 (0.014)***	0.025 (0.000)**	0.050 (0.010)***	0.051 (0.015)***	0.044 (0.007)**	0.063 (0.017)***
<i>Measures of spillovers (Average years of schooling#)</i>						
Share of college-educated workers	0.013 (0.021)	0.004 (0.000)**	0.006 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.020)	0.002 (0.007)	0.018 (0.023)
<i>National schooling quantity and quality</i>						
Tertiary education completed	0.798 (0.312)**	0.084 (0.004)***	0.645 (0.137)***	0.553 (0.275)*	0.276 (0.105)**	0.862 (0.307)**
Avg. years of total schooling	-0.031 (0.016)*	-0.005 (0.000)**	-0.022 (0.006)**	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.004)**	-0.033 (0.016)**
Avg. PISA score	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)**	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)
<i>Outcomes effect of Spillovers (Wages of workers#)</i>						
Rental prices of land	-0.067 (0.017)***	-0.009 (0.002)***	-0.059 (0.017)***	-0.070 (0.018)***	-0.030 (0.012)**	-0.064 (0.018)***
Productivity of firm	-0.076 (0.023)***	-0.008 (0.001)**	-0.069 (0.012)***	-0.090 (0.027)***	-0.028 (0.010)**	-0.066 (0.021)***
<i>Types of education spillovers (External returns#)</i>						
Social returns	0.066 (0.018)***	0.007 (0.000)**	0.059 (0.008)***	0.069 (0.020)***	0.024 (0.009)**	0.063 (0.018)***

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Table 7 – continued from previous page

	(1) (OLS)	(2) (FE)	(3) (RE)	(4) (WLS)	(5) (WLS)	(6) (WLS)
<i>Estimation methods (OLS#)</i>						
FE	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.000)***	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.020 (0.017)
IV	-0.046 (0.019)**	-0.005 (0.000)***	-0.034 (0.006)***	-0.058 (0.023)**	-0.009 (0.003)***	-0.048 (0.019)**
Other estimation	0.029 (0.013)**	0.001 (0.001)***	0.032 (0.007)***	0.007 (0.023)	0.018 (0.015)	0.024 (0.015)
<i>Types of dataset (Pooled cross-sections#)</i>						
Panel data	-0.022 (0.017)	0.003 (0.000)***	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.026)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.029 (0.016)*
Cross-section data	-0.033 (0.012)**	-0.006 (0.000)***	-0.031 (0.009)***	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.022 (0.011)*	-0.044 (0.013)***
<i>Other data characteristic</i>						
Time period considered	-0.020 (0.011)*	-0.000 (0.000)***	-0.015 (0.003)***	-0.020 (0.011)*	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.019 (0.011)*
Data size	-0.015 (0.004)***	-0.004 (0.000)***	-0.014 (0.002)***	-0.012 (0.003)***	-0.007 (0.001)***	-0.015 (0.004)***
Constant	0.212 (0.215)	0.152 (0.008)***	0.260 (0.120)**	0.084 (0.269)	0.373 (0.189)*	0.187 (0.236)
Observations	777	777	777	777	777	777
R-squared	0.211		0.332	0.266	0.245	0.214

Note: When the grouped variables include all possible categories, the categories omitted in the subsequent analysis (the benchmark categories) are indicated by #. OLS denotes ordinary least square, which does not assign any weight to each estimate. FE denotes meta-regression fixed-effects, which weight each estimate by the within-study variance (column 2). RE denotes meta-regression random-effects, which weight each estimate by the within-study variance plus the between-study variance (column 3). WLS denotes weighted least square, which uses either the inverse of the number of estimates reported in the study as a sampling weight (column 4), or the inverse of the standard error of PCGs (column 5) and the quality level of the study as an analytical weight (column 6). (1), (4), (5) and (6) procedures calculate standard errors clustering at the study level. We standardize the two continuous variables, i.e. the number of observations and time period considered, in order to make them more interpretable. The significance levels are \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

# Appendices

## A List of journal articles considered in the meta-analysis

Acemoglu, D. & Angrist, J. (2000). How large are human-capital externalities? Evidence from compulsory schooling laws. *NBER Macroeconomics Annual*, 15, 9-59.

Battu, H., Belfield, C. R. & Sloane, P. J. (2003). Human capital spillovers within the workplace: evidence for Great Britain. *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*, 65(5), 575-594.

Bentsen, K. H., Munch, J. R. & Schaur, G. (2019). Education spillovers within the workplace. *Economics Letters*, 175, 57-59.

Bratti, M. & Leombruni, R. (2014). Local human capital externalities and wages at the firm level: Evidence from Italian manufacturing. *Economics of Education Review*, 41, 161-175.

Broersma, L., Edzes, A. J. & Van Dijk, J. (2016). Human capital externalities: effects for low-educated workers and low-skilled jobs. *Regional Studies*, 50(10), 1675-1687.

Canton, E. (2009). Human capital externalities and proximity: evidence from repeated cross-sectional data. *De Economist*, 157(1), 79-105.

Ciccone, A. & Peri, G. (2006). Identifying human-capital externalities: Theory with applications. *Review of Economic Studies*, 73(2), 381-412.

Czaller, L. (2017). Increasing social returns to human capital: evidence from Hungarian regions. *Regional Studies*, 51(3), 467-477.

Dalmazzo, A. & De Blasio, G. (2007a). Production and consumption externalities of human capital: An empirical study for Italy. *Journal of Population Economics*, 20(2), 359-382.

Dalmazzo, A. & De Blasio, G. (2007b). Social returns to education in Italian local labor markets. *Annals of Regional Science*, 41(1), 51-69.

Fan, W., Ma, Y. & Wang, L. (2015). Do we need more public investment in higher education? Estimating the external returns to higher education in China. *Asian Economic Papers*, 14(3), 88-104.

Groot, S. P. & de Groot, H. L. (2020). Estimating the skill bias in agglomeration externalities and social returns to education: Evidence from dutch matched worker-firm micro-data. *De Economist*, 168(1), 53-78.

Heuermann, D. (2011). Human capital externalities in Western Germany. *Spatial Economic Analysis*, 6(2), 139-165.

Iranzo, S. & Peri, G. (2009). Schooling externalities, technology, and productivity: Theory and evidence from US states. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 91(2), 420-431.

Joshi, R., Subramanian, C. & Swaminathan, S. (2019). Are There Social Returns to Education

in Developing Countries? Evidence from Indonesia. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 67(2), 315-332.

Kimenyi, M. S., Mwabu, G. & Manda, D. K. (2006). Human capital externalities and private returns to education in Kenya. *Eastern Economic Journal*, 32(3), 493-513.

Kirby, S. & Riley, R. (2008). The external returns to education: UK evidence using repeated cross-sections. *Labour economics*, 15(4), 619-630.

Liu, Z. (2007). The external returns to education: Evidence from Chinese cities. *Journal of Urban Economics*, 61(3), 542-564.

Liu, Z. (2014). Human capital externalities in cities: evidence from Chinese manufacturing firms. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 14(3), 621-649.

Michaud, P. C. & Vencatachellum, D. (2003). Human capital externalities in South Africa. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 51(3), 603-628.

Martins, P. S. & Jin, J. Y. (2010). Firm-level social returns to education. *Journal of Population Economics*, 23(2), 539-558.

Moretti, E. (2004a). Workers' education, spillovers, and productivity: evidence from plant-level production functions. *American Economic Review*, 94(3), 656-690.

Moretti, E. (2004b). Estimating the social return to higher education: evidence from longitudinal and repeated cross-sectional data. *Journal of Econometrics*, 121(1-2), 175-212.

Muller, C. & Nordman, C. J. (2011). Within-firm human capital externalities in Tunisia. *Journal of Development Studies*, 47(4), 657-675.

Muravyev, A. (2008). Human capital externalities Evidence from the transition economy of Russia. *Economics of Transition*, 16(3), 415-443.

Purnastuti, L. & Salim, R. (2015). Externalities and the social return to education in Indonesia. *Australian Journal of Labour Economics*, 18(1), 53.

Rauch, J. E. (1993). Productivity gains from geographic concentration of human capital: evidence from the cities. *Journal of Urban Economics*, 34(3), 380-400.

Rudd, J. B. (2000). Empirical evidence on human capital spillovers. Federal Reserve System.

Sand, B. M. (2013). A re-examination of the social returns to education: Evidence from US cities. *Labour Economics*, 24, 97-106.

Wheeler, C. H. (2007). Do localization economies derive from human capital externalities?. *Annals of Regional Science*, 41(1), 31-50.

Winters, J. V. (2014). STEM graduates, human capital externalities, and wages in the US. *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 48, 190-198.



Wirz, A. M. (2008). Private returns to education versus education spill-over effects. *Empirical Economics*, 34(2), 315-342.

## B Additional tables and figures

Table B.1: Education spillovers: PCCs by study characteristics

Study Characteristics	Observations	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
<b>Scope</b>					
Regional level#	875	0.039	0.015	-0.223	0.507
Industry level	48	0.007	0.007	0.006	0.009
Firm level	86	0.076	0.048	-0.008	0.477
Regional-level and Industry-level	8	0.050	0.039	0.023	0.112
<b>Measure</b>					
Average years of schooling#	593	0.047	0.019	-0.223	0.506
Share of college-educated workers	424	0.032	0.011	-0.204	0.507
<b>Outcome</b>					
Wages of workers#	838	0.045	0.016	-0.223	0.507
Rental prices of land	23	0.022	0.019	0.013	0.041
Productivity of firms	156	0.018	0.012	-0.053	0.136
<b>Type</b>					
External returns to education#	650	0.040	0.016	-0.223	0.507
Social returns to education	367	0.043	0.013	-0.204	0.477
<b>Data Set Type</b>					
Pooled cross-sections#	503	0.044	0.009	-0.223	0.507
Cross-section	249	0.057	0.041	-0.060	0.477
Panel data	265	0.019	0.012	-0.053	0.470
<b>Estimation method</b>					
OLS#	357	0.043	0.017	-0.137	0.477
FE	181	0.016	0.014	-0.053	0.136
IV	234	0.034	0.003	-0.204	0.311
FE and IV	30	0.016	0.010	-0.006	0.056
OLS and IV	10	0.042	0.042	0.033	0.062
Other estimation	205	0.069	0.042	-0.223	0.507
<b>Country Type</b>					
High-income economies#	777	0.037	0.010	-0.223	0.507
Upper-middle income economies	189	0.049	0.037	-0.053	0.263
Lower-middle income economies	51	0.063	0.045	-0.060	0.306

Note: When the grouped variables include all possible categories, the categories omitted in the subsequent analysis (the benchmark categories) are indicated by #.

Table B.2: Testing for citation bias, OLS models, alternative journal ranking

	(1)	(2)	(3)
PCCs	-4.170 (6.205)	-2.303 (5.240)	-5.974 (3.105)*
Article influence scores		0.540 (0.135)***	0.325 (0.084)***
Publication age			0.221 (0.033)***
Constant	4.050 (0.527)***	3.086 (0.516)***	1.016 (0.470)**
Observations	31	25	25
R-squared	0.013	0.391	0.806

Note: Dependent variable: Log number of (Google Scholar) citations as of 2020. Journal rank based on Article influence scores. Publication age measured in years difference between 2020 and year of publication of article. All estimation procedures cluster standard errors at the study level. The significance levels are \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table B.3: Instrumental variables used in each study

Study	IV
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000)	State compulsory education and child-labour laws
Bratti and Leombruni (2014)	Interaction between lagged change (1990-95) in university supply of manufacturing-related courses spurred by a reform and 20-year lagged demographic structure
Ciccone and Peri (2006)	State compulsory education and child-labour laws
Czaller (2017)	Literacy rate among the population aged seven and above in 1880s
Dalmazzo and De Blasio (2007a)	Local-lagged demographic structure
Dalmazzo and De Blasio (2007b)	Lagged demographic structure
Fan et al. (2015)	Number of provincial '211' universities
Groot and de Groot (2020)	Presence of universities
Heurmann (2011)	Number of regional grammar schools and of students attending them
Iranzo and Peri (2009)	Compulsory schooling laws, proximity to land-grant colleges, and push-driven immigration of highly educated foreigners across U.S. states
Liu (2007)	Compulsory education law and college graduates share in city population in 1990
Liu (2014)	City library book collection
Martins and Jin (2010)	Lagged firm average schooling and lagged retirement share
Moretti (2004a)	Fraction of large firm openings among all the firm openings in city (excl 3-digit industry)
Moretti (2004b)	Lagged city demographic structure and presence of a land-grant college
Muravyev (2008)	City college share in 1989 and number of higher education establishments at end of Soviet period
Purnastuti and Salim (2015)	Ratio of higher education institutions per 1,000 people and percentage of households using clean water
Sand (2013)	City's lagged demographic structure and national-level changes in college completion; immigration enclaves; city climate

Note: This table describes the instrumental variables used in the social returns to education studies that implement an instrumental variables approach. The full list of papers and their details can be found in Appendix A. See also Muller and Nordman (2011) which includes two estimates using IV.

Table B.4: Meta-regression: drivers of education spillovers

Dependent variable: PCCs	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(OLS)	(FE)	(RE)	(WLS)	(WLS)	(WLS)
<i>Scope of spillovers(Regional level#)</i>						
Industry level	-0.023 (0.006)***	0.004 (0.001)***	-0.022 (0.008)***	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.025 (0.007)***
Firm level	0.019 (0.010)**	0.029 (0.001)***	0.015 (0.009)*	0.065 (0.017)***	0.026 (0.005)***	0.022 (0.012)*
<i>Measures of spillovers (Average years of schooling#)</i>						
Share of college-educated workers	0.005 (0.008)	0.002 (0.000)***	0.006 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)	0.006 (0.010)
<i>Estimation methods (OLS#)</i>						
FE	-0.014 (0.007)**	0.001 (0.001)	-0.010 (0.012)	-0.028 (0.009)***	-0.009 (0.004)**	-0.019 (0.008)**
IV	-0.012 (0.004)***	-0.008 (0.000)***	-0.011 (0.006)*	0.001 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.001)***	-0.015 (0.003)***
Other estimation	0.038 (0.008)***	-0.005 (0.000)***	0.036 (0.006)***	0.001 (0.008)	0.008 (0.004)**	0.040 (0.009)***
<i>Types of dataset (Pooled cross-sections#)</i>						
Panel data	-0.005 (0.009)	0.004 (0.001)***	-0.006 (0.012)	0.004 (0.010)	0.009 (0.004)**	0.003 (0.011)
Cross-section data	0.008 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.000)***	0.008 (0.007)	0.008 (0.006)	0.002 (0.003)	0.005 (0.006)
<i>Types of country analysed (High-income economies#)</i>						
Lower-middle income economies	0.043 (0.011)***	0.031 (0.002)***	0.034 (0.010)***	0.056 (0.014)***	0.037 (0.006)***	0.057 (0.013)***
Upper-middle income economies	0.029 (0.006)***	0.037 (0.001)***	0.029 (0.008)***	0.029 (0.008)***	0.039 (0.006)***	0.036 (0.007)***

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Table B.4 – continued from previous page

	(1) (OLS)	(2) (FE)	(3) (RE)	(4) (WLS)	(5) (WLS)	(6) (WLS)
<i>Other data characteristic</i>						
Time period considered	-0.009 (0.002)***	-0.001 (0.000)***	-0.008 (0.002)***	-0.010 (0.003)***	-0.002 (0.001)***	-0.008 (0.002)***
Data size	-0.022 (0.006)***	-0.002 (0.000)***	-0.019 (0.005)***	-0.024 (0.006)***	-0.006 (0.001)***	-0.019 (0.005)***
Constant	0.018 (0.004)***	0.009 (0.000)***	0.017 (0.004)***	0.018 (0.003)***	0.010 (0.001)***	0.017 (0.004)***
Observations	650	650	650	650	650	650
R-squared	0.172		0.271	0.340	0.238	0.186

Note: When the grouped variables include all possible categories, the categories omitted in the subsequent analysis (the benchmark categories) are indicated by #. OLS denotes ordinary least squares, which does not assign weights. FE denotes meta-regression fixed-effects, which weight each estimate by the within-study variance (column 2). RE denotes meta-regression random-effects, which weight each estimate by the within-study variance plus the between-study variance (column 3). WLS denotes weighted least square, which uses either the inverse of the number of estimates reported in the study as a sampling weight (column 4), or the inverse of the standard error of PCCs (column 5) and the quality level of the study as an analytical weight (column 6). (1), (4), (5) and (6) use robust standard errors. We standardize the two continuous variables, i.e. the number of observations and time period considered, in order to make them more interpretable. The significance levels are \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table B.5: Meta-regression heterogeneity analysis - social re-  
turns

<b>Dependent variable: PCCs</b>	(1) (OLS)	(2) (FE)	(3) (RE)	(4) (WLS)	(5) (WLS)	(6) (WLS)
<i>Scope of spillovers (Regional level#)</i>						
Firm level	0.190 (0.030)***	0.009 (0.001)***	0.147 (0.021)***	0.138 (0.025)***	0.067 (0.016)***	0.184 (0.034)***
<i>Measures of spillovers (Average years of schooling#)</i>						
Share of college-educated workers	0.041 (0.020)**	-0.092 (0.002)***	0.009 (0.011)	0.014 (0.027)	-0.032 (0.012)***	0.041 (0.020)**
<i>Outcomes effect of Spillovers (Wages of workers#)</i>						
Rental prices of land	-0.058 (0.026)**	-0.087 (0.002)***	-0.080 (0.017)***	-0.109 (0.025)***	-0.065 (0.016)***	-0.060 (0.029)**
Productivity of firm	-0.003 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.027 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.019)
<i>Estimation methods (OLS#)</i>						
FE	-0.059 (0.017)***	-0.003 (0.000)***	-0.050 (0.012)***	-0.056 (0.021)***	-0.014 (0.005)***	-0.076 (0.017)***
IV	-0.087 (0.020)***	-0.004 (0.000)***	-0.070 (0.009)***	-0.110 (0.025)***	-0.011 (0.003)***	-0.093 (0.019)***
Other estimation	-0.029 (0.040)	0.079 (0.003)***	0.006 (0.029)	0.016 (0.026)	0.045 (0.023)**	-0.032 (0.042)
<i>Types of dataset (Pooled cross-sections#)</i>						
Panel data	-0.089 (0.025)***	0.005 (0.001)***	-0.076 (0.019)***	-0.065 (0.031)**	-0.018 (0.013)	-0.066 (0.023)***
Cross-section data	-0.114 (0.024)***	0.003 (0.001)***	-0.095 (0.017)***	-0.087 (0.033)***	-0.032 (0.011)***	-0.100 (0.023)***

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Table B.5 – continued from previous page

	(1) (OLS)	(2) (FE)	(3) (RE)	(4) (WLS)	(5) (WLS)	(6) (WLS)
<i>Types of country analysed (High-income economies#)</i>						
Upper-middle income economies	0.091 (0.025)***	-0.054 (0.002)***	0.054 (0.015)***	0.040 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.013)	0.087 (0.026)***
<i>Other data characteristic</i>						
Time period considered	-0.056 (0.013)***	0.001 (0.000)*	-0.041 (0.008)***	-0.032 (0.012)***	-0.012 (0.006)**	-0.049 (0.015)***
Data size	-0.010 (0.004)**	-0.002 (0.000)***	-0.009 (0.003)***	-0.014 (0.004)***	-0.008 (0.003)***	-0.012 (0.004)***
Constant	0.104 (0.022)***	0.101 (0.002)***	0.119 (0.011)***	0.141 (0.026)***	0.084 (0.015)***	0.102 (0.024)***
Observations	367	367	367	367	367	367
R-squared	0.278		0.480	0.313	0.327	0.265

Note: When the grouped variables include all possible categories, the categories omitted in the subsequent analysis (the benchmark categories) are indicated by #. OLS denotes ordinary least squares, which does not assign weights. FE denotes meta-regression fixed-effects, which weights each estimate by the within-study variance (column 2). RE denotes meta-regression random-effects, which weights the each estimate by the within-study variance plus the between-studies variance (column 3). WLS denotes weighted least squares, which uses either the inverse of the number of estimates reported in the study as a sampling weight (column 4), or the inverse of the standard error of PCCs (column 5) and the quality level of the study as an analytical weight (column 6). (1), (4), (5) and (6) calculate robust standard errors. We standardize the two continuous variables, i.e. the number of observations and time period considered, in order to make them more interpretable. The significance levels are \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .




Figure B.1: The distribution of PCCs




Figure B.2: Education spillover effects by the year of the publication

Note: In order to obtain a clearer picture, we dropped two observations with extreme high/low values. The number of estimates is 1,019.






Figure B.3: Trim-and-fill-funnel plot

Note: The values of PCCs obtained are plotted against the inverse standard errors. 'Imputed studies' denotes potential estimates which may be missed because of publication bias.




Figure B.4: The relationship between log number of citations and PCCs

Note: The log number of citations are plotted against PCCs