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ABSTRACT

Sir! I'd Rather Go to School, Sir!*

Military service is a popular method of army recruitment for governments of developing countries that are particularly prone to conflict. This study contributes to the largely under-researched issues of military service by looking at an unintended consequence of a military service exemption policy and answering a principal question: is there a fear of conscription among the youth? It uses a discontinuity in the military service law in an under-researched country, Iran, and offers causal evidence that fear of conscription entices young men to get more education against their will. This exogenous increase is used to estimate returns to education.

JEL Classification: I23, J47, I26, N35

Keywords: conscription, coercive labor market, natural experiment, regression discontinuity, higher-educational attainment

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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY

96 out of 99 countries that experienced internal armed conflict between 1946 and 2014 are developing countries. Moreover, at least one side of all 122 interstate armed conflicts in the same period has been a developing country. This indicates that having a strong yet relatively inexpensive army is critical for the state in these countries. Conscription is one popular solution. Despite the prevalence and importance of conscription, its different aspects and consequences have remained largely under-researched.

This paper sheds light on a principal issue of military service in one of the most understudied countries, Iran. The research question is whether conscription is disliked by the potential conscripts. In particular, the paper shows that the fear of conscription entices young men to get more education against their will. The paper uses a discontinuity in the military service law in Iran to answer this question. Iranian males become eligible for military service when they reach 18 and are most typically drafted without omission. But, between 2000 and 2010, sole sons whose fathers' age was over 58 at the time of son's eligibility were exempted from the service. Sole sons whose fathers' age was a bit below the threshold were not eligible for this exemption, but could have exploited a loophole: they could have attended school until their fathers' age reached or surpassed the threshold, in order to obtain exemption upon leaving school. This study shows that, as a result of this, there is a discontinuity in education levels of sole sons at the father's age of 59; sole sons whose fathers' age was below the threshold were 13 percentage points (20 percent) more likely to attend college than those whose fathers' age was above it. This exogenous increase is used to estimate returns to college education. The important policy implications of these results are discussed.

1 Introduction

96 out of 99 countries that experienced internal armed conflict between 1946 and 2014 are developing countries.¹ Moreover, at least one side of all 122 interstate armed conflicts in the same period has been a developing country.² This indicates that in developing countries, having a strong yet relatively inexpensive army is critical for the state. Military service, which is mandatory in over 60 countries around the world (Chartsbin, 2011), is a relatively inexpensive way governments use to recruit for their armed forces. Yet, its compulsory nature remains controversial.

Despite the prevalence and importance of conscription, its different aspects and consequences, particularly in developing countries and during peace times, have remained largely under-researched.³ As one of the few studies on this topic, this paper uses a novel natural experimental setting to document whether and to what extent (if any) the compulsory nature of military service is abhorred in a developing country at the time of peace. The results draw on some of the fundamental pillars of economic science, including incentives, decision making, and inefficiency and utilize data from one of the most understudied developing countries, Iran.

Military service for males of age 18 and above is compulsory in Iran. But in some cases exemption is possible. For instance, certain disabilities and chronic conditions make one eligible for permanent exemption. College and graduate students are also exempted (temporarily) from service during their studies. One particular case of exemption is that of a sole son; between 2000 and 2011, a sole son could obtain exemption to take care of his

¹The three developed countries are France, Spain and United Kingdom. Source is author's calculation from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2015. The dataset is provided by Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Center for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). See Gleditsch et al. (2002), Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015), and Themner (2015) for the description of the dataset. In this dataset, an armed conflict (internal or interstate) is defined as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths." For a more in-depth discussion on definitions, see <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/>.

²Source is author's calculation from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2015. For a definition of conflict, as well as information on data, see footnote 1.

³As will be discussed, most of the literature is about developed countries and draft at the time of war.

elderly father if his father was of age 59 or older (over 58) when he had reached his 18th birthday and became eligible for the military service.⁴ This implies that those sole sons whose fathers are younger than 59 may miss this opportunity. Nevertheless, they also have a means by which to benefit from this exemption; an 18 year-old sole son whose father's age is below but close to 59 can get temporary exemption by attending school (i.e. college) for a few years and, in doing so, postpone his conscription. If throughout the duration of his study, his father reaches or surpasses the age of 59, the son will become eligible for exemption. In effect, 18 year-old sole sons whose fathers' age is above 58 (59 or older) have less incentive to continue their education than those whose father is 58 or younger.

This study establishes that, in Iran, there is a discontinuity in the college attainment rate of sole sons whose fathers' age was over 58 when they were 18 years old relative to the sole sons with slightly younger fathers. The size of this discontinuity is at least about 13 percentage points (20 percent). Because the military exemption law does not apply to any other group except the sole sons, the discontinuity in the educational attainment should only exist for sole sons. As a robustness check, this study demonstrates that there is no discontinuity in college attainment among the sisters of sole sons nor the sons and daughters of multiple-son households. We can, therefore, conclude that fear of conscription incentivizes sole sons to obtain more education against their will. Thus, if there had not been such an exemption law, sole sons of younger fathers would not have attended college as much. This exogenous increase in college attendance may be used to estimate returns of college on various outcomes, such as wages. But potentially because of data limitations, this exogenous increase turns out to be a weak instrument for college attendance and the IV estimates of returns to college are not reliable.

By showing that individuals are willing to get more education, despite their will, to avoid conscription, this study provides evidence for the inefficiency of conscription and offers a

⁴The required age of father has increased to 65 in 2012 and then to 70 in 2014. Later, the age requirement was abrogated and replaced with a father's disability that impedes him from working. This has remained the law until now that this paper is written.

lower bound (minimum) for the size of these inefficiencies.

There have been many studies on the impact of conscription in developed countries, and almost all of which pertain to war times. Angrist (1990) is a seminal work that uses Vietnam draft lottery as a natural experiment as draft-eligible individuals were conscripted based on randomly chosen birth-days. Most studies that came later (such as those below) utilize the same natural experiment. Angrist (1990) studies the effect of conscription at war time on earnings of US veterans later in life. He finds 15% lower earnings for veterans vs. non-veterans in 1970s and 80s. Angrist et al. (2011), however, revisit the question 20 years later and find, notably, that the gap between veterans and non-veterans earnings has disappeared by the early 1990s. Angrist and Chen (2011) attribute this to flattening of wages in mid-life and increase in schooling of veterans due to the Vietnam War GI Bill. Autor et al. (2011), on the other hand, find a decline in employment and a rise in disability receipts by Vietnam War Veterans (particularly for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) in 2000s; this is while Angrist et al. (2010) found no evidence of either one in 1990s. Conley and Heerwig (2012) find that interestingly, there is no impact of draft on post war mortality of veterans vs. non-veterans in the long-run. Siminski and Ville (2011) find the same results for Australian veterans who were drafted during the Vietnam War. All studies on various impacts of the Vietnam-era draft⁵ inevitably use this draft implemented during a war. Therefore, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of war vs. the effect of conscription in these studies. They remain silent about the effect of conscription during peacetime.

There is very little research on the impacts of conscription during peacetime on various outcomes and markets, such as human capital accumulation (cognitive and non-cognitive skills, educational attainment, and health), earnings, hours worked, labor markets, and marriage markets. Two studies that do examine these impacts are Bauer et al. (2012) and

⁵For example, Schmitz and Conley (2016) find that “veterans with a high genetic predisposition for smoking were more likely to have been smokers, smoke heavily, and are at a higher risk of being diagnosed with cancer or hypertension at older ages.” They also find that the effect is smaller among those who went to college after the war. Conley and Heerwig (2011) study the impact of the same draft on residential stability, housing tenure, and extended family residence after the War and find mixed results.

Card and Cardoso (2012). Using regression discontinuity, Bauer et al. (2012) compare cohorts who were born before July 1, 1937 in Germany and hence were exempted from service in 1950s with those who were born immediately after and had to serve in 1950s. They find no effect of conscription on wages later in life. Similarly, in a different design Card and Cardoso (2012) also find no effect of conscription on Portuguese individuals with more than primary education, despite finding a positive impact on less educated individuals.

These studies concern developed countries. Nevertheless, if there is no effect on earnings (in such countries) or a positive effect in the case of less educated Portuguese men, one wonders to what extent people are willing to avoid it. This study aims to answer this question. Card and Lemieux (2001) answer a similar question: whether people were willing to go to college to avoid draft during the Vietnam War. But, again, they look at a draft during a war, while this paper is about draft during peacetime. It is not very surprising to find that individuals were willing to go to college to avoid serving in war. It is interesting, however, to understand whether individuals behave similarly in the absence of war and in a developing country where supply of college education is limited and entry to college is very competitive and costly. Moreover, as Card and Lemieux (2001) explain, they “find a strong correlation between the risk of induction faced by a cohort and the relative enrollment and completed education of men.” This study, rather, finds a causation.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the military service and its exemption laws in Iran. It also describes the identification strategy. The data are discussed in Section 3 after which the estimation and results are depicted in Section 4. Lastly, the conclusion discusses policy implications for countries with military service laws.

2 Military Service in Iran

Conscription, in its modern form, was first introduced by the French Republic in the wars after the French Revolution⁶ to protect the country from attacks by other European powers. It later established the French army as one of the most powerful military in the early 1800s. With the rise of nationalism in Europe and the rest of the world in the 19th century, this system became popular among governments to create and maintain an army.⁷ In recent decades, however, criticism from various angles (religious, philosophical, economic⁸, political, and human rights grounds⁹) has made conscription a controversial method. After the end of the cold war and with the advances in military technology, which reduced the need for large armies,¹⁰ many states abandoned this system and began to rely on professional armies and volunteers.¹¹

In Iran, mandatory military service for men was first introduced in 1924 by Reza Shah,

⁶*Britannica Academic*, s.v. “Conscription,” accessed August 13, 2016, <http://academic.eb.com.ezproxy.babson.edu/levels/collegiate/article/25932#>.

⁷Interestingly, the Prussian system of conscription, developed during the Napoleonic wars, became the model for other European nations. France which abandoned conscription after Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, re-instituted it later with some restrictions. But, it reverted back to universal conscription after the defeat by the large conscripted German army, in the Franco-German War (1870-71). Russia, and later the Soviet Union, have had some form of conscription for most of the last two centuries. United States and Britain are two Western powers that tried to avoid conscription for most of the 19th and 20th centuries, except at the time of the US Civil War, and the two World Wars (*Britannica Academic*, s.v. “Conscription,” accessed August 13, 2016, <http://academic.eb.com.ezproxy.babson.edu/levels/collegiate/article/25932#>.) One of the early examples of conscription in developing countries is its introduction by Muhammad Ali (the Ottoman Albanian ruler of Egypt) in early 19th century in Egypt.

⁸For a thorough discussion of economics of conscription vs. all-volunteer force, see Warner and Asch (2001). They also offer empirical evidence that the arguments for all-volunteer force in the US are substantially stronger in 2001 than they were in 1973, when conscription was abolished.

⁹One may challenge military service on other dimensions as well. For instance, using draft lottery in Argentina, Galiani et al. (2011) show that conscription increased the chance of development of criminal record.

¹⁰There has been a complementarity between capital and labor in the military in all human history even with some modern technologies. For instance, guns need soldiers and tanks need drivers and gunners and vice versa. The advanced military technologies, such as smart drones, make capital more of a substitute for labor rather than a complement. This reduces the need for labor in the armies. Moreover, some military technologies that have considerable destructive capabilities cannot be confronted with armies of regular soldiers. Therefore, return to regular soldiers has been declining over time, which has reduced the need for large standing armies.

¹¹For a review of studies on recruitment, retention, military experience and productivity in the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) era in the United States, see Warner and Asch (1995).

the king at the time, to the Parliament and became the law despite some opposition.¹² After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the law was modified in 1984 (in the middle of Iran-Iraq War), to state that conscription consists of 30 years and is divided into four periods: An initial two-year period in which every male who has completed his 18th year of life and is in his 19th year of life must participate in military training and activities.¹³ A period of training lasts for three months and succeeds by a twenty one month period spent in service to the armed forces (military and police). Completion of time in service is followed by three consecutive “reserve” periods: an eight-year period, called “priority reserve” followed by two ten-year periods, “first reserve” and “second reserve”. During these reserve periods, those who finished the two-year military training and service are on reserve and would be called to service if needs arise (for example, if the country goes to war). Priority would be given to those who are on the priority reserve, and then the first and second reserves respectively.

According to the law, those who are medically unfit for service, because of a disability or a chronic illness, are exempted. Tertiary level students are also exempted from military service as long as they are in school. Students cannot stay in school more than a certain number of years depending on the degree they pursue (Bachelor, Master, and Ph.D.). Upon leaving the tertiary level institutions, they are required to go to military service. Another form of exemption, which is also a basis of this paper, is given to the only sons whose fathers are at age 59 or older¹⁴ at the time of conscription. The argument is that the elderly father may need his sole son’s assistance in old age.¹⁵

¹²From 1906 to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran had been a constitutional monarchy with a parliament.

¹³The two-year training and service period has recently changed to 21 months.

¹⁴59 was the threshold for father’s age until 2012. It has changed to 65 in 2012 and then to 70 in 2014.

¹⁵There are other exemptions as well: 1) men who are the sole child of their parents, 2) men who are the sole caregiver of a physically or mentally disabled parent, sibling, or second line family members, 3) doctors, firefighters, and other emergency workers whose military service may jeopardize health and emergency services, 4) employees of important governmental agencies that directly or indirectly assist the military are exempt at the time of war, 5) employees of businesses that work with the military are exempt from service at the time of war, 6) prisoners.

2.1 Exemption and Education

This paper uses a combination of the sole son and student exemptions laws to identify a discontinuity in educational attainment. Consider a male who is 18 years old and is the only son of a father that is 55 to 58 years old. He is just one to four years short of the threshold needed for exemption by the law. Yet, he can take advantage of the student exemption law and attend college for four years to receive (temporary) student exemption for the duration of those years. Once completing his collegiate studies (or even in the middle of it), his father has surpassed the age of 58 and he becomes eligible for the sole son exemption. Compare him with someone who is 18 years old and the only son of a father who is 59 and older; this second man does not need to go to college to get exemption. Therefore, sole sons whose fathers' age is below the threshold when they are 18 have greater incentive to attend college or grad school than sole sons whose fathers' age is above the threshold. This may provide a discontinuity in educational attainment for the sole sons whose fathers are younger and older than 58. Thus, the regression discontinuity method can be used to estimate the effect of exemption law on educational attainment.

3 Data

In this study and for the reasons explained below, I use the 2% random and nationally representative sample of the 2011 Census of Iran. Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) is the main organization in charge of gathering micro datasets in Iran. It has been collecting the national census every ten years starting in 1956 and every five years since 2006.¹⁶ The latest one available is the 2011 census. The military exemption law for age 59 was implemented between 2001 and 2011. The 2011 census includes individuals that were affected throughout the whole period. This is one advantage of this dataset.

The 2011 census provides basic demographic data on age, education, labor market par-

¹⁶The censuses are 1956, 1966, 1976, 1986, 1996, 2006, and 2011.

participation, marital status, employment status, relationships within the household, as well as the number of children ever born, and pregnancy in the 12 months prior to the survey. It also contains information on the household's dwelling and its amenities. It does not, however, have information on the labor market outcomes such as income and hours worked.

Education, which is the most important variable in this study, is reported with codes. Unfortunately, more often than not, each code represents more than one grade. For example, there is one code assigned to several grades of high school. Therefore, it is not possible to find the years of education attained from these codes. But it is possible to identify the level of education, i.e. primary, middle school, high school, and college and above. Hence, in this study, only a dummy variable that is equal to one when an individual has attained college or above and zero otherwise is defined and used as the main dependent variable. The number of years of college or graduate school attended is not observed. Education code is not reported for individuals who are illiterate. But whether or not an individual is literate is observed in the census.¹⁷ When defining the college dummy variable, one should make sure that the dummy variable for college education is zero for the illiterate even though the education code is missing for them.

Age is another important variable in this study and is measured in years. I use the age of the father when the sole son was 18 to identify whether or not the exemption law would apply to the sole son. If the father is younger than 59 (i.e. 58 or younger), the law applies to his sole son.¹⁸ In other words, the discontinuity in the exemption law starts at the end of age 58, just when the father becomes 59. In this study, sole sons whose father's age was in a range around 59¹⁹ when they were 18 are studied. This is a very small sample of the population. Therefore, one needs a dataset with many observations to be able to have enough number of sole sons with fathers in that age range. The fact that the 2011 census has over 1.5 million

¹⁷A dummy variable is in the census that is one for the literate and zero otherwise.

¹⁸Unless the son goes to college and postpone his illegibility for military service until his father becomes older than 58 (59 or older).

¹⁹The main age range used is 49 to 68 (± 10 years around the threshold). Other age ranges used for robustness check are 53 to 64 (± 6), 51 to 66 (± 8), 47 to 70 (± 12), and 44 to 73 (± 15).

observations is another advantage of this dataset over other Iranian datasets.

One may argue that age is a variable for which “bunching” at certain values may occur. That is people are more likely to round their age to the closest multiple of 5. For example, people aged 58, 59, or 61 are likely to report their age as 60. Therefore, the number of observations with ages that are multiples of 5 (like 40, 45, 50, etc.) is usually larger than the number of observations with ages around those multiples in surveys. For example, the number of observations with age 60 is larger than those with age 58, 59, or 61. But, here, we are considering the age of a father when the child was 18 and not the age of a father reported in the survey. Therefore, bunching should not occur, particularly around the discontinuity threshold. Moreover, the distribution of father’s age when the child was 18 (depicted in Figure A in the appendix) supports this as it changes smoothly with no evidence of bunching. Table A in the appendix shows that there is no discontinuity in the number of observations around the threshold.

From the discussion of age, it is clear that we need to be able to identify fathers and sole sons. This is not particularly easy to achieve because the demographic information in the data set is very basic. None of the Iranian datasets identify a child’s father in the household. The best variables that can be used to identify fathers (and other household members) are the *relationship to the head*, and *gender*. The *relationship to the head* variable helps us identify, the head’s spouse, the children of the head, other relatives of the head who live with the household including in-laws, and non-relatives. Using this variable, we can identify households that only consist of a male head, his spouse, and his children. Obviously, male heads in those households are fathers of individuals reported as their children. In the rare case that the head of the household is reported as female and her spouse is male (0.2% of the households), the spouse can be both the father or step-father. Therefore, those households are not considered. In households that have extended family members, particularly multiple generational households (households with grandfathers their children and grand children), it is not possible to accurately identify fathers.

One issue relevant to all Iranian datasets is that only the children present in the household are recorded in the data and those who left the household, for any reason (studying in another place or marriage), are not in the data. This makes the identification of sole sons difficult. For example, a household that seems to have one son in the data, may actually have two or more; if the other son(s) left the household after marriage or to attend college in the city. The 2011 census, however, has two questions that help us eliminate this issue (this is another advantage of the 2011 census over other Iranian data sets.) The first question asks about the number of children ever born by a mother and the second question inquires about who each person's mother is in the household. Using these two questions one can restrict the sample to households whose children are all present. In order to do that, first, I restrict the sample to households that only consist of a male head and his spouse and the children of the head. In these households, only one mother is present. Then, I identify the number of children who are present in the household and belong to the mother. We also know the number of children the mother has given birth to. Only households for which these two numbers are the same are considered. These are households that do not have children who left the household. Therefore, it is possible to identify sole sons within them with accuracy. The foremost focus of this paper is on these households. Table 1 shows the number of different types of households in the census data including the final sample that is used.

It is unlikely that this algorithm identifies individuals who are not sole sons as sole sons. But in the case that it does occur, the inaccurate identification of sole sons takes place on both sides of the threshold and hence does not bias the regression discontinuity results in favor of the hypothesis. In other words, it does not create an effect when in reality there is no effect. In fact, measurement error in identification of sole sons creates a noisy estimate (larger standard errors) and an under-estimation of the true effect of the military service law.

In rural areas, the size of the sample of sole sons (identified by the way explained above) is quite small and inadequate to get statistical power. This is because of two reasons: 1) we

need to identify sole sons, aged 19 and over, from the sample of households whose all children are present. But rural children (especially in this age range) are substantially more likely to not be present in the household or to have siblings who are not present in the household than their urban counterparts. They leave the household to migrate (temporarily or permanently) to urban areas and marry earlier. 2) In 2011, less than 30% of the population was living in rural areas. Thus, the size of the urban population was more than twice the size of the rural population. For these two reasons, fewer sole sons can be identified in rural areas.

Even if we have enough number of sole sons in rural areas to get statistical power, we still cannot identify the true effect of exemption law on college attainment rates in rural areas. This is because almost all college-educated (or college-enrolled) rural children attend(ed) college in a city (not in the village) and usually remain there after graduation. In other words, most college-educated or college student sole sons have already left the household and are excluded from the sample. As a result, we do not observe them to be able to measure the impact of policies on the college attainment rates in rural areas. For these reasons, we only focus on urban areas in this study.²⁰

Another concern that one may have is measurement error in father's age. Because we are interested in discontinuity close to a threshold of father's age, measurement error in age close to the threshold can easily take an observation from one side of the discontinuity to the other. This, however, can happen on both sides of the threshold, and hence, only increases the standard error of the estimate and produces an under-estimation of the true effect. A similar concern is that ineligible sole sons close to the threshold may misreport their fathers' age in order to move to the other side of the threshold and become eligible for the military service exemption. This means that there should be a discontinuity in the number of sole sons around the threshold. But, as will be discussed later, Table A and Figure A in the appendix provide evidence that there is no discontinuity in the number of sole sons observed at the father's age of 58. If anything, there are a few more ineligible sole sons than eligible

²⁰The results for rural areas are mostly statistically insignificant.

ones at the threshold.

Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the variables in six samples: 1) Sole sons (top-left panel), 2) Sisters of sole sons (top-right panel), 3) Sons in multiple-son households (mid-left panel), 4) Daughters in multiple-son households (mid-right panel), 5) All men aged 19 to 28 (bottom-left panel), 6) All women aged 19 to 28 (bottom-right panel). Since the military exemption law was applied between 2001 and 2010, in the 2011 census, the sole sons are 19 to 28 years old. Therefore, all samples used in this study and reported in Table 2 are of the same age range. As can be seen the sample of sole sons and their sisters are different from the general population (the bottom panel). They are slightly younger but substantially more educated. Therefore, the results found in this study are Local Average Treatment Effects (LATE) and may not be generalized to the population.

4 Estimations and Robustness Checks

As explained in Section 2.1, because of the exemption law we expect that sole sons whose fathers were 58 or younger (when they were 18) attended college more than those whose fathers were older than 58. This means that there should be a discontinuity in the college attainment rate immediately after the father's age of 58. This section documents this discontinuity and discusses its consequences. Figure 1 documents the discontinuity in college attainment of the sole sons whose father's age was between 49 and 68 when they were 18 years old, in urban areas²¹. The figure has three sub-figures showing linear, quadratic, and polynomial fit of the data. The horizontal axis shows the father's age when his sole son was 18 and the vertical axis is the share of sole sons who attended college and above. The solid lines are the fitted lines and the light gray lines show the 95% confidence interval. The dots represent the average college attendance rate at each father's age. The discontinuous decline in college attendance rate right after age 58, in all specifications in Figure 1, is evidence for

²¹As explained in Section 3, we only focus on urban areas because the sample of sole sons for rural areas is small and selected.

the impact of the exemption law.

We do not expect the exemption law to affect girls. So for robustness check, we can draw a similar figure as Figure 1 for sisters of sole sons. Since sisters of sole sons live in the same household (have the same parents and face a somewhat similar environment), they are a good comparison group. Figure 2 is drawn similar to Figure 1, but for these sisters. The horizontal axis is the age of a father who has a sole son when his daughter (sole son's sister) was 18 and the vertical axis is the share of sole sons' sisters who attended college and above. The figure does not show any discontinuity in the college attainment rate for sisters of sole sons immediately after the father's age of 58. This provides further evidence that it was the exemption law that affected college attainment of sole sons at father's age of 58 or lower, and not any other factor (particularly those that could have affected their sisters too).

To further strengthen the result, we can also check to see if the exemption law had any impact on sons in households with multiple sons. The law should not affect college attainment rates of these sons. Figure 3 shows that this is the case. Although it may seem that there was a decline, there is no statistically significant discontinuity in college attendance rate for this group just after age 58. Similarly, one expects that the exemption law does not affect daughters in households with multiple sons. Figure 4 is indeed the evidence for that. The fact that only sole sons (and not the other three groups) have a discontinuity in college attainment at the threshold is strong evidence that military service exemption law caused the discontinuity.

We can formalize these figures in regressions as follows:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \tau D_i + \sum_{k=1}^l \gamma_k (p_i - 58)^k + \sum_{k=1}^l \delta_k D_i (p_i - 58)^k + u_i, \quad l = 1, 2, 3 \quad (1)$$

in which Y_i is the college attendance for individual i . It is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual attended (or is attending) college or higher levels of education and zero otherwise. D_i is a dummy variable equal to one if individual i 's father was 58 and younger

when he/she was 18 and zero if the father’s age was 59 and higher.²² The running variable in this regression discontinuity setting is father’s age when individual i was 18 and it is represented by p_i .²³ The regressions contain a polynomial of $(p_i - 58)$ with degree l .²⁴ l is equal to one, two, and three. The Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) is τ .

Table 3 reports the results for Sole sons (left panel), sisters of sole sons (middle panel) and sons in multiple-son households (right panel).²⁵ The running variable, p_i , in the sample extends from 49 to 58 (i.e. ± 10 years from the threshold). In other words, the samples include individuals whose fathers were between the age of 49 and 68 when they were 18.²⁶ p_i is a discrete rather than a continuous variable. Lee and Card (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010) argue that when the running variable is discrete, correlation in standard errors should be “clustered” at values of the discrete running variable. Therefore, all regressions correct for robust heteroskedastic standard errors and correlation inside those clusters. The first column of Table 3 explores college attendance for sole sons in a linear setting ($l = 1$ in Equation (1)). The coefficient of D is positive and significant, thus, showing that sole sons whose fathers’ age was 58 and slightly below when they were 18 have about 13 percentage points greater chance of attending college than those whose fathers’ age was 59 and slightly higher. Since the average college attainment rate for the sample of sole sons is 66% (see Table 2), the effect translates as a 20 percent increase.

Columns (2) and (3) report the quadratic and third-degree polynomial settings. The coefficient of D remains statistically significant in those settings. It also increases in size to 0.23 and 0.33 which translate into the LATE of 23 and 33 percentage points (35 and 50 percents respectively). For robustness check, one can run similar regressions for sole sons’

²²Other age ranges were analyzed as well and their results reported in Table 3. See footnote 19 .

²³ p is chosen to denote this variable since it is the first letter of the Latin word *pater* and the Persian word *pedar*, both meaning father.

²⁴The effect is the difference between actual and counterfactual at the threshold. Since the law affected sole sons with father’s age of 58 not 59, we are interested in finding the counterfactual at the father’s age of 58. This is why p_i is subtracted from 58 in the regression.

²⁵The results for daughters in multiple-son households are not reported because of limited space but are available upon the request.

²⁶We change the range of the sample in Table 4 and get similar results.

sisters. The results are reported in the middle panel of Table 3. All showing that there is no evidence of discontinuity in college attendance for them (as the coefficient of D is statistically insignificant). This indeed confirms that the discontinuity is something attributed to boys and therefore related to the compulsory military service exemption. As another robustness check, we can estimate the effect of military exemption law on sons living in households with multiple sons. The right panel in Table 3, that is Columns (7), (8), and (9), report the result of such estimation. The coefficient of D , which is the effect of the military exemption law, is statistically insignificant, supporting the fact that this law should not affect college attainment of sons in multiple-son households. For further robustness check, one can estimate the same regressions for daughters living in multiple-son households. As expected and similar to Figure 4, the effect of military service on this group is also not statistically different from zero.²⁷ All these results show that the discontinuity in college attainment rate only exists for the sole sons, the only group that can benefit from the exemption law. Therefore, this discontinuity at such a particular age of the father is evidence for the causal impact of the law. Sole sons preferred to go to college rather than serve in the military and the exemption law provided the incentive.

One may wonder if sole sons who are not eligible for the exemption, that is their father's age is below 59, try to exaggerate their father's age to become eligible. Military service in Iran, however, is a serious matter of national security and a rare process in which gaming the system is extremely difficult. But even if sole sons whose father is a bit younger than the threshold try to become eligible by falsely reporting their father's age higher, we would only underestimate the effect of military service. Thus, such gaming of the system should not create a false positive. Moreover, this false representation of father's age should create a discontinuity around the threshold: one should see more observations on the eligible side of the threshold (59 and older) than the non-eligible side (58 and younger). Figure A, however, does not show any discontinuity at the threshold. If anything, there are a few more ineligible

²⁷The results are not reported in Table 3, but are available upon request.

sole sons than eligible ones at the threshold. In addition, we can estimate the coefficient of D in Equation (1), τ , when the dependent variable is the number of observations at each father’s age. Table A reports this coefficient which is insignificant in all specifications, showing no discontinuity in the number of observations at the threshold.

As another robustness check, we can change the range of the running variable, i.e. father’s age, from ± 10 years around the threshold (49 to 68 year old fathers) to ± 6 (53 to 64 year olds), ± 8 , ± 12 , and ± 15 years (44 to 73 year olds). Table 4 reports the estimates for the coefficient of D in Equation (1), τ , using these age ranges across the sample of sole sons, sisters of sole sons and sons in multiple son households. The results are the same as those reported in Table 3 for ± 10 years around the threshold. There is a statistically significant discontinuity in education of sole sons regardless of the range of running variable. But no discontinuity is found for sisters of sole sons and sons in multiple son households. Moreover, we can implement optimal bandwidth choices following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), Ludwig and Miller (2007), and Calonico et al. (2014). The results confirm the findings above.²⁸

Since the discontinuity in college attainment for sole sons does not exist for their sisters as well as sons and daughters of households with multiple sons, one can use the *difference-in-discontinuities* design, as another robustness check to estimate the effect of the exemption law. The difference-in-discontinuities (diff-in-disc) design, introduced by Grembi et al. (2016), is a quasi-experimental method to identify effects of an intervention, especially if the the observations on the two sides of threshold are inherently different.²⁹ It estimates the difference between two discontinuities in the outcomes, at the same threshold. By taking the difference between the two discontinuities, it removes any selection that may exist around the threshold and is common between the two discontinuities. In our case, we can practically take the difference between the discontinuity in college attainment for sole sons and the discontinuity in college attainment for sisters of sole sons. This is essentially the

²⁸The estimation following Calonico et al. (2014) does not converge.

²⁹Grembi et al. (2016) call the estimated effect Neighborhood Average Treatment Effect (NATE).

difference between Figures 1 and 2. Since there is no discontinuity for sisters of sole sons, we can consider the difference between these two discontinuities as the effect of the exemption law on sole sons. Instead of using the sisters of sole sons to compare with sole sons, one can consider sons in multiple-son households or daughters in multiple-son households or a combination of these groups. One advantage of this method is that it creates more statistical power, since we include sole sons and their sisters in the same regression. Moreover, if the observations (in both the sole sons sample and the comparison group sample) before and after the father’s age of 58 are inherently different from each other, under mild assumptions, the diff-in-disc can remove this difference and give an unbiased result. It is hardly the case that there would be an inherent difference between the observations on the two sides of the threshold (father’s age of 58), but we can employ this method as a robustness check.

The difference-in-discontinuities design takes the shape of the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_i = & \alpha + \beta D_i + \sum_{k=1}^l \gamma_k (p_i - 58)^k + \sum_{k=1}^l \delta_k D_i (p_i - 58)^k + \\
 & S_i \{ \alpha_s + \tau D_i + \sum_{k=1}^l \gamma_{ks} (p_i - 58)^k + \sum_{k=1}^l \delta_{ks} D_i (p_i - 58)^k \} + u_i, \quad l = 1, 2, 3 \quad (2)
 \end{aligned}$$

in which S_i is a dummy variable equal to one if individual i is a sole son and zero if she/he belongs to a comparison group that was not affected by the exemption law. τ represents the Neighborhood Average Treatment Effect (NATE), which in our case is the effect of the law on sole sons’ college attainment rate at father’s age of 58.

There are three potential comparison groups: sisters of sole sons, sons in multiple-son households and daughters in multiple-son households. We can run three separate diff-in-disc using these groups, or combine these groups in various ways into a single comparison group. Here, I estimate diff-in-disc between sole sons and their sisters first, and then gradually add the sons and daughters in multiple-son households to the comparison group. Table 5 shows the estimated effects. The right panel reports τ using the sample of sole sisters as the

comparison group. This is referred to Sample I in the table. When we use this sample, S_i in Equation (2) is equal to one for sole sons and zero for their sisters. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the estimates for this sample using linear, quadratic, and third-degree polynomial settings, respectively. In Columns (4), (5), and (6), the sample of sons in multiple-son households is added to the sample of sole sisters as the comparison group to form Sample II. In other words, S_i in Equation (2) is equal to one for sole sons and zero for sisters of sole sons and sons in multiple-son households. Finally, one can add the sample of daughters in multiple-son households to the comparison group and form Sample III. In this sample, S_i is zero for sisters of sole sons as well as sons and daughters in multiple-son households. Columns (7), (8), and (9) report the effect of the exemption law on sole sons using Sample III.

Notably, the size of the effects for the diff-in-disc design (particularly Samples II and III) resembles the simple regression discontinuity estimates for sole sons reported in Table 3. The coefficients of $D \times S$ in linear, quadratic, and third-degree polynomials for Samples I, II and III seem to be in the following ranges 0.11-0.13, 0.23-0.3, and 0.31-0.37 . These are very close to the estimates reported in Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 3.³⁰ This further strengthens the results found previously in Table 3.

The results of this paper are strongly in line with anecdotal evidence. In fact, one reason that was mentioned officially in 2011 for raising the father’s age threshold for this law from 59 to 65 (and later to 70) was that non-eligible sole sons were attending college to get exemption when their fathers reach 59.³¹

This discontinuity is an exogenous factor to college attainment and potentially can be used as an instrument to estimate various returns to college education such as the return on wages. The census does not provide data on earnings, wages, or hours worked.³² It

³⁰In fact, except for the estimate in Column (2), all estimates in Table 5 are (statistically) identical to the ones reported in the first three columns of Table 3.

³¹Interview of *Khabar-online* with General Kamali, vice president of human resources for armed forces, on changes to military service conscription laws, (January 12, 2012), accessed October 17, 2015, <http://khabaronline.ir/detail/193772/>.

³²Moreover, efforts in using other datasets, for which it was harder and problematic to identify sole sons,

does, however, contain the job the individual has. One can use the job status or skill-level required for the job as the labor market outcome variable. In the data, jobs are divided into 9 categories: 1) legislators, senior officials and managers, 2) scientists, engineers, lawyers and other professionals, 3) technicians and associate professionals, 4) office workers, 5) sellers, and semi-technical service workers, 6) semi-technical agricultural workers, 7) semi-technical construction and industrial workers, 8) machine operators and drivers, 9) laborers and unskilled workers. Based on this, I define a variable to represent the status of the job or skills it requires and call it *job status*. Larger values correspond to jobs of greater skill or status: five for the first job category (legislators, senior officials, and managers), four for the second, three for the third job category, two for the fourth to eighth job categories, and one for the last category. The results are robust to different definitions of the job status variable. For example, one may define this variable to take nine values, each associated with a job category. It can start at 1 for the ninth category and increase by one for each category until it reaches 9 for legislators, senior officials and managers. The results are similar to what follows and can be found in Table B.

We can estimate the effect of college attainment on the job status variable using the discontinuity as an instrument for college (and above) education. But, because the number of sole sons with jobs is small, the discontinuity is a weak instrumental variable. To increase power, we can combine sole sons and sons in multiple-son households in one sample and use the diff-in-disc design in the first stage. In other words, Equation (2) becomes the first stage of the two-stage least squares, in which S_i is equal to one if individual i is a sole son and zero if he is a son in a multiple-son household. In the second stage, the effect of college education on job status is measured. I refrain from including sisters of sole sons and daughters in multiple-son households in the comparison group, because the female labor supply decision, and the industries they work in are generally very different from men in Iran.

The first two columns of Table 6 reports the OLS and IV estimates of the effect of college

revealed that the discontinuity is a weak instrumental variable for college education. Therefore, any estimates of returns to college education is biased.

and above education on job status. The OLS results show that job status increases by one level. The IV estimate, however, is 60% larger which may show that the actual effect of education is larger than the OLS predicts. This could be a sign of measurement error in the data. On the other hand, the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic for the first stage is small which means the discontinuity is a weak instrument. As a result, the IV estimate can, unfortunately, be biased and unreliable and the effect of college education on job status may not be accurately estimated using this instrument.

The *job status* variable is a more subjective measure than income. To give a sense of how much the increase in job status due to college education means in monetary terms, I introduce a new variable, AW, in the census data which is equal to the average wage in each of these job status levels. These averages are calculated from the Iranian Household Expenditure and Income Survey of 2010. Hence, all individuals who have the same job status, get the same wage in the census. Running the same OLS and IV regressions and including age and age squared, one finds the results reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6. The OLS estimate shows a 23.3% return on wages from college and above education while the IV estimate depicts a 37.5% return.³³ Notably, these estimates are in the same range as the estimates of returns for the United States and European countries. Nevertheless, one should note that these are the returns for a young sample (19 to 28 year-olds); as one ages, returns may become larger due to complementarities between education and experience.³⁴ In both OLS and IV regressions, the coefficients of age profile variables, age and age squared, are insignificant. This may be because the age range is small and individuals are early in their career.

One may wonder how much the estimated returns in Columns (3) and (4) are different from the OLS estimates of the return for the general population, when one uses individual level wages, W, rather than aggregate averages, AW. Using Household Expenditure and

³³The fact that the IV estimate is larger than the OLS estimate here is not surprising, given the fact that the IV estimate for job status was also larger than its OLS estimate.

³⁴These complementarities cannot be captured by the age profile variables.

Income Survey (HEIS) of 2010, Column (5) reports the return to college and above education for wages. The dependent variable is the natural log of wages, $\ln(W)$. The return is estimated to be 28%. An individual with college and above education on average earns 28% more wages. This estimate is similar to the estimate in Column (4) for the smaller sample of sole sons and sons in multiple-son households (who still live with their parents.) Column (6) reports the same OLS regression but the dependent variable is the average wage of the job status level of the individual, AW . The estimated return is 25.5% and is even closer to the estimated return in Column (4). Thus the average return for the specific sample we used in this study is not different from the general population.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to use the Household Expenditure and Income Surveys to estimate the return to college education using the discontinuity. This is because these surveys do not contain the number of children ever born, and because non-present members of the household are not recorded in the data, it is not possible to identify households with sole sons in these datasets.

5 Conclusion

This study documents that a discontinuity in the law for military service exemption has created a wedge in education levels of sole sons. Sole sons whose fathers were 58 or slightly younger, when they were 18, were 20% more likely to go to college only to get exemption from the service. In other words, if the military exemption law did not exist, they would have attended college less. Military service is not favored by sole sons and they chose against their will to go to college to avoid it.

This is while entering college especially until the late 2000s has been very competitive and challenging as the supply of college seats has been a fraction of demand. It required the individual to be ranked in the top 30% in the national college entrance examination, known

as *Konkoor*³⁵. It was estimated that in 2011 alone, households spent about 4.3 billion USD³⁶ on supplemental educational sources beyond school, such as supplemental test taking books and tutoring, to help their children get an edge in *Konkoor*.³⁷ This amounts to nearly half of the Ministry of Education's budget for that year. According to the census data, 2.52% of households have someone who is planning to go to college. This amounts to about 520,000 households in 2011. Assuming that all of these households spent on supplemental educational sources outside of school, every household spent about 8,000 USD in 2011 which was roughly about 1.15 times the GDP per capita of Iran in that year. In other words, an average urban household is willing to spend more than the income of one year to increase the likelihood of their child going to college. Anecdotal evidence supports the fact that households start saving early on to afford such expenses, especially that college education can be free if the student gets into one of the public universities (which have a higher quality as well.)

In this market for higher education, sole sons face an intense competition and challenge to enter college. Nevertheless, they are willing to go through this ordeal and come out successfully just to avoid conscription (even) in peace times. Using this exogenous increase in education, there is some evidence that this quest for education is beneficial to sole sons in the labor market, but the problem of weak instrument makes the results unreliable. If given a larger sample of sole sons, the discontinuity could be a strong instrument for college attainment. More information on various outcomes of the individuals such as cognitive and non-cognitive skills, health, or basic labor market outcomes such as wages and hours worked, could also help us identify the many impacts of college education and conscription in Iran. Further research may expand horizons to do so.

³⁵It is based on the French word *concours* meaning contest.

³⁶70,000 billion Iranian Rials.

³⁷Source of data is Ali Abbaspour Tehrani, vice-chairman of the parliamentary committee on education and research, who mentioned it in an interview with *Aseman Weekly* (A Persian periodical in Iran), in December 2012. The Weekly is out of print but this part of the interview is reported on other websites, particularly, The Iranian Student News Agency (ISNA) on December 25, 2012, accessed August 23, 2016 <http://www.isna.ir/news/91100503204/>.


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Figure 1: Discontinuity in College Attendance of Sole Sons



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Figure 2: Discontinuity in College Attendance of Sole Sons' Sisters





Figure 3: Discontinuity in College Attendance of Sons in Multiple Son Households



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Figure 4: Discontinuity in College Attendance of Daughters in Multiple Son Households




Table 1: Types and Number of Households in the 2011 Census

	Number	Share out of all Households with head (in %)
All Households	423,637	
without head	1,303	
with head	422,334	100.0
but no spouse	68,341	16.2
and one spouse	353,001	83.6
and more than one spouse	992	0.2
Households with head living with		
sons or daughter-in-laws of the head	6,312	1.5
parents of head or spouse	10,329	2.5
siblings of head or spouse	5,904	1.4
other relatives and non-relatives	2,542	0.6
Households with a mother and her husband	274,382	65.0
with all children present*	129,619	30.7
Sample of this study [†]	1,431	0.3

Note: This table contains the number of households in the census based on the composition of the household. There are 1,481,586 individuals in the data.

Only 0.4 percent of them (5,840) are living in households without head. This study only focuses on households that have a head and one spouse but do not have any other member except children. These households may not have children at all.

* The households in this sample are identified using two rules: 1) The households only consist of a male head, his spouse, and their children (no step-child, another spouse, or any extended family member), 2) the number of father's children present in the household is equal to the number of children ever born by the mother. Table 2 contains summary statistics of these mothers.

[†] This is the sample of sole sons whose fathers age was between 49 and 68 when they were 18.

Table 2: Summary Statistics

	Sole Sons					Sisters of Sole Sons				
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Age	1,431	22.4	2.6	19	28	1,771	22.1	2.6	19	28
Primary or Middle School	1,431	0.06	0.23	0	1	1,771	0.03	0.16	0	1
High School	1,431	0.27	0.44	0	1	1,771	0.18	0.39	0	1
College & Above	1,431	0.66	0.48	0	1	1,771	0.78	0.42	0	1
	Sons in Multiple-son HHs					Daughters in Multiple-son HHs				
Age	3,065	22.2	2.6	19	28	1,009	22.2	2.6	19	28
Primary or Middle School	3,065	0.11	0.31	0	1	1,009	0.08	0.27	0	1
High School	3,065	0.33	0.47	0	1	1,009	0.26	0.44	0	1
College & Above	3,065	0.53	0.50	0	1	1,009	0.63	0.48	0	1
	Men Aged 19-28					Women Aged 19-28				
Age	114,303	23.8	2.8	19	28	119,331	23.8	2.8	19	28
Primary or Middle School	114,303	0.27	0.44	0	1	119,331	0.20	0.40	0	1
High School	114,303	0.36	0.48	0	1	119,331	0.37	0.48	0	1
College & Above	114,303	0.34	0.47	0	1	119,331	0.40	0.49	0	1

Note: Age is the age of the individual at the time of survey. Urban is a dummy equal to one if the individual lives in an urban area and zero otherwise. Primary or Middle School is a dummy equal to one if the individual's last level of education was primary or middle school and zero otherwise. High school is a dummy equal to one if the individual's last level of education was high school. College attendance is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual attended college or higher levels of education and zero otherwise. The means of "Primary or Middle School", "High School", and "College & Above" do not add up to one, since around 1 to 3 percent of the samples are illiterate. All samples include ages 19 to 28 only.

Table 3: Discontinuity in College Education

	Sole Sons			Sole Sons' Sisters			Sons in Multiple-Son HH		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
D	0.127** (0.054)	0.228*** (0.052)	0.329*** (0.114)	-0.009 (0.049)	-0.075 (0.071)	-0.044 (0.072)	0.044 (0.033)	0.064 (0.039)	0.080 (0.079)
$p - 58$	-0.000 (0.009)	0.077** (0.031)	0.124 (0.109)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.063** (0.028)	-0.083 (0.055)	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.011 (0.027)	0.030 (0.084)
$(p - 58)^2 \times 10^{-1}$	0.005 (0.011)	-0.089** (0.036)	-0.065 (0.117)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.082** (0.037)	0.169** (0.066)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.020 (0.028)	-0.056 (0.086)
$(p - 58)^3 \times 10^{-4}$		-0.080** (0.034)	-0.191 (0.244)		0.069* (0.034)	0.116 (0.140)		-0.004 (0.028)	-0.101 (0.175)
$D(p - 58)$		0.064 (0.038)	0.355 (0.263)		-0.050 (0.040)	0.076 (0.162)		0.011 (0.030)	0.018 (0.182)
$D(p - 58)^2 \times 10^{-1}$			7.119 (14.943)			-3.062 (10.241)			6.328 (10.122)
$D(p - 58)^3 \times 10^{-4}$			5.154 (16.194)			14.828 (11.515)			-12.510 (10.695)
Constant	0.570*** (0.044)	0.438*** (0.040)	0.391*** (0.097)	0.777*** (0.031)	0.879*** (0.035)	0.898*** (0.051)	0.512*** (0.030)	0.506*** (0.030)	0.464*** (0.078)
Observations	1,431	1,431	1,431	1,771	1,771	1,771	3,065	3,065	3,065

Note: Sample used in regression in the left panel only includes sole sons whose father's age when they were 18 was between 49 and 68. Sample of the regressions in the middle panel includes sisters of sole sons whose father's age when the sister was 18 was between 49 and 68. Sample used in the right panel includes sons in multiple son households whose father's age when the son was 18 was between 49 and 68. Dependent variable is college attendance explained in notes for Table 2. D is a dummy equal to 1 if the father's age of a sole son is less than 59 when the son was 18 years old and zero otherwise. p is father's age. Robust-heteroskedastic standard errors corrected for correlation inside clusters are in parentheses. Clusters are values of father's age when son was 18.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Discontinuity in College Education Across Various Samples (τ in Equation (1))

	Sole Sons			Sole Sons' Sisters			Sons in Multiple-Son HHs		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
53 to 64 (± 6)	0.229*** (0.055)	0.250** (0.088)	-0.109 (0.185)	-0.058 (0.064)	0.039 (0.048)	0.047 (0.089)	0.065* (0.030)	0.051 (0.077)	0.089 (0.156)
Obs.	580	580	580	701	701	701	1,160	1,160	1,160
51 to 66 (± 8)	0.132** (0.052)	0.321*** (0.072)	0.111 (0.121)	-0.037 (0.055)	-0.052 (0.066)	0.065 (0.060)	0.047 (0.030)	0.067 (0.051)	0.071 (0.097)
Obs.	939	939	939	1,117	1,117	1,117	1,965	1,965	1,965
47 to 70 (± 12)	0.127** (0.052)	0.181*** (0.057)	0.353*** (0.092)	0.011 (0.045)	-0.044 (0.078)	-0.140 (0.092)	0.040 (0.032)	0.056 (0.034)	0.073 (0.064)
Obs.	2,145	2,145	2,145	2,645	2,645	2,645	4,673	4,673	4,673
44 to 73 (± 15)	0.114* (0.059)	0.187*** (0.051)	0.279*** (0.071)	-0.011 (0.037)	0.014 (0.069)	-0.137 (0.086)	0.073* (0.039)	0.008 (0.033)	0.101* (0.057)
Obs.	3,501	3,501	3,501	4,309	4,309	4,309	7,861	7,861	7,861
Polynomial order	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd

Note: See notes for Table 3 for information on each panel in the table. Only the coefficient of D in Equation (1) is reported for various samples. Father's age between 53 and 64 (± 6 years around the threshold, Father's age between 51 and 66 (± 8 years around the threshold), father's age between 47 to 70 (± 12 years around the threshold), father's age between 44 and 73 (± 15 years around the threshold). when they were 18 was between 50 and 68. Robust-heteroskedastic standard errors corrected for correlation inside clusters are in parentheses. Clusters are values of father's age when son was 18.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Discontinuity in College Attendance of Sole Sons (τ in Equation (2))

	Sample I			Sample II			Sample III		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
$D \times S$	0.136* (0.076)	0.303*** (0.091)	0.372** (0.147)	0.118* (0.059)	0.232*** (0.056)	0.341** (0.130)	0.107* (0.058)	0.225*** (0.056)	0.307** (0.122)
Polynomial order	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd
Observations	3,202	3,202	3,202	6,267	6,267	6,267	7,276	7,276	7,276

Note: Regressions are based on Equation (2). See notes for Table 3 for more information on variables. Coefficient of $D \times S$ shows the Neighborhood Average Treatment Effect from a Diff-in-Disc regression. Sample I includes sole sons and sisters of sole sons. Sample II adds sons in multiple-son households to Sample I. Sample III adds daughters in multiple-son households to Sample II. Robust-heteroskedastic corrected for correlation inside clusters are in parentheses. Clusters are father's age of the individual when s/he was 18.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: OLS and IV Estimates of Return to College Education on Job Status and Wages

	Job Status		ln(AW)		OLS HEIS [†]	
	OLS (1)	IV (2)	OLS (3)	IV (4)	ln(W) (5)	ln(AW) (6)
College & above	1.009*** (0.088)	1.633*** (0.315)	0.233*** (0.021)	0.375*** (0.084)	0.281*** (0.038)	0.252*** (0.010)
Age			-0.039 (0.044)	-0.041 (0.048)	0.141 (0.107)	-0.015 (0.016)
Age ² × 10 ⁻²			0.096 (0.096)	0.080 (0.103)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.000)
Constant	1.954*** (0.024)	1.802*** (0.083)	13.571*** (0.494)	13.663*** (0.570)	10.480*** (1.287)	13.272*** (0.191)
F-statistic [‡]		2.658		2.466		
Observations	774	774	774	774	2,978	3,387
Adj. R-squared	0.227	0.140	0.242	0.177	0.100	0.358

Note: Job Status is a variable that is one if the individual is an unskilled worker, two for semi-technical workers, three for technicians and associate professionals, four for scientists, doctors, lawyers, and engineers, and five for managers, and top government officials. ln(AW) is the natural log of the average wage for the job status an individual has. ln(W) is the natural log of individual's wage. IV estimates are 2SLS estimates with Equation (2) as the first stage and the discontinuity as an instrument for college education. Robust-heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses.

[†] OLS HEIS are OLS estimates based on the HEIS 2010 (Household Expenditure and Income Survey of 2010) dataset.

[‡] Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

A Appendix

Table A: Discontinuity in Number of Observations of Sole Sons

	(1)	(2)	(3)
D	-19.26 (14.06)	7.17 (11.16)	16.94 (17.82)
Polynomial controls	Linear	Quadratic	Third-degree
Adjusted R ²	0.96	0.99	0.99
N	20	20	20

Note: Regressions are based on Equation (2). The dependent variable is the number of observations. Coefficient of D shows the discontinuity in the number of observations at father's age of 58 in urban areas only. Standard errors in parentheses.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B: OLS and IV Estimates of Return to College Education on Job Status and Wages

	Job Status		ln(AW)	
	OLS (1)	IV (2)	OLS (3)	IV (4)
College & above	2.368*** (0.196)	4.530*** (0.819)	0.406*** (0.041)	0.605*** (0.140)
Age			-0.088 (0.092)	-0.089 (0.081)
Age ² × 10 ⁻²			0.223 (0.204)	0.200 (0.173)
Constant	3.632*** (0.065)	3.105*** (0.215)	14.153*** (1.018)	14.282*** (0.955)
F-statistic [†]		2.658		2.466
Observations	774	774	774	774
Adj. R-squared	0.207	0.033	0.275	0.232

Note: Job Status is a variable that takes nine values: from one for unskilled workers, to nine for top managers and government officials. ln(AW) is the natural log of the average wage for the job status an individual has. IV estimates are 2SLS estimates with Equation (2) as the first stage and the discontinuity as an instrument for college education. Robust-heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses.

[†] Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure A: Discontinuity in Number of Observations of Sole Sons

